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Abstract 
This work focuses on the role of state policy and multinational capital in the 
reproduction of social divisions in Northern Ireland. It concentrates on the period since 
1972, when Direct Rule from Westminster replaced the Stormont regime. 
While the Unionist state has been abolished, sectarianism continues to dominate 
economic, political and social life. Although some reforms have been introduced, British 
policy has been unable to attack the roots of sectarianism. Multinational companies play 
no straight forward 'modernising' role in relation to sectarian (or gender) divisions. The 
evidence presented suggests that foreign capital has both undermined and reproduced 
existing social divisions. Sectarian practices have changed in response to political 
pressure, rather than any inherent tendency in capital itself. 
The political importance of the sectarian divide has overshadowed interest in gender 
inequalities. The two issues have remained separate in academic literature and in policy. 
This thesis has brought the two together, both theoretically and in the empirical work. 
It is argued that gender has been a crucial element in the construction of sectarian 
divisions, while sectarianism helps sustain patriarchal structures. Sectarianism has 
compounded gender disadvantage for Catholic women. 
The early chapters concern the theoretical framework, and the historical background to 
the period of Direct Rule. These are based largely on published sources, integrating 
material on both sectarian and gender inequalities. The later chapters review the 
evidence of the impact of British state policy on these inequalities. These are based 
mainly on official data; on published and unpublished material from the Fair Employment 
Commission's monitoring returns of individual companies and public authorities, and on 
a small number of interviews. These sources are supplemented with a small-scale study 
of employment at the Royal Victoria Hospital, based largely on interviews with staff and 
management. 
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Corrections 
p 27 Footnote 7. Replace second sentence with: "Following a ruling by the European 
Court in 1981, the legislation on homosexuality was brought into line with 
British law." 
p 32 Second paragraph, second sentence should read: "They were made to feel 
inferior, and to make matters worse they often were inferior, if only in those 
personal qualities that make for success in competitive economic life." 
p 43 First sentence should begin: "In Northern Ireland, Catholics are lazy, unreliable 
and disloyal" 
p 46 Third paragraph: Amsden 1982 should read Amsden 1980 
p 96 Last sentence should read: "Net emigration, the product of underdevelopment, 
has - apart from a short period during the 1980s - remained a permanent 
feature. " 
p 138 Paragraph 2 line 1, second sentence should begin: "Areas formerly under the 
control ... " 
p 169 Note 6, last sentence should end: " ... (lrish News, 28th March 1992)." 
p 199 Note 4. Quotation should begin: "Although I have not achieved my goal of 
becoming Chief Constable ... " 
p 211 Table 6.8. Bottom line: % of Protestant women in work should read 61.1 
p 227 Paragraph 3. All after the first sentence (from "In a cautious conclusion .. ") 
should be deleted. 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
Northern Ireland - A Divided Society 
The divisions in Northern Ireland between Protestant and Catholic reach into every area 
of life - social, political, economic. Religious identity generally determines where people 
live, and almost certainly where they go to school. It affects the likelihood of getting 
a job, and where and at what they work. It will determine who their friends are and 
whom they marry; where they drink, the sports they play and the songs they sing 
(Murray, 1985; Darby, 1983; Howe, 1990). Above all, in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, it determines political allegiance, and where people stand on the major divides 
in Northern Ireland politics: the question of power sharing within Northern Ireland, and 
more fundamentally, the British connection and the border. The divide goes so deep that 
a large minority of people (almost exclusively Catholics) reject the very existence of the 
state in which they live, while for most Protestants, the maintenance of 'their' state is 
the most important political priority. 
To the observer from outside Northern Ireland, these divisions may not be immediately 
apparent. It takes experience to be able to detect whether a person is Protestant or 
Catholic: they look more or less the same; they speak the same language;' they share 
much popular culture, watch the same television programmes. In their segregated 
schools, they will follow the same National Curriculum.2 And the Protestant and 
Catholic ghettoes which house the urban working class may appear equally bleak and 
run down. 
But segregation is more all-embracing than that between apparently more dissimilar 
groups in Britain. Many Catholics grow up without any social contact with a Protestant 
(Murray 1985); some Catholics living on the Falls Road will never venture onto the 
Protestant Shankill, just a few hundred yards away. 
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These divisions do not represent merely difference but inequality. For the first fifty 
years of Northern Ireland's existence, Protestants - through the Unionist Party - held 
almost unchallenged political power. Control of the local state apparatus was used 
ruthlessly to maintain and reinforce the relative economic advantage of the Protestant 
population, and to exclude Catholics. At the same time, large-scale industry was owned 
almost exclusively by Protestants, while the distribution of agricultural land was 
disproportionately favourable to Protestant farmers (Crotty, 1986). Discrimination in 
employment was institutionalised in both public and private sectors. The marginalised 
economic and social position of Catholics meant that their living standards were lower, 
and they had less access to employment opportunities, even in the absence of direct 
discrimination. 
In 1972, the British government imposed Direct Rule from Westminster on Northern 
Ireland as a response to a growing political crisis. The old Unionist-dominated Stormont 
parliament was abolished, and reforms were enacted in the law governing local 
elections which had perpetuated Unionist control of all but a handful of local authorities. 
The system of 'gerrymandering' of electoral boundaries under which a minority of 
Unionist voters had been able to outvote the majority was ended.3 The property 
qualification for voters was abolished, instituting for the first time 'one person, one 
vote' in local elections. Official policies aimed at combatting religious and gender 
discrimination were developed, including both the removal from local control of public 
services (for example the creation of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive), and the 
establishment of the Fair Employment Agency (later the Fair Employment Commission) 
and the Equal Opportunities Commission. 
A further development was the growing involvement of multinational capital from the 
late 1950s. Many commentators have argued that foreign capital has no interest in 
what they consider to be archaic divisions in Northern Ireland, since these firms are 
motivated purely by the search for profits. Multinationals are thus a 'modernising' force 
whose expansion would tend to undermine differences between Protestant and 
Catholic, as they seek out the cheapest labour and most efficient production processes 
(Farrell, 1980; Probert, 1978).4 
This optimistic view of the possibilities for eliminating discrimination has not gone 
unchallenged. O'Dowd and his co-authors (1981) have argued that sectarianism is so 
deeply embedded in the structures of Northern Ireland that even the ending of direct 
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discrimination, and the apparently impartial attitudes of foreign capital will not 
overcome these divisions. 
The past 20 years have seen major restructuring in the labour market, partly as a result 
of these developments. But the evidence suggests that there has been no simple 
process of narrowing of differences. The consistency of the unemployment differential 
- Catholics are more than twice as likely to be unemployed as Protestants - points to 
continuing inequalities. 
The focus of this work is on the way in which these political and economic changes 
have affected social divisions in Northern Ireland, and in particular divisions within the 
labour market. It will examine how far British state policy and the penetration of foreign 
capital have tended to undermine, or alternatively to reinforce, these divisions. 
Economists have not generally concerned themselves with these questions (Harris, 
1990; Canning et ai, 1987). The methodology of conventional economics takes the 
political status quo for granted. The peculiarities of the Northern Ireland state, and the 
differences between the job markets for Protestants and Catholics, if addressed at all, 
are taken as 'given', and belonging outside the realm of economics. The impact of the 
'Troubles' on the economy is also taken as an external factor, to be costed and allotted 
its share of lost jobs. But the origins of these 'Troubles' in the political and economic 
structures of Northern Ireland are not seen as within the scope of economic analysis. 
Others have accounted for divisions between Protestant and Catholic, and for 
differences in the development of North and South, by the 'Protestant work ethic', and 
the existence of more 'personal initiative' within the Protestant community. 5 This idea 
also underlies much of the writing of the British and Irish Communist Organisation,6 
whose particular brand of Marxism led them to argue that there are two nations in 
Ireland, a progressive Protestant nation and a reactionary Catholic nation. 
The question of the root of these divisions lies at the heart of the debate around 
imperialism in Ireland. This has divided into two antagonistic camps writers who claim 
to take their inspiration and analysis from the works of Marx. 
Commentators on both sides of the debate would agree that the relatively high level of 
industrial development in the North East, and the different positions of Protestants and 
Catholics in that industrialisation process, were the foundations of Unionist resistance 
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to independence, and thus of partition. They disagree, however, on two crucial 
questions: the extent to which partition reflected, and continues to reflect, Britain's 
own interests; and the possibilities for democratic reform in Northern Ireland. 
While the two strands of thinking are by no means homogeneous, those within each 
group broadly agree on their attitude to these questions. Thus the labels anti-imperialist 
and revisionist (Martin, 1982) have often been used to distinguish them. 
Debates on Ireland continue to be dominated by these issues. Anti-imperialists argue 
that Britain's imperial interest in continued dominance of Ireland was the major reason 
why it handed over power to the Unionists in Northern Ireland. On this reading, 
Northern Ireland is inherently undemocratic, and Unionist domination is the raison d'etre 
for the state. British policy, therefore, whatever its claimed reformist stance, would play 
a crucial role in reinforcing sectarianism. Sectarian divisions are also seen as important 
in maintaining Northern Ireland as a source of cheap labour. The national question thus 
remains a major issue for socialists. 
The revisionists argue that partition was largely a result of internal divisions in Ireland, 
and that Britain's interest was secondary. They claim that imperialism no longer 
dominates Ireland, and that the real struggle is that of workers against capitalist 
(domestic and foreign). Socialists should therefore attempt to unite the working class 
- Protestant and Catholic - in pursuit of class interests. The national question is seen as 
a dangerous diversion from this strategy. 
These debates have their roots in differences over the relationship between socialism 
and nationalism which go back over a century. Marx left a contradictory legacy in his 
own writing on this question, and the problem has continued to divide Marxists. But 
nationalism is 
-the driving force behind revolutionary advances in Central America and the CIlUSIJ of socialist 
dissension in south-ellSt Asia. It hIlS underlain many victories for socialism - from Vietnam to Cuba 
- and many other retreats from socialism - from the USSR to Algeria - fMunck, 1986, pI J. 
A related division is on the question of underdevelopment, where Marxists have had 
similar difficulties in developing an analysis capable of comprehending the specific 
processes of accumulation in what is variously called the 'Third World', the 'periphery' 
the 'semi-industrialised countries' (Palma, 1978). 
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While Marxists have engaged in vigorous debate on the origins of national divisions in 
Ireland, much less has been written on gender and still less on the connection between 
the two. The limited attention given to this question both by Marx himself, and in the 
classic Marxist texts, is reflected in the marginalisation of writing on gender issues from 
mainstream debates on imperialism and nationalism. This is true both generally, and 
specifically in relation to Ireland, where very little work has been attempted on 
integrating the study of gender inequalities with those of nation and class. This 
indifference to questions of gender is of course even more apparent in mainstream 
economic theory, with its preoccupation with the (genderless) individual and the market 
(Waylen, 1986). 
The conflation of national (or ethnic) identity in Northern Ireland with religious affiliation 
makes this omission particularly glaring. The extreme conservatism of both the major 
religious denominations, particularly on questions of the family and sexuality, suggests 
in itself the importance of the gender dimension to an understanding of national 
divisions. Opposition to abortion and gay rights has been one of the few areas on which 
politicians and clergy from both sides can agree. These views have been allowed to 
prevail in relation to state policy which continues to lag behind British policy on these 
issues.7 
The dominance of the Churches' views on the family plays a central role in cementing 
the political alliances based on religious affiliation, and this issue is therefore crucial to 
an understanding of Northern Ireland society. This patriarchal culture however also 
points to reasons why both sides in the debate (ie those emphasising class or nation) 
have preferred to ignore issues of women's oppression. 
Discussion of labour market discrimination between Catholic and Protestant focuses 
almost exclusively on male workers, and more specifically on the male unemployment 
differential. 8 At the same time discussion of equal opportunities for women largely 
ignores the religious aspect, on the assumption, often implicit, that Catholic women are 
disadvantaged mainly as women rather than by their religion (see for example Osborne 
& Cormack, 1987). This is institutionalised in the separation of the Fair Employment 
Commission, which is concerned with religious discrimination, and the Equal 
Opportunities Commission, which is concerned with gender inequality. The political 
priority given to religion in current state policy is demonstrated by the far greater 
powers available to the FEC (discussed below, Chapter Five); its larger budget;' and a 
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higher maximum level of award (£30,000) for religious discrimination than for sex 
discrimination (£10,000). 
The separation of the issues of religious and gender divisions which pervades the 
academic literature and social policy imposes severe limitations on our understanding 
of both of these issues. Economic restructuring for example has been a complex 
process in which jobs have been reconstructed both on a religious and gender basis (for 
example the substitution of 'Catholic female' by 'Protestant male' jobs).10 The 
processes which have reproduced sectarian divisions have also reproduced gender 
divisions. 
It will be argued below that employment is structured by both gender and religion 
together. This means for example that Catholic women have a specific relation to the 
labour market which is not merely a result of their sex, nor even of a summation of 
sexual and religious oppression. It results from their position in a society which is not 
only structured by class, but is based on patriarchal dominance and the institutional 
power of one religious group. 
Marxism and Ireland 
Political divisions in Northern Ireland, reflected for example in support for political 
parties, concern the role, structure, and indeed continued existence of the Northern 
Ireland state. These differences cut across class and gender, marginalising those parties 
which have called for a class-based politics that ignores this divide, as well as those 
non-socialist groupings of an avowedly non-sectarian nature." Irish Marxism itself is 
split into two camps which reflect the allegiances of each within the overall divide in 
Northern Irish society. Morgan (1980, p188) refers to the two camps as Green 
socialists and Orange socialists. 
For marxists, concerned with the political and economic emancipation of the working 
class, this appears a dismal prospect. Some British observers are impatient with what 
they see as Irish preoccupation with reactionary ideas. Appeals are made for a pure 
class politics which ignores what are seen as bourgeois nationalist concerns. 12 
6 
That such widely differing views on nationalism can be held by those claiming to be true 
to Marx's own work arises partly from the fact that 
wthere was no 'scientific revolution' in this area comparable to that brought IIbout by Mane in the 
critique of political economy· (Munck, op cit, p9). 
It reflects a more general weakness in Marxist analysis of social divisions other than 
class, including those of gender and ethnicity (Anthias & Yuval Davis, 1983). 
The divide in Irish Marxism encompasses differences about the possibilities for building 
working class unity within the boundaries of the Northern Ireland state, which 
immediately raises the question of the British connection. This leads to fundamentally 
opposed theoretical and political conclusions about the progressiveness of current 
political struggles. The role of British state policy in reproducing divisions within the 
working class - the focus of the current work - is thus central to this controversy. 
It is appropriate to begin the discussion with the anti-imperialist/revisionist debate. A 
brief outline of the work of Marx and Engels on Ireland will be followed by a review of 
the two schools of thought which claim to follow in the same tradition . 
Marx and Engels on Ireland 
The approach of Marx and Engels to the Irish question marked a decisive break with the 
schema that had dominated their writing on nationalism in the 1840s and 1850s: the 
Hegelian notion of 'historic' and 'non-historic' nations (Munck, op cit, pp9-15). This led 
them to dismiss the rights of small nations as 'counter-revolutionary', and to support 
imperial conquest as a means of bringing progress to 'barbaric' societies. Engels wrote 
of 
-These relics of a nation mercilessly trampled under foot in the course of history... these residulll 
fr8(Jments of peoples IIlwllYs become fllnllticlIl standard-bellrers of counter-revolution lind remllin 
so until their complete extirpation ... - (Milne" Engels, 1977, p234) 
Marx characterised the 'Asiatic Mode of Production' as one where private property in 
land is absent. Such societies he argued would be static, lacking internal mechanisms 
for change. Therefore "Indian society has no history at all" (cited in Avinieri, 1976) and 
progress could come only from without, by the forcible breaking down of archaic 
structures. This conception has been criticised for its Eurocentricity (ibid, p238). A 
7 
mode of production described in geographic terms also sits uncomfortably with the 
claims of Marxism to be universal theory of history (ibid, p255). 
Marx wrote a series of articles for the New York Daily Tribune during the 1850s in 
which, while condemning in the sharpest terms the brutalities of British rule, he refused 
to support what he considered to be the backward-looking Indian Mutiny of 1857. His 
analysis of India nevertheless reflected a development from the sweeping certainties of 
the 'historic' nation, towards a more complex view of the relation between nationalism 
and social development. He argued that British colonialism had a two-fold impact on 
India, both destructive and progressive, which while bringing untold misery, also laid 
down the conditions for capitalist development (Palma Dutt, 1940). But, he argued, 
India would only gain the benefit of this process when she had thrown off colonialism. 
It was in relation to Ireland that the distinction between the nationalism of the 
oppressed and the oppressor nation replaced that between the 'historic' and the 
'non-historic' nation for Marx and Engels. They stood unambiguously for Irish 
independence, both in their writing and their political campaigning. 
Their work on Ireland, covered a period of nearly fifty years from 1843 to 1892.13 While 
both undertook research on Irish history, often using original sources, neither produced 
an extended analysis of the Irish question. Their writings are mainly fragments, much 
of the material in the form of letters and newspaper articles. They are refer to Ireland 
in some of their major works (for example, Marx's Capital). 
Their ideas about the desirability of Irish independence changed dramatically over this 
period. In 1845, Engels wrote that repeal of the Union could "not remove Irish distress" 
(Marx & Engels, 1971, p53). By 1867, Marx wrote that he "previously thought that 
Ireland's separation from England impossible. Now I think it inevitable" (ibid, p153). 
Two themes dominated their later work on Ireland: that Ireland's development has been 
hampered by British rule; and that the English working class must demand Irish 
independence in its own interest. They campaigned in Britain for Irish independence, 
and some of their most clearly stated positions are in resolutions to the First 
International and the International Working Men's Association (ibid, p417). Engels wrote 
to Marx in 1870 that: 
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-Ireland has been stunted in her development by the English invasion and thrown centuries back. 
And this ever since the 12th century. -
He notes however that the early wars of invasion 
-did not have the distinctly devastating character they assumed in the sixteenth century, and which 
afterwards became the rule - (ibid, pp399-400) 
He makes clear that this conclusion results from his study of Irish history. Both Marx 
and Engels wrote in some detail of a number of periods in Irish history which they 
believed decisive in determining the impact of British Rule - the plantations; the Union 
and the Famine. Their analysis of these events will be discussed in Chapter Three. The 
general conclusion they draw from their work is that with the development of capitalism 
in Britain around the sixteenth century, Ireland became economically subordinated to 
British capital. British policy limited the development of the productive forces, and 
impoverished the Irish peasantry. The development of capitalist relations in Ireland, 
which were established in the nineteenth century and hastened by the Famine was also 
shaped by British domination. In Capital, Marx wrote of the 
·conditions in which ground rent, the mode of landed property corresponding to the capitalist mode 
of production, has a formal existence even though the capitalist mode of production itself does not 
exist, the tenant himself is not an industrial capitalist, and his manner of farming is not II capitalist 
one. This is how it is in Ireland- (Marx, 1976, Vol III, p763J. 
In the nineteenth century struggles for independence were developing, with mass 
agitation around land. 
·'n Ireland, the land question has hitherto been the exclusive form of the social question ... lind is 
at the same time inseparable from the national question- (Marx & Engels, 1971, p407J. 
For Marx and Engels, this question was also crucial to the success of the British class 
struggle: 
·lreland is therefore the grellt means by which the English aristocrllcy mllintllins its dominlltion over 
Englllnd herself ... But the overthrow of the English aristocrllcy in Irelllnd involves lIS II neCBS811ry 
consequence its overthrow in Englllnd. And this would fulfil the preliminllry condition for the 
proletarian revolution in England- (ibid pp406-7J. 
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For them the interests of the English working class were indissolubly tied to the Irish 
question. 
"The English working class will never accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland" (ibid, 
p398). 
Colonial rule divided the English working class: 
"The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. 
In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into 
a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country and against Ireland, thus strengthening their 
domination over himselr (ibid, pp407-81. 
It is sometimes argued that Marx's support for Irish independence lay solely in the 
progressive effect he believed it would have on the British working class (Martin, op cit, 
p57). Lenin wrote that Marx's support came "not from the standpoint of the interests 
of 'justice for Ireland' but from the standpoint of the interests of the revolutionary 
struggle of the oppressor" (Lenin, 1973, p214). The great bulk of Marx and Engels's 
writing on Ireland, however, concerns the impact of British policy on Ireland. It would 
seem artificial to make a distinction between these two themes. The demand for Irish 
independence reflected in their view both the interests of Ireland and of the British 
working class. This is evident in Marx's statement that Ireland needed 
1) Self-government and independence from England 
2) An agrarian revolution 
3) Protective tariffs against England" (Marx & Engels, 1971, p158) 
Lenin's own writing on the subject was much more abstract, and based on no original 
study of Irish history. He used Ireland as an example in a polemic against Rosa 
Luxemburg on the right of nations to self-determination (Lenin, 1963, Vol I). This rather 
one-sided view of Marx's argument therefore stems from the different context in Lenin 
wrote. 
A major omission in the work of Marx and Engels is any analysis of the causes and 
consequences of the separate path of development taken by the North Eastern counties 
of Ireland from the nineteenth century, and in particular of the support given to the 
English connection by the Protestant working class. Although they mention Cromwell's 
Plantation of Ulster, there is little discussion of what this settler population would mean 
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for social development in Ireland. The importance of this question had not developed 
to the level it was to reach by the end of the century. Nevertheless, following the Act 
of Union, Ulster had embarked on a process of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation 
which was already significant by the middle of the century, as were the sectarian 
character of the work practices. 
Marx and Engels' work on Ireland cannot be taken as giving unambiguous support for 
the current campaign for Irish unity.'4 While some see this as merely a continuation of 
the necessary struggle for self-determination, others have argued that partition 
represented a settlement of the national question. The failure of Marx and Engels, and 
later Lenin, adequately to address the issues which culminated in partition has opened 
the way for a number of contradictory interpretations, all claiming to be faithful to their 
ideas. 
This battle of ideas is echoed in debates about imperialism and underdevelopment in the 
'Third World'. While, through their work on Ireland, Marx and Engels came to question 
the notion that the penetration of capitalism through colonialism was universally 
progressive, they did not discard the notion of the 'Asiatic Mode of Production'. It is 
thus possible to argue that support for Irish independence cannot be generalised to 
other parts of the world, or other times. Bill Warren, one of the leading protagonists in 
the revisionist camp in the Irish debate, also made a major contribution to the debate 
on underdevelopment in his polemic in defence of capitalist imperialism (Warren, 1980). 
In spite of the contradictory elements in his writing on nationalism, Marx, with Engels, 
had begun the task of developing a "historically determined concept of national 
oppression" (Munck, op cit p 21). Nationalism was not an abstract question, but one 
to be judged according to specific historical circumstances, against the criterion of what 
best promoted the interests of the working class. Nevertheless the Irish work suggests 
that the balance had shifted from support for 'progressive nations' towards the 
'oppressed nation'. Nationalism was never Marx's central concern, since class was the 
main driving force in his theory of history. But it has probably been at the root of most 
splits within Marxism, and the gulf in Irish Marxism has so far been unbridgeable. 
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James Connolly 
James Connolly was unquestionably the leading figure in the Irish socialist and trade 
union movement at the beginning of this century. For Connolly, the importance of the 
struggle against British rule in Ireland was not the achievement of formal political 
independence, but of economic independence, and the transformation of society in the 
interests of the working class. Since Ireland was a colony dominated by British capital, 
working class struggle inevitably took the form of a struggle against British institutions. 
Nevertheless: 
"If you remove the English Brmy tomorrow, Bnd hoist the green flBg over Dublin Cutle, unless you 
set Bbout the orgBnisBtion of the socialist Republic, your efforts would be in vain. " (Beresford Ellis, 
1973, p124J 
The national struggle is not merely a step towards socialism, but must be integrally 
linked with it. In his famous phrase 
"The CBuse of labour is the CBuse of lre/Bnd. the cause of lrelBnd is the CBuse of IBbour. They CBnnot 
be dissevered. " (Beresford Ellis. 1985, p226J. 
This view guided Connolly's political life and the manner of his death by a British Army 
firing squad for his part in the "Easter Rising" of 1916. At his death Connolly was 
General Secretary of the Irish Transport and General Workers Union, the largest union 
in Ireland. The Irish Citizen's Army,15 which he led into Easter Rising was the 
embodiment of the fusion of the workers' struggle with the national struggle. 
While Connolly saw Irish nationalism as essentially tied to the struggle for socialism, it 
was from a perspective of internationalism and opposition to the World War which had 
destroyed the International Socialist movement: 
"Should the working cllJS8 in Europe. rllther thBn slllUghter fI/Ich other for the benefit of kings MId 
finBnciers proceed tomorrow to erect bllrriclldes .// over Europe .... thllt WIIf might bellbolished .... 
we should be perfectly hBPPy;n follow;ng such II glorious eXllmpl •• " (Beresford E//;s. 1973, p237J 
Connolly believed that partition would be a disaster for Ireland, binding her yet more 
closely to British imperialism and bringing reaction on both sides of the border. 
Anti-imperialists argue that the undemocratic nature of Northern Ireland - and the 
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conservatism of the Republic in the south - shows this prediction to be correct. The 
ending of partition is essential in the struggle for socialism. 
It can be argued that Connolly underestimated the opposition of Protestant workers to 
independence, (Morgan, 1988). Connolly's suggestion that they were led to support the 
Unionists by "skilful use by the master class of religious rallying cries" (cited in Martin, 
1982) neglects the real material advantages which Protestant workers enjoyed in the 
North East. Nevertheless, in his work as a trade union organiser in Belfast Connolly 
encountered sectarianism in the workforce. He had some limited success in organising 
union action across the sectarian divide, and he knew that "the industrial working class 
of the North-east could not be won over by simply offering the green flag of Irish 
nationalism" (Munck, op cit, p46). 
Connolly's execution, while elevating him to the status of national hero, also largely 
broke the influence of Marxist ideas on the national struggle during the crucial period 
of the War of Independence and the Civil War. The separation of the social question 
from the national question brought about the disastrous results he predicted in the 
divisions of the Irish working class, both North and South and within the new Northern 
Ireland state. 
While his work is relatively little known outside Ireland, Connolly remains a major figure 
in Ireland's history. It is ironic that while his life's work involved asserting the 
indissoluble unity of the national and the socialist struggles, he is claimed both by 
nationalists who disavow his socialism, and by Marxists who find his nationalism a 
lamentable lapse. 
Marxism and the Contemporary National Struggle in Ireland 
Ireland's independence struggle took place when the international socialist movement 
had been all but destroyed by the First World War, and the failure of the workers' 
movements in the contending states to oppose their own ruling class. Thus the Easter 
Rising of 191 6, and the War of Independence received virtually no political or material 
support from socialists in Britain or the rest of Europe. Meanwhile the destruction of the 
left-wing leadership after the Rising, and the abstentionist position of the Irish Labour 
Party during the War of Independence marginalised socialist ideas in the formation of 
the two new Irish states at partition. 
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The dominance of Unionism in the North, and conservative nationalism in the South 
which equated Irishness with Catholicism (Brown, 1981), meant that neither state 
proved fertile ground for the development of Marxist ideas. The isolation in which both 
states developed in subsequent years kept the socialist and labour movement insulated 
from ideas in the rest of the world, and ensured that with some exceptions, Ireland was 
neglected by non-Irish Marxists. 
For about fifty years, relative stability was maintained in both parts of Ireland. The 
periodic eruptions of the national struggle gained limited support, and none made a 
major impact outside Ireland. But the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s paved the way 
for an urban guerilla movement unprecedented in its scale, persistence and degree of 
popular support. Ireland has once more been forced onto the agenda of British, and 
sometimes, world politics. This period of mass social upheaval brought with it a 
development of political consciousness within Ireland, which included renewed interest 
in Marxist ideas. Ireland also became a focus for some British, and to a lesser extent, 
US and European, Marxists.16 
The direct military involvement of the British state in Ireland has had major implications 
for British society. The counter-insurgency campaign brought the development of new 
technology (BSSRS, 1974; Ackroyd et ai, 1977) and changes in the law, avowedly 
aimed at combatting terrorism, which have placed considerable restrictions on civil 
liberties.17 This point echoes the warning given by Marx 100 years: 
-Irelllnd is the only pretext the English government hIlS for retllining II big stllnding IIrmy, which if 
need be, lIS hIlS hllppened before, clln be used II(Jllinst the English workers lifter hllving done its 
militllry trllining in Irelllnd- (Mllrx & Engels, op cit p255). 
In spite of these developments, interest in Ireland remains marginal to British political 
life. The bi-partisan policy on Ireland pursued by the two major parties has effectively 
prevented serious discussion within mainstream politics. Restrictions on the media 
(Curtis, 1984) and the deportation of activists under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
have also been effective in silencing dissent. But another factor must be anti-Irish 
prejudice - itself a product of the colonial situation - which is prevalent in Britain and 
extends into the socialist and labour movement. This has limited contact between Irish 
nationalists and British socialists, and therefore the cross-fertilisation of ideas. 
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Current Marxist debate on Ireland has become focused around the contributions of what 
has become known as the revisionist group. This term covers a range of thinkers both 
in Britain and in Ireland (particularly the South) who have rejected the nationalist version 
of history. While they have provided a much-need critique of the simplicities of some 
of the earlier anti-imperialist views, the entrenchment of these two distinct, and 
mutually hostile schools of thought has also tended to stifle more productive 
developments. 
The Anti-Imperialists 
The 'anti-imperialist' school includes those for whom partition represents a defeat for 
progressive forces in Ireland. The division of Ireland is seen as undemocratic, creating 
a reactionary Unionist-dominated state in the North, and a conservative and dependent 
state in the South. The current nationalist struggle is therefore broadly progressive. 
While they may disagree about the tactics and strategy of the Provisional IRA campaign, 
they sympathise with its aim of an independent united Ireland. 
The ideas of this group support the emphasis placed by James Connolly on the 
inseparability of the nationalism and socialism in Ireland. Partition in this view represents 
the denial by British imperialism, in alliance with Unionism, of democracy to the majority 
of the Irish people. The border continues to dominate political and social life in Ireland, 
dividing the working class and preventing the development of independent socialist 
politics in either state. 
British policy is aimed at maintaining these undemocratic structures. In the period up 
to Direct Rule this was done through the budget 'subvention' which was channelled 
through the Loyalist-dominated Stormont regime, and helped to reinforce sectarian 
practices (Troops Out Movement, 1975, p22). In the period since the 'Troubles', the 
main thrust of British policy has been aimed at defeating the Republican struggle, and 
preserving the integrity of the border. 
The major contribution of this group has been in detailed analyses of the nature of the 
Northern Ireland state. (Farrell, 1980; O'Dowd et ai, 1981; de Paor, 1971). They have 
argued that divisions between Protestant and Catholics are built into the structures of 
Northern Ireland, and that only by dismantling these institutions will the obstacles to 
working class unity be overcome. In this view, the destruction of sectarian state 
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structures is synonymous with the end of Partition, since the basis for the 'artificially 
created' state was sectarianism (Munck, 1992, p99). 
Less progress has been made in analysing the nature of Britain's imperialist interest in 
Ireland. Little attempt has been made to apply recent theoretical developments in this 
area to Ireland. Bew et al can with some justice criticise the anti-imperialists for their 
conception of imperialism as: 
aJ too broad, in that it is not associated with any particular historical period 
bJ too diffuse, in that it is not associated with specific effects, but is reduced to being synonymous 
with violence and repression 
cJ formalistic, in that imperialism is seen as being merely associated with foreign presence (Bew at ai, 
1979J. 
Nevertheless, criticism of lack of rigour in some formulations does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion which Bew and his collaborators draw from it; that imperialism no 
longer dominates Ireland. As Munck stated in a recent review of 'revisionist work' there 
is a debate among socialist republicans about the precise economic status of the South 
of Ireland, but 
"That the Republic suffered from many of the attributes described by the Latin American theory of 
'dependency' seems incontestable, so at this stage, we cannot afford to discard the theoretical 
framework ofimperialism" (Munck, 1992, p101J.'8 
Furthermore, Coulter argues, 'clientism' rather than class politics dominates Southern 
Ireland, but this 
"form of politics goes back to the compromise which ended British rule over a majority of the 
country and the subsequent evolution of the state" (Coulter, 1992, p9J. 
Some anti-imperialist writers have explicitly argued the separation of the economic from 
the political in present-day Orangeism. Farrell, for example argues that the sectarian 
characteristics of the state are "archaic", but that Orange ideology has acquired a 
"virulent life of its own" (Farrell, op cit), while its material base has been eroded by 
"modernisation". Monopoly capital, he argues, has no interest in maintaining the 
sectarian structures of the state. This analysis is remarkably similar to that of Probert 
(1978), whose own conclusions - that modernisation will create the basis for unity 
between Protestant and Catholics within Northern Ireland - put her into the other camp. 
This position is challenged by O'Dowd et al (op cit) who argue that monopoly capital 
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is incapable of transforming the existing structures of the state, while sectarianism has 
a material reality which is constantly reproduced. 
The notion of a modernising capitalism untainted by the 'distortions' of sectarianism is 
idealised and ahistorical. This methodology is shared by many writers on both sides of 
the argument, although they draw opposite political conclusions. Bambery (1987) 
argues that imperialism no longer dominates Ireland, but supports the demand for British 
withdrawal on the grounds that this would rid Northern Ireland of sectarian practices, 
which prevent the unity of the working class. This argument fails to address the 
economic basis of sectarianism, and again poses an abstract notion of 'pure' class 
struggle. 
The Revisionists 
The growth of revisionism in Irish Marxism is paralleled by similar developments in 
mainstream historical writing. Beresford Ellis attacked this approach in a recent lecture, 
arguing that it meant 
-that history must prepsre the way for an acceptsnce of II justificlltion for the status quo in Irelllnd 
today, particulsrly in relstion to the Six Counties •• 19 
He cited works by politicians Garret Fitzgerald and Connor Cruise O'Brien, and 
mainstream academics as well as authors like Henry Patterson who place themselves 
within the socialist camp. The revisionist attack on nationalist historiography is a 
product of recent developments in the Southern state, exemplified by the election to the 
presidency of the liberal and anti-nationalist Mary Robinson with the support of much 
of the left. Rapid capitalist industrialisation of the South in the 1970s, and the 
marginalisation of Sinn Fein, had led many socialists to demand that the left abandon 
the national question and concentrate on class politics (Bew et ai, 1989). The 
discussion below on socialist revisionism will concentrate on the corollary of this 
position: an acceptance of the continued existence of the Northern Ireland state. Since 
their positions are quite distinct, some of the main contributors to this debate will be 
discussed separately. 
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The British and Irish Communist Organisation 
The origins of the socialist anti-nationalist position in Ireland can be traced to a series 
of pamphlets produced by the British and Irish Communist Organisation (BICO) from the 
early 1970s. This group arose from a split in the Irish Communist movement and 
subsequently developed overtly Stalinist positions. Their theoretical positions derive 
from the ideas of Bill Warren, who, claiming a return to orthodox Marxism, argued that 
imperialism plays a historically progressive role in hastening the development of 
capitalism (Warren, op cit). 
Warren attacked the idea that imperialism had held back Irish development, arguing 
instead that colonialism had been a progressive force, and criticising the "false view 
that Northern or Southern Ireland is the victim of neo-colonialism" (BICO, 1975a). In an 
extraordinarily selective history of Ireland, the group argues that the British state 
initiated extensive reforms, and that imperialism "carried out the bourgeois democratic 
revolution in Ireland". The nationalist movement is associated with backward and 
reactionary forces, above all with the Catholic Church. The imperialist state, "functioned 
as the agent of the agrarian revolution", which triumphed before the nationalist 
movement, and independent of it (ibid). This analysis writes out of history the mass 
agitation for land reform which was bound up with the nationalist movement throughout 
the nineteenth century. 
In The Two Irish Nations (1975b) they argue that there is a distinct Protestant nation 
which has democratic reasons to resist incorporation into the rest of Ireland. The 
Protestant settlers in Ulster have from the seventeenth century "cohered into a social 
unit", which being Protestant, individualist and bourgeois, was "in the vanguard of 
bourgeois civilisation". These characteristics, and the more advanced system of land 
holding (Ulster Custom) in Ulster brought about the development of capitalist relations 
in the North, separating it from the backward south. This then is the material basis for 
the "Two Nations" and partition. 
The real national question becomes in this view not the anti-imperialist struggle of an 
oppressed Catholic minority in the North, but that of the Protestant nation against the 
designs of 'Catholic Nationalists' from the South. For the BICC, the marginalisation of 
Catholics within the Northern Ireland state, and the whole apparatus of discrimination 
and repression is a rational response to the threat from 'Catholic nationalists' to impose 
their rule on Ulster. In the words of Bew et al (1979) the state becomes the "expression 
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of the real or imagined fears" the Protestant community, and class analysis becomes 
redundant. This involves uncritical support for British state operations against 'catholic 
nationalists', and defence of the institutions of the Northern Ireland state. 
This grouping now argues for the total integration of Northern Ireland into the British 
state, and their proposed way forward for the labour movement is to campaign to join 
the British Labour Party. The only denial of democratic rights in Ulster which they 
recognise is of the right to participate fully in the political life of Britain. 
Tom Nairn 
Nairn also supports the view that there is a distinct Protestant nation in Ireland. He sees 
this group as squeezed between Ireland and Britain, neither Irish nor British, and with 
no independent identity. Unlike the BICa though, he argues that this identity can only 
be gained if Protestants achieve self-determination within their own state. 
In his view, Partition is a result of uneven capitalist development in Ireland, which 
produced more advanced industrialisation in the north. This gave Protestants a material 
interest - as well as ties of language and culture - in maintaining the British connection. 
But his arguments about the present are grounded in psychological rather than political 
analysis. Settlement of the national question is an essential precondition for the struggle 
for socialism in Ireland, but this is seen in terms of the Protestant community regaining 
a lost "psychic identity" rather than in class terms (Nairn, 1981). 
Nairn argues that the current crisis in Ireland has its roots in the struggle which began 
in the 1950s in both states to emerge from backwardness and inward-turning. The 
movement towards "modernisation" arose in the South from the development of a 
genuinely modern bourgeoisie, with its expression in the Expansion of Industry Act of 
1958;20 and in the North from the struggle of the Catholic community for civil rights 
which led to conflict with the Unionist state structures. The British state, in his view 
has no interest in maintaining divisions within Ireland, nor does imperialism dominate 
either part of Ireland. Therefore the struggle for a united Ireland is not anti-imperialist, 
and can not transform itself into a socialist one. 
While using unsubstantiated assertions to dismiss the progressive content of the 
national struggle, Nairn makes no attempt to demonstrate the anti-imperialist content 
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of an independent Ulster. It is hard to see how this demand could be progressive 
according to his own criteria, or those of Lenin, whose work he takes as a reference 
point. It is also difficult to see how this state (assuming it could be achieved without 
a disastrous civil war) could extend democratic rights. In his vision of an independent 
Ulster Nairn has nothing to say about the role of Catholics. He does not analyse the 
political nature of Orangeism: the apparatus of the Northern state is seen merely as 
novercompensationn for the fear of betrayal to the South, but unlike BICO, these fears 
he sees these fears as irrational. 
Bew, Gibbon and Patterson 
The most thoughtful contributions of the revisionist school come from the various 
collective or individual writings of Bew, Gibbon and Patterson. As well as their 
trenchant criticisms of the anti-imperialist school, they have made major contributions 
in the study of class divisions in the Protestant community, and of the nature of the 
Orange state. 
They argue that the emphasis on external causes of partition is mistaken. The notion 
of an all-powerful British imperialist interest able to manipulate divisions in order to 
maintain control begs the question of what that imperialist interest was, and what it 
now represents. Partition in their view stemmed primarily from internal causes, which, 
like others in the revisionist camp, they see as a product of the uneven development of 
capitalism in Ireland. A different mode of production was established in the North East 
from that prevailing in the South. In the North this was characterised by machine 
industry, while commercial farming prevailed in the South, with an underdeveloped 
social structure (Gibbon, 1975). The Protestant working class therefore had a material 
interest in maintaining its separation from the South. 
This use of the Marxist notion of 'mode of production' here is problematic. As Smyth 
argues, Gibbon refers to 
-two types of economic activity which mayor may not be subordinllttJ to different modes of 
production ... The uneven pattern of development .• . is common to the development of clIPitlllist 
during the early phases of industrialisation. ... What was unique in the development of Ire/lind was 
the close link to II much stronger economic power- (Smyth, 1S82, pp3S-40). 
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Most of the work of this group is concerned with the Northern Ireland state, and the 
relationship of classes in the 'Protestant bloc' to that state. Sectarianism is seen as a 
fundamental characteristic of the state, but unlike the writers discussed above, this is 
seen as profoundly reactionary. However, they argue that the "role of sectarianism was 
less in founding the state than in influencing the form that it took" (Bew et ai, 1985, 
p20). Instead of supporting one of the various forms of Protestant self-determination, 
they include the Catholic working class in their programme, with appeals to working 
class unity. The solution they propose to the present crisis involves measures to 
transform the structure of the state and eliminate sectarianism. 
Following Balibar, they see the role of the capitalist state as to 'hinder the unity of the 
dominated classes', in order to reproduce the conditions for continued exploitation of 
the working class. In Northern Ireland this is achieved by integrating Protestant workers 
into an all-class alliance, which excludes Catholics. This has the dual function of 
preventing Protestants from pursuing their independent class interests, and dividing the 
working class. The central conflict thus appears between two grand class alliances -
nationalist and Unionist. The way forward is to break down these alliances by 
independent working class action. 
This analysis shares considerable common ground with the anti-imperialist school. 
Indeed Bew and Patterson argue that the Stormont state is irreformable: "The existing 
state apparatus was deeply implicated in the creation of sectarian division" (Bew et ai, 
1985) in accounting for the failure of "modernisation" in the late 1960s. However, their 
argument rests on the separation of the specifically Unionist state in the North from any 
state structure in the North (Bew et ai, 1980). Thus they believe it is possible to build 
alternative democratic structures within the present boundaries, and the national 
question becomes redundant. 
The trio attack the "myth" of the monolithic character of Unionism which they claim 
anti-imperialist writing has perpetuated. Munck argues this is not a necessary element 
of socialist-republican analysis, and there "is no problem in embracing the more subtle 
historical analysis put forward in their book" (Munck, 1992, p96). All three argue that 
there have been at times significant developments towards class politics. The support 
of sections of the Protestant working class for the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 
in the 1950s, marked a move towards secular class politics. But as Driver points out, 
the NILP was at this time an avowedly unionist party, and this short-lived move 
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represented a desire to win concessions from within the Protestant bloc rather than a 
move towards non-sectarian politics (Driver, 1981). 
They part company with the anti-imperialists most explicitly on the crucial question of 
British involvement. They argue that Britain never had a substantial interest in 
maintaining partition, and would abandon the unionists if it became politically useful: 
-The strategic implication of our analysis is thllt the problem of the involvement of the British stllte 
in Northern Ireland lies not in its existence but in its specific forms- (Bew et ai, 1985, p 144). 
Having stated that there is no anti-imperialist content to the present struggle, however, 
they state that the "British ruling class has always pursued an imperialist line" (ibid 
p143), a point which is not explained or developed. 
The solution offered by Bew and Patterson in 1985 is that the British state, under a 
Labour government, initiate structural reforms in Northern Ireland, combined with a 
massive programme of economic recovery, and a phasing out of the RUe. This 
conclusion is disappointing in view of the incisiveness of much of their analysis. It does 
not follow from their diagnosis of the problem, and strikes one more as wishful thinking 
than a strategy tied into actual events in Ireland. While the "disarticulation of the two 
communal class alliances" may be a "task for internal socialist and democratic forces" 
(ibid p 150)' their own analysis shows these alliances to have a material base within the 
state. 
Furthermore, they ask the British state to carry out a task which they declare almost 
impossible in their analysis of the failure of modernisation, and which they criticise the 
Provisionals, among others, for demanding. According to their own theoretical position, 
this would be to ask the capitalist state to act against the interests of capital. 
The demand for an economic recovery programme in the North assumes that British 
capitalism is capable of achieving this. They quote Rowthorn in support of this point: 
WThe idelll combinlltion for Northern Ire/llfld would be II vigorous programme for economic recovery 
in the United Kingdom lIS II whole together with II strong rfl(JionM policy for directing invlIStmllflt 
towllrds the province w (Rowthorn, 1S81, p27J. 
However, Rowthorn's own subsequent work has led him to doubt the possibility of this 
programme, both in view of the deepening crisis of British capitalism, and the long run 
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and seemingly irreversible decline of the Northern economy within its present structure 
(Rowthorn & Wayne, 1988). 
Another aspect of the idealism of this analysis is its failure to relate to the present set 
of contending forces, and to give any clear strategy for socialists in coming to terms 
with the actual struggles which are taking place in Northern Ireland. What for example 
should be the attitude of socialists to the presence of the British Army on their streets 7 
While relying on the British state to provide the solution to the crisis, they have nothing 
to say about the role of the repressive apparatus of that state in its confrontation with 
republicans. 
In a later work, Bew & Patterson' analysis of the Anglo-Irish agreement betrays a more 
pronounced tendency to recognise progressive elements within the Protestant 
community while denying them in the nationalist community. The "expanded symbolic 
recognition within Northern Ireland of the nationalist identity" contained within the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement is viewed as a "recipe for sectarian confrontation", while the 
restrictions on the display of Unionist symbols in traditionally Protestant-dominated 
workplaces is "foolish" since they restrict the "greater expression of the relatively 
secular and modernising aspects of the Unionist tradition." (Bew & Patterson, 1987, 
p56). This is a breathtaking description of a tradition by which Protestant workers have 
excluded, often violently, Catholic workers from employment. In an Alice in Wonderland 
world, "(e)qual rights is deemed sectarian and bigotry is labelled as secular" (Munck, 
1992, p98). 
In the context of Northern Ireland, "(c)ommitment to 'basic' class issues merely serves 
to reinforce the problem of working-class division" (Stewart, 1991, p185) since 
"economic disunity within the working class was founded upon the domination of 
Catholic workers" (ibid, p184). In their attempts to abstract from this key political 
question, Bew & Patterson, for all the sophistication of their analysis are reduced to the 
most banal and reactionary conclusions. Their proposed "benign way out" of the 
present situation is the re-introduction of periodic border polls in order to 
"reassure Unionists and perhllps those foreign business men who ... are now doubly reluctllnt to 
invest in Northern Ireland because they see the Hillsborough Agreement lIS the first step to II British 
withdrllwal" fop cit pp64-6J. 
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The work of Bew, Patterson and Gibbon in particular has been important in opening 
debate on a series of key questions. While this work is seriously flawed, and ultimately 
gives support to reactionary politics, it has forced a deeper study of positions which 
have tended to be taken for granted in the past. 
Neither side in this debate addresses questions of gender. Stewart appears to 
acknowledge the issue when he begins his critique of Bew & Patterson by arguing that 
the 'structures of institutions of subordination' in Northern Ireland which exclude 
Catholics not only facilitate class domination, but 
-also equally dependent on other social relations and identities, which may be stunted in the 
process ... These other social relations include ..... gender fop cit, p 177). 
While he does not develop the idea further, it provides a useful starting point. Margaret 
Ward echoes this view in her discussion of the Northern Ireland women's movement 
"Partition has divided us and it has circumscribed our strategies for change. Until we can deal with 
that reality the women's movement in Ireland will not develop as a strong and positive force. " 
(Ward, 1991, p163). 
The interconnection of gender and religious subordination will be a central theme of the 
following chapters. 
Outline of Work 
The focus of this work is the study of the role of state policy and multinational capital 
in the reproduction of social divisions in Northern Ireland. In integrating discussion of 
the relationship between gender and sectarian divisions, the objective is to show that 
these are an integral part of class formation. The state therefore reproduces not merely 
class domination, but relations of gender and sectarian domination and subordination. 
The specific period under consideration is the twenty years since 1972, when Direct 
Rule from Westminster replaced the Stormont regime. It will be argued that, while the 
Unionist state has been abolished, sectarian divisions remain integral to Northern 
Ireland. British policy, while involving some anti-discriminatory legislation, has as its 
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primary aim the maintenance of the Union, and cannot ultimately challenge existing 
forms of domination. 
It will also be argued that multinational capital plays no straight forward 'modernising' 
role in relation to sectarian (or gender) divisions. That relationship is contradictory, since 
capitalism is not an abstract system, but always a historically concrete process in which 
classes are divided on gender, ethnic and other lines, which are reproduced in the 
accumulation process. In Northern Ireland foreign capital has both reproduced and 
undermined existing social divisions, and where anti-discriminatory measures have been 
undertaken, this has been a product of political struggle as much as any inherent 
tendency in capital itself. 
In Chapter Two, I shall discuss some of the relevant theoretical material in an attempt 
to develop a framework for analysing class, gender and religious domination in Northern 
Ireland, and their relation to changing economic and political structures. It will be argued 
that while religious divisions have taken a unique form in Northern Ireland, nevertheless 
all capitalist societies are characterised by relations of dominance along lines of 
ethnicity/race and gender. Therefore as well as discussing the various competing 
'explanations' for Protestant/Catholic divisions in the labour market, I shall examine 
some of the theoretical work on racial and ethnic divisions which potentially provides 
illumination in the context of Northern Ireland. This chapter also examines some of the 
major theories of gender subordination and their relevance to the Northern Ireland 
context. 
Questions concerning the nature of the Northern Ireland state - particularly the 
relationship between sectarianism and state structures; and the relationship between 
Northern Ireland and the British state - have been touched on in the above discussion. 
This chapter will use some recent developments in the theory of the state in capitalist 
society in an attempt to clarify these arguments. 
Chapter Three provides some historical background to the political economy of Northern 
Ireland. It is divided into two sections; firstly the background to Partition and the 
character of the Northern Ireland state; secondly the period of Stormont Rule, 
1920-1972. The aim is to show the importance of gender and religious divisions in the 
formation of the state, and the way in which these were reproduced in the Unionist 
regime as the economic basis of the state shifted. 
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Chapter Four discusses economic policy under Direct Rule. This covers two main 
periods: firstly 1972 to the early 1980s, which saw a major restructuring of the 
economy with a decline in manufacturing and sharp increase in services, particularly in 
the public sector; and secondly the 1980s to the present day, which have seen 
elements of 'Thatcherite' economic and social policies introduced. The period has been 
one of economic crisis, with escalating unemployment. Northern Ireland's dependence 
on state employment and subsidy has led to the description 'workhouse economy' 
(Rowthorn, 1987). 
The next two chapters discuss the impact of state anti-discrimination policies on the 
labour market. Chapter Five examines state equal opportunities policies and the record 
of the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Fair Employment Agency and 
Commission. Chapter Six provides an overview of gender and religious divisions in 
employment during the period of Direct Rule, and their relation to income inequalities. 
Chapters Seven and Eight examine these divisions in specific sectors. Chapter Seven 
looks at employment in large private sector firms, and particularly the record of 
multinational capital. Chapter Eight concerns the public sector. The bulk of this chapter 
consists of a case study of employment at the Royal Victoria Hospital in West Belfast. 
It aims to demonstrate the overall impact of government labour market, policy including 
both equal opportunities legislation and deregulation. It is based on interviews with 
management and trade unionists, as well as relevant published and unpublished data. 
Chapter Nine summarises the findings in the previous chapters, and the implications for 
the possibility of overcoming sectarianism in Northern Ireland. 
Notes to Chapter One 
1. There are a small number of Irish-medium schools, attended almost exclusively by Catholics. For many 
nationalists the Irish language is a part of their Irish identity. The speaking of Irish as a first language has 
however virtually died out in Northern Ireland, and English is the common language for almost all purposes. 
2. Approximately 98 % of children attend schools in which either Protestants or Catholics are in the 
overwhelming majority. State 8chools are in effect 'Prote8tant' (8ee for example Murray, 1986) while most 
Catholics attend Catholic-run school8 which receive 8tate financial 8Upport through Voluntary Aided status. 
The National Curriculum, which under the 1988 Education Act mU8t be taught in all 'maintained' schools. 
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including those with Voluntary Aided status, will make the teaching Irish history in Catholic schools more 
difficult. Religious education is not covered by the National Curriculum. 
3. The most notorious gerrymander was in Derry City. In 1966, two thirds of the adult population was 
Catholic, but ward boundaries were constructed to give Unionists a majority of City Council seats by 
concentrating Catholic voters into one very large ward (see Farrell, pp84-5). 
4. The view that capitalist modernisation will override divisions based on race, ethnicity and so on is not 
confined to Northern Ireland. See for example the debate on the relation between capitalism an apartheid in 
Wolpe, H.(1988) Race, Class and the Apartheid State (UNESCO), pp25-28. 
5. See for example the comments of Thomas Wilson, author of the Wilson Report on the Northern Ireland 
economy, cited in Lee (1989) p 418. 
6. This organisation has dissolved itself into the Labour Representation Committee and is primarily concerned 
with campaigning for the British Labour Party to organise itself in Northern Ireland. 
7. The provisions of the Abortion Law Reform Act (1967) were not extended to Northern Ireland, and access 
to abortion remains severely restricted. Homosexual activity remains illegal, even for consenting adults in 
private. 
8. The chair of the Fair Employment Commission, Bob Cooper, describes the Protestant-Catholic differential 
in male unemployment as the key target for the Commission. "We would not have legislation if it wasn't for 
that, and we will be judged by our ability to change it." (Interview, April 2nd, 1992). 
9. According to the organisations' annual reports, the Fair Employment Commission received £1,519,000 in 
grant from the Department of Economic Development in the Financial year ending March 1991, compared 
with £934,000 for the EOC. Of this, the FEC spent £864,836 in salaries and wages, compared to less than 
half that figure (£382,069) for the EOC. 
10. For example the decline in full-time female employment in the Belfast linen industry, and the growth of 
male employment in the new industries outside Belfast. While this type of change has tended to predominate, 
particularly in relation to fUll-time work, there has also been some substitution of female unskilled/semi-skilled 
employment in the electronics industry for traditional skilled 'male' engineering employment. The largest 
growth in female employment has been in public sector 'female' jobs (eg teaching, personal care). 
11. In the 1992 election, the Workers Party received 0.91 % of the vote, or an average of 1.72% in the nine 
constituencies in which it stood. The party has its origins in the 'Officials' side in the split in Sinn Fein which 
took place in 1971 on the question of the armed struggle. It is now virulently anti-nationalist and 
counterposes a 'non-sectarian' programme of workers' unity. The middle-of-the road 'non-sectarian' AlliMlce 
Party gained 9.6% of the vots. Most of its votes were won in constituencies in which there wn no 
nationalist candidate. 
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12. This view is typified by the Militant Tendency. Others take the opposite position, offering unconditional 
(and sometimes more or less uncritical) 8Upport for the IRA. See for example the Irish Freedom Movement. 
13. The combined and individual writing of Marx and Engels, are collected in a single volume, originally 
produced in the Soviet Union, under the title Ireland and the Irish Ouestion (Marx & Engels, 1971). 
14. This should be taken as the prioritising of the question, rather than as support for the form the struggle 
is taking. It is possible to argue the importance of the national question without supporting the tactic of armed 
struggle. 
16. The Irish Citizen Army, "which has been described a8 the world's first Red Guard" (Beresford Ellis, 1986, 
p 201) was formed in October 1913 during the Dublin lock-out as workers' defence force. 
16. French writers Goldring and Faligot have written on Ireland in both French and English: see for example 
Goldring (1991); Faligot, R. (1983) Britain's Military Strategy in Ireland: the Kitson Experiment (published in 
French and English) and Faligot, R. (1978) James Connolly et Ie mouvement revolutionnaire irlllndais (Francois 
Maspero, Paris). See also Foley, G. (1972) Problems of the Irish Revolution. Can the IRA meet the Chllllenge? 
(Pathfinder Press, New York). 
17. The most important of these has been the Prevention of Terrorism Act, passed in the wake of the 
Birmingham Pub bombings in 1974. Many hundreds of Irish people have been deported from Britain under the 
act. 
18. See also Lysaght, 1980; Caherty et al (1992); Hoffman, 1980. 
19. Greaves Memorial Lecture, 1989 
20. The Expansion of Industry Act marked the shift in policy in the South after the failure of industrialisation 
through tariff protection towards the attraction of foreign capital through extensive grants and subsidies. 
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Chapter Two 
The State and Social Divisions 
Introduction 
The differences in the debate discussed in the previous chapter centre on the source 
of divisions between Protestants and Catholics, and the extent to which the Northern 
Ireland state, within its current boundaries, is 'irreformable'. A related question is the 
interest of the UK state in maintaining these divisions, and whether reformist polices 
under Direct Rule are capable of undermining sectarianism. 
Discussion on religious divisions has until recently been relatively isolated from 
economic analysis. The economy tends to be dealt with fairly sketchily in the literature 
discussed above, with discrimination seen largely as a political phenomenon. 
Mainstream economists, on the other hand, priding themselves on their 'value-free' 
approach have seen the question as outside their sphere. This tradition continues in a 
recent textbook produced by economists from Queen's University in Belfast. Of its 
several hundred pages, two are devoted to religious discrimination, as an appendix to 
a chapter on the labour market (Harris, 1990). The recent study by Rowthorn and 
Wayne (1988) is one of the first analyses of Northern Ireland by economists which has 
made religious discrimination a central theme. 
But the continuing efforts of government to isolate republicanism has brought some 
shift of emphasis. Religious discrimination in employment has become a highly sensitive 
political issue in recent years, with powers extended to the Fair Employment 
Commission (FEC) far exceeding those of other state-funded anti-discrimination bodies 
in Britain or Northern Ireland. Ministers clearly want to be seen to be addressing a 
Catholic grievance which has been at the heart of nationalist complaints about the 
unfairness of the Northern Ireland state. At the same time efforts have been redoubled 
to undermine the legitimacy of critics of government policy.' 
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While interest is focused on male unemployment, sexual disadvantage remains both a 
secondary and a separate concern. The institutional separation of 'fair employment' 
from 'equal opportunities' is mirrored in political campaigning on these issues and in 
academic literature. Campaigns for women's rights have generally attempted to bridge 
the religious divide by avoiding 'sensitive' issues. Nevertheless, many have foundered 
on this question (Evason, 1991 ; Ward, 1991). The reluctance of republicans to disturb 
their base of support in the Catholic community has limited the development of their 
programme for women's equality.2 It has also made cautious in campaigning for such 
things as gay rights which do form part of their the programme (McLaughlin, 1986). 
The academic literature has remained in even more distinct groups. If mentioned at all 
in the literature on national divisions, the importance of gender is merely noted. On the 
other hand, virtually all work on women and the labour market ignores religion 
(McGuire, 1987; Morrissey, 1991; Barry & Jackson, 1988). A recent work by Cockburn 
(1991) on exclusionary practices against women includes a substantial section on 
Northern Ireland, but makes no mention of religion. It is surprising that Cockburn who 
has made a significant contribution to feminist theorising of the social construction of 
gendered work should ignore this issue, while in the same work making efforts to 
incorporate racial divisions in her work. 
An early exception was Janet Trewsdale's analysis of gender and religious divisions in 
the labour market based on census data (Trewsdale, 1983). While this represented an 
important breakthrough, the work suffers from limitations inherent in mainstream 
economic theorising, taking as 'given' factors which need to be explained. She 
concludes that Catholic women suffer disadvantage on account of sex but not religion. 
In a more recent work, McWilliams (1991) argues that Catholic women suffer specific 
disadvantage in relation to the labour market as a result of the high unemployment of 
Catholic men. 
These studies were based on officially published statistics. No detailed study of 
sectarianism in the workplace has been produced comparable to those on gender such 
as Cockburn's (1991, 1983); or those of McLaughlin & Ingram (1991) or Maguire 
(1987) in relation to Northern Ireland. This reflects the continuing sensitivity of the 
issue. 
Religion is not a straightforward category in Northern Ireland. The meanings attached 
to a person's identification with one religious group or another have little to do with 
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religious belief. Because religion is not an immediately visible identity, a variety of 
secondary indicators are used to assign an individual to religious group. The FEe uses, 
"as indiclltors the forenllmes lind surnllmes, the schools IIttended, the subjects studied, the leisure 
interests, the employment histories lind the persons nllmed as referees on sppliclltion forms" (FEC 
1986, p3J. 
This list illustrates the degree of separation of the lives of Protestant and Catholic. In 
Northern Ireland, 'telling', the 
"Syndrome of signs by which Clltholics lind Protestllnts IIrrive lit religious ascription in their every 
dllY interllction" (Howe 1990, p13J. 
becomes an integral part of social life. The sensitivity surrounding the issue helps 
explain why many have preferred to avoid the issue, or to mention it obliquely.3 
Nevertheless, the official surveys which ask questions on religion report a good 
response,4 in spite of a limited boycott of the religion question in the 1981 census. This 
has allowed more detailed analysis of the structural positions of the two communities. 
Religious Divisions 
Explanations for inequalities in the labour market fall into two broad categories. The first 
seek the answer in characteristics of Catholics themselves, and deny the existence of 
discrimination on any significant scale; the second see discrimination as the main 
problem. Some argue that discrimination can be eliminated through expanded 
employment and equal opportunities polices; others believe that it is too embedded in 
the structures of Northern Ireland to be overcome within Northern Ireland itself. The 
labour aristocracy theory is the most widely accepted by the latter group. I shall briefly 
review these groups of explanation below, ending this section with a discussion of 
theories of racial/ethnic divisions and their relevance for Northern Ireland. 
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a) Catholics as the source of the problem 
i) 'Cultural differences' 
In its most explicitly pro-Unionist version, Catholics are viewed as 'spongers' who do 
not want to work (Rolston & Tomlinson, 1988 p56) and furthermore, criticise the state 
while accepting "welfare benefits all too eagerly, benefits they could not hope to 
receive across the border" (Howe, 1990, p38). Catholics cannot be trusted, since they 
are 'disloyal' (Farrell, 1980). Even as respectable a figure as Professor Thomas Wilson, 
author of the Wilson Report on Economic Development in Northern Ireland opined that 
"as for business life, Presbyterians and Jews are probably endowed with more business IIcumen thlln 
Irish Catholics .•. They were made to feel inferior, and to make matters worse they often were 
inferior, if only in those personal qualities that mllke for success in competitive economic life" 
(quoted in Lee, 1985 p418, emphasis in originlll). 
A more 'acceptable' version of this argument is that Catholics' larger family size is a 
disincentive to work, while higher population growth accounts for the gap between jobs 
and available labour supply in the Catholic community. This idea involves the notion that 
there are 'Catholic jobs' and 'Protestant jobs' (Howe, 1990). Compton, one of the main 
proponents of the population thesis, concludes from an analysis of population trends: 
"While some unfairness in job alloclltion may exist, it is structural imbalances generllted by fllctors 
specific to the Roman Catholic community, such lIS higher rllte of population growth, lower socilll 
status, larger families, and a divergence between geographiclIl distribution lind the loclltion of jobs, 
that account for II considerllble Pllrt of the displlrity" (Compton, 1981, p140). 
This argument is also related to Protestant fear that they will be 'outbred' by Catholics, 
and so lose their control over the state. 
Osborne, a leading authority on unemployment differentials, rejects this view. He argues 
that Catholic disadvantage had appeared before the birth rates of the two communities 
began to differ substantially, and that these rates are becoming more similar again, 
while the differential remains. Furthermore this view takes no account of labour market 
processes where practices include "exclusion, segregation and unfair hiring practices" 
(Osborne, 1987, p279). 
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McWilliams (1991) argues that the benefit system deters wives of unemployed men 
from working, particularly part-time. Since Catholic men are more likely to be 
unemployed, this has a disproportionate effect on Catholic women. Surveys of attitudes 
to work do not suggest any religious difference in desire for stable long-term 
employment (Osborne, op cit; Kremer & Curry, 1986), although the very high 
unemployment rates among Catholics can have the effect of discouraging them from 
seeking work (Howe, 1990). 
ii) Location 
Compton suggests the geographical distribution of the two communities as another 
cause of high Catholic unemployment, and Trewsdale uses it to explain the higher rate 
of unemployment among Catholic women. Catholics are overrepresented in areas West 
of the Bann, where unemployment is high. This argument has been challenged at two 
levels. Firstly Catholic unemployment is higher in all areas (Census of Population, 1971; 
1981). Secondly, the location of employment is not accidental, but is affected by state 
policies which have often been blatantly sectarian (O'Dowd, 1981). This issue is 
discussed further in Chapter Three. 
A variation of this argument relates unemployment differentials to industrial structure, 
suggesting that Catholics are concentrated in sectors with high unemployment 
(Compton, 1981). This ignores the problem of access to certain types of employment 
for Catholics (for example in shipbuilding and engineering). 
iii Education 
Relatively lower educational attainment by Catholics is another possible source of 
difference. Osborne is cautious about this explanation, because 
·CHS dlltll suggests thllt Clltholics lire more likely to be unemployed than Protestants irrespective 
of the level of qualification held and thllt this relationship is evident IIcross lIfIe groups. • fop cit. p 
280) 
It also begs the question why Catholics should have lower qualifications. Part of the 
explanation must lie in the segregated system of schooling. Until recently Catholic 
schools have had to find a large part of their funding from their own community, and 
this was reflected in poorer resources and larger class size (Murray, 1983). Catholic 
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girls' schools provided fewer opportunities for girls to learn science while in general a 
different profile of subjects tended to be taken by the two communities «Trewsdale, 
1983; Osborne, 1985). 
All the above arguments take as 'given' factors which need to be explained. They are 
part of the specific structures of the state, and reflect its sectarian and conservative 
character. 
b) Discrimination 
The widespread discrimination in employment, and other areas, under Unionist rule is 
well documented.5 Government policy since Direct Rule has curbed the more overt 
practices, and some commentators now claim that discrimination is a thing of the past. 
Academic support for this view has come from Compton, and from some economists, 
particularly those associated with the Northern Ireland Economic Research Council 
(NIERC). The latter have argued that the target of reducing the male unemployment 
differential is unsustainable because of the slow turnover in the labour market (Murphy 
and Gudgin, 1991). 
This issue developed into public controversy when the Director of NIERC was 
commissioned by Belfast City Council to defend it after an FEC report pointed to 
inadequacies in their employment policies (Irish News, 2.4.1992). The response of the 
chair of the FEC, Bob Cooper was forthright: 
·'t is nonsense to argue that they don't discriminate. You can't guarantee that there is no 
discrimination by any employer. At Purdysburn Hospital there is overrepresentation of Catholics but 
they were still found to have discriminated against a Catholic laundry worker . ..tI 
In this case, the Eastern Health Board was ordered to pay £25,000 in compensation. 
The FEC's Annual Report for 1990-1991 mentions 41 cases for which findings had 
been issued, of which unlawful discrimination was upheld in 14 (FEC, 1991). 
While direct discrimination is a result of individual decisions by employers, they do not 
control the social and economic structures in which they operate. Equal opportunities 
policy is isolated from other state policies, such as economic development and security, 
and thus have a limited impact on the structures which were built up over the years of 
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Unionist rule. Others have therefore explained Protestant/Catholic differentials as a 
product of structural relations within the Northern Ireland state. 
c) The Labour Aristocracy 
The labour aristocracy has "a central place in traditional Marxist analysis of Northern 
Ireland" (McAuley & McCormack, 1991, p116). It is however a contentious theory, 
both in relation to Ireland, and more generally. 
The concept is mainly associated with Lenin's 'Imperialism' (Lenin, 1982). His aim in 
that work was to analyse the relationship between capitalism and imperialism, and to 
explain the support given by the workers' movements of the imperialist countries to the 
war efforts of their ruling class during World War One. Although the labour aristocracy 
was an important part of his explanation, his treatment of it was sketchy. Lenin 
described the labour aristocracy as 
"the upper stratum (which) furnishes the bulk of the membership of co-operatives, of trade unions, 
of sporting clubs and numerous religious sects. To this level is adapted the electorlll system" (Lenin, 
1982, p99). 
Superprofits from the possession of colonies made it 
"economically possible to bribe the upper strata of the proletarillt, lind thereby fosters, gives shllpe 
to, and strengthens opportunism" (ibid, p98 ) 
This group therefore depended for its relatively privileged position on imperialist 
conquest, and saw its interests as ultimately tied to those of the ruling class. There is 
thus an objective reason for divisions in the working class. 
An article by Eric Hobsbawm in 1964 stimulated renewed interest in the idea. 
Hobsbawm aimed to characterise more precisely the labour aristocracy in nineteenth 
century England, identifying it in primarily sociological terms. He did not attempt to 
trace the link between the labour aristocracy and imperialism, referring in fact to three 
distinct eras - the industrial revolution, the classic age of the Labour Aristocracy and the 
age of imperialism - a periodisation which would appear to preclude the relation which 
Lenin propounded (Hobsbawm, 1986). 
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In the subsequent literature, criticism of the work of Hobsbawm and Lenin has centred 
around three main issues: 
a) the problem of identifying the labour aristocracy as a distinct grouping 
It has been suggested that Hobsbawm's definition is too narrow and that possession 
of skills and higher wages are not necessarily defining features. For Gray (1981) a 
degree of control over the recruitment of labour, and for Foster (1974) control over the 
pace of production are important in differentiating 'aristocratic' workers. Foster 
emphasises the different life styles of the Labour Aristocracy - their involvement with 
the temperance movement, co-op, trade unions and the Liberal Party - which made 
them a 'respectable' working class, and purveyors of bourgeois ideas in the factory, and 
political organisations. 
Most contributors to this debate take the working class family as an unproblematic 
category: a feature of 'aristocratic' families was that the male's higher earnings enabled 
his wife to withdraw from the labour market. But Gray's work on nineteenth century 
Scotland showed how the division of labour in the factory "reinforced and reproduced 
sexual division within the family" (Gray, 1 981 ), with the men taking on tasks classed 
as skilled while women's work was deemed unskilled. The concept of 'skill' is itself 
'saturated with gender' (Phillips & Taylor, 1986). Status as a skilled worker depends 
on control over the labour process as much as 'objective' criteria of capabilities. 
The labour aristocracy implies that the working class will 
-normally unite in support of progressive and socialist ideas. Consequently, when they do not, a 
special explanation is required- fReid, 1980, p 113). 
Furthermore, it suggests that the least privileged sections will naturally be most 
politically advanced. But the working class is at any time split along a series of lines -
for example by gender, race and ethnicity, religion - so class unity is something to be 
forged in concrete circumstances around particular struggles (Anthias & Yuval Davis, 
1983). 
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b) the relation of the labour aristocracy to imperialism 
In Hobsbawm's work, the labour aristocracy appeared before the classic age of 
imperialism. Although Lenin did point out that in Britain, economic developments and 
colonial super profits occurred earlier, this does raise questions about the general 
usefulness of the concept. 
Some critics argue that higher wages derived from internal sources rather than 
imperialism. Moorhouse (1978) stresses the revolution in techniques following the 
industrial revolution which brought accumulation through expanding labour productivity 
rather than extending the working day (relative rather than absolute surplus value) and 
allowed capitalists to concede higher wages. For Nairn (1964) and Anderson (1964), 
the impact of imperialism was primarily in developing a nationalist consciousness in the 
working class, rather than creating the material conditions for division. 
c) the lack of a clearly specified mechanism for the 'bribery' of the working class 
Lenin does not explain how superprofits are used to 'bribe' workers, and there is no 
evidence for any direct bribery. Gupta (1975) argues that if workers were bribed by 
imperialism, it should be most in evidence in industries, for example ship building, most 
dependent on imperial markets. This, he suggests, is not the case. Foster (op cit) in his 
study of Oldham claims to show a direct link between imperialism and the labour 
aristocracy, by arguing that workers in the engineering industry gained more security 
from the export of machinery to Russia. 
One can argue that there· is no necessity for a direct link between individual groups of 
workers and capitalists: employers will not necessarily set out consciously to buy off 
workers through higher wages, but colonial superprofits allow the possibility of 
conceding higher wages and welfare provision to organised groups of workers without 
jeopardising accumulation. 
The Labour Aristocracy in the Northern Ireland Context 
Following Connolly's use of the labour aristocracy to describe the 'Orange working 
class' at the beginning of the century, anti-imperialists have adopted the concept as a 
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standard tool. Religious divisions are viewed as arising from the material privileges 
which Protestants derive through their relationship to the state. The term has however 
been stretched to cover a variety of groups and situations, and sometimes appears more 
as a general derogatory description of Protestant privilege than one with a precise 
meaning. Revisionists have tended to use it in a much more restricted sense which they 
claim is closer to Lenin's own work (Bew et ai, 1980, p158). 
Labour aristocracy has been used variously to describe the Protestant community (Bell, 
1976, p22), the Protestant working class (Marlowe & Palmer, 1978, p12)' Protestant 
manual workers (Farre", 1980, p16)' or Protestant skilled workers (Gibbon, 1975). In 
each case it is identified as Protestant. This slippage of meaning can present a view of 
the Protestant community as homogeneous, or a simplistic identification of Protestant 
with skilled labour and Catholic with unskilled. It is often used ahistorica"y, suggesting 
that no significant change has taken place since Partition. Marlowe & Palmer, quoting 
Connolly argue that "the Protestant workers formed a labour aristocracy which allied 
itself with imperialism" (op cit, p12). This aristocracy has, they suggest, persisted 
throughout the whole period, and in "Belfast, the workers are divided into unskilled 
Catholic and skilled Protestant workers" (ibid, p13). 
Anti-imperialists tend to use labour aristocracy in its wider senses, to explain the 
material existence of specifically Protestant privilege, and the impossibility of reforming 
the Northern Ireland state. The possibility of any commonality of interests between 
Protestant and Catholic is denied. Marlowe & Palmer, describing the "economic and 
social revival of Ulster in all spheres" in the O'Neill period of the 1960s, say 
categorically that it was "only the Loyalists who enjoyed the benefits" (ibid p19). 
For the revisionists the labour aristocracy refers to specific groups of skilled workers at 
a particular point in time, such as Gibbon's discussion of shipyard workers at the turn 
of the century. According to Gibbon, their aristocratic status derived from possession 
of craft skills which gave them some independence; a high degree of control over their 
own conditions and pace of work; and the physical isolation of the docks which "lent 
it the status of a culture-building work of its own" (Gibbon, 1975, p84). The shipyard 
was "a bulwark of British imperialist might", and consequently the prosperity of the 
shipyard workers was tied to "the state of British capitalism internationally" (ibid). For 
Reid, however, attachment to the labour aristocracy undermines the usefulness of his 
analysis, since it 
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·tends to underestimste the complexity of the shipysrd Isbour process and produces the notion of 
s homogeneous Isbour sristocrscy . • (Reid, 1980, p84) 
For Gibbon as for Sew, the distinct ideology of the labour aristocracy "combining 
militant anti-Catholicism with democratic anti-landlord and anti-capitalism sentiment" 
(Sew et ai, 1979, p46) was undermined by the populist wing of the Unionist 
bourgeoisie with the formation of Northern Ireland. The labour aristocracy is not a 
permanent feature, and "sectarianism is not a structural component of the state ... 
rather the outcome of particular moments of class struggle" (Stewart, 1991, p194). 
When this group of workers reappears in their analysis, they are seen as the most 
progressive section of Protestant workers: in opposition to anti-imperialist conceptions 
of the labour aristocracy, they argue that it was skilled workers who were the backbone 
of the Northern Ireland Labour Party in the 1950s (Sew et ai, 1980, p158). However, 
in viewing this party as unambiguously progressive and secular, they underestimate the 
degree to which support for sectarianism could coexist with a specifically Protestant 
working class politics. 
Soth the wide and narrow conception of labour aristocracy are deeply flawed. The 
revisionists are right to point to confusions in the anti-imperialist version, but their own 
analysis is unsatisfactory. It separates the existence of the Unionist state, with its 
"apparatus of fifty year's reproduction of populist sectarianism" (ibid, p161) from the 
working class, the recipients of sectarian privilege, and makes abstract calls for "unity 
of the oppressed" (ibid, p160). 
The labour aristocracy idea carries too heavy a weight of explanation in the 
anti-imperialist version. The term was inadequately developed by Lenin, and far from 
adding theoretical rigour to the anti-imperialist account, tends to act as a barrier to 
understanding. The positive aspect is that it suggests a material explanation for working 
class divisions. These are not related purely to wage differentials, but spread into every 
aspect of life, and derive from the relationship of Protestants to the state. But in 
attempting to make Protestant workers fit the Leninist concept, they falsely conflate 
Protestants with skilled workers. There is no simple one-to-one relation between 
Protestants and skilled work, although there are major differences in the proportions of 
skilled workers in each group, as with other indicators of inequality. Perhaps more 
importantly, in Protestant consciousness, they are the skilled workers, and Catholics 
"the despised 'croppies'" (Wilson quoted in Lee, 1989, p418). 
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The relation with Britain, and the Empire has been crucial to Orangeism, both in terms 
of material interest and ideology. As Gibbon's analysis suggests, Protestant-dominated 
industry developed to serve a world - and particularly Empire - market. At partition, 
much of it was directly or indirectly concerned with armaments and other war 
commodities, and thus the fate of Protestant workers was tied to the fate of the 
Empire. The descendants of the colonial settlers of Cromwell's time, Protestants still 
in many ways see themselves as defenders of the British Empire, maintaining civilised 
standards and the Protestant way of life against the tide of barbarism or Romanism 
(Bell, 1976). Loyalty is demonstrated in the annual celebration of the Battles of Empire 
by Orange Lodges. During World War II, a Commonwealth Labour Party was formed in 
Northern Ireland. 
The decline of the traditional industrial base on which the skilled labour force depended, 
suggests that explanations for the continuation of Protestant privilege must be sought 
elsewhere than either the historically limited version of the labour aristocracy of the 
revisionists, or the historically unchanging version of some anti-imperialists. The sense 
of betrayal felt by the Protestant community over the Anglo-Irish agreement (Teague, 
1987), and the spectacle of loyalists marching against the British government, and at 
times engaging in bloody confrontation with the RUC, suggests that these relationships 
may not be immutable. 
d) Ethnicity in Northern Ireland 
If the labour aristocracy provides a limited theoretical basis for understanding sectarian 
divisions, alternatives must be sought which both encompass the depth of these 
divisions, and their capacity for continuity and change. In his study of two Belfast 
housing estates, Howe describes how the 
"two communities have been established and they are kept in being by the complex inttJraction of 
cultural, ethnic, political and economic factors. ThtlSe tend to be mutually reinforcing, .• , the cultural 
differences which act as boundary markers, to label and identify the two groups Me also used to 
recruit people to kinship groups, economic role8 and political positions and this in tum consolidatflS 
the separation of the two communities" (How., 1990, p31J. 
This use of ethnicity is powerful in describing the segregation of the two communities, 
and the links between the economic and cultural aspects, neither of which are captured 
by the labour aristocracy. But it is important that an understanding of difference should 
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not be at the expense of inequality, which is central to the labour aristocracy theory. 
The definition of an ethnic group generally denotes "some level of political, cultural or 
economic inferiority" (Ramazanoglu, 1989, p119). As Anthias and Yuval Davis (1983) 
put it, 
"Our use of the term ethnicity has as B centrBI element exclusionBry/inclusionlJry prBctices Bnd the 
relBtions of power of dominBnce/subordinBtion" (p67). 
Ethnicity and race are often used as interchangeable concepts (as in 'ethnic minority') 
and they share "both the categories of exclusion and power". But "(r)acist discourse 
posits an essential biological determination to culture" (ibid p67). Miles & Phizacklea 
(1980 ) define racism as: 
"those negBtive beliefs held by one group which identify Bnd set Bpart another by attributing 
significBnce to some biologicBI or other 'inherent' characteristic(s) .... The possession of these 
supposed chllrllcteristics is then used as justification for denying thBt group equBI Bccess to msteriBI 
and other resources and/or politicill rights. " (p22) 
In the Northern Ireland context there is no obvious physical distinction between 
Protestant and Catholic on which to hang racist practice. But "the social practice of 
racial difference cannot be understood in terms of physical difference" (Ramazanoglu, 
p120) and 
"'race' has no reality other than as a social construction" .. (so) .. whBt hss to be explBined is not 
'rBce in itself' but a SOciBI construction" (Miles & PhizackleB, 7980, p2). 
The FEC's guidelines for assessing religion mentioned above use the classifications 
"ProtestBnt, Roman Catholic or Other, where Other wss used variously to describe those for whom 
the Agency officer was not prepared to make a religious identification and those not bom or 
educated in Northem Ireland" (FEC, 7986, p 6). 
This makes clear that the categories 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' only have social 
meaning within the context of Northern Ireland. Curtis (1984b) has shown how Irish 
people have been 'racialised' and portrayed as 'inferior' throughout the history of 
colonialism. In the nineteenth century, at the height of 'scientific' racism, the need to 
control the Irish was 'explained' in terms of the presumed biological characteristics of 
smaller skull sizes and different shaped heads. 
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Wilson (see above) makes use of supposedly 'inherent' characteristics of Catholics to 
explain their inferior status as do the other negative stereotypes which centre on 
'disloyalty', 'laziness', 'scrounging'. There are of course reciprocal stereotypes among 
the Catholic community. Murray's study of the staff of schools serving different 
communities showed that Catholics thought of Protestants as humourless and 
hard-working (Murray, 1985). But apart from the differences in the images themselves, 
the Catholics' views of Protestants are not reinforced by political power over them. 
While it seems apparent that varying forms of racist discourse have been used to 
underpin Protestant exclusionary practices, I find the use of ethnicity, which does not 
depend on a supposed biological base, a more generally useful concept in relation to 
Northern Ireland. Anthias and Yuval Davis define 'ethnic phenomena' as 
·forrns of ideological construct which divide people into different collectivities or communities. This 
will involve exclusionary/inclusionary boundaries ..•. although the constructs are ideological, they 
involve real material practices and therefore origins and effects- (ibid p66). 
This encompasses the essential elements in the relationship between the two 
communities. It makes central the notion of power relations, which are tied to 
exclusion/inclusion. The importance of material practices is also stressed, which in 
Northern Ireland appear in various forms of discrimination operated both an individual 
and group level, and at the level of the state. 
Another dimension to ethnicity in Northern Ireland is the way in which gender imagery 
is blended with religious difference, so that Catholics are stereotyped as 'female' and 
the dominant Protestant group is portrayed as male (Goldring, 1991). Anthias and Yuval 
Davis (1989) argue that gender is important in marking the 'boundaries' of nations and 
ethnic groups. In Northern Ireland, relations of oppression based on religion have 
invoked gender. Woman's eternal suffering is a metaphor for Ireland's oppression. 
'Mother Ireland' 'dark Rosaleen' is a figure running through nationalist mythology and 
culture, while Derry City is known both as the 'Maiden City' and 'mother of us all' 
(McLaughlin, 1986). Neither image is liberating, and their converse, the whore, is as 
essential complement to this notion of womanhood (Rolston, 1989). Protestant imagery 
is masculine, with male power in the workplace and the family buttressing Protestant 
power in the state. 
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These stereotypes are reflected in the labour market, where traditionally female 
occupations are also predominantly Catholic, while the archetypal Protestant worker is 
the male, skilled manual worker. 'Female' jobs are of course of relatively low status, 
and reflect the difficulty of access for Catholic men (as well as women) to high status 
occupations. Both are "underpinned by a notion of a 'natural' relation" which serves to 
"legitimise" inequality (Anthias & Yuval Davis 1983, p67). 
The Dual Labour Market 
Dual labour market theories - originally developed to explain the segregation of black 
workers in the United States in low-status jobs, and also used in relation to gender -
would appear to have some relevance here. In an early formulation Gordon (1972) 
rejects the neo-classical view of a homogeneous labour market, arguing that 
segmentation arises because firms require different types of labour which dictate 
different employment strategies: on the one hand, in order to retain skilled labour, 
employers need to create an internal career structure (the primary labour market), while 
for unskilled, dispensable labour, insecurity is important in maintaining management 
control (the secondary labour market). The promotion of disunity between workers is 
also important. 
The recognisability of different groups (eg black workers; women) provides a convenient 
screening device for recruitment to the two labour markets, while the characteristics 
ascribed to these workers legitimate unequal treatment (eg women are unreliable 
because of domestic commitments; black workers are lazy, unskilled). On the other 
hand, some characteristics applied to these groups are desirable from the point of view 
of employers (women's 'nimble fingers'; Asian women's 'docility'). But since these 
characteristics of subordinated groups are taken to be natural, they are not accorded 
status in terms of higher wages. 
In Northern Ireland, Catholics are lazy, unreliable, and disloyal, but they also have the 
'female' quality of caring, and are overrepresented in the female professions as well as 
unskilled labour. Their 'recognisability' comes not primarily from physical 
characteristics, but from socially acquired characteristics (accent, schooling, place of 
residence) whose divisions along religious lines are embedded in society, and are well 
known to potential employers. The Catholic/Protestant division has also served to create 
a workforce with different characteristics - Catholics have fewer technical skills and 
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experience of work so even without overt discrimination, a separated workforce is 
perpetuated. 
The Dual Labour Markets theory has been criticised on three main grounds. Firstly there 
are major exceptions, which leave groups unexplained. One of the most obvious of 
these is 'female' professional occupations. This clearly applies to the growing number 
of Catholic women professionals in Northern Ireland, the majority of whom are engaged 
in servicing their own community. Secondly the theory takes as given the 'ascribed' 
characteristics of the dominated group, and does not enquire into their origins. It is 
"easy to confuse the properties of jobs with characteristics of job holders" (Barron & 
Norris, 1976) while those who hold particular jobs may acquire these characteristics, 
so the explanation becomes circular. 
Thirdly, emphasis on employers' manipulation of labour underestimates the role played 
by the dominant group of workers in excluding potential competitors. Exclusionary 
practices can be against the interests of capital, as in the case of the struggle by print 
workers against management attempts to replace skilled male labour with 'semi-skilled' 
female labour (Cockburn, 1983), or the strike by white workers in South Africa in the 
1920s to maintain a colour bar excluding black workers from skilled jobs. Exclusionary 
practices in Northern Ireland, such as the use of Protestant Orange Lodges for recruiting 
labour, are well documented and clearly require the collaboration of both management 
and labour. But there have also been times when management and workers have come 
into conflict on this issue, for example at Harland and Wolff in the 1860s (see Chapter 
Three) and more recently at Short Brothers on the question of the display of Loyalist 
flags. 
A fourth problem, which is of particular importance in the Northern Ireland context, is 
the tendency to view the capitalist firm in isolation from the wider role society. But the 
state not only reproduces the values of the dominant group, but intervenes directly in 
the labour market through legislation which has differential effects. Firms also have 
individual relations to the state as for example recipients of subsidies and suppliers of 
commodities. The Stormont regime explicitly legitimated discrimination against 
Catholics. Lord Craigavon, the first prime minister, was quoted in 1933 as saying: 
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WThere were a great number of Protestants and Orangemen who employed Roman Catholics. he felt 
he could speak freely on this subject as he had not a Roman Catholic about his own plllce . •.. He 
would appeal to Loyalists therefore, wherever possible, to employ good Protestant Illds lind lasses. W 
(Farrell, 1980, p90) 
Segregation in Northern Ireland takes a distinct form as a result of a history which has 
given a unique social meaning to the categories Protestant and Catholic. In introducing 
ethnicity into the discussion, I have attempted to do two things. Firstly to provide a 
more comprehensive category for understanding the social, economic and political 
segregation of the two groups in Northern Ireland than is provided by the usual analysis 
in terms of labour aristocracy. And secondly, to suggest that these divisions are not a 
product of a peculiar Irish attachment to religious struggles which the rest of the world 
has outgrown; rather they have similarities to, though they are distinct from, other 
forms of ethnic division. These divisions, which appear as religious sectarianism have 
their own 'relatively independent rhythms' (Rolston & Munck, 1987, p95), so 
·class and religion generated two forms of political practice ... and were not mutually exclusive· (ibid 
p8). 
Gender Subordination 
The religious divide which dominates political life both reinforces the patriarchal nature 
of Northern Ireland society, and undermines the self-organisation of women against 
gender inequality. For while these divisions centred on religious affiliation are not about 
religion as such, they nevertheless mean that the Church becomes an important focus 
in organising the community and shaping political and social views. Feminists have to 
confront not only the ideological dominance of church teaching, but the idea that to 
argue for a politics which rejects the Church shows disloyalty to the group. McLaughlin, 
in her study of Derry City found that: 
·to identify as Catholic was, and still is, perceived by many Catholics as IIfI anti-colonial act in itseff-
(while colonialism had) -ensured the survival in Northern Ireland of a pM'ticul.,1y conservativ. form 
of Catholicism· (McLaughlin, 1986, p369J. 
This conservatism, particularly on the family and sexuality is also shared by the 
Protestant Churches. Unionist control of the state apparatus, has restricted women's 
rights both by legal prohibitions (on for example abortion), and through lack of social 
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provision (for example childcare). This situation has impeded women's involvement in 
the labour force and in political life both at a practical and ideological level. 
The literatures on gender and religious divisions have, as noted above, remained very 
distinct. This is not unique to Northern Ireland. Separation of gender from race/ethnicity 
has been a feature of feminist literature in general, which, particularly in the 1970s took 
the white nuclear family as the norm,7 while much of the literature on race assumed a 
male-centred model (eg Castles and Kosack, 1974). Nevertheless, many theoretical 
concerns are shared, and some concepts developed in one area (including the Dual 
Labour Market theory discussed above) have been borrowed and adapted to the other. 
A substantial literature on gender inequality in work has been developed in the past 
three decades (for example Beechey, 1987; Walby, 1986 and 1991; Amsden 1982; 
Feminist Review, 1986) This has addressed three main issues: inequality of access to 
paid work; income and status differentials in paid work; and segregation in the 
workplace. Early theories tended to concentrate on the family and domestic labour as 
obstacles to women's participation in paid labour, while more recently discussion of the 
workplace itself has predominated. Theories in both groups span a range of positions, 
from liberal to socialist feminist. I shall not attempt a comprehensive critique of these 
views, but try to point to ideas which have been particularly important in understanding 
gender divisions in Northern Ireland, or those which offer insights into both gender and 
sectarian divisions. 
The Family and Gender Subordination 
Liberalism 
Analysis of the family and domestic labour has been placed outside mainstream 
economic theorising. Political economy as a discipline developed with the development 
of industrial capitalism, which brought the separation of production from the family. The 
economy became the public sphere of production, distribution, and exchange of 
commodities through the market. Reproduction of the labour force and care of 
dependents became a private activity. The role of family labour, which did not produce 
commodities, was excluded from socially productive labour, and therefore outside the 
scope of economic analysis. As well as excluding unpaid domestic labour, economic 
theory assumes away power relations within the family, taking the household as a unit 
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with a common interest. The altruism of the family is the antithesis of the individualist 
values of the market place. (Barrett & Mcintosh, 1982). Waylen's critique of neo-liberal 
theory is applicable to economic theorising generally: 
-There is obviously a contradiction here: on the one hand, individuals are the basic units of society, 
interacting in the free market, but, on the other hand, it is only the male head of the household who 
behaves as an individual. .., The main implication of this confllltion of neo-liberalism is thllt the 
doctrine of the individual becomes the doctrine of the male, as the sex which clln enjoy the 'rights' 
and 'privileges' of the free market" (Waylen, 1986, pp95-6J. 
These tensions emerged more explicitly within New Right thinking, where individualism 
in the economic sphere has been accompanied by conservative rhetoric on the family 
(David, 1986). The contradiction between economic freedom and 'traditional' values can 
be reconciled only if women are excluded from full participation in economic life. 
Conventional economics not only excludes discussion of the family, but marginalises 
analysis of sexual inequality in work. The approach precludes discussion of structural 
inequality, since the 'individual' comes to the market with a fixed endowment of 
'factors of production', and all are socially equivalent in a neutral market place. Within 
this framework, neo-classical theorists explain wage differentials by individual 
differences in 'human capital'. Women receive lower wages because of lower 
productivity due to differential acquisition of skills, training, experience (human capital). 
Discrimination is 'irrational' for a profit maximising firm, since if women could supply 
labour of the same productivity as men at a lower wage, they would be employed 
instead. Lower pay is a result of an individual's choice to spend less effort in acquiring 
marketable skills. This also rules out discrimination on other grounds, such as religion. 
This explanation has been challenged on empirical grounds (see for example Amsden, 
1980). More fundamentally, feminists have challenged the notion of skill as a purely 
objective category. (Cockburn, 1983; Phillips and Taylor, 1986). 
Human Capital theory takes for granted that it is women who should carry out domestic 
labour. Women have a 'comparative advantage' in caring, while men's advantage is in 
market-orientated attributes such as competitiveness. It is notable that in seeking 
explanations for sexual difference, economists have resorted to 'non-economic' 
explanations which are imported uncritically into the analysis. A similar process is used 
by Wilson to account for Catholic disadvantage. As Lee points out, 
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-Not only did he not feel obliged to produce a scintilla of evidence in support of his assumption of 
pervasive Catholic inferiority, but he failed to enquire if there might be any connection between the 
assumed inferiority and the admitted earlier discrimination. The rigour of the reasoning would 
scarcely pass muster with Wilson on any other subject- (Lee, op cit, p419). 
An alternative 'liberal feminist' view suggests that attitudes and values are not natural 
and unchanging, but socially constructed. Distinguishing between 'sex role' and 'gender 
role', they argue that women's career horizons are limited since they are socialised into 
seeing their primary role as wives and mothers. The corollary of this view is the need 
for measures to eliminate sexism, particularly in education. 
The growth of women's employment in the post-war period led to concern with the 
pressures placed on women by their 'dual role' as workers and mothers (Myrdal &. Klein, 
1970). The concentration was on barriers to women's entry into the labour force, and 
led to demands for more flexible working hours. However, these problems were seen 
as essentially a 'dilemma' for the individual woman, a conflict of roles, which she is 
able to overcome more or less satisfactorily. 
While this work raised serious issues, it is limited by a methodology which takes for 
granted what needs to be explained. The central questions of the functions of the family 
and the role of women as the main providers of domestic labour are not addressed. This 
methodology is evident in Trewsdale's work on Northern Ireland, in which she attributes 
religious differences in employment to different levels of skill, and to the location of 
industry, as if these were unproblematic facts. 
Marxist Theories 
Much feminist analysis developed as a response to perceived inadequacies in Marxism, 
and shares many of its central ideas. One of the most crucial is that exploitation and 
oppression are not incidental features of capitalism, but are essential elements of the 
system. But feminists argue that Marx's concentration on class division excluded 
serious consideration of sexual inequality and other non-class divisions. His work 
focused on the relations of commodity production; the sphere of reproduction, though 
acknowledged, was not of major interest. He tended to lapse into an essentialist view, 
taking the sexual division of labour in family relations for granted (Jagger, 1983). Engels 
(1970) made a pioneering material analysis of women's oppression, which he linked to 
the development of the family and private property. For him, however, women's 
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specific oppression - and indeed the family - would wither away with the socialisation 
of labour through modern industry. 
In the 1970s, a revival of interest in feminist ideas led Marxists to reexamine the basis 
for women's oppression under capitalism, particularly the persistence of the nuclear 
family. While recognising that the family was central to women's oppression, this was 
analysed primarily in terms of its functionality to capitalism. Various aspects of this 
relationship were prioritised by different theorists. 
a) Most concern focused on the relation of domestic labour to capital accumulation. 
While domestic labour is not a commodity, and therefore has no 'value', it is 
essential for the reproduction of labour power and therefore for capital (Gardiner, 
1975). Much energy was spent in 'the domestic labour debate' in trying to 
theorise the precise role of domestic labour (Molyneux, 1979). This debate 
remained abstract and in the end could only move on through more concrete 
studies. But the issues it raised have been of central importance to feminist 
theorising and political campaigning. 
b) Women's dependence on the male wage was used to explain their role as part 
of a reserve army of labour (Marx, 1976, vol ch 25). Women could be paid less 
than men since part of the cost of their reproduction was covered in the family. 
Thus women represented a marginal group who could be brought into the labour 
force in times of expansion, and return to the family when no longer needed 
(Beechey, 1987). Bruegel (1989) has argued convincingly that while this 
relationship may have been true for example during wartime, it cannot be used 
as a general explanation. Widespread gender segregation in the labour force 
means that women's work does not substitute directly for men's labour. 
c) Braverman (1974) in his work on the US economy argued that increasing 
management control over the labour process brought de.killing and the 
replacement of skilled male labour by female. This undermined the economic role 
of the family, which became important primarily as a unit for the consumption 
of the products of capitalist industry. Male and female roles thus tend to 
converge. 
d) Michele Barrett (1980) stressed the ideological role of the famHy in ensuring the 
stability of capitalist relations of production. She theorises a triangular 
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relationship between the family, state and the workplace, in which familial 
ideology is mediated through all three institutions. 
These various positions were extremely important in removing the 'invisibility' of 
domestic labour and showing its crucial economic and social role. But the functionality 
of the family to capitalism was over-emphasised at the expense of both the extent to 
which men benefit from women's subordination, and the contradictions between family 
and capitalism. 
Feminism and the household 
The use of the term patriarchy gives central importance to gender relations. While it has 
been used in many different ways, and some feminists are unhappy with using it at all 
(Beechey, 1987)' it serves to focus attention on the way unequal power relations are 
embedded in social structures; the state, family, workplace. The relation between 
patriarchy and capitalism has been variously interpreted: radical feminism counterposes 
patriarchy as the main oppressor to the Marxist concentration on exploitation by 
capitalism. Others have viewed them as two systems of oppression. For Hartmann 
(1979), the two became one system of 'capitalist patriarchy'. For Delphy (1984), the 
two spheres are distinct. She used a theory analogous to the marxist theory of surplus 
value to explain the exploitation of women's unpaid labour in the family. 
I prefer a view of patriarchy and capitalism as two relatively autonomous systems, 
neither reducible to the other. In this view, patriarchy is both functional to capitalism, 
but also contradictory with it. The relation is one of "conflict and accommodation" (Dale 
& Foster, 1986), and varies in different historical periods (Walby, 1986). For example 
the post-war expansion of the female labour force enabled profitable accumulation, but 
undermined patriarchal control in the household (ten Tusscher, 1986). 
This analysis helps illuminate the contradictions at the heart of the neo-liberal theory, 
which stem from the fact that commodity production (the 'economic' sphere) is 
dependent on reproduction of labour power outside the sphere of commodity production 
itself. Though capitalism viewed in the abstract may appear ungendered, this is not 
possible either historically, or theoretically, since capital accumulation is dependent on 
the sexual division of labour within the 'private sphere' of the family. Capital cannot 
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directly control this process. Although the state intervenes to regulate the family and 
reproduction, there are limits to this intervention within capitalism (Keane, 1988). 
The presentation of the 'nuclear' family with male breadwinner and dependent wife, as 
the universal type of family relation under capitalism has been attacked by black 
feminists as Eurocentric. In Northern Ireland, high male unemployment means that 
women, particularly Catholics, are often not dependent on a male wage, but via their 
husbands on welfare benefits. This also restricts their own access to labour market. It 
does not appear however that male unemployment has a major impact on the domestic 
division of labour (Campbell et ai, 1991). 
Much of the analysis discussed so far tends to view the household in isolation: 
women's oppression in the family is counterposed to a relatively gender-free workplace. 
This is particularly pronounced in Delphy's version of sexual exploitation at home, and 
capitalist exploitation at work. The notion of public patriarchy (Walby, 1990) focuses 
on the world of paid work, and the state, as major reproducers of gender domination. 
Gender in the Workplace 
In every economy in the world, there is women's work and men's work, although what 
is women's work in one country may be men's work elsewhere. What is constant is 
inequality in status and rewards. The range of female occupations is narrower than male 
(Beechey, 1986). This horizontal segregation is tied to vertical segregation (Hakim, 
1979). In all occupational groups women are under-represented at the top, even if (as 
in 'female professions' such as teaching) they dominate the bottom rungs. 
Women and men experience employment restructuring differently. The growth of 
part-time employment has been almost entirely female, while for men, flexible 
employment is achieved through for example overtime working. Beecheyand Perkins 
(1987) suggest that 
-many of the characteristics of part-time work do not stem from some (I""erlll economically defined 
process ..... the division between full-time and part-time work is one crucial contemporary 
manifestation of (lender within the sphere of production - (pp8-9J. 
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Divisions based on gender intersect with those of class, ethnicity and so on. In Northern 
Ireland the sectarian division has led to specific types of labour becoming 'Protestant 
men's work', or 'Catholic women's work.' 
Studies of individual work places demonstrate how gender saturates all aspects of the 
work experience. Cockburn (1991) describes how masculinity and femininity is 
constructed in different working environments. In comparing for example civil servants 
and male manual workers, she shows how very different conceptions of masculinity can 
be equally exclusionary. 
The garment industry in Northern Ireland displays a high degree of gender segregation, 
and 
"pay rates have historically been determined by the sex of those in an occupation rather than by the 
inherent complexity and responsibility of the job. " (McLaughlin & Ingram, 1991, p46J. 
Liberal feminists recognise the existence of discrimination in the workplace, and aim to 
eliminate unfair practices. 'Sexism' and 'traditional attitudes' on the part of individual 
employers are blamed. Legislation on equal pay and sex discrimination and the abolition 
of restrictions such as those which forced women to leave work on marriage, have 
removed much of the formal barriers to equality in the UK. 
Feminists also point to the existence of informal power structures which exclude 
women (Cockburn, 1983; 1991). An alternative 'female networking' has become 
common, particularly among women in business and the professions. Equal 
opportunities policies often recognise these informal power structures, and aim to 
eliminate discriminatory practices in recruitment and promotion by creating sets of 
procedures based on neutral criteria. These criteria are designed to eliminate not merely 
sex bias but also for example religious bias.8 
But while for the liberal feminist these problems are essentially solvable by these 
measures, gender inequality remains a structural feature of paid work. 
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Exclusionary Practices 
Some feminists have argued that exclusionary practices in the workplace have been as 
important as the family in restricting women's involvement in the labour force. Walby 
(1986) has shown how female entry to many occupations was prevented through 
exclusive male trade union control and legal restrictions in the nineteenth century. 
Legislation barring women's employment, avowedly to protect them from dangerous 
work was selectively applied, so that where women did not compete for employment 
with men, they were not protected. 
While these formal restrictions have largely been eradicated, exclusionary practices 
persist. Cockburn has shown the power of male workers to keep women from skilled 
work in the print industry. One of the main ways of excluding groups is through 
'informal recruiting'. The family traditions of the print industry excluded women as well 
as other groups deemed undesirable. Another way of excluding women from 'skilled 
work' has been in the 'informal' paths by which knowledge of the job is passed on, and 
the 'male culture' in which this takes place. A study of Fleet Street journalists shows 
how young female recruits were at a disadvantage if they do not feel comfortable in the 
male, pub-orientated networks in which journalists tend to operate which are essential 
to learning the trade (Smith, 1986). 
The recent prominence of the issue of sexual harassment at work has undermined the 
notion of work as a neutral asexual territory (Hearn & Parkin, 1987). This raises the 
whole question of 'workplace culture' and its role in maintaining sexual (and religious) 
dominance. 
In Northern Ireland religious harassment has become a more public concern, although 
the first two sexual harassment cases in the UK were taken by the Equal Opportunities 
Commission for Northern Ireland (EOCNI).9 Sexual harassment includes not merely 
physical or verbal abuse but displays of offensive material. Religious harassment too has 
ranged from extreme violence10 to displays of flags and material of one religious group. 
This was banned under the Flags and Emblems Act. 
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Sex and skill 
One of the most prominent themes in Braverman's work is the deskilling of labour -
splitting execution from conception - as part of management strategy to control the 
labour process. He argued that male skilled jobs were replaced by unskilled female jobs. 
His work portrays the process as one-sided, with workers relatively passive. He 
conceives of 'skilled labour' as an objective category. Beechey (1987) suggests that 
socially recognised skills embody different aspects, which tend to be conflated: 
8) ~Complex competencies which lire developed within II pllrticulllr set of socilll reilltions of production 
lind lire objective competencies ... (combining) conception lind execution lind (involving) the 
possession of pllrticulllr techniques. ~ 
b) ~Control over theillbour process~ 
c) "Conventionlll definitions of occuplltionlll stlltus" (p83). 
Oeskilling under monopoly capitalism is not linear, but a complex and uneven process 
of "destruction and recomposition of skills". There has been resistance to the 
encroachment of capital, and workers have sought to maintain control partly through 
excluding other groups seen as threatening their position. The discussion above on the 
labour aristocracy showed how traditional skills (a) were often undermined, to be 
replaced by workers with some control over the production process, as pacesetters, and 
foremen (b). A major contribution of feminists has been to shown how the classification 
of jobs as skilled is sex related (c) (see eg Cockburn, 1983; Phillips 8t Taylor, 1986). 
Mclaughlin 8t Ingram show how women garment workers are recruited on the basis of 
'natural aptitude' which assumes previous experience of sewing. The skills which they 
bring with them are not counted in determining their status within work. Women 
workers experienced only "piecemeal and largely unrecognised training" within the firm, 
whereas cutters and mechanics, who were mainly male, were given formal training, and 
no previous competence was required (op cit. p35). 
Women's subordination is thus materially embodied within the production process. But 
this is not static, as for example new techniques may make it profitable to replace 
skilled workers with unskilled. But these changes threaten the existing basis of the 
division of labour, which is the product not merely of the labour process, but of the 
ideology of gender division in which this labour process operates (Barrett, 1980). In 
Northern Ireland, changes in the labour process threaten not only gender, but sectarian 
domination. 
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Gender and Religious Divisions 
WWithin western societies, gender divisions are more important for women than ethnic divisions in 
terms of labour market subordination. In employment terms, migrant or ethnic women lire usulllly 
closer to the female population lIS II whole than to ethnic men in the type of wlI(/e-lllbour performed-
(AnthillS and Yuval Davis (1983, p69J. 
This is in tune with the official view in Northern Ireland that religious inequality in 
employment is primarily a male problem. At first glance, the figures bear this out. The 
employment profiles of Catholic women and Protestant women are much more similar 
than those of Catholic and Protestant men. Catholic women are disadvantaged relative 
to Protestants, but this disadvantage is smaller than the male." 
But where such wide-ranging divisions based on religion exist, it is not conceivable that 
women's employment should escape its effects. I suggested above that Catholic 
women have a specific relation to the labour market which is a product of both gender 
and religious subordination. This arises both from the way the labour market is 
structured by gender and religion, and through family relationships. Below I sketch some 
of the ways in which these interact, and in the next section will show how these are 
reinforced at the level of the state. 
a) Almost total religious segregation in schooling creates different educational 
experiences. The different emphasis of the two education systems has led to a 
different profile of subjects taken by Protestants and Catholics, and specifically 
Catholic girls and Protestant girls. This obviously has implications for 
occupational choice (Trewsdale, 1983). 
The tendency for each community to service its own has led to 
overrepresentation of Catholic men in the medical and legal professions, and of 
Catholic women in nursing. 
b) Social and educational segregation affects the views that two communities hold 
of each other (Murray 1986; Donnan & McFarlane, 1983). This reinforces 
reluctance to work with the 'other side', and therefore segregation in work. It 
is well established that women travel shorter distances to work than men. This 
is due to lack of access to transport; their generally lower incomes; and to their 
concentration in part-time work. In Northern Ireland this is exacerbated by the 
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problem of crossing 'hostile territory'. Residential segregation has increased 
since the start of the 'Troubles'. 
c) Family relationships and ideology affect women's ability to work. The relatively 
high birth rate among Catholics, and the large number of women with dependent 
children and adults restricts access to labour force. The EOCNI's study of 
attitudes to work showed Catholic women relatively more liberal than 
Protestants, and suggests that the existence of 'traditional values' cannot be 
taken for granted (Kremer & Curry, 1986; see also Montgomery & Davies, 
1991). But traditional values have been embodied in state policy and 
employment practices. Poor child-care facilities and lack of flexibility in working 
hours (Mclaughlin & Ingram, 1991) often make the practical problems of 
combing paid work and caring for dependents insurmountable. 
d) Women experience different relations to the labour market through their partner. 
Catholic men are much more likely to be unemployed than Protestant men, 
which creates a disincentive for their wives to work, especially part-time, due 
to the loss of benefits they would incur (McWilliams, 1991). The popular notion 
of women as 'breadwinners' in Derry has been refuted in work by McLaughlin, 
who shows that households in which only the women is in paid work are the 
least common, whereas if the male is unemployed, the women is much more 
likely to be as well (McLaughlin, 1986). 
She also puts paid to another myth, that, in the words of the popular Derry 
song, 
-the men on the dole played a mother's role-'2 
Male unemployment appears to make little difference to the sexual division of 
labour in the household. This result was supported by a more recent study for 
the EOCNI (Campbell et ai, 1990). 
The pre-war pattern was of much greater dependence by married women on the 
male wage in Britain and Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland marriage bars kept 
women out of the labour force much later than in Britain, while the relative 
security and high pay of Protestant males allowed their wives to remain outside 
the paid labour force. This pattern has shifted in recent years, with increasing 
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participation of women, particularly Protestant women. Labour force 
participation is greatest among women married to men in full-time jobs, and two 
income families have been increasing in Northern Ireland. But Catholic males 
have the highest male unemployment rates in the UK, and the majority of their 
wives are unemployed (McWilliams, 1991). Thus the patterns of female 
participation reinforce the trend to increasing inequality, which has both a 
religious and a gender dimension. 
e) The process of employment restructuring has religious and gender implications. 
The identification of skilled jobs as male as well as Protestant may mean that 
Catholic women are not seen as posing the same threat to Protestant males as 
would Catholic men. As the managing director of one private firm put it, he 
could "get away with employing Catholic women but not men" .13 
f) The sectarian divide weakens the women's movement, and therefore the 
development of strong campaigns for women's equality. Divisions along lines of 
ideology, class, and ethnicity are not unique to Northern Ireland: the difference 
is that the sectarian divide overrides all others, so that instead of being able to 
develop a common programme, which recognises sectarianism and incorporates 
a strategy to struggle against it, the issue is treated as too difficult to handle, 
as 'divisive' and 'sensitive'. Attempts are generally made to ignore it. But 
sectarian divisions constantly appear and shatter this fragile unity. 
Increased activity by Republican women in the 1970s and late 1980s led to 
significant developments towards more feminist perspectives in their political 
programme. But this activity tends to become dissolved into organising support 
for male relatively (such a around the hunger strikes) and to lose much of its 
independence. This activity also separates them from non-Republicans, and so 
yet again community loyalties are counterposed to loyalty to other women. 
The State and the Economy 
The relationship between the state and sectarianism is the major political issue in 
Northern Ireland. But in attempting to unravel this question, a series of problems arises. 
The term state is used to mean many different entities: it may mean the state 
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apparatus; the Unionist state; the United Kingdom state; the Northern Ireland state. It 
is not always clear which is being referred to. 
The 'reformability/irreformability' debate centres on whether the Unionist state can be 
seen as separate from the Northern Ireland state as an entity. The position of Bew and 
his co-authors (1980) is that 
"the unreformability of the Unionist State •. does not prove that a national question still awaits 
resolution. That state .. was incomplltible with the ending of sectarian discriminlltion lind oppression 
of Catholics is clear. What is not clear is that any state structure in the North would be incompatible 
with equal rights for Catholics" (p 169J. 
Therefore for them the border is irrelevant and working class unity within Northern 
Ireland is the way forward. For anti-imperialists, the existence of Northern Ireland 
remains an insuperable barrier to unity. The relation between sectarianism and the state 
structures under Stormont have been discussed in great detail, while less has been 
written about the implications of Direct Rule. 
The analysis has implications for Britain's role in Ireland. If, as Bew et al claim, the 
Unionist state was the problem, then Britain, having abolished Stormont, can playa 
progressive role in reforming the state structures. If on the other hand the present 
boundaries are the problem, then Britain's role in defending these borders becomes part 
of the problem, and British withdrawal the key to change. 
State Theory 
State theorising is notable for its abstractness (Jessop, 1990). Part of the problem is 
that there is little agreement about what the state actually consists of, and the 
inclusiveness of the definition depends on the theoretical position taken. Just what is 
comprised in the definition is not always clarified in theoretical accounts. 
There are three very broad groups of ideas about the relation between the state and the 
economy with which I shall be concerned: the state in conventional economic theory 
(by which I mean Keynesian macroeconomics and the micro economics of welfare 
which formed the basis of mainstream economic theorising before the rise of 
neoliberalism); neoliberalism; and Marxism. Most work on the state in the 1960s and 
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1970s was in the Marxist (and radical) tradition. The key concern was the relation 
between the state, capital accumulation and the capitalist class, and reflects the 
inseparability of the political and the economic in this version. The neoliberal view of 
the state has gained ground in the past two decades. 
Most economic analysis of Northern Ireland falls into the first category (for example 
Canning et ai, 1987; Harris, 1990). The theory of the state is implicit rather than 
explicit, with more attention paid to the impact of state policy than to the nature of the 
state itself. This results from the separation of the 'economy' from other areas of social 
life in economic theory. A 'class mediation' model assumes a given set of property 
relations, whose interests are seen as 'above' society. This presents a benign view of 
the state, whose role is to act in the interests of society as a whole. 
In the Keynesian version, the state plays a major role through fiscal policy in 
overcoming the chronic tendency of the market system to stagnation. The problem is 
primarily the technical one of maintaining demand at an appropriate level. At the micro 
level the state again acts to clear up problems of 'market failure'; in this case 
externalities, the inadequate supply of 'merit goods' and so on. There is no coherent 
view of the state; indeed, much model building assumes 'no government intervention' 
with the state making an appearance only when things go wrong. 
The state then is a neutral instrument, external to the economy. This underpins 
economists' self-image of essentially neutral technocracy. It also presumes that state 
intervention will be socially beneficial. The massive extension of spending throughout 
the advanced capitalist countries in the post-war period took place when this thinking 
was largely unchallenged. 
The neo-liberal version has underpinned the economic policies of the current British 
Conservative administration. Because of the political situation in Northern Ireland, these 
policies have been applied later, and more selectively than in Britain. 
The basis of this view of the state lies in the work of Hayek and Friedman. From 
different methodologies, both argue that state spending, other than the minimum 
necessary to maintain the rule of law, undermines individual liberty. Liberty is 
associated with negative freedoms, based on the individual's right to dispose of his (sic) 
own property, and to engage in unfettered market exchange. Inequality is due to 
individual failure. In order to reach the goal of a competitive market system, however, 
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some theorists argue the need for a 'strong state' to break monopoly elements such as 
trade unions. Friedman himself advised the military government of General Pinochet in 
Chile after the 1974 coup. Neoliberal economic thinking in Britain and the United States 
has been associated with conservative family values (Levitas, 1986) and 
authoritarianism (Gamble, 1988). 
These versions share a view of capitalism as essentially harmonious, without 
irreconcilable conflicts. The state, in its benign or malign forms is not theorised as 
having structural relations with dominant class (or non-class) interests. Neither the 
Keynesian nor the New Right theories are therefore capable of dealing seriously with 
issues of sectarianism and the state. 
Marxist State Theory 
In Marxist theory, the state is not neutral, but a central instrument for maintaining class 
rule. It takes a specific form in capitalist society; its role is to reproduce the conditions 
for capital accumulation. But according to Jessop there is 
-no well-formulated coherent theory of state in the clsssic (Marxist) texts- (ibid, p29) 
Fragmentary, and often mutually contradictory, ideas contained in the classic texts have 
been developed into competing theories. The view of the state as the 'instrument' of 
the ruling class dominated until the 1960s. Marx and Engels' description of "a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (1973, p44) had 
been developed via Lenin's Imperialism into the monopoly capitalist state theory of 
Stalinist orthodoxy. The New Left critique of Stalinism in the 1960s brought a 
reworking of state theory, with the Althusserian structuralist school, which rejected 
crude instrumentalism. Poulantzas viewed the state as a series of complex social 
institutions, in which class struggle is reproduced. The state became widened to include 
not only the coercive apparatus and the executive, but such institutions as the Church, 
schools, social work departments. The state has an "objective function to perform in 
maintaining social cohesion so that accumulation can proceed" (Poulantzas, 1973, 
pp44-50). Poulantzas also developed the notion of the 'relative autonomy' of the state 
from capital. Gough (1979) criticised this view for underestimating class struggle. He 
sees the development of the welfare state as not only functional to capitalism (in 
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helping to reproduce an educated workforce) but the result of successful working class 
struggle. 
Gramsci had argued that class domination was secured through force (the coercive 
apparatus) and ideological hegemony (mobilisation of the 'active consent' of the 
dominated groups) (Jessop, 1990, p51). The notion that the ideological hegemony of 
a power bloc involves mutual self-sacrifice has implications for Unionist bloc (ibid, p42). 
This concept has underpinned some of the more theoretical work on the state in 
Northern Ireland (Bew et ai, 1979). 
The regulationist school (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1987) has analysed the relation of the 
state to the economy in different periods of capital accumulation or 'modes of 
regulation'. Jenson (1989) argues that while formally recognising the importance of 
political action, regulationists have in practice concentrated on economic processes. The 
actual periodisation of US capitalism on which Aglietta based the development of his 
concepts is problematic (Brenner & Glick, 1991). In its British version, regulation has 
become entangled with utopian versions of 'Post Fordism' (Marxism Today, 1988) with 
reactionary political conclusions (Clarke, 1990; Levidow, 1990). But this is not a 
necessary result of this conceptual framework (Barbrook, 1990) and the notion of 
Fordism can provide a useful tool (see below). 
Jessop's definition of the state embodies both a recognition of state institutions and 
state discourse (or hegemony). 
-The core of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions ""d organisations 
whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the 
members of II society in the name of their common interest or general will. - (p34 7 J. 
But he qualifies this in a number of ways, some of which are particularly relevant to the 
Northern Irish context: 
-The boundaries and identity of the society lire often constituted in and through the s"",. proctlSS 
by which states are buiW (p342J. 
Other theories tend to ignore this question of how the boundaries of the state 
themselves can be politicised, or as Luhmann suggests, "state formation can be 
understood in terms of the territorialisation of political dominance." (Jessop, p 350). 
This is crucially significant to the Irish debate. 
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Jessop goes on to qualify the notion of 'common interest' 
" .. whatever the political rhetoric of the common interest or general will might suggest, these are 
always 'illusory'" (p342J. 
This is true in the Northern Ireland case, but the relevant 'common interest' here is the 
Unionist bloc. The Northern Ireland state has never operated in a consensual framework 
which included Catholics as full members of society. It is the all-class Unionist alliance 
which claims a common interest for all Protestants. 
Jessop criticises most state theory for operating with a limited view of class struggle, 
in which classes other than those based on capital and labour, and other social forces 
are excluded. While he argues that these - including religious ideology in Northern 
Ireland - are "critical to an understanding of the nature of state power in particular 
societies" (ibid, p41) he does not develop this analysis concretely. But the notion of a 
hegemoniC project can help to illuminate this issue. 
Hegemony and Sectarianism 
For Gramsci's, hegemony involves the 
"organisation of different 'class-relevant' forces under the 'political, intellectual and moral leadership , 
of a particular class" (Jessop, pp207-BJ. 
But to be successful, hegemony must be pursued through a concrete hegemonic 
project, involving mobilising support behind a national programme which 
"asserts a general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly IIdvllnce the 
long-term interests of the hegemonic class (frllction) and which also privileges particulllr 
'economic-corporate' interests compatible with this progrllmme. Conversely, those pllrticulllr 
interests which are inconsistent with the projects lire deemed immorlllllndlor i""tion"lllnd, in so 
far 118 they lire still pursued by groups outside the COnSfInSU8, they lire IIIso liele to slInction. 
Normlllly hegemony 81so involves the sacrifice of certllin short-term interests of the hegemonic clllSS 
(fraction) lind a flow of mllterial concessions for other socilll forces mobilised behind the project. It 
is thereby conditioned lind limited by the accumulation project" (ibid, p208). 
The distinction between a hegemonic project and an accumulation strategy allows for 
the possibility of contradiction between the needs of capital and the stability of the 
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hegemonic bloc, and for 'crises of hegemony' arising from the need to restructure the 
state when accumulation becomes restricted. Such a crisis could be said to have 
occurred in Northern Ireland in the 1950s when the accumulation strategy, upon which 
the material privileges of Protestants was based, had become exhausted. 
In Britain, the post-war social democratic settlement rested on 'one-nation' hegemony, 
an inclusive ideology built on economic expansion, Keynesianism and welfarism. This 
was replaced in the 1980s with the exclusionary two-nations project of Thatcherism: 
increased personal incomes for the majority at the expense of a massive underclass of 
low paid and unemployed. Part of the ideological backing for this has been appeals to 
ideas of race, nation, and family. 
In Northern Ireland, hegemony has always been of a 'two nations' kind, based on 
sectarianism and the exclusion of Catholics. 
Poulantzas argues that the coupling of individual citizenship with the nation state, by 
suggesting that all are equal political subjects, is effective in maintaining the notion of 
a common national interest. But in Northern Ireland, citizenship has always been 
politicised. The creation of the state itself was contested, while discrimination and 
gerrymandering excluded Catholics from full citizenship, including voting rights. The 
notion of a 'national interest' united Protestants in defence of 'their state', to which the 
Catholic population were seen as disloyal. As Q'Dowd points out, 
"Most liberal and social democratic states attain some degree of legitimacy ... by 'partitioning' the 
apparatuses of repression ... from other stlJte institutions. " (O'Dowd, 1980, p20) 
Sectarian use of coercion by Unionists undermined the notion of neutrality, and the 
state's monopoly of legitimate violence, legitimating alternative sources of violence in 
the eyes of many Catholics. 
The conflation of the state with Protestantism serves to hide its class nature. Religious 
exclusion has prevented independent working class activity. The Protestant working 
class acquired its 'material benefits' through sectarian allocation of jobs and housing, 
rather than general welfare provision. The welfare state when it appeared was imposed 
from Westminster, not a product of internal struggles. Bew et al (1980) argue that 
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-the pre-1972 state in Northern Ireland WBS in many respects an ordinary bourgeois one •.. (with) .. 
the character of the bourgeois state BS the site of the operation of specific bourgeois strategies, 
operationalized by the leaders of specific parties to secure specific bourgeois political objectives-
(ppI54-5). 
They are right to emphasise the class character of the state. But to argue that all 
bourgeois regimes maintain power by strategies to divide the dominated classes does 
not tell us anything about the possibility of building a specifically working class 
programme within that structure. 
The Unionist State v the NI State 
If the Unionist cross-class bloc was maintained through control of the state apparatus 
at Stormont, what are the implications of the abolition of this regime? Does Direct Rule 
mean that the objective basis for sectarianism has been destroyed ? This is the 
argument that Bew et al appear to make in the statement quoted at the beginning of 
this section. In a later work they concede that 
-.. the unintentional effects of British policy have been to eXllcerbate conflict between Catholics lind 
Protestants. - (Bew et aI, 19B5, p3) 
But to suggest that Northern Ireland under Direct Rule is 'reformable' raises a number 
of questions. It implies firstly that the British ruling class has no interest in maintaining 
divisions, or that it would be capable of transforming the apparatus of sectarianism 
without damaging its own interests. Whyte argued that 
-The hegemony of the unionist clsss alliance, though embedded in the local social formation, 
depended on the British connection. Insofar BS the alliance still exists, or is in the process of 
transformation, the impetus and support comes from the British state . • (Smyth, 1980. p42) 
Furthermore, the state's ability to overcome these divisions is limited, although the 
·problem of sectarianism, the motor of politics under Stormont, becomes a technicBl problem to be 
manipulated- (but the state cannot be neutral) -In its main objective of lJISSuring the accumulation 
of cBpitBl it must depend upon a complex system of clllSS alliances •• • (ibid, p44) 
A similar argument is made by Q'Dowd. The view of monopoly capital as 'reforming' 
was based on the invalid separation of discrimination from the economic base, which 
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failed to see sectarianism as embedded in the material structures of the state. Thus the 
analysis of O'Dowd and his co-authors shows that sectarian divisions are being 
recreated within the new state apparatus 
WThe British 'reforms' introduced after 7968 implicitly sought to detach sectarianism from cllJSs 
relations. To fundamentally reform sectarian division however, would be to transform cllJSs division 
- an impossibility for a capitalist state. - (O'Dowd, 1987, p24). 
While some employment practices have been reformed, the fundamental sources of 
unequal power, the ownership of capital and the control over the security forces, have 
not been touched. Fundamental reform would imply that sectarian divisions can be 
separated from other social divisions, so that they could be eradicated while leaving 
everything else intact. But 
-In Northern Ireland sectarian division is a materiBI reBlity ..• It is not merely Bn over/BY on cllJSS 
divisions to be seen IJS something which is either more or less important than cllJSs . •.• CllJSs 
relBtions in Northern lrelBnd were only experienced IJS sectarian cllJSs relations-(ibid, p26). 
Finally, this view suggests that the boundaries of the state have no implications for the 
form it takes, in particular for sectarianism. But as Jessop pointed out 'the boundaries 
and identity' of the state are inseparable. This is particularly appropriate to Northern 
Ireland whose boundaries have been extremely politicised. The border was drawn with 
a very precise purpose, to ensure the largest possible area which could be held 
permanently under Unionist control (see Chapter Three). According to O'Dowd, 
-It is not the struggle over the territori.1 extent of the stlJte per se which denies the stllte its 
legitimllcy... The Border is the over-lJrching mllnifestlltion of hundreds of internll' sect.ri"" 
boundllries which designllte Protestllnt lind Catholic space. - (ibid, p27) 
British policy since Partition has prioritised the maintenance of the border. The 
entrenched Unionist majority ensures that Unionists win almost all elected offices and 
continue to speak for Northern Ireland. This confers a legitimacy to the border which, 
given the restrictions on serious debate on Ireland in the British media, is easily 
accepted in Britain. O'Dowd concludes that 
-HistoriclI'ly the stllte in NI hIlS depended for its sepMllte existence on secfllrien clllSll divisions. 
Forms of political msnsgement have been altered lIS these divisions and the stilt. itself have been 
reshaped in response to new forms of capitBl .ccumullltion lind the emelflence of new politicBl 
structures in Britain- (ibid, p207). 
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Patriarchy and the State 
The role of the Northern Ireland state in maintaining sectarianism has been the major 
focus of debate. Little attention has been given to the gendered nature of these state 
structures. 
Pateman made an important critique of liberal and Marxist state theory by showing how 
the definition of the boundaries of the state were built on a "fraternal contract" 
(Pateman 1988). The apparently genderless citizen was in fact male, since the 'social 
contract' of citizens is built on a sexual contract embodying women's subordination. 
The issue of gender, 
·formally excluded from the discourse of state theory, is nevertheless present under the surface" 
(Connell, 7990, p 57 7/. 
This dualism parallels the treatment of the 'genderless' individual and the 'family' in 
economic analysis. Feminist state theory is itself relatively underdeveloped. Mies has 
a rather untheorized view of the state as an instrument of patriarchal power (Mies, 
1986); Barrett (1980) on the other hand writes of the state working through the family 
to maintain familial ideology, but she sees this primarily as a means of maintaining the 
stability of capitalist social relations, rather than representing patriarchal power as such. 
Walby tries to connect patriarchy and capitalism at the level of the state: the "state is 
gendered - patriarchal as well as capitalist" (1990, p150)' but she does not take the 
discussion much further than this. Connell argues that 
"gender is a collective phenomenon, an IISpect of social institutions lIS well lIS personal life .. internal 
lIS well lIS external to the state. " (Connell, p50S1 
which needs to be theorised at the level of the state. His theoretical framework raises 
a number of issues which are relevant to Northern Ireland, not just in terms of gender, 
but in relation to sectarian divisions. The state he argues 
"is constituted within gender relations lIS a central institution of gendered power ••• (and} is II bBlll'er 
of gender ... each state hIlS II definable 'gender regime'· (p61S}. 
This gender regime appears in 
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a) a gendered division of labour within the state apparatus, with the elite and the 
coercive apparatus dominated by men, and women concentrated in 'caring' 
roles. The division of labour in Northern Ireland is also sectarian, with 
Protestants and Catholics taking the male and female roles respectively. 
b) a gendered structure of power in the state apparatus and among elected 
representatives. Here again male power is also Protestant power. 
c) a structure of cathexis or emotion. I referred above to the gendered imagery of 
Protestants and Catholics, and its connection to domination and subordination. 
Mies notes how nationalist movements take on male identities on achieving 
power 
Win this phase, the femBle image of the nBtion, found on the revolutionBry posters .. is 
replaced by the images of the founding-fathers: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, MilO, Ho Chi 
Minh, Castro, MugBbe .. Typically, among this gBllery of social patriarchs, there are no 
women W (Mies, 1986, p 199). 
Connell also states that "(t)he state has a major stake in gender politics" (p 530) noting 
that feminist activity has been met not by a counter-mobilisation of men but of the right 
and the Church, with women often the most vigorous defenders of patriarchal power. 
Gender subordination acquires ideological hegemony among the subordinated group. 
This legitimacy is not paralleled by Catholic support for sectarianism, but gender 
subordination plays an important role in defining group identity. 
While the state is traditionally regarded as having the monopoly of legitimate violence, 
feminists have pointed to the family as an arena of legitimised male violence. Although 
the "state sets limits to the use of personal violence" (Connell, p527) in Northern 
Ireland the exclusionary hegemonic project which has denied full citizenship to Catholics 
has created other forms of legitimate violence. This is primarily directed against the 
state, and has widespread support from women as well as men in the Catholic 
community. 
Arms are concentrated in male hands. Goldring (1991) claims that this provides another 
means of control over women, although he does not provide any direct evidence of the 
use of weapons in this way. The issue of domestic violence is also made more complex 
because of the Catholic community'S distrust of the police. McLaughlin (1986) found 
that many women who suffered domestic violence in Derry preferred to seek refuge in 
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a Church run hostel, rather than moving outside their own community, even though 
Church activity was directed towards ensuring that women did their Christian duty and 
returned to violent husbands. 
Finally, Connell states that "(t)he state's position in gender politics is not fixed", 
suggesting that the decline of patriarchal institutions (such as the Church) reduces the 
legitimacy of inequality (for example in work). In Northern Ireland the role of the Church 
is much stronger than in other European countries, or Australia where Connell is based. 
But equal opportunities policies and state-sponsored Fair Employment, however limited, 
do pose challenges to the legitimacy of the sectarian divide, on which the state has 
rested. 
Very little of the existing feminist literature on the state explicitly attempts to 
incorporate questions of ethnic or national identity. There are exceptions (Kandiyoti, 
1991; Anthias & Yuval Davis, 1989). But although their studies provide new insights 
into a number of concrete cases, their relevance to the Irish case is limited. 
Conclusion 
In Northern Ireland, sectarianism has been integral to the structures of the state, but so 
also has patriarchy. While much less has been said about the latter, the two have been 
mutually reinforcing. The exclusion of Catholics from state power has empowered the 
Church in both communities as a focus for their 'common interests'. Whereas secular 
state forms have taken on the task of social reproduction in most of Europe, in Northern 
Ireland the Churches, with the conservative and authoritarian attitudes to sexuality and 
the family, continue to playa major role. 
The following chapters will examine the way in which state policies have developed, 
and explore in more detail the ways in which sectarianism and patriarchy have 
interconnected and reinforced divisions in the state, in work and in the family. 
Notes to Chapter Two 
1. The two academics who wrote the Dbair Report on Unemployment in West 8elfest were publicly 
denounced a8 Sinn Fein supporters by the Minister, Richard Needham. A United State. journali.t who wrote 
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a sympathetic piece on the report received telephone calls the next day from both the Northern Ireland Office 
and the office of the British Labour Party's Northern Ireland spokesperson, warning him not to be taken in 
by wrepublican propagandaw. (Information supplied by Bill Rolston). 
2. Sinn Fein opposes the British 1967 abortion act becoming law in Northern Ireland, in spite of campaigns 
by women supporters in support of abortion rights. 
3. In a study of the clothing industry for the EOCNI, McLaughlin & Ingram discuss the informal criteria for 
promotion to supervisor's posts: wA person is likely to find another person who is similar to him or herself, 
culturally, politically and in terms of gender, the most 'acceptable'w (p 38). One of the author. confirmed to 
me that 'culturally' here meant religion. 
4. Kevin Sweeney, (Department of Finance and Personnel) speaking on the Northern Ireland income and 
household expenditure surveys, Conference on StlltisticlIl Sources for LoclIl lind Regionlll Development, 
Queen's University, Belfast, 3rd April, 1992. 
6. See for example Disturbllnces in Northern Irelllnd: Report of the Cllmeron Commission (HMSO, London, 
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6. Interview with Bob Cooper, 2nd April, 1992 
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12. From The Town I loved so Well, popular Derry song. 
13. Reported by Bob Cooper; interview, 2.4.1992. 
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Chapter 3 
The Rise and Fall of Stormont 
Introduction 
With the creation of the Stormont regime in 1920, class, gender and sectarian 
domination became institutionalised in the apparatus of the state. While its roots can 
be traced to the seventeenth century, partition was by no means inevitable. It was a 
product of the balance of class and national interests in Britain and Ireland at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
This particular resolution of sectarian and class conflict has out-lasted the expectations 
of many of those involved in its creation, and its long survival has led many social 
scientists to treat the Northern Ireland state as 'given'. But the continued struggle over 
the legitimacy of partition makes it essential to examine its historical roots. 
-'rish history hIlS been, lind continues to be, lin IIrell of debllte lind contestlltion ...... beclluse of the 
IIbiding mllnner in which populist nlltionlllist, lind Unionist/loYlllist, versions of Irish history continue 
to be used to legitimize current politiclI! positions" (Hutton & Stewllrt, 7997, p 7 J. 
This is reflected in the anti-imperialist/revisionist controversy. In the South, this debate 
has a rather different dynamic, in which the 'nationalist' view of history is contested 
as part of a continuing struggle over the identity of Irish nationhood. As the Republic 
strives to become a modern industrial nation, for many - on left and right - the 
',preoccupations of nationalism are seen as belonging to the past. Chief among the 
embarrassing remnants of nationalism is the verbal commitment of all major parties to 
Irish unity. 1 
But the Republic2 is as much a product of partition as Northern Ireland, while its 
character has been of major importance in forming Protestant views of Irish nationhood, 
and reinforcing partitionist sentiment. 
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As revisionist history attempts to change the discourse of Irish history, feminist 
historians are beginning to develop their own critique. Most of the literature on both 
sides of the nationalist debate has assumed that the key actors were male. (see for 
example Farrell (1980); Lee (1989); Cullen (1972)). But the history of Irish women 
"is not just the history of the oppressed 'other' living in II sepllrllte dimension lIS one might hllve 
supposed from ... reading the trllditionlll textbooks in Irish history... Their lives lire firmly connected 
to, and dictated by, the political, social, demographic and economic happenings of the time. They 
are part of history, not on the fringes of it" (Luddy & Murphy, cited in Hutton, p3J 
Furthermore, according to Mary Cullen, 
"History within a patriarchal paradigm is the history of patriarchy, in which most men lIS well lIS 
women are left out. w3 
Nationalist history has generally made its obeisance to two 'great women', Maud Gonne 
and Constance Markievicz. But there has been little discussion of the position of women 
in general in the nationalist movement, or the relation between the nationalist 
movement and struggles for women's rights. The activity around the suffrage 
movement at the turn of the century for example have largely been ignored by 
historians (Cullen Owers, (1990). While partition has been denounced for its betrayal 
of Republican aspirations, and for the defeat it represented for the working class (see 
eg Beresford Ellis, 1985), the implications for women's position have been much less 
to the fore. 
It is beyond the scope of the present work to make a detailed evaluation of these 
historical debates. The purpose of this chapter is to provide some of the historical 
background necessary to an understanding of social divisions in present day Northern 
Ireland. The main concern is to examine how sectarianism has intersected with class 
and gender divisions at different periods, both in the formation of the Stormont regime, 
and in its 50 year existence. 
The first section discusses the origins of partition, and traces the development of the 
divisions which led to the formation of the Stormont regime. While this work is about 
Northern Ireland, the character of the state is a product of events in Ireland as a whole. 
This section will therefore be concerned as much with the South as with the North. 
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The second section concentrates on the Stormont regime itself, and the reasons for its 
downfall. It examines the nature of the Stormont state, and the contradictions which 
developed at the political and economic level: in particular the contradiction between 
a state structure built on a 'two nations' project based on an all-class alliance within the 
Protestant community which excluded Catholics from full citizenship; and the crisis in 
the traditional process of accumulation which necessitated economic modernisation. It 
is argued that women's oppression and sectarianism have been mutually sustaining 
within the Northern Ireland state. 
The Rise of Stormont 
The Development of English Rule 
Ireland became England's first colony in 1170, but it was with the development of 
capitalism in Britain that the economic subordination began which was to transform 
Irish life. This period also laid the foundations for the separate development of the North 
East, although it was not until the nineteenth century that the separate identities of the 
two part of Ireland became thoroughly established. 
For almost four hundred years after the English invasion Irish life "beyond the Palen4 
went on more or less as before. Sporadic revolts were repressed, but Ireland was never 
totally subdued; the conquerors intermarried with the natives becoming absorbed into 
Irish society.5 But as Ireland became more rebellious, the English Crown planned the 
thorough suppression of its troublesome neighbour on the pretext that it was a potential 
base from which England's enemies could invade. 
The 'plantations' were aimed at replacing the Irish with English settlers loyal to the 
Crown. Beginning in 1536 under Henry VIII, they continued for over a century. English 
policy was "to keep Ireland in a state of division and strife" (Marx & Engels, (1971). But 
Plantation was only partially successful. Settlers did not come forth in sufficient 
numbers to displace Irish people from the land. The main 'undertakers' included City 
Companies, who acquired huge land holdings (Beresford Ellis, 1985). Their interest was 
not in colonisation, but in gaining quick profits. They were only too willing to allow Irish 
peasants to pay rent for the right to continue to till their land. Settlers in the South and 
West never became more than a "thin upper crust of landlords and administrators" 
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which meant that "settler native conflicts were also class conflicts" (Rowthorn & 
Wayne, 1988, p18). 
The difference took on a religious dimension after the Reformation in England and 
Scotland. Settlers were now Protestants, while the Irish remained Catholic. 
As England experienced the long disintegration of feudalism and transition to 
commercial farming, semi-feudal relations were established in Ireland. Although the 
formal position of tenant farmers in the two countries was similar, the social reality was 
vastly different (Strauss, 1951). In Ireland a class of absentee landlords was created, 
whose primary concern was with the amount of rent they could extract. An elaborate 
system of sub-letting developed: the smallest tenant-farmers worked tiny plots to 
produce their own food (mainly potatoes), but they had to engage in wage labour for 
larger farmers to pay rent. Since they produced their own subsistence, wages could be 
pushed to minimal levels, as low as 4d to 8d a day during the seventeenth century 
(ibid). Larger tenants earned rent through producing export crops. Ireland's land system 
became inextricably bound to the commercialisation of agriculture, but commercial 
activity was parasitic on producers. Marx describes the position of the small farmer: 
"Whllt he plfys to the IlIndlord for his lelfse ohen IIbsorbs not only If portion of his profit, i.e. his own 
surplus Illbour, which he hIlS II right to lIS the owner of his own instruments of Ilfbour, but Iflso If 
portion of the normlll wllge, which he would receive for the slime Ifmount of Illbour under other 
conditions. The IlIndowner, moreover, who does nothing lit 1111 here to improve the soil, exproprilftes 
from him the smBII Cllpitlfl which he incorporates into the soil for the most Pllrt by his own 'lfbour" 
(Mllrx, 1976, p763) 
Commercialisation undermined self-sufficiency, while acting as a barrier to increased 
productivity. Petty estimated that in 1670 rent on Irish land was £800,000, 
approximately 20% of annual income (Strauss). In addition, peasants paid taxes to 
maintain the imperial presence which enforced this system, and for the Established 
Anglican Church to which they did not belong (Strauss p15). The system encouraged 
a network of middlemen and usurers. The exactions of landlords and other parasitic 
classes frequently necessitated naked force, so the interests of these classes were 
bound to British rule. 
Ireland's became an "agricultural province of England" (Marx & Engels, 1971), also 
supplying food for slaves in the lucrative triangle trade. But where the interests of Irish 
merchants conflicted with England's commercial interest, Ireland's trade was 
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suppressed. Export of cattle was barred in 1666, butter and cheese in 1681. Farmers 
turned to wool production, but this too was prevented, by banning exports firstly to 
England, and to third countries in 1699. Many other products were restricted by similar 
legislation (Perrons, 1978). Navigation Acts suppressed the growth of Irish shipping by 
stipulating that all trade with the colonies had to use English ships. 
The Penal Laws limited Catholics' right to inheritance and the acquisition of property 
and allowed the confiscation of property for petty offences (Crotty, 1986). While the 
effectiveness of these laws in transferring land has been questioned (Cullen, 1968, 
p113), they undoubtedly underpinned dispossession and contributed to the 
underdevelopment of agriculture. 
But the Penal Laws helped to strengthen the hold of the Catholic Church: barred from 
landholding and the professions, better off Catholic men turned to commerce and the 
priesthood. The number of priests increased and they became authority figures, 
particularly in rural communities. By imposing a specifically Catholic grievance, they 
reinforced the Church's leadership in struggles against English rule. This continued into 
the nineteenth century, when agitation was first around Catholic emancipation, and 
later around Home Rule. Catholicism became identified with anti-colonialism, particularly 
as the Irish language declined, making religion the major badge of Irishness. 
Ulster 
It was the strength of resistance of the North East province of Ulster which ensured 
that plantation was carried out most thoroughly there. Following the defeat of the Ulster 
chieftains and the 'Flight of the Earls', settlement began in 1609 (Darby, 1983). This 
policy reached its height following the 1641 Rising. The majority of settlers were 
Scottish Presbyterians or English Anglicans. They were true colonists, who planned to 
make their lives in Ireland. 
Cromwell's original aim was to eliminate the Irish population of Ulster, driving them into 
the infertile lands of Connaught (Beresford Ellis, 1985). An Act of 1652 made resisters 
liable to the death penalty. But even this was not sufficient to drive out the Irish. 
Catholics, without other means of subsistence had no alternative to paying exorbitant 
rents which squeezed living standards to the barest minimum. Protestant settlers on the 
other hand needed the inducement of a better level of living than they had left, which 
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restricted the amount of rent which could be extracted from them. It therefore suited 
landlords to let their land illegally to Catholics. Protestants farmed the best land, while 
Catholics were confined to hillier, less fertile areas (Rumpf & Hepburn, pp165-7). To 
attract settlers, undertakers offered more favourable tenancy arrangements, with some 
security of tenure, the Ulster Custom (Crotty, 1986). 
A different set of relations between settler and native was established in Ulster. They 
were divided between classes as in the South, but also within classes. While their 
settler status gave Protestants a material advantage, divisions also centred on religion 
and culture, and their relation to the English conquest. Settlers saw themselves as 
defending the outposts of British civilisation against the native hordes. This self-image 
has persisted. The Battle of the Boyne, in which the Protestant King William of Orange 
defeated the Catholic James II, is celebrated annually by the Orange Order which took 
its name from William. 
Towards the Union 
By the end of the eighteenth century Ireland was one of the most highly developed 
economies in Europe. In spite of the obstacles described above, Ireland had developed 
a small industrial sector based largely on domestic manufacture. Wool and linen 
industries prospered throughout Ireland. Linen exports grew from half a million to 40 
million yards between 1705 and 1790. Tariffs protected the industry from competition 
from Lancashire. Cotton was centred on the north, although 20% of production was 
in the south until the 1820s. 
The most advanced development was in the North East. Opinions differ as to the most 
important factors responsible for creating this lead. The British and Irish Communist 
Organisation (BICC, 1975b) emphasises the role of Ulster Custom in allowing capital 
accumulation in agriculture, a view challenged by Solow (1972) and Gibbon (1975). But 
whatever the extent of its positive contribution, Ulster Custom probably protected 
agriculture from the calamitous Famine of the mid-nineteenth century. 8 
Gibbon (1975) emphasised the settlers' commercial or artisan backgrounds. Tenants 
supplemented their income through textile production, originally as a cottage industry. 
The skills they developed were later transferred to factories. Goldring (1991) notes that 
the expulsion of Huguenots from France in 1685 had given a boost to the linen 
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industry, since they brought technical skills and marketing experience. Children in 
Belfast's Poor House were trained in textile production during the eighteenth century, 
and construction of the City's famous Linen Hall begun in 1784. 
During the eighteenth century, the small mainly Protestant industrial class formed a 
Nationalist Party and began to demand freedom from restrictions on Irish manufactures. 
They won some legislative independence for the Dublin-based Anglo-Irish Parliament 
under Henry Grattan, and freedom from most restrictions on Irish industry and trade 
(Beresford Ellis, p64). But this limited freedom fuelled demands for political 
independence. Sections of the Protestant commercial and professional classes, 
influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution found common 
cause with Catholics. These were mainly Presbyterians, who also suffered disabilities 
under the Penal Laws. The United Irishmen, founded by the Protestant Wolfe Tone, 
attempted to unite "Catholic, Protestant and dissenter" in a movement for Irish 
independence (Pakenham, 1972). 
But the United Irishmen never won a majority of Protestants. The Orange Order, 
founded in 1795, embodied a different set of values: maintenance of Protestant 
supremacy and the British connection. The United Irishmen threatened the interests of 
the landed aristocracy, and the Orange Order organised - through secret societies such 
as the Peek O'Day Boys - an anti-Catholic movement among the peasantry. They fed 
off the long-standing animosity between Protestant settler and Catholic, cementing the 
loyalty of the Protestant tenantry through their relatively privileged status. Opposition 
to the United Irishmen also came from the newly-proletarianised Protestant 
linen-weavers of Armagh, who sought protection for their reduced status in the 
exclusion of Catholics. The clientist relations of landlord-tenant began to be transferred 
into industrial employment (Perrons, 1978). 
The Rising of 1798, led by the United Irishmen, was put down with great ferocity. The 
Irish Parliament was bribed into accepting the Act of Union of 1800. The Dublin 
Parliament, like its English counterpart, was composed of men of property, chosen by 
men of property. Of 300 members, 64 were elected. It was exclusively Protestant. 
Representing the privileged class, they favoured the preservation of the landed interest 
and British control in Ireland. 
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The Act created legislative and economic union with Britain. Irish M.P.s now sat in the 
British House of Commons. Tariff barriers imposed in the late 18th century were 
abolished. 
The Catholic Church supported the Union on the promise of the repeal of the Penal 
Laws. But lobbying by Protestant settlers ensured that this promise was not kept until 
1829 (Rowthorn & Wayne, p20). Instead of crushing nationalist sentiment, the Union 
increased it. But while the Republican United Irishmen had been led by Protestants, 
from now on nationalism became increasingly identified with Catholics. 
This was the last time that Northern Protestants were able to playa progressive role 
on an all-Ireland basis. With the democratic current in the Protestant community 
defeated, Orangeism became politically dominant. The Protestant bourgeoisie from then 
on looked towards Britain rather than the South for capital, raw materials and markets, 
and for political and economic support. The social basis of Presbyterian Republicanism 
was undermined, precluding any long-term alliance with Irish Catholics (O'Dowd, 1981, 
p54). 
The economic effects of the Union in North and South ensured that material as well as 
political differences widened. It intensified the uneven development, already evident in 
the eighteenth century, which a successful independence movement might have 
moderated. Partition was not an inevitable consequence, but the Act of Union was a 
crucial turning point in the road towards it. 
The Impact of Union 
The North East 
Industrial capitalism developed rapidly in the North East in growing isolation from the 
rest of Ireland. The triumph of reaction provided the basis for the transfer of 
sectarianism into the industrial sphere, as the 
-Protestllnt proffltllrillt trifid to re-define the historic 'socilll contrllct' which had existed since the 
Plllntiltion betwHn efements of the ProtNtMt temtntry lind their IlIndlorrls by .Hleing to to",,, II 
specific lind IIdvllntB(JeOus reliltionship with the new bourgeois mlJ8ters- (O'Dowd et III, 1981 p7J. 
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Belfast developed economies in handling and insurance: by 1900 two thirds of Ireland's 
exports were routed through the city. The city's supremacy in linen was established by 
the beginning of the century. It superseded cotton as the main industry, employing 
21,000 by 1850, and 69,000 at its peak in the 1890s. The industry was based on 
exports, particularly to the United States. This linked its interests to the Union, both 
through ties to British mercantile capital, and dependence on imperial trade routes. The 
North East's separation from the rest of Ireland was sharpened with the development 
of protectionism in late nineteenth century nationalism (Bell, 1976, p95). 
Spinning and weaving continued as mainly domestic activities in the early part of the 
century as low wages discouraged mechanisation. British textile manufacturers used 
sweated labour in Belfast to weave yarn (Strauss, p75). It was not until the middle of 
the century that power looms were introduced. Between 1853 and 1861,4755 were 
constructed in Belfast alone. The number of factories almost doubled to 40 in the three 
years up to 1861 (Goodman, 1991, p 12). 
Low wages were partly a product of sectarian divisions. Catholics, driven off the land 
in the South and West, flocked into Belfast from the beginning of the century. The 
response of Protestant workers was to exclude them from skilled work. The Iron 
Moulder's Union founded in 1826; Boilermakers 1841; Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers 1851 all excluded Catholics and organised their own Orange Lodges 
(Goldring). As domestic production moved into the factory, these divisions were 
reconstructed. Sectarian riots, a persistent feature of city life, flared in the 1850s, as 
Protestant workers asserted demands for privilege within this new setting. These 
demands became more urgent as the Famine forced more dispossessed Catholics into 
Belfast (Rumpf & Hepburn, p175). Catholics settled in the West and North of the city, 
a pattern which still persists. The riots were about both occupational and territorial 
exclusion. 
The Orange Order, once an instrument of the landlords, and for decades almost 
dormant, was revived as a political force. It became a key instrument for maintaining 
sectarian divisions in work. Orange Lodges were used to recruit labour, and thus to give 
Protestants privileged access to employment. The loyalty of Protestant workers was to 
prove crucial in later political struggles. The landed gentry remained powerful in Ulster 
while declining elsewhere in Ireland. They allied themselves through the Orange Order 
with the bourgeoisie. 
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Mechanisation of the linen industry provided the basis for the development of those 
other bulwarks of the Ulster economy, shipbuilding and engineering. Both industries 
were, like linen, heavily dependent on external markets and capital. Harland and Wolff 
shipyard was founded in 1858. At its height it was the biggest private employer in 
Northern Ireland, and the largest shipyard in the world. Its name has also been 
synonymous with sectarian employment practices. In 1866, it employed 225 Catholics 
out of 3,000 workers (7.5%) and the proportion was still only 7.6% in 1911, while 
Catholics were 24% of Belfast's population (Farrell, 1980, p16). The sectarian riots 
which accompanied partition forced most Catholics out of the yards altogether. Goldring 
notes that the Yard's management condemned the attempted exclusion of Catholic 
workers in 1864, but condoned it later in the century, as the struggle against Home 
Rule necessitated a strengthening of the alliance between workers and industrialists (op 
cit, p64). 
By the end of the century, Protestants monopolised skilled labour, while Catholics were 
almost entirely confined to unskilled work. Although Protestants formed an absolute 
majority of unskilled workers, their collective image was of skilled labour. Sectarianism 
corresponded with their daily experience. This also had a gender dimension, as in the 
textile industry 
-the jobs of supervision snd the maintenance of machinery were held by skilled Protestant men 
surrounded by thousands of poorly paid Catholic women - (Goldring p60J. 
In 1901, Catholics made up a quarter of Belfast's population, and 50% of female 
spinners; 33% of labourers; 77% of bricklayers; 41 % of dockers. But they provided 
only 6% of shipyard workers and 10% of boilermakers (Goodman, 1991, p13). These 
patterns persist in the current labour market (see Chapter Six), but while at this time 
wages in skilled trades were higher than in Britain, and unskilled wages lower (Bell, 
1976)' both have now moved towards British levels. 
-As sectarianism depressed WlI(Je rates for unskilled labour, full use could be made of chellP female 
and child labour both in factories and -lIS much lIS possible - in the home- (Goodman, op cit p 14J. 
The proportion of women in paid work was much higher than in Britain, and the majority 
were Catholic. A Commission of Inquiry in 1891 found that of the 30,000 workers in 
textiles, five out of six were women, a tenth of Belfast's entire population. Wages were 
even lower where women predominated. Another Commission in 1912 found wages 
79 
in textiles were less than a penny an hour. Girls started work early, and continued into 
old age. 
"My grandmother worked in the mill until she WBS seventy-three. My mother worked in the mill, lind 
she went to school half-time. She worked from when shfl WBS IIbout twelvfI. You wflnt to school 
and you workfld the other hlllf" (NUPE, 1992, pp79-80). 
This system imposed a heavy toll on young girls. Journalist Robert Lynd, writing in 
1909 described how 
"Vitality is slowly squeezed out of thflm, lind it is hardly IIny eXlI(Jgeration to say that from the age 
of fiftefln upwards they die like flies. " (cited in ibid, p 80) 
Derry, Northern Ireland's second city, became the centre of the clothing industry, again 
with a largely female labour force. Like linen, the industry was initially domestic. 
Factory production begun with the invention of the sewing machine in 1841. By 1867, 
2,000 people were employed in seven factories, but were outnumbered by 10,000 
outworkers. In 1871, 22,812 women were employed in shirt making in Derry either in 
factories, or as outworkers in the surrounding rural areas (McLaughlin, 1989). By 1896 
there were 20 factories with 10,000 workers. Working hours of were relatively short 
for the time (51 per week), to allow women to walk from outlying areas (ibid). 
The working lives of women in Derry appear to have taken a different pattern from 
those in Belfast. Mclaughlin (1986) argues that then, as now, the stereotype of the 
'female breadwinner' in the Derry clothing factories is largely mythical. The majority of 
workers were young single women. Their activities were strictly controlled, and their 
mothers required to act as guarantors. Employment of inexperienced girls did not 
challenge patriarchal family relationships, which were replicated within the factory. 
Employment of married women was more problematic. Fears of female domination were 
expressed by the City establishment. Unemployment resulting from technical progress 
in the industry was regarded as 'proper' for women, who were not seen as workers in 
their own right. Women were excluded from the Amalgamated Society of Tailors until 
1917. They were not regarded as skilled workers: the skills in needlework which they 
brought into the factory were seen as 'traditional', and they were not given recognition 
in terms of wages or status. 
There was no significant Catholic merchant or industrial class which could have allied 
with the Protestant business class. The Catholic middle class consisted mainly of 
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publicans, and professionals serving their own community: priests, doctors and lawyers. 
In 1881 Catholics formed 17 % of the legal profession in Belfast, and 10% of the 
medical (Rolston & Tomlinson, 1988, p25). 
The interests of the local bourgeoisie were dependent on sectarian working practices, 
but "UK state policies were relatively autonomous of the interests of both landowners 
and the middle class in Ireland" (Goodman, p 56). While they did not directly challenge 
the Orange leaders, who were the main base of support for British rule in Ireland, some 
British policies did run counter to the interests of this class. The extension of suffrage 
undermined the landlords throughout Ireland. The Commissions of Inquiry cited above 
which were a feature of nineteenth and early twentieth century British public life were 
often critical of aspects of local Unionist rule. An inquiry into the riots of 1864 riots 
noted that the local state apparatus was openly sectarian, with only one policeman in 
30 Catholic (Goodman, op cit). 
As sectarianism became entrenched in the North, it divided the economy further from 
the South. Economic ties to the Empire strengthened dependence on the Union. 
Unionists were able to unite all classes in the Protestant community against Home Rule, 
and ensure that no movement for independence could develop on an all-Ireland basis. 
The South 
The Union acted as a spur to industrial development in the North: in the South, industry 
was submerged by competition from Britain, while the underdevelopment of agriculture 
intensified, culminating in the disastrous Famine of the 1840s. 
Decline was not immediate. Cotton flourished until the Anglo-American War of 1812-4, 
when British manufactures, having lost their American market, dumped cotton in 
Ireland. In 1822, recession further damaged the industry. Cotton workers numbered 
3,000-5,000, compared to 30-40,000 in 1800 (Strauss p75), and Southern wool 
production was reduced to providing only 10% of the Irish market (Cullen 1972). 
While nationalist historians blame the removal of tariffs for the decline, others (Johnson 
& Kennedy, 1991, p15) argue that this was relatively insignificant. For Cullen the 
crucial event was Britain's industrial revolution which transformed technology and 
allowed British firms to undercut competitors. But the removal of protection increased 
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the vulnerability of Ireland's industry (Strauss). The Union not only created a privileged 
market for British manufacturers in Ireland, it entrenched the subordination of the Irish 
economy. While a domestic industrial class developed in Ulster, which was able to use 
the local state apparatus to support its industry, colonial relationships in the South 
made this impossible. 
The Corn Laws, which excluded exports from outside the United Kingdom, gave Irish 
farmers privileged access to the British market. The Napoleonic Wars pushed prices 
higher, but the main beneficiaries were landlords, and large tenant-farmers. Rent 
increases creamed off most of the extra cash. But as grain prices collapsed after the 
war, rents did not fall in step, and the peasantry was forced into debt. 
Large numbers of redundant urban workers were forced back into the archaic 
agricultural system. Population growth reached unprecedented levels: the 1841 census 
estimated population at 8 million. Extreme pressure on the land brought further 
sub-division of plots, while the destruction of the textile industry deprived small tenants 
of the additional income they had derived from domestic spinning (Johnson & Kennedy 
p21 ). 
The period saw a sharpening sexual division of labour in agriculture, and women 
became increasingly marginalised. In the eighteenth century, farm labour had been 
shared, with women also largely responsible for domestic weaving. The disappearance 
of this source of income further undermined women's economic status (Rossiter, 
1991). 
Famine 
The Famine increased divisions between North and South. Disease attacked the potato, 
the main subsistence crop, and by 1846, millions were starving. Though triggered by 
natural causes, the roots of the Famine lay in the colonial land system. 
-more then e third of the poteto crop throughout the l.nd wu gone; in some districts more th.n 
helf; .nd et the seme time the bulk of the remeining supplies, cettle .nd com, butter, beef.nd pork, 
which would heve fed ell the inhebit.nts, continued to be exported to Englllnd to pey the rent of 
ftJrms which no longer yielded the cultivetors their ordinery food. (Duffy, quoted in Speed (1976}). 
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The catastrophic results have marked Irish life to this day. Population fell to 5 million 
by 1851, as 1 million people died of hunger, and others, unable to survive on their land, 
or evicted for non-payment of rent, were forced to emigrate. Government policy 
facilitated the transfer of estates to large landlords. Poor relief was confined to people 
with less than a quarter of an acre of land. The aim was to replace the old land system 
with capitalist agriculture. But the new landlords were if anything harsher than those 
they replaced, with no interest beyond securing the highest possible rent. They were 
speculators, taking advantage of the collapse of land prices to make easy gains, rather 
than farmers interested in improving the land (Rumpf & Hepburn, p4). 
Consolidation of holdings was intensified by the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1847. 
This opened the British market to grain from more efficient producers. Irish farmers 
switched to cattle rearing, where transport costs gave them an advantage over imports 
from further afield. As tillage disappeared, women's economic role was further 
weakened as men took on the less labour intensive jobs involved in pasture (Rossiter). 
Emigration had been common throughout the century, but with the Famine the trickle 
became a flood. British policy encouraged emigration on the Malthusian principle of 
absolute surplus population. But the social changes which Famine precipitated, far from 
creating a new equilibrium population, ensured that the haemorrhage of people became 
permanent. 'Surplus population' was continually renewed as the gap between Ireland's 
food production and the ability of peasants to feed themselves widened.' Emigration 
has continued, and population has never again approached its pre-Famine level (Census 
of Population, various dates). 
Britain and Ireland in the Age of Imperialism 
The depression of 1870 marked the end of Britain's unchallenged domination of the 
international economy. Competition grew as Germany, France and the United States 
developed industrially behind tariff barriers. Better communications reduced the cost of 
trade and enabled these economies to invade Britain's traditional export markets, while 
refrigeration allowed trade in food from further afield. Competition for markets and raw 
materials brought the division of the world through imperial conquest (Lenin, 1982). 
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The North's ties to the imperial economy increased, while the South's importance to 
Britain declined. Between 1866-1870 and 1884-8, the value of her exports fell by 25%, 
bringing renewed conflict between landlords and tenants. 
The landlord class in both Britain and Ireland was by now weakened economically and 
politically. The British industrial revolution had established the dominance of industrial 
capital. Repeal of the Corn Laws further undermined the landlords, whose incomes 
depended on high agricultural prices. Manufacturing prospered as extension of the 
franchise in 1832, 1867 and 1884, (to which the votes of Irish members of the House 
of Commons contributed (Strauss)) weakened the political power of landlords. 
The Irish Land Acts of 1870 and the 1880s - which granted the Three Fs: Fair Rent, 
Fixed Rent and Fixity of Tenure - reflected the decline of this class, as well as 
successful agitation. The Act of 1881 removed many of the Irish grievances at the 
time. They also removed the direct material interest of the Anglo-Irish landed class in 
the Union. Many were happy to be bought out, receiving ample compensation from the 
British government. The Land Purchase Acts from 1885 completed the process, so that 
by 1917 almost all land was owner occupied, mainly in 5-10 acre holdings (Strauss, p 
199). 
The class of independent small farmers created by this process has been a powerful 
bulwark of social conservatism. The transfer of title to male 'heads of household' and 
primogeniture further marginalised women in rural areas. Maintenance of the land 
became central to Irish family life. Men were discouraged from marrying until they 
inherited from their parents, often in middle age. Marriage became an economic 
transaction, in which a dowry was common. Many rural men never married. 
The army of single women this situation produced found no satisfactory outlet in the 
country or in the city, where the main occupations open to them were domestic service 
or shop work. Women's wages were even lower than men's. At Jacobs biscuits 
factory, one of Dublin's major employers, men's wages were £1 a week, compared 
with 7-101- for women.8 Many sought a more independent life outside Ireland. Between 
1885 and 1920, 1,357,831 people emigrated. Just over half (684,159) were women, 
of which 89% were single, mostly aged under 24 (Rossiter, 1991). 
The particularly puritanical and authoritarian nature of the Irish Catholic Church on 
sexual matters can also be traced to the post-Famine social structure, when celibacy 
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was rigidly enforced as a means of survival. A Catholic religious revival coincided with 
Protestant revivalism in the North. This renewed influence of the Churches further 
divided people North and South (Rossiter; Rumpf & Hepburn). 
The material basis for the Union was undermined from two sides: rent, which had been 
guaranteed by the Union, was declining, while Irish supplies of wage goods to Britain 
market were becoming less significant. The underdeveloped agricultural system which 
the Union had entrenched no longer served the needs of either the British or Anglo-Irish 
ruling class. It was only in Ulster that the landed aristocracy retained political influence 
through the Orange Order. At one stage they were prepared to support Home Rule 
rather than submit to the loss of power entailed in the extension of the franchise 
enacted by the British parliament (Bell, pp97-8). 
For most of the century substantial capital sums had been drained from Ireland through 
taxation, in addition to rent. The exact amount is disputed (Johnson and Kennedy, p 19), 
but a report in 1896 showed that Ireland paid both the full cost of administering the 
Union, and of the army. It also contributed £2 million per annum towards running the 
British Empire. However by the end of the century the Tories planned to 'kill Home Rule 
by kindness' (Strauss, p201 ) introducing Old Age Pensions and other welfare payments. 
This created a drain on the exchequer, which was greater because emigration meant 
old people were a disproportionately large section of the population. 
From Home Rule to Republicanism 
The independence movements of the nineteenth century were based in the South, and 
largely rural in membership. The predominantly landlord leadership of the parliamentary 
Home Rule Parties needed both to mobilise support from the peasantry, and to maintain 
political control over the movement to avoid jeopardising their own interests. The 
agrarian question was so tied to the colonial question, that leadership always threatened 
to move from landlords such as Daniel O'Conell, and later Parnell into the hands of 
radicals such as Michael Davitt, founder of the Land League. The involvement of the 
Catholic church helped maintain bourgeois authority over the movement, but it also 
reduced its attractiveness to Ulster Protestants. 
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The Irish Parliamentary Party held the balance of power at Westminster for much of the 
century, and was able to use the threat posed by the Land League and the Fenians to 
secure concessions. The Land Acts served to demobilise the radicals. 
As the economic advantages of the Union diminished, the idea of Home Rule was 
accepted by sections of the British ruling class, who saw advantages in handing power 
to a 'moderate' leadership, which could preserve stability. Dominion status would have 
given Ireland sovereignty over fiscal matters and reduced Britain's liabilities. But the 
Home Rule Bills brought in by Gladstone were continually frustrated by a House of Lords 
dominated by the landlord interest (Dangerfield, 1977). 
With the partial solution of the land question, Parnell needed to mobilise another group 
in support of independence. Ireland's industrial bourgeoisie, although weak, had grown 
significantly since 1881 (Beresford Ellis) and was influential in the Home Rule 
movement. Parnell's demand for tariff protection for Irish industry aimed to strengthen 
this class. But it was against the interests of British industrialists, for whom Ireland was 
still a significant market, especially as competition from other producers increased. They 
opposed any settlement which would allow Ireland the right to protect industry. 
The demand for economic separation from Britain also threatened capitalists in Ulster. 
Industry was tied to British and Empire markets, and imperialist conquest and 
rearmament brought a boom in shipbuilding and engineering. This class had nothing to 
gain from protection. But successful resistance to Home Rule depended on their ability 
to mobilise other classes. 
Protestant workers had substantial reasons to support the Union. the prosperity of the 
North East was in marked contrast to the rest of Ireland. Protestant privilege could not 
have survived an all-Ireland political settlement in which they would be greatly 
outnumbered: the Union was the guarantee of the ascendancy. 
Their standard of living was also tied directly to the Empire. In the abstract one can 
conceive of an all-Ireland economy in which selective tariffs were applied so that 
Belfast's industry did not suffer. Politically this was impossible, since Belfast's industry 
depended on the Empire whose interests were threatened by the demand for tariffs. 
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Parnell's Home Rule programme, and that of Arthur Griffiths' Sinn Fein ('Ourselves 
Alone') was essentially a programme to develop capitalism in the South. It offered 
nothing to Protestant workers. On the contrary, it threatened the basis of their relative 
prosperity without presenting a radical alternative which could unite their interests with 
those of Southern workers. 
Nationalism, Socialism and Feminism 
The alternative to this programme was articulated most notably by James Connolly. His 
vision of an independent Ireland included a radical transformation of property relations 
in the interests of labour. 
The end of the nineteenth century saw the rise of general unions, organising unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers. The limited industrial growth had delayed the development of 
trade unionism in the South, but Dublin was a commercial and shipping centre, with 
significant numbers of dockers and other transport workers. The development of 
small-scale industry at the end of the century increased the labour force. Irish general 
unions began as branches of British unions. The most important was the National Union 
of Dock Labourers, whose Dublin organiser was James Larkin. A series of bitter 
disputes in which the Irish branch felt let down by the distant London headquarters led 
to a split. In 1909, Larkin formed the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union 
(lTGWU) and 
·The Irish LIIbour Movement was born, with Larkin summing up its philosophy in one phrase, 'The 
Land of Ireland for the people of Ireland. ,. (Beresford Ellis, p 183/. 
The ITGWU remains the largest Dublin-based union. Larkin's aim was to organise "(t)he 
whole of unskilled labour in Ireland" (Beresford Ellis, p182)' and in 1911, Connolly 
moved to Belfast to become the Union's organiser. There was intense political and 
industrial struggle at the beginning of this century, both in the South and in Belfast. The 
ITGWU organised some successful strikes which united Protestant and Catholic 
workers. This showed that the support of Protestant workers for their bosses was by 
no means continuous or unconditional, and the alliance against Home Rule not 
inevitable. 
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By the First World War the fragile unity had broken. The working class in the South 
though militant, was tiny and geographically concentrated. The ITGWU sustained a 
serious defeat in the 1913 lock-out, when the employers' federation combined to 
attempt the destruction of the trade union movement. Irish trade unions were too weak 
to win without material support from British unions, but the TUC condemned the Irish 
workers and left them isolated. They were bitterly denounced by the conservative wing 
of the nationalist movement, notably Arthur Griffiths. With trade unions weakened, 
Protestant workers were more ready to respond to appeals to unite against the threat 
of Rome Rule. There was 
-no way that the Republic could win over Protestant workers from communal politics that at least 
gave them a junior share in Protestant hegemony over Catholics, to the role of victim of exploitation 
equal to that of Catholic workers, and subject to Catholic as well as Protestant employers - (Lysaght, 
1991, p44) 
A Home Rule Bill passed in the Commons in 191 2 was opposed by Northern Unionists 
led by Sir Edward Carson. 218,00 people signed a Solemn League and Covenant, 
pledging to use "all means necessary" to oppose Home Rule. In 1913 Carson formed 
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), an illegal Protestant army. These moves were 
accompanied by organised sectarian attacks. In 191 2, 2,000 Catholic workers were 
driven from the Belfast shipyards. 
The British government ordered its brigade at the Curragh military camp to raid the UVF 
headquarters and arrest its leaders. The commanding officer refused, and the 
government agreed to the officers' demand that the Army would not be used against 
the Unionists. Lenin wrote of these events: 
-March 27, 7914, will be IIIJ epoch milking turning point, the dllY when the noble IlIIJdlords of Britllin 
smashed the British Constitution and British IIIW to bits IIIJd gllve IIIJ excellent lesson in class 
struggle- (cited in Beresford Ellis, p 207). 
Rather than take on the Unionists, Lloyd George's government capitulated. A 
compromise was worked out which for the first time opened up the possibility of 
partition. With the First World War all progress towards Home Rule was postponed. 
The War further cut off Northern workers from their Southern counterparts. An 
armaments and shipping boom increased prosperity, while political differences over the 
Empire were bought to the fore. The British trade union and labour movement turned 
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its back on class politics and internationalism, as did European socialists, further 
isolating Irish nationalists. 
The threat from the UVF led Larkin and Connolly to reform the Irish Citizens Army (lCA), 
pledged to "the principle of equal rights and opportunities for the People of Ireland and 
to work in harmony with organised Labour towards that end" (Beresford Ellis, p208). 
With the Irish Volunteers9 the ICA organised the 1916 Easter Rising against British rule. 
A split in the Volunteers brought confusion over the orders to mobilise, and far fewer 
than planned actually took part. The Rising was swiftly defeated, its leaders, including 
Connolly, executed. 
The brutality of the executions, and the reprisals which followed increased opposition 
to British rule, while the Rising provided inspiration for the growing Republican 
movement. But with the death of Connolly the movement lost its most important 
socialist voice. Connolly's aim of uniting the independence movement with organised 
labour was destroyed, as the ITGWU and the Labour Party withdrew support from the 
ICA. From then on the labour leaders abstained from involvement in the national 
struggle. In the 1918 election at the height of the national revolution, the Labour Party 
withdrew their own candidates declaring 'unqualified adherence' to the demand for self 
determination, and their willingness to 
"sacrifice party interests in the interests of the nation in this important crisis in the history of the 
nation" (Voice of Labour, quoted in Beresford Ellis, p204J. 
The turn of the century had seen an extraordinary ferment of radical activity in Dublin, 
with women not only taking a leading role in the nationalist movement, but for the first 
time in Ireland, making demands in their own right, through the suffrage movement. 
Women had always been active in the nationalist movement, but the 'Ladies 
Committees' were excluded from full participation. Women such as the Fenian Mary 
Jane O'Donovan Rossa, active in the 1860s, were often involved through male 
relatives. They tended to take a supportive role, without raising issues on their own 
behalf. Family life was accepted unquestioningly as the sphere of women. 
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"In the Irish nationalist tradition, women have only become politically visible lIS a group ... when the 
moment of struggle has allowed the temporary suspension of the cultural norms restricting women's 
behaviour. Their participation at such moments hIlS had less the chlJrllcter of independent IIction lind 
more that of sponsorship by the lelldership of male-dominllted movements. "(Wllrd, 1980, p96) 
As the trade union and socialist movements begun to flourish, and the nationalist 
movement revived, women became involved independently. Many were active in all 
three movements: socialist and trade union activity; nationalism; and women's rights 
through the suffrage movement. Helena Moloney, later elected president of the Irish 
TUC, was one: a well-established actress at Dublin's Abbey Theatre, she played a key 
role in many organisations. 
But the harsh conditions under which the majority of women worked excluded them 
from political activity. Both Gonne and Markievicz were from privileged, Anglo-Irish 
families, and Ann Haslam, the Quaker founder of the Irish suffrage movement was from 
a middle-class background. Moloney was able to support her activity through her 
earnings in the theatre. 
With the separation of the national and social questions, the demand for suffrage came 
to be seen as competing with the national movement. Most nationalist men were either 
hostile to women's demands or argued they were marginal to the main struggle. 
Connolly was unusual in actively supporting the movement and speaking at Suffrage 
meetings. In 1911 a Bill to grant women the vote was given its first reading in the 
House of Commons. All 32 Irish MPs voted in favour. In 191 2, fearing the loss of the 
Home Rule Bill, they voted against and it was lost. Suffragist'O militancy increased, and 
there were 35 convictions in 1912. The Catholic clergy denounced the women from the 
pulpit. 
The war strained the unity of the suffrage movement, as British suffragettes supported 
the war effort. It drew a further wedge between nationalists and suffragists: women 
were expected to put their interests on hold as the national struggle dominated. Some 
nationalist women even opposed the demand for the vote on the grounds that it was 
wrong to demand anything from the imperial parliament. Moralism of this kind has been 
a pervasive feature of Republican politics. 
The Irish Volunteers refused to demand the inclusion of women's suffrage in the Home 
Rule Bill (Ward, 1980, p101). Cumman na mBan, the women's organisation of the Irish 
Volunteers (which became Sinn Fein's women's group) was caught in double bind: 
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-If nationalist women refused to work for the Volunteer movement until they were gu.,anteed equal 
status (as the Irish Women's Franchise LeB(1ue tried to persuade them to do) they felt they would 
isolate themselves in the emerging new nation ... if they sacrificed their own interests and worked 
hard for independence, some saw clearly that this renunciation would defeat whatever chance 
women stood of being accepted as partners - (ibid, p 102). 
Some Northern women were involved in the suffrage campaign, but they were never 
as active as Southern women (Goldring). The situation in the North was not conducive 
to women's self-organisation. Women activists in the South generally had relative 
economic independence. For Catholic women, with their double burden of domestic and 
waged labour, political activity was difficult. Unionist women were not so hard-pressed 
in this way, but the conservative influence of Unionism did not encourage independent 
activity. It was not possible for these women to find common cause with the most 
progressive elements of the trade union and nationalist movements as happened at the 
turn of the century in the South. The strains to the movement during the war destroyed 
the basis for any united North-South campaign. 
The marginalisation of both the 'social' and the 'women's question' from the national 
struggle destroyed any effective challenge to the conservative leadership of Sinn Fein. 
This has had profound implications for the type of state which was constructed in 
Ireland. 
Partition 
At the first general election after the War, in 1918, Sinn Fein won 73 of the 105 Irish 
seats. The Sinn Fein M.P.s immediately met to declare an Irish Republic. The 
Proclamation contained a radical democratic programme written by Thomas Johnson, 
the Labour leader. But the absence from the meeting of some leading Sinn Fein 
members, including de Valera, suggests that it may not have had universal backing 
(Rumpf & Hepburn). Certainly there were no moves to implement it. 
The Republic was unanimously recognised by both the Irish TUe and Labour Party. The 
British government sent in troops and irregulars (the Black and Tans) to quell resistance, 
and a bitter guerrilla war ensued. The Volunteers had become the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA). In the North, some of the most brutal violence took place as pogroms were 
launched against Catholics (Farrell). 
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The outcome of the War of Independence was stalemate. No side - Republicans, 
Unionists, the British government - was able to win outright victory. Partition, the first 
choice of none of the protagonists, marked a recognition of the continuing divisions in 
Ireland. It allowed the Unionists to strengthen their hold in the North East, while Britain 
maintained important economic and political powers over the whole island. 
The six north eastern counties became Northern Ireland, remaining part of the United 
Kingdom. The other twenty six counties became the Irish Free State, with Dominion 
status. The two states were artificial constructions. The principle on which the border 
was drawn was to give Northern Ireland the largest population and land area over which 
Unionist rule could be maintained. Northern Ireland is not the historic nine-county 
province of Ulster. As Lord Cushendon, a leading Unionist politician, lamented: 
"To separate themselves from fellow 10Ylliists in Monaghlln, Cllvan lind Donegal WIIS hateful to every 
delegate from the other six counties ... but the inextricable index of statistics demonstrated that 
although Unionists were in a mBjority when geographicBI Ulster WBS considered lIS II unit, yet the 
distribution of popuilltion made it certain that a sepllrate parliament for the whole province would 
have a precarious existence" (Bell, p7). 
But had Northern Ireland encompassed only areas where Protestants were a significant 
majority - Belfast and its hinterland - the new state would not have been economically 
viable. Catholics made up around a third of the population at partition, concentrated in 
the West. 
Republicans were bitterly divided. The group led by Collins who had negotiated the 
Treaty, were prepared to compromise in the hope that partition would be temporary. 
The Boundary Commission set up under the Treaty was expected to cede sufficient 
territory to the South to make the Northern state unworkable. But for many Republicans 
this represented a betrayal, and for the left and the labour movement the division of the 
working class was disastrous. 
Partition was welcomed by a war-weary population since it offered at least stability. In 
the Civil War which raged for two years between supporters and opponents of the 
Treaty, Republicans were defeated by a combination of British, Free State and Unionist 
forces. Class divisions within the movement re-emerged as groups of workers seized 
land and ran farms as communes. The Knock Creamery was declared a Soviet. This 
action embarrassed the official labour movement, and was opposed by conservative 
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elements in Sinn Fein (both pro- and Anti-Treatyites) as the movement began to 
threaten property rights. 
With the victory of the pro-Treaty forces the powers of the Boundary Commission, 
which had been expected to pass Tyrone and Fermanagh to the Free State, were 
revoked. Under threat of renewed war, Lloyd George forced the Free State government 
to accept the existing boundaries, and to compensate the British government and the 
Unionists for the cost of the army during the War of Independence. The sum agreed 
was £ 1 50,000, with an annuity of £250,000 for the next sixty years. 
The New States at partition 
The Twenty Six Counties 
The new Irish Free State was remarkably conservative for a nation emerging from a 
protracted and bloody struggle for independence (MacOonagh, 1977). Far from taking 
radical steps to separate the economy from England, let alone to carry out the spirit of 
the Proclamation and redistribute wealth, the economic policies adopted by the Free 
State government were a model of British Treasury caution. Social conservatism, was 
embedded in the institutions of colonial rule which the new regime took over, and in the 
central role of the Catholic Church. 
-Against a divided opposition the Irish bourgeoisie united behind the Trellty ... This unity hlld II pllrllllel 
in the Catholic hierarchy. During the Anglo-Irish wllr it hlld not been lIbie to unite .. Now "II the 
bishops moved to support the new settlement- (Lysaght, 1991, p48J. 
At partition, few people believed the new state would survive in its existing boundaries. 
But in waging the civil war the pro-Treatyites were forced to defend the new regime, 
which inevitably meant defending the boundaries on which its power rested. The border 
was given further legitimacy when, following the defeat of the anti-Treaty forces, their 
leader de Valera led his new Party, Fianna Fail, into the Oail. De Valera himself became 
Taoiseach (Prime Minister) in 1932, and carried out repressive measures against the 
minority of Republicans who continued a sporadic armed struggle. 
Commitment to a united Ireland was enshrined in the constitution, but no major political 
party had a "credible strategy for achieving this aim" (Rowthorn & Wayne, 1988, p26). 
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They were obliged to construct a nation state within the Twenty Six Counties. In the 
name of building the Irish nation, a national identity was forged which separated it 
further from the Six Counties. Irish nationhood was based on a narrow and 
inward-looking nostalgia for a gaelic tradition, in which the Catholic church was 
inseparably linked to Irishness. (Brown, 1981). The church took on many state 
functions, running the majority of schools, and many hospitals (Phadraig, 1986). 
The Church's role in the state was unlikely to make it attractive to Northern 
Protestants. But conservatism on sexual matters united the two states. In many ways, 
each was a mirror image of the other, and 
"Irish women psid the price of s psrtitioned Irelsnd, where two mutuslly sntll(1onistic ststes sdopted 
ideologies which were religiously orthodox and patrisrchs" (Rossiter, 1991, p232). 
The Church view of women prevailed in state ideology, and this 
"misogynist attitude received its fullest expression in Article 41of the southern state's 1937 
Constitution, which defined the role of mothers as properly belonging to the home" (ibid). 
Although they won the vote, women's involvement in political and social life diminished 
after partition. O'Dowd suggests 
"one reason was thst it was precisely in these areas that the Churches, notably the C.tholic Church, 
most strongly exerted their authority" (O'Dowd, 1987 pp "-2). 
The 26 County economy was extremely weak at partition. Nearly all the advanced 
industry was in the Six Counties, and one third of the Irish market and taxable capacity 
was lost, along with a fifth of the population. The Free State still depended on Britain 
as a market for her agricultural exports, and a source of manufactured imports. Much 
of industry was British-owned while British banks dominated the financial sector. The 
Irish punt was tied to the pound sterling giving little control over monetary policy. 
"From the 19208 until the 19608, despite the achievement of political independence from Brifllin .•..• 
the Republic of Ireland remained an almost classic example of II dependent society" (Wickham, 
1986, p74). 
State initiatives did not challenge economic backwardness in the first thirty years. 
Economic policy was inhibited both by ties of dependence to Britain and fear of 
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retaliation, and by the conservatism of the new regime (Lee, 1989). The annuities 
represented a continuing drain on Irish income. Protection did bring some limited 
development of domestic industry, mainly in low technology consumer goods. 
Agriculture, based on small individual proprietors remained the mainstay of the 
economy. The rural economy also reinforced conservatism on economic and social 
policies. 
The reality of the border necessitated the construction of a formal 26 County economy, 
with separate fiscal and monetary policy. This further reduced economic links with the 
North. Both economies remained outward-orientated, at the expense of intra-Ireland 
trade. 
Although the border disappeared as a serious political issue, the major parties have their 
origins in opposing sides in the civil war. Political debate has concentrated on alternative 
conceptions of Irish nationhood, rather than class. Fianna Fail remains the largest party, 
losing power only when other parties have formed coalitions. It has constructed 
hegemony 
·on an alliance of petit-bourgeois economic nationalism and popular social reform, creating an imll(Je 
of Ireland lIS 'classless'· (Hazelkorn, 7986, p334J. 
Clientist politics have prevented an effective challenge to Fianna Fail through socialist 
or social democratic politics. Trade unionism is strong, but the Labour Party had until 
1993 achieved office only as a junior coalition partner of Fine Gael. 
The regime came into crisis in the 1950s. As the rest of Europe experienced post-war 
boom, the inability of the Irish economy to sustain adequate living standards was 
reflected in mass unemployment and emigration which drained the country of its 
younger generation. But Fianna Fail's hegemonic position allowed it to lead the policy 
changes of the late 1950s, which reversed some of the traditional canon of nationalism 
(Butler, 1992). Economic policy turned outwards, with a strategy of attracting 
multinational capital through lavish grants and subsidies. 
Perrons (1978) argues that this represented a change of emphasis rather than a 
substantive change of direction. There was little attempt to direct investment or plan 
economic development, let alone interfere with property relations. It was essentially a 
policy of 'dependent industrialisation' (Wickham, 1986', with Ireland taking a 
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subordinate place in the world division of labour. The policy was relatively successful 
until the early 1980s, but the limits to a strategy based on cheap labour and resources 
emerged more sharply as other newly industrialising countries were able to offer these 
more cheaply. By the mid-1980s, a 'Jobs Crisis' had developed (lCTU, 1984), while tax 
concessions and grants to multinationals brought mounting debt, which was paid by 
increasing the tax burden on working people. While state policy has shifted towards a 
more directed industrial strategy embodying more skill-intensive sectors, the basic 
structural problems remain. 
Industrialisation brought other modernising influences. Social mobility has reduced the 
importance of the three-generation family. Women, particularly in urban areas, have 
taken up opportunities to work. A new labour force of young women was also 
constructed in some rural areas where new multinational factories provided semi-skilled 
employment (Harris, 1989). Ireland became less insular as communications expanded 
and foreign travel increased. As the economy flourished, emigrants started to return in 
large numbers, often bringing less traditional ideas. 
But social change has been slow, reluctant and uneven. Social welfare provision was 
brought in against Church opposition, for whom the 'Mother and Child' proposals (Child 
Benefit) struck at the roots of Christian family responsibility (Browne, 1986). Again it 
was Fianna Fail rather than labour which had the power to carry forward these 
proposals. Other social legislation has been introduced through the EC, of which Ireland 
is a major beneficiary. 
But Ireland remains on the fringes of Europe both geographically and socially, at the 
bottom in terms of many social indicators (Eurostat). The female participation rate is still 
very low, and childcare worse than any other EC state. In 1950, Ireland had the lowest 
marriage rate in Europe, with one in four women and one in three men over 55 
unmarried; but while elsewhere marriage has become less popular as couples favour 
cohabitation, marriage rates in Ireland have increased. Ireland has the highest birth rate 
and the largest family size in the EC. During the 1970s, population grew at more than 
four times the EEC average, but population density is the lowest. Net emigration, the 
product of underdevelopment, has - apart fro a short period during the 1980s, remained 
a permanent feature. 
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The rural family retains rigid age and sex roles. Men still marry very late, often waiting 
till they have inherited. Men still control the farm, with their wives and sons often 
having little influence over its management (Commins, 1986). 
The Catholic church retains unrivalled power in the state. In 1981 93% of the 
population declared an affiliation to the Catholic church, and 91 % of these claim to 
attend church weekly (Phadraig, p141 ).11 No significant political party has ever been 
overtly anti-clerical, despite the Church's authoritarianism and puritanism (Rumpf & 
Hepburn, p15). Commins (1986) explains this as the inheritance of colonialism, when 
the church was seen as mediating on behalf of an underprivileged people. 
Catholic idealisation of both Irish motherhood and virginity is only reconciled by 
rigorously policing extra-marital deviance (O'Dowd, 1987). It is the only country in 
Europe to ban divorce. Contraceptives are now available, though difficult to obtain in 
rural areas. A referendum in the early 1980s made abortion unconstitutional under any 
circumstances. 
The recent attempt by the Dublin Attorney General to prevent a 14-year-old girl from 
travelling to England for an abortion after she had been raped threw into crisis not only 
the relationship between church and state, but also the project of modernisation 
through the European Community. The Maastricht Treaty was threatened by 
anti-abortionists who wanted to restrict the right of pregnant women to travel within 
Europe for abortions. This forced the major parties to distance themselves somewhat 
from the Catholic Church, by proposing a new Constitutional amendment which 
represented a compromise on the abortion issue. 12 
Ireland's economic development has weakened the specific ties to the British economy. 
British capital is no longer dominant, nor is it the major trading partner (Wickham, op 
cit). These ties were also weakened when Ireland joined the EC, whose expanding role 
it has embraced more enthusiastically than Britain. The link of the two currencies was 
broken in 1979. 
Many argue that the national question is largely irrelevant to the South's development. 
In a recent work, Bew et al argue that to understand Ireland's 
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·contradictory realities needs .. no plumbing of the depths of '800 years of Oppression'- Sew et aI, 
1989, p13J. 
and that Ireland is moving towards 
-a long delayed realignment towards a politics based on class, as has traditionally been the case 
elsewhere in modern Europe -. 13 
The success of the Labour Party in the last general election (November 1992) when it 
won seats at the expense of both traditional parties, was widely seen as marking this 
transformation in Irish politics. But the bargaining following the election produced a 
governing coalition in which, although Labour hold more powerful offices than in its 
previous partnerships with Fine Gael, Fianna Fail remains the leading partner. 
Revisionist historians are rightly critical of the conservatism and inwardness of much 
nationalist thinking in Ireland. But these are a product of a history which includes 
Ireland's subordination to Britain. Ireland's social, economic and political development 
remain shaped by the border (see Chapter One). A search for 'pure' class politics is as 
unrealistic in the South as it is in the North, or indeed in the rest of 'modern Europe'. 
The Six Counties 
The Treaty gave Northern Ireland a locally-elected administration based at Stormont. 
The Unionists originally opposed a local parliament, preferring to continue the old 
constitutional arrangements. But Craigavon, writing to Lloyd George in 1921, agreed: 
-As a final settlement and supreme sacrifice in the interests of peace, the government of Ireland Act 
was accepted by Northern Ireland, although not IJSked for by her representativtlS- (quoted in Lyons, 
1973, p696J. 
In the event, they took full advantage of the local state apparatus to secure their control 
over the Six Counties (Rumpf &. Hepburn). The Stormont parliament became responsible 
for domestic matters such as education, health, housing, and law and order, while the 
British government retained responsibility for trade, defence and foreign policy. 
The financial relationship between Britain and Northern Ireland was complex. Although 
subordinate to the British government, Stormont had substantial autonomy in spending. 
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The majority of taxation was paid into the UK Exchequer (Reserved Revenue). From this 
was deducted the Imperial Contribution, through which Northern Ireland paid for items 
not under its control (eg the Army, the UK National Debt). The cost of Reserved 
Services - post office, inland revenue - was also deducted from Reserved Revenue. The 
balance came under the control of the Stormont government. Stormont also controlled 
'transferred revenue', taxes collected directly in Northern Ireland, while local authorities 
collected rates. 
At first Northern Ireland was expected not only to 'pay her way', but to contribute to 
the British exchequer. But during the 1930s, special payments were made to alleviate 
the severe unemployment. As late as 1948-9, Northern Ireland was paying £22.5m per 
annum through the Imperial Contribution, over a quarter of total public spending, and 
five times as much as spending on education. A total of £262 million was paid between 
1920 and 1949 (Ulster Year Book, various years). 
Perhaps the most important area of Unionist control was 'law and order', which came 
under Stormont's Home Affairs Ministry. The state had been created in a bitter war, 
which after the Treaty settlement turned increasingly to sectarian violence. Hundreds 
of people - mainly Catholics - were killed; pogroms against Catholic areas forced 
thousands to flee their homes; thousands more lost their jobs through expulsion and 
intimidation. Some Unionist politicians openly encouraged violence, while the authorities 
did little to prevent it (Farrell). 
Sectarian violence became institutionalised, as responsibility for security passed to the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Special Constabulary (the B Specials), an almost 
100% Protestant force, largely recruited through Orange Lodges. At partition, one in 
five Protestant men carried arms in some section of the security forces. Draconian 
'Emergency Powers' were enacted, later made permanent in the Special Powers Act. 
Its repressive aspects - reportedly the envy of Prime Minister Verwoed of South Africa 
(ibid) - have been detailed in numerous reports, including later official enquiries (for 
example the Cameron Commission, 1969; see also Hillyard, 1983). 
One Party Rule 
Protestants outnumbered Catholics by two to one in the Six Counties, but the majority 
was concentrated in the area around Belfast. Catholics were a majority in two Western 
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counties, and in two others the Protestant majority was precarious. Several towns had 
overwhelming Catholic majorities. In Belfast, Catholics formed a substantial minority, 
concentrated in the West of the city. In the whole of Ireland, Unionists were a minority 
of about a fifth. 
This demography produced permanent insecurity among Protestants. Unionist leaders 
played on the twin fears: that Protestants would be swallowed up in the 'Catholic 
South', and subject to 'Rome Rule'; and that they would lose their majority in Northern 
Ireland (be 'outbred'). Catholics, the majority of whom had supported Irish 
independence, were seen as "disloyal". Speaking in Stormont in 1934, prime minister 
Brooke announced that "Catholics are out to destroy Ulster with all their might and 
power" (Rumpf & Hepburn, p180). Unionists dealt with "disloyalty" by marginalising 
Catholics politically, economically and socially. On the other hand 
"If IlISting loyalty to the new state WllS to develop among the Protestant mllSses, they had to be 
given a privileged position within it .... Protestant privilege would effectively prevent the emergence 
of any working class solidarity.... The Unionists set about constructing an Orange and Protestant 
state with almost a" political power and patronage in their own hands" (Farrell, pSt). 
The Protestant majority constructed with the border was reinforced by gerrymandering 
of local boundaries, and restrictions on the franchise. This helped maintain Protestant 
control of Stormont and virtually all local councils. In the first local elections, held under 
proportional representation (PR), 25 of the 80 Councils elected nationalist majorities. 
Stormont promptly abolished PR, and redrew local boundaries, which produced 
non-Unionist control of only two councils by 1924.'4 PR for Stormont elections was 
abolished in 1929. 
The most famous gerrymander was Derry City Council (see Chapter One). The 
boundaries were changed after Direct Rule, giving non-Unionists a majority. One of their 
first acts was to change the City'S official name from Londonderry to Derry, an act of 
great symbolic significance. 
Northern Ireland was effectively a one-party state under Stormont. Abolition of PR 
meant that the Unionist/Nationalist divide remained the overriding issue in each election. 
Nationalists could not outvote Unionists on their own, and the Protestant class alliance 
prevented any substantial challenge to Unionist rule. Unionists never held less than 33 
of the 52 Stormont seats. There was remarkable continuity of personnel, with only six 
prime ministers in the entire 50 years of Stormont, and three in the first 40 years. 
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Unionist politicians came almost entirely from the landed, industrial and professional 
classes. During the Home Rule crisis Carson initiated the Ulster Unionist Labour 
Association in order to gain trade union votes. Three nominees sat as Labour Unionists 
at Westminster, between 1918 and 1922. But once the state was established, and 
Protestant loyalty secured, this element disappeared. They never had any influence over 
Unionist policy-making, and by 1925 working class representation among elected 
members was almost non-existent (Rumpf & Hepburn p 177). 
Catholics tended to abstain from public life in the early days, believing that the state 
would be unable to establish itself. When they did stand for election, the opposition -
various nationalist parties, plus an occasional Labour member - was marginalised at 
Stormont, and there were frequent nationalist boycotts. The sectarian nature of the 
contest meant that the result of elections was often a foregone conclusion; 47% of 
Unionist victories were unopposed. 
Unionists had even more control over the twelve Westminster seats. Until 1970, they 
held at least nine. They played little part there, but on economic and social questions 
they tended to align themselves with the right of the Conservative Party. 
A Protestant State 
Northern Ireland's first Prime Minister, Lord Craigavon, told Stormont in 1934 
-All I boast is that we have a Protestant parliament and a Protestant stllte- (Farrell, p92J. 
Stormont's total spending was determined by Westminster. Until parity in service 
provision was established with the welfare state in 1947, Northern Ireland's spending 
was constrained by low income (Rump & Hepburn, p172). But Stormont controlled 
most services, and this power was used to maintain Protestant privilege through access 
to jobs and services. As Lord Craigavon put it 
-The appointments made by the Government lire made, so far as we clln mllnllgll it of loylll fflIIn 
and women. - (cited in Rowthorn " Wllyne, p33J. 
In the Civil Service, only 13 of 209 people in technical and professional grades were 
Catholic; 23 of 319 in administrative grades; 16 of 11 5 government nominees to Health 
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Boards (Farrell, p 91). Employment in the security forces was virtually closed to 
Catholics. 
Catholics were underrepresented in other areas of the public sector, such as the fire and 
ambulance services, and electricity. All are traditionally skilled male work, highly 
unionised with strong group identities - the public sector labour aristocracy - and remain 
Protestant strongholds. 
Unionist control of local government also became a self-perpetuating mechanism for 
marginal ising Catholics. This was supported both politically and financially by Stormont: 
rate revenue made up only around one quarter of local government receipts, the rest 
coming via Stormont (Ulster Year Books). 
Councils controlled the building and allocation of public housing, and since the local 
government franchise was based on a housing qualification until the late 1960s, this 
was crucial to retaining power. Unionist members of Omagh Rural Council, which was 
62% Catholic wrote to the Unionist whip at Stormont: 
·We would point out thllt in certllin districts cottll{1es IIrfi rflquirfld by Unionist workers but Wfl 
hfiSitlltfi to invitfl rflprflsflntlltions lIS Wfl know thflrfl would bfl II flood of rflprflsflntlltions from thfl 
Nlltionlllist sidfl lind our politiclIl opponflnts IIrfi only wlliting thfl opportunity to USfi this mflllns to 
OUtvotfi us in divisions whflre mlljoritifls IIrfi closfl . • (quotfld in FII""I/, pBB). 
This fear - and Unionist distaste for public provision - meant that Stormont had a poor 
record of house building, creating high dependence on private rented accommodation. 
In 1961,57% of households in Belfast, and 37% in Northern Ireland as a whole rented 
privately, compared to 31 % in Britain. 
The third major aspect of Unionist local government was discrimination in employment: 
in 1951, Catholics held 11.9% of non-manual posts. This percentage was not evenly 
spread, for Catholics were overrepresented where they had local control. Some councils 
employed no Catholics in non-menial work. 
Stormont politicians also helped sustain widespread discrimination in private 
employment. Sir Basil Brooke, MP (later Prime Minister Lord Brookeborough) said in 
1933 
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"There were a great number of Protestants and Orangemen who employed Roman Catholics . He 
felt he could speak freely on this subject as he had not a Roman Catholic about his own place ..... He 
would appeal to Loyalists therefore wherever possible to employ good Protestant lads and lassies. " 
(quoted in Farrell, p90). 
Harland & Wolff was the major private employer, its cranes towering over the Belfast 
landscape. Together with Short Brothers engineering works, it became a symbol of 
Protestant supremacy. The pogroms of the 1920s had excluded most Catholics from 
the yards. By 1970, there were only 400 Catholics among its workforce of over 
10,000, mainly in menial positions (Boyd, 1984, p62). 
Rowthorn and Wayne summarise the 'mechanics of discrimination' in the private sector: 
the location of employment was often difficult or dangerous for Catholics to reach; 
Catholics seeking certain types of employment were unlikely to be hired; Catholics 
didn't bother to apply to firms known to discriminate; trade unions sometimes acted as 
hiring agents and barred Catholics; there was often no public recruitment, with hiring 
through family or the Orange Lodge (ibid, p34). 
The dual labour market created in the nineteenth century was further institutionalised 
under Stormont. Catholics were confined to a narrower range of occupations than 
Protestants. Unemployment was consistently higher, forcing many to emigrate. Catholic 
emigrants outnumbered Protestants. This helped maintain political stability, firstly by 
cutting the official rate of unemployment; and secondly by preventing the natural 
increase in the Catholic population from feeding into the electorate, and threatening 
Unionist control. The proportion of Catholics remained roughly the same (34%) 
throughout the Stormont years. But more than 40% of those under 15 were Catholic, 
while the proportion fell to 30% for those of working age (Northern Ireland Census of 
Population). 
Education became a major source of conflict. The Catholic Church was determined to 
maintain its own schools, while Unionist-controlled local education boards insisted that 
the compulsory religious instruction in county schools was Protestant. A revival of 
Protestant fundamentalism at partition increased Unionist intransigence. County schools 
became effectively Protestant, and Catholics opted out of the state system, 98% 
attending religious schools (Murray, 1983). Until 1967 , when Voluntary Aided Status 
financed religious schools at almost the same rate as county schools, the already poorer 
Catholic community received a substantially smaller proportion of the state's resources. 
This was reflected in poorer equipment and teacher-pupil ratios, and lower academic 
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attainment, which contributed to maintaining low economic status. There are very few 
religiously mixed schools, which are mainly independent. 
A series of Protestant privileges thus stemmed directly from Unionist control of the 
state apparatus. Protestant separateness was reinforced by social institutions such as 
the Orange Hall, the Church, Protestant drinking clubs, and sports teams (Donnan &. 
McFarlane, 1983; 1986). The Orange Order was central to the unity of the Unionist 
Party, and the majority of its MPs were members. It was also the link which bound 
employers to employees, both through general ties of community, and directly through 
its role in labour recruitment. Most jobs were not advertised publicly, or filled through 
official labour exchanges throughout the Stormont years (Gibbon, 1975). 
Loyalty to the Unionist Party and the state was preserved, while any tendency for 
Protestant workers to make common cause with Catholics was discouraged. Hostility 
to independent politics was demonstrated in 1920, when not only Catholics, but 
Protestants "in sympathy with the red flag of revolution" (Goldring, 1991, p64) were 
expelled from the shipyards. 
Church, State and Family 
As in the South, the Church was a crucial element in legitimising the regime. Protestant 
churches, unlike the Catholic Church, are not monolithic, but their influence has been 
as profound in shaping the state. They are authoritarian, particularly in matters of family 
and sexuality, and their influence has been crucial in cementing sectarianism, and 
maintaining patriarchal dominance. 
-The churches, Clltholic lind Protestllnt IIlike, lire mille, the difference being thllt Illn Paisley hIlS II 
devoted wife who keeps his home-fire burning, wherellS the Clltholic bishop hIlS servllnts devoted 
to his well-being- (Goldring, p73). 
The Protestant churches, with their married clergy 
-e/evllted conjugillity over virginity- and -Protestant clergy were more likely to devolve the role of 
marlll guide to husbands and fathers within the family- (O'Dowd, 1987, pp14-16). 
Unionist women are excluded from the all-powerful Orange Order, their function 
confined to such activities as preparing teas for the men. The big public displays of 
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Orangeism are male affairs, when men dressed in bowler hats and the ancient regalia 
of their lodges march to triumphalist drumming on huge lam beg Drums. 
Northern women had not shared in the upsurge of activity around the suffrage 
campaign in the South. It may be an exaggeration to say that the movement "passed 
Belfast by" (Goldring), but Unionist women 
"were generally less prominent than their nationalist counterparts in the politiclIl struggles prior to 
1921. Thereaher they ..... continued to playa rather invisible auxiliary role in Unionist and Orange 
organisations" (O'Dowd, 1987, p3J 
The religious divide, and particularly segregated schooling, also strengthened the hold 
of the churches over their congregations. The Catholic Church has not been very 
successful in preventing members of its flock (mainly male) and the occasional priest 
from becoming involved in violence through the IRA, but it has had more success in 
retaining obedience to its prohibition on abortion. The Church's version of Irish 
womanhood is a vital part of catholic identity. 
Women were also marginalised in economic life. In 1926, 36% of women over twelve 
were in paid employment, but only 15% of married women. Women were confined to 
a narrow range of occupations, with 61 % in three sectors; textile manufacture 
(26%);clothing (19%) and domestic service (16%). The only profession to employ 
substantial numbers of women was teaching, which on both sides of the border was 
69% female (O'Dowd, 1987, p22). But a marriage bar confined women to the lower 
rungs. A similar obstacle in the civil service not only restricted women's advancement, 
but ensured that their influence was absent in shaping public policy (ibid, p26). 
The ideal of the 'family wage' prevailed, but only among Protestants could this 
approach reality. Catholic male unemployment meant that Catholic married women were 
twice as likely to work as Protestants, and they predominated in the least attractive 
forms of work. 
Unionist rule was not merely Protestant domination, but class and gender domination. 
Unionism united all classes in the Protestant community in defence of 'their' state, 
dividing the working class. This 'two nations' hegemonic strategy (see Chapter Two) 
involved no attempt to woo the support of one third of the population, who were denied 
some basic civil rights. This situation necessitated often naked state repression. But this 
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exclusive strategy was based on gender domination, which was legitimised in both 
communities through the church. To oppose one's church is to be disloyal to one's 
'own side' (McLaughlin, 1986). 
Until the civil rights movement of the late 1960s forced Northern Ireland to the 
attention of the world, British governments of all parties were content to leave 
Stormont to run its own affairs. Attempts by M.P.s and interested groups to raise 
questions were rebuffed. In 1935, following sectarian riots in Belfast, a group of British 
MPs, nationalist leaders, and bodies such as the NCCL called for a public inquiry. The 
prime minister, Stanley Baldwin dismissed this request: 
"This matter is entirely within the discretion lind responsibility of the government of Northern Irelllnd 
and by fundamental constitutional relJSons the possibility of holding an enquiry by the imperial 
government is completely ruled out" (quoted in Farrell, p 742J. 
A profound indifference and ignorance prevailed (Bew et al; Boyd). So long as stability 
could be maintained, the British government preferred to ignore complaints. They had 
no taste for tackling the Unionists, who were the main bastion of Britain's interests in 
Ireland. 
The Fall of Stormont 
This section is concerned with developments in the political economy of Northern 
Ireland under Stormont. It concentrates on moments of crisis when the conditions for 
economic expansion came into conflict with the political structures on which the state 
was founded. In other words the 'two nations' project of Unionism created obstacles 
to capitalist accumulation. 
Major crises occurred in the early 1930s, the 1950s, and finally the late 1960s. In the 
earlier periods, a political challenge came from sections of the Protestant working class, 
as the material conditions on which their privileges depended were eroded. The 
Stormont regime survived. In the 1930s, the economy recovered with increased 
demand for industrial goods due to the Second World War. This temporary reprieve 
could not solve the fundamental economic problems caused by the declining industrial 
base. In the 1950s, the exhaustion of the old economic strategy brought more 
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fundamental changes. A policy of attracting multinational capital brought new forms of 
employment, but sectarian working practices were incorporated in the new situation. 
In the late 1960s, when the Catholic community mounted a serious and sustained 
political challenge to the state through the Civil Rights movement and later armed 
struggle, tensions within the Stormont regime finally became unmanageable. The regime 
was not able to meet the movement's demands - essentially full citizenship for Catholics 
- without undermining the alliance on which its own power rested. While sections of the 
official trade union gave limited support to civil rights, the Protestant working class was 
not mobilised in support of reform. Instead the movement provoked the first serious 
electoral challenge to the official Unionist Party from within the Protestant community, 
as Ian Paisley's rabidly anti-Catholic Democratic Unionist Party won much working class 
support. 
The revolt forced the British government to intervene and attempt to dismantle some 
of the more undesirable features of the state. They were unprepared for the implications 
of these 'reforms' which toppled the Unionist regime and forced them to take direct 
responsibility for defending the Union. 
The Inter-War Years 
"In economics, lIS in politics, the aim of Northern Ireland in the inter-war years might be summed 
up by the single word - survivlIl." (Lyons, 1971, p706). 
As Unionists struggled to establish their state in Northern Ireland, they inherited an 
economy already facing serious problems. These weaknesses intensified during the next 
50 years. The Six Counties were the most highly industrialised in Ireland, but industry 
was extremely narrowly based, and proved incapable of adjusting to changing economic 
circumstances. Part of the problem lay with the state boundaries. 
"The Six Counties hardly seemed a rational, let alone an ideal, economic unit. Even ifll borders 
seemed to militate against it. On the IlIfIdward side, a straggling frontier which owed more to 
religious than to economic geography, and cut off one of its two larg6 towns, Londonderry, from its 
natural hinterland; to the ellSt the inhospitable S6a, adding to the cost of its imports IIfId lIubtrecting 
from the value of its exports" (ibid pp706). 
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Industry was geographically concentrated around Belfast. By 1937, 63% of the 
population lived within 30 miles of the city. The majority of employment was in 
shipbuilding, engineering and textiles. Even before 1914 these industries revealed 
serious deficiencies (ibid). By 1924, 60% of the industrial workforce was in declining 
industries, compared to 40% in Britain (Johnson & Kennedy). Industry was export 
orientated, a tendency reinforced by the small domestic market. But Northern Ireland's 
location imposed extra transport costs both for finished goods and imported inputs. 
There was no domestic source of coal, and the linen industry became increasingly 
dependent on imported flax: 30% was domestically produced by the 1920s, declining 
to 10-12% in the late 1930s (ibid). 
Lyons describes textiles and engineering as complementary, in that one employed 
mainly women, while the other was overwhelmingly male. But as Goldring points out, 
-unfortunately the picture of Janet going to the linen mill and John to the shipyard is inaccurate 
because generally speaking, the wives and daughters of skilled Protestant workers were not in paid 
work . ... In fact, John went off to work in the yard and Maureen to the mill. They never met and 
so never married- lop cit, p35} 
Work in the textile mills continued as a major source of employment for women 
particularly in Belfast. In the 1930s women worked from 8.00 am to 6.00 pm with only 
20 minutes for lunch, for a wage of between five and six shillings a week.'s Conditions 
were harsh 
-There weren't any helJlth or slJfety regullJtions. most of the women who worked in the mill had very 
bad feet because they stood in water IJII the time. They had leg ailments becllUstl of the time they 
had to spend standing. And they had very bad chests because of the POUCtI that was in the air-
INUPE, 1992, p Bt}. 
Unemployment was high throughout the inter-war years. In 1921, the violence which 
accompanied partition, combined with a post-war slump, had created official 
unemployment of 18%. In the boom years of the late 1920s - an 'elastic' use of the 
term as Lyons points out - unemployment averaged 15%. 
Northern Ireland's industry was particularly vulnerable to the catastrophic decline in 
international trade in the 1930s. The shipping market crashed, and employment fell 
from 20,000 in 1924 to 2,000 in 1933. Linen suffered competition from cotton, and 
later from artificial fibres: by 1938, 50% of the workforce was unemployed. While 
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service employment grew from 80,000 in 1926 to 100,000 in 1937, it could not make 
up for the collapse of industry. Officially recorded unemployment was more than 27% 
in 1932, and did not fall below 20% throughout the decade (Lyons, p710). 
Even these figures are probably an underestimate. In 1925, regulations for claiming 
unemployment benefit were changed, and many were struck off the register. John 
Beattie (one of two Labour MPs elected in the 1920s) claimed that the official figure of 
64,000 was 13,000-14,000 short (Farrell, p122). Women's unemployment was 
particularly underestimated, since married women were ineligible for benefit, and their 
unemployment was never considered as serious as that of men (McLaughlin, 1986). 
Unemployment relief in 1933-34 absorbed more than a third of rate revenue, but 
"It trickled through to the individual recipients as the bitter dregs of official charity grudgingly 
conceded after a searching means test" (Lyons, p773) 
Benefits were substantially lower than in Britain, a mere 2/6 per week for a single 
person, conditional on "task work" on an Outdoor Relief Scheme. Married men who did 
not take up this work or could not get onto a scheme were paid in kind. Single people 
got nothing, and if no relatives could keep them, were faced with the workhouse. 
The effect on Protestants was traumatic. Not only did they lose work they felt theirs 
by right; they, with Catholics, had to turn to Outdoor Relief. Welfare provision had from 
the nineteenth century been designed to exclude 'foreigners' - Catholics. Protestants, 
facing humiliating interrogation by the Poor Law Guardians, were made to feel 
foreigners in their own state (Goldring). 
Mass unemployment led to the founding of the Outdoor Relief Workers Committee. Its 
activity culminated in a strike to demand improved conditions for unemployed workers. 
The strike, which began on October 4th 1932, was accompanied by a wave of mass 
meetings, marches and riots. The government attempted to repress the movement by 
banning marches, imposing a curfew and sending in heavily armed RUC to arrest 
strikers. John Campbell, secretary of the Labour Party claimed 
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WLord Craigavon's solution was to divide the workers into different religious camps an it WIJS 
noteworthy that although the recent trouble WIJS spread all over the city only in a Roman Catholic 
area did the police use their guns· (Farrell,p 129) 
But according to Farrell, 
WThe marches and rallies were completely united and Geehan's leadership readily accepted even 
though he was a Catholic. " (ibid p 131 ) 
After ten days, the strikers won nearly all their demands. Relief rates were doubled, and 
the means test regulations changed. Payment in kind was abolished. 
But the unity of Protestant and Catholic so vital to the success of the struggle did not 
extend to a more fundamental challenge to the government. In the election three 
months later, sectarian loyalties were firmly in place. Labour's vote increased only 
slightly, and the Party won no new seats. 
Over the next few years, the worst sectarian rioting since partition erupted, with 
attacks on Catholics in their work and homes. In 1935 200 Catholic workers were 
expelled from the shipyards, and Catholic women were forced from the Belfast 
linen-mills. This tragic aftermath destroyed the hopes of the strike leaders that lasting 
unity had been achieved. Farrell suggests that 
• as in 19 19, this working-class unity WIJS frlJf1ile and would soon be shattered by the clever use of 
sectarianism. Dramatic though it was the struggle had been too short and too quickly forced back 
into the Catholic ghettos for it seriously to shake the Orange ideolO(/y or to change the political 
consciousness of the Protestant workers" (p131J. 
He believed that 1932 was an exceptional period, and 
·Sectarianism retreated during the great strikas but it reappeared in the summer of 1933- (p 136J. 
Rolston and Munck (1987) in a study of these struggles based largely on the 
recollections of participants, challenge this interpretation, arguing that 
-the extent of class unity has bfHlfl eXlJf1gerIJted and that the ODR strike w .. not _ bI'fIIIk with a 
historical pattern, but a disruption of _ rel_tively IJUtonomous sectarlllll politi" (pp7-81. 
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They question the extent to which sectarianism was fomented by Unionist politicians 
'beating the Orange Drum': 
WSectsrisn speeches by politicisns did certsinly influence public opinion, but they could hsrdly hsve 
csused the 1935 riots on their own ... sectsrisn struggles were lIS 'normsl'lIS clllSS strugale W (ibid 
p9J. 
In their view 'pure' working class politics had never existed, and sectarianism continued 
in 1932: 
wclllSs snd religion genersted two forms of politicsl prsctice •.. snd sre not mutuslly exclusive w (ibid 
p 8J. 
I find this latter interpretation more satisfactory. The result of the election following the 
strike is explicable if one sees it as the product of a different type of political practice, 
involving different loyalties. Elections had been constructed around the national 
question. Working class activity, however militant, did not necessarily challenge 
Protestant loyalty on this issue. Sectarianism was an integral part of class formation, 
and of every worker's living experience. This identity was not shed for an abstract class 
identity when struggle developed. 
Although the O.D.R. strike was victorious, it precipitated no major change in state 
strategy to tackle the causes of unemployment. The conservativism of the Unionist 
regime prevented it from carrying out the structural changes necessary to reduce the 
dependence of the economy, while the militancy of Protestant workers increased fears 
of interfering with the economic basis on which the class alliance had been built. In the 
pre-Keynesian era, Unionists were - partly through necessity due to the limited 
resources available - the most orthodox of managers. 
Some limited attempts were made to attract new industry through Loan Guarantees 
Acts enacted between 1922 and 1938, and the New Industries Acts of 1932 & 1937. 
The main recipients of state subsidy were existing firms. As late as 1955, only 54 
firms, employing 6,000 had taken advantage of its provisions (Lyons, p711). While the 
British economy began to recover through a house building boom, the politicised nature 
of housing in Northern Ireland made this impossible. By 1939 less than 4,000 houses 
had been built by local authorities; in urban areas, of 34,312 houses built, only 2,166 
were public (Lyons, p712). Unemployment remained at 28.3% in 1938. The economy 
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did not recover until the Second World War brought a boom led by demand for military 
supplies. 
At the outbreak of war, personal income per head in Northern Ireland was only 55% of 
the UK average (Simpson, pS1). The gap was the result of a combination of factors: 
average wages below British levels, particularly for unskilled labour; higher 
unemployment and lower labour force participation; dependence on declining sectors. 
Agriculture still employed a quarter of the population and the predominance of small 
farms had been reinforced by legislation similar that in the South. Most farmers 
struggled to make a living, while agricultural wages were only two thirds of those in 
England and Wales (Lyons, p709). 
Poverty was felt in shorter lives and harsher conditions. The death rate was the highest 
in the UK, and had changed little from the position at partition (14.4 per 1,000 in 1939, 
compared to 15.5 % in 1922-24). Infant mortality at partition had been below the UK 
average, but by the 1950s was 33% above. Children of the unemployed were 2 to 3 
inches shorter than middle class children, graphic evidence of malnutrition. While no 
figures are available which break down these indices by religion, it is clear that the 
sectarian distribution of employment and public spending would mean that Catholics 
were disproportionately represented among the most disadvantaged. 
The Impact of War 
While war brought economic recovery, unemployment was slow to fall, remaining at 
5% as late as 1943 when the British level had fallen to 0.5%. But traditional industries 
enjoyed a renewed boom. Employment in shipbuilding increased from 7,300 in 1938 
to 20,600 in 1945; in the aircraft industry from 5,SOO to 23,5000 (Lyons p731). 
Shirt-making increased to supply the military, and textile production expanded. 
The Unionists were unwilling to impose conscription, but thousands from both 
communities enlisted in the British Army. Lyons argues that the 
·connection with the UK wu formidebly strengthened by the feet thet Northern Irelllnd hed mtlde 
good in blood its pledge to be stend by Britain .. (which did) more to perpetu.r. the pllrlition of 
Ire/end then e whole generetion of Twelfth of July dempnstretions. • (ibid p 730) 
112 
The government of Ireland Act of 1949 strengthened the constitutional position of 
Northern Ireland, declaring 
"thBt Northern IrelBnd remBins pBrt of His MBjesty's dominions Bnd of the United Kingdom and it is 
hereby Bffirmed thBt in no event will Northern IrelBnd or Bny pBrt thereof ceBSe to be B pBrt of His 
MBjesty's dominions of the United Kingdom, without the consent of the pBrliBment of Northern 
IrelBnd. " (Lyons, p 738) 
Given the built-in Unionist majority at Stormont, this consent was extremely unlikely. 
A recently released civil service memorandum made the position even more forcibly: 
"It hBS become B mBtter of strBtegic importance to this country thBt the North (or Ireland) should 
continue to form pBrt of his MBjesty's Dominions. So fBr BS is CBn be foreseen, it will never be to 
GreBt BritBin's BdvBntBge thBt Northern lrelBnd should form B territory outside his Majesty's 
jurisdiction. Indeed, it would seem unlikely thBt GreBt BritBin would ever be Bble to Bgree to this eWlt 
H the people of North.", 'reiMt/ dNltwllt. " (quoted in Bew et BI, 1986, p9) (my emphBSisJ 
This document suggests that the formal guarantees on partition owed as much to 
Britain' strategic interest as to gratitude to Loyalists. 
Northern Ireland gained economically from the British government's pledge to abandon 
the 'step by step' approach to public spending, in favour of parity of service provision. 
With the development of the welfare state, this principle acquired major significance, 
and became the most important factor in raising Northern Ireland living standards. 
Although Stormont's financial autonomy diminished, there was a massive transfer of 
resources from Britain, while the Imperial Contribution fell to £7.5m by 1962-3. 
"Within B decade Northern IrBlllnd passed from the status of an exceptionally bllckwllrd lIrea to full 
membership of the welfBre stllte." (Lyons, p741J 
But although formally incorporated into the British welfare system, Northern Ireland did 
not become a welfare state in a political sense. British welfare provisions were the 
product of the landslide Labour victory, and the inclusive one-nation ideology of the 
social democratic consensus which lasted until the 1970s. No such consensus was built 
in Northern Ireland. The Unionist Party at Westminster 
"joined with the Conservative opposition in resisting the sociBlist legislBtion which established the 
welfare state, while at Stormont the Unionist Party solemnly resolved to IInneXe as much or the 
legislation as possible to its own purposes" (Lyons, p739) 
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They were able to present expanded welfare provision as a benefit arising from the 
Union. Instead of posing a threat to the political basis of Unionism by demonstrating the 
effectiveness of working class politics, increased living standards for the Protestant 
community became further tied to the maintenance of the Union. Through their control 
over the administration of health and education, they were able to use the increased 
resources available to reinforce sectarianism. 
There was no 'one nation' rhetoric. As Labour introduced universal suffrage for local 
elections in Britain in 1946, Unionists restricted the franchise still further, excluding 
lodgers, of whom two thirds were Catholic. Company directors retained up to six votes. 
Commitment to full employment was never a reality. Robert Babbington, later a Unionist 
MP, expressed this particularly blatantly: 
·Registers of unemployed Loyalists should be kept by the Unionist Party and employers invited to 
pick employees from them. The Unionist Party should make it quite clear that the Loyalists have the 
first choice of jobs· (Farrell, p227). 
Social divisions are apparent in income distribution, which was more unequal than in the 
UK as a whole. Between 1949 and 1950,43.8% of income earners received less than 
£50 per annum, compared to 35.7% for the UK. At the other end of the scale, 2.8% 
earned over £1,000, compared to 2.3% for the UK (Isles & Cuthbert, p 16). These 
figures are not broken down by religion, but they point to inequalities which in a state 
built on sectarianism, are bound to be reproduced in disproportionate poverty for 
Catholics. The male-female wage differential, which narrowed in Britain, remained 
constant in Northern Ireland (ibid, p 227). 
The welfare state was built on the assumption of a family wage, with male breadwinner 
and dependent wife and children (see eg Dale & Foster, 1986). But discrimination in 
employment meant that this could not be a reality for Catholic families. 
In spite of its increased financial commitment to Northern Ireland, the British 
government took no more interest in how the money was spent than it had in pre-war 
years. Bi-partisanship kept Ireland out of British politics, while Unionists were left to run 
Northern Ireland in the traditional way. A Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) 
delegation protesting at the change in the local franchise was informed by the Home 
Secretary that this matter was entirely for the Northern Ireland Parliament (Rumpf & 
Hepburn, p 202). 
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The sectarian divide remained an obstacle to the emergence of a mass social democratic 
party. The high level of trade union organisation, (200,000 members by the 1960s) was 
not reflected in working class influence on policy making. Brookborough, Prime Minister 
for the twenty years to 1963 refused to recognise the Northern Committee of the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions, to which the unions were affiliated, or to repeal the 
"obnoxious Trade Union Act of 1927" (Lyons p749). 
While the state played a larger role in social reproduction for Catholics, 
"Catholic/Protestant 'apartheid'" (O'Dowd et ai, 1981, p16) remained. Catholics 
continued to attend denominational schools, which were given more generous state 
funding after the War (a decision which cost the minister responsible his job). The new 
health service was also largely organised so that each community serviced its own 
needs. 
These arrangements ensured that the churches lost none of their influence as organisers 
of cultural and community life. The conservative Unionist regime introduced only 
statutory provisions, and Northern Ireland remained the worst provided with nurseries 
and facilities for the elderly. The debates on sexual morality which took place in Britain 
in the 1960s passed Northern Ireland by, and the liberalising Homosexual Law Reform 
and Abortion Acts were not enacted there. 
Nevertheless the development of welfare and more interventionist economic policy 
brought a fundamental change in the relationship of both communities to the state. 
Before the war, Catholics' main contact with the state had been with the repressive 
forces, or as recipients of the dole. Now for the first time they benefited significantly 
from state provision, and the state became a major employer of Catholic labour. 
As the effect of expanded secondary education was felt in increased numbers of 
Catholic students in higher education, an educated middle class developed, who became 
increasing impatient with their second class status and demanded some share in 
political life. 
Economic Decline 
The relative prosperity of the war years continued for some time. Excess demand kept 
activity levels high, but disguised underlying problems. By the 1950s, linen and 
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shipbuilding were again in deep decline, and agriculture was experiencing severe 
problems. 
Income levels had moved closer to the British levels in the war years, but the gap 
widened again in the late 1940s (Isles & Cuthbert, p 11). Average earnings were 13% 
lower for men, and 20% for women (ibid, p 13). Although by 1970s average earnings 
had reached 90% of the British level as national wage agreements spread (ibid, p 347), 
consumption per head was only 75%, reflecting large family size, lack of jobs for 
women, and concentration of employment in low paid sectors (Rowthorn & Wayne, 
p73). 
Agriculture underwent a major transformation, with employment falling from 25% in 
1945 to 10% by 1970. But it was the downward lurch of the traditional industries 
which was most traumatic. In 1952, four industries (shipbuilding, engineering, textiles 
and clothing) employed 44% of male, and 88% of female manufacturing employees. 
The first two were predominantly male, the latter female, with 79% of women in 
textiles and clothing alone (Isles & Cuthbert, p65). 
It was in these industries that competition from newly industrialising counties was most 
intense. Japan and Korea developed shipbuilding based on relatively cheap labour and 
strong state support. In Northern Ireland on the other hand, the extra costs due to its 
location were compounded by increasing labour costs. State policy remained tied to 
preserving old economic structures rather than developing new more efficient industries. 
By the 1970s, the shipping market had collapsed. Employment at Harland Wolff was 
down to 7,400, a third of its 1950 level. Textiles declined precipitately, and linen 
production fell by over 60% between 1960 and 1979 (Kennedy et ai, p108). This was 
partially replaced by the short-lived artificial fibre industry in the 1950s. 
While Britain experienced almost full employment throughout the 1950s, in Northern 
Ireland male unemployment never fell below 6.2% between 1946 and 1957, and female 
unemployment below 2.4%. (Isles & Cuthbert). The latter figure especially should be 
treated with caution. With the collapse of textiles, female unemployment was probably 
much higher. Male unemployment was continuously over four times the British rate, 
reaching seven times in 1954. While post-war unemployment did not approach the level 
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of the 1930s, it was much greater relative to Britain, at a time when the welfare state 
promised higher living standards. 
Table 3.1 - Unemployment as a proportion of the civilian labour force 
(multiple of UK average) 
1923 
1929 
1936 
1938 
1947 
1960 
1966 
Source. Simpson. p 82 
Northern 
Ireland 
1.3 
1.2 
1.4 
2.1 
3.9 
3.4 
5.3 
Scotland 
1.5 
1.2 
1.5 
1.4 
2.0 
2.1 
2.1 
Unemployment would have been even higher had not emigration reduced the potential 
labour force. Barritt and Carter calculated that 58% of emigrants in the 1950s were 
Catholic. Simpson (1983) extended their calculations to the 1960s. Since Catholics 
were only around a third of the population, these figures suggest that more Catholics 
than Protestants emigrated throughout the period. Rowthorn and Wayne's calculations 
for the period 1926-81 suggest that this pattern persisted into the 1980s (op cit, 
pp208-9). 
Table 3.2 - Net Emigration ratas from Northern Ireland (thousand p.I.) 
1937-51 
1961-61 
1961-71 
Catholic 
6.5 
10.8 
6.9 
Non-
Catholic 
2.3 
4.6 
2.8 
Source: Calculated from Simpson. page 102 
Total 
3.7 
6.7 
4.3 
Catholic emigration 
rate 8S proportion 
of Protestant 
2.8 
2.3 
2.6 
Low wages and high dependence on trade combined to produce an extremely low 
multiplier, estimated at 0.6 compared to an estimated British multiplier of 2.2 (Islas & 
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Cuthbert p338). This problem was compounded by the drain of resources to Britain 
through British control over the banking system. Northern Ireland industry was heavily 
dependent on bank lending, since 60% was privately owned compared to 36% in the 
UK as whole 
Productivity was lower than in Britain, and as wages approached British levels, the 
advantage in labour costs was eroded. Low investment levels kept productivity low. 
Management inflexibility has been blamed for the inability to adjust to changed 
circumstances. Only 10% of new state-assisted plants were local initiatives in the 
1950s (O'Dowd, 1981, p37). But to diversify the industrial base and change the labour 
process would have involved tackling the basis of the Unionist class alliance, which 
depended on the high wage skilled labour of Protestant men. 
Stormont commissioned a number of reports on the economy.'1S Their recommendations 
were hardly radical, but they did call for a shift from subsidising existing jobs towards 
supporting new industry. 
As unemployment mounted, an electoral threat to the Unionist Party forced a change 
of strategy. The NILP won four seats at Stormont in 1958, and again in 1962. Much 
of their support was in traditional bastions of Protestant privilege, such as the 
shipyards. The party had committed itself firmly to the Union in 1949. It was therefore 
mainly Protestant, and all its Stormont members were Protestant lay preachers 
(Goodman). 
This challenge to Unionist hegemony precipitated a shift in the balance of power in the 
Unionist Party. In 1963, Terence O'Neill succeeded Brookborough as Prime Minister, 
pledged to a programme of economic modernisation. 
O'Neill's Modernisation 
The new strategy, embodied in the Wi/son Plan of 1964, accepted the main 
recommendations of the various economic reports, and involved replacing employment 
in declining sectors with new investment. A total of £450 million in new expenditure 
was committed to improve infrastructure, including the development of new towns, and 
to provide grants and subsidies to attract new industry (Farrell p229). 
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This policy was relatively successful in the 1960s. Manufacturing output increased by 
60% during the decade, faster than the UK (Rowthorn & Wayne, p72). Northern Ireland 
became a major producer of artificial fibres, which partially replaced traditional textile 
industries. While only six foreign firms had opened in Northern between 1945 and 
1959, thirty were established in the next ten years (Teague, 1987, P 162). 
Employment growth was not so satisfactory. Expansion of services stemmed the 
unemployment rate, but new manufacturing employment was not sufficient to replace 
that lost in declining industries. The percentage of employees in manufacturing fell from 
44.9% in 1952 to 36.3% in 1971, and rose in services from 41.1 % to 52.3% 
(O'Dowd, 1981, P 32). The industrial base remained narrow, with more than 80% of 
manufacturing employment in four major sectors in 1971 
Table 3.3 - % of manufacturing employment In major industrial sector., 1952-71 
1962 1969 1971 
food 11.4 11.9 16.2 
textile8/clothing 61.2 46.6 38.7 
8hipbuilding/marine engineering 11.6 13.0 6.6 
engineering 14.3 17.2 21.6 
all four 8S.6 8S.7 81.0 
Source, O'Oowd et ai, 1981, p36 
The structure of the labour market was also changing, with a decline in male jobs, and 
an increase of female jobs of 40% between 1959 and 1979, many of them part time 
(Trewsdale, 1987). For the first time Protestant women entered the labour force in large 
numbers, as part-time service employment replaced the full-time employment of 
Catholic women in manufacturing. But as traditional industry also shed its skilled 
Protestant male employment, sectarian privilege was reconstructed in new forms. 
Protestant males moved into administrative and supervisory work both in the private 
and public sectors (Gibbon, 1975). 
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Sectarianism and Modernisation 
The new industrial strategy was necessarily tied to the sectarian character of the state. 
The Unionists depended for their survival on the recreation of Protestant privilege. But 
this involved a shift in power within the Protestant establishment. The emphasis on 
attracting new capital posed a threat to traditional capital, and shipbuilding and 
engineering continued to be heavily subsidised. Local authorities, another major focus 
of clientism, lost power through the centralising tendencies necessitated by a more 
interventionist strategy. 
The implementation of regional policy brought a layer of functionaries to Stormont, 
whose self-image was of technocratic modernisers. The new policy was 
"replete with the 'growth centre' and 'New Town' rhetoric of 'objective' planning while its 
implementation sought to marry the new rhetoric with the practice of reproducing Unionist 
hegemony" (O'Dowd, 1980, p39) 
This apparent neutrality was noted by Quigley in his 1976 report: 
"Nevertheless we take comfort from the fact thllt economic lind industrilll issues Me much less II 
matter of political controversy lind dissension in NI than in most other Pllrts of the western world. " 
(quoted in ibid, p60). 
But as Q'Dowd argues, the report 
"fllils to recognise that the very same situation which produced the 'sllCUrity problfJm' also producfJd 
the lack of 'political controvllrsy' presumably IJSsociatlld with LIIh-Right splits lI/slIwhfll'e" (ibid) 
One of the most controversial issues was the location of new industry and growth 
centres. It is true that 
"Deliberllte discrimination is only pllrt of the story •. government mllde no systetnlltic IIttempt to 
direct investment towllrds IIny particulllr pllrts; of the province. Rllther it plilyed an essentilll/y pessive 
role, supplying finance and support services as lind where rllquired by priVII,. firms .•• Yet this in 
itself was enough to ensure thllt the bulk of privllte investment went to Pro tes"", t MellIS. • (Rowthom 
" Wllyne, p 76) 
Nevertheless many decisions appeared blatantly sectarian. Two new towns were 
developed in the strongly Protestant areas Antrim/Ballymena and Lurgan/Portadown 
(provocatively renamed Craigavon). The new University of Ulster was sited at the small 
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Protestant town of Coleraine rather than the second city of Derry, which was not even 
one of the eight 'growth centres'. A senior civil servant at Stormont defended these 
decisions on the grounds that 
-There WIIS usulllly much less 10cIII initilltive there. In the richer more populous lind more go-.helld 
ellstern pllrts there WBS IIlwllYS fllr more loclllly-generllted drive, privllte lind commercilll, lIS well lIS 
municipllr (quoted in Lee, p 4191. 
A more apparently neutral defence of this decision was that access to Coleraine was 
more convenient. But this was somewhat disingenuous in view of the fact that rail links 
to Derry, and the other major Catholic town Newry, were cut. The process built up the 
East at the expense of the West, consolidating the 'dual economy' (Quigley Report, 
1976 p41). 
While the East expanded, Belfast itself declined. Catholic West Belfast was hardest hit, 
with unemployment remaining spectacularly high. As employment in old firms declined 
from 75% to 50% of the engineering sector between 1959 and 1980, new firms were 
set up with state help (O'Dowd, 1981). But no major engineering firm was established 
in West Belfast until the short-lived Strathearn Audio in 1974. The suburbs around 
Belfast housed mainly Protestants, and the skills and experience they had acquired in 
traditional industries allowed them to take on most of the new jobs. 
Table 3.4 shows that the widening East-West divide was related to sectarianism, so 
that the 'dual economy' was not merely geographical but religious. Catholic 
unemployment exceeded Protestant unemployment in each of the 26 District Council 
areas, and in Belfast was particularly marked (Northern Ireland Census 1971). 
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Table 3.4 - Religion and Economic Change, 1961-71 by county 
County % RC Unemployment net migration % 
1961 1961 1971 1961-71 
Derry CB 67.1 17.6 14.3 -17.6 
Co Tyrone 64.8 12.3 12.6 - 6.9 
Co Fermanagh 63.2 9.8 9.2 - 6.0 
Co Armagh 47.3 12.8 9.6 + 0.3 
Co L'derry 42.6 11.6 8.8 + 2.7 
Co Down 28.6 8.3 6.2 + 7.4 
Co Antrim 24.4 6.7 6.9 + 11.0 
Belfast CB 27.6 8.6 9.6 -17.4 
Source: Rowthorn & Wayne, p 75 
Some commentators have argued that the influx of multinational capital would reduce 
the gap between Protestants and Catholics in the job market. Multinationals are agents 
of 'modernisation' with no interest in perpetuating archaic sectarian structures (Bell, 
1978; Probert, 1978; Boserup, 1972). This argument has been put by protagonists on 
both sides of the 'revisionist/anti-imperialist' divide. Farrell (1980) for example writes 
of 
"the decline of traditional industries, where discrimination and Protestant privilfl(Je were 
well-entrenched, and the rise of new firms which didn't discrimin.te or which employed. lot of 
mainly C.tholic semi-skilled or female I.bour" (pp229-30J. 
This view echoes the position taken by Farrell in relation to the ODR strike, when he 
saw sectarianism and class consciousness as opposites. Here the multinational 
corporation is seen as the embodiment of 'pure' capital. O'Dowd et al (1980), on the 
other hand, argue that multinationals do not transform sectarian structures but operate 
within them. Even if they do not consciously intend to discriminate, structural 
conditions force them to reproduce sectarian employment practices. Protestant workers 
have the skills, and experience which industry needs, and industry is already 
concentrated in Protestant areas, so 
"the 'requirements of capitll/' were easily reconciled with existing sectarian geO(Jraphy ""d 
dominlltion" (O'Dowd, p41J. 
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It is not in the interests of multinational capital to provoke problems with the workforce 
through challenging existing patterns of recruitment, and they tend to adopt them 
themselves. Only 10% of vacancies in new industries were filled through employment 
exchanges in 1965 (Bew et ai, 1985). Nevertheless, multinationals operate within 
different constraints from domestic capital, which may influence their relation to 
sectarianism. This is illustrated by the response of United States firms to the MacBride 
campaign against discrimination. 
Teague (1987) argues that both positions are weakened by a lack of empirical evidence 
to substantiate their assertions. Both sides make unwarranted assumptions about 
multinationals' role in establishing employment practice: firstly they exaggerate the 
importance of foreign capital relative to local employers; and secondly they assume too 
great a homogeneity of employment policies. Teague himself believes that 
"some multinationals fit into the established system of industrial relations while others challenge it" 
(p (66). 
He suggests that they need to be discussed on a case by case basis, although he does 
not pursue this himself. The current evidence will be examined in detail in Chapter 
Seven. 
From Civil Rights to Civil War 
O'Neill presided over a rapid expansion of inward investment and industrial growth. In 
pushing Northern Ireland towards modernisation, he established a Ministry for 
Development and Department of Health and Social Services in 1965. Another significant 
move was the recognition of the ICTU in 1964. He encouraged trade union participation 
in the Advisory Economic Council (later the Northern Ireland Economic Council - NIEC). 
From this time, the official trade union movement have been deeply involved in the 
quangos which have proliferated as Northern Ireland's problems deepened (Boyd, 
1984). 
O'Neill's modernising role was misunderstood by the British government, which showed 
remarkable willingness to accept 'modernisation' rhetoric as British-style social 
democratic reformism. O'Neill was not a bigot: he wrote disparagingly of predecessor 
Lord Brookborough: 
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"In twenty years lIS Prime Minister he never crossed the border, never visited II Clltholic school lind 
never received or sought II civic reception from II Clltholic town. " (quoted in Fllrrell, p240) 
But his policy of "integrating Catholics, however gradually, into the Stormont state" 
(Lee p411) was largely confined to symbolic gestures. He visited Catholic schools and 
was "photographed chatting with priests and reverend mothers" (Farrell, p240). Even 
this enraged Protestants, and his explanation on his resignation did not help to calm 
feelings on either side 
"The bllSic fellr of Protestllnts in Northern Irelllnd is thllt they will be outbred by Romlln Clltholics 
•. It is frightfully hllrd to explain to a Protestant thllt if you give Romlln Clltholics II good house they 
live like Protestants ... they will refuse to hllve eighteen children, but if the Romlln Clltholic is jobless 
and lives in a most ghastly hovel, he will rear eighteen children on nationlllllSsistllnce" (quoted in 
Lee, p426J. 
But he was neither able nor willing to let Catholics become more like Protestants in the 
vital matter of civil rights. It was not until 1969, following widespread revolt, that he 
conceded the principle of universal suffrage in local elections. 
O'Neill took over a party which was beginning to fracture on class lines as economic 
restructuring challenged the traditional base of Unionist power. In his first years of 
office, he secured greater power for the Party. The NILP lost seats as Unionist 
modernisation "stole most of its policies" (Farrell) and brought economic expansion. 
Recovery was to be temporary, but it outlived his rule. It was the challenge of the civil 
rights movement at the end of the 1960s which broke up the Unionist Party and swept 
him from office. 
The movement began with the Campaign for Social Justice founded in 1964, which 
started organising against discrimination in housing. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) formed in 1967, was to become the umbrella organisation for the 
wider movement. The main planks of its programme were one man (sic) one vote; no 
gerrymandering of electoral boundaries; fair distribution of council housing; repeal of the 
Special powers Act; disbanding of B Specials; a complaints procedure against local 
authorities. 
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The Birth of the Civil Rights Movement 
There has been considerable controversy over the reasons why the civil rights 
movement developed at this particular time. The most fundamental factors were social 
and economic changes in Northern Ireland itself, particularly through the welfare state. 
But the movement also drew inspiration from the wave of protests sweeping Europe 
and the United States at the time, particularly the civil rights movement of the American 
South. Michael Farrell, one of the leaders of People's Democracy, reports that the tactic 
of the long march which the organisation adopted was modelled on the Selma Alabama 
Civil Rights movement (Farrell, p249). 
The welfare state and the programme of economic modernisation had weakened the 
hold of traditional Unionism, while creating a new urban educated professional Catholic 
middle class. They provided the leadership of the new Catholic political parties, which 
came together as the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) in 1970, replacing the 
old nationalist parties. This group hoped that O'Neill's reforms would give them a 
greater role in the state, but found themselves increasingly excluded by the lack of 
political reform. McLaughlin (1986) suggests that the election of Labour in Britain in 
1964 was important, since it raised expectations of change which were later 
disappointed. 
Students from Belfast and Derry played an important role in some organisations, 
particularly People's Democracy. They were more radical than the group which became 
the SDLP, but they too looked to change within Northern Ireland itself, rather than to 
traditional Republican aspirations of a united Ireland. The violence with which the state 
responded to the movement led many to reject the possibilities of change within 
Northern Ireland itself. 
The importance of these groups has probably been exaggerated in historical accounts 
of the civil rights struggles, while the role of 'ordinary people' in initiating activity tends 
to be underestimated. This is illustrated in one of the early protests against 
discrimination in housing. The Unionist council in Tyrone allocated a new house to a 
young single Protestant woman, the secretary to the local Unionist candidate, while 
Catholic families remained in desperately overcrowded conditions. This decision sparked 
a series of protest squats by local families. Farrell's version of these events says little 
of the role of these families, mentioning by name only Austin Currie, later SDLP MP 
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(Farrell, p245)' But according to Mrs Gildernew, whose daughter had expected to be 
allocated the house, her family initiated the protest and been active over a long period. 17 
Margaret Ward writing of the Civil rights movement Twenty Years On reports that 
although Peoples Democracy had many women members, they were not prominent, 
with the exception of Bernadette Devlin, MP. In 1970 women 
"were still unquestioningly accepting the fact that when we undertook a token overnight squat of 
a house in protest against housing policies, it was the women who would go lind shop for food and 
make the endless sandwiches lind ensure that all those who came to make speeches thllt evening 
would be fed. It think I missed most of the political talk because I was so busy buttering bread. " 
(Ward, 1S88, p12S). 
The Northern Ireland civil rights movement was not alone among radical movements of 
the time in confining women's role to providing support for male activists. But in failing 
to challenge the subordinate status of women, the movement left intact a vital element 
in the construction and maintenance of sectarian boundaries. 
Many on the left favoured a· mechanistic explanation for the rise of the movement. 
Britain was seen as a prime mover in pushing towards reform, but was unable to control 
the monster of the Unionist backlash which this unleashed. The visit of the Southern 
Prime Minister was accorded major significance. Farrell suggests that 
"The Southern economy was now dominllted by Britain, to whom it was becoming lIS import""t lIS 
the North so that North-South rapprochement and economic co-operlltion becllme British policy •• •••• 
The major obstacle to North-South rapprochement was the trelltment of the Clltholic minority in the 
North, lind so the Westminster government bfI(Jan nudging Stormontgentiy towards reform" (p328J. 
Furthermore 
"British interests required II stable pellcefullreland where production and the rate of profit were not 
disturbed by political upheavals. This in turn required the dismllntiing of the Or""ge S)f$tem in the 
North to remove the grievances of the Catholic middle cl8SS and provide opportunities for their 
IISpiring young politicillns" (p329J. 
Farrell again opposes a non-sectarian 'modernising' capitalism to the archaic practices 
in Northern Ireland. 
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-Ulster based industries hlld 1111 but disllppellred, lind with them most of the economic reasons for 
the six-county stllte- (ibid). 
Bell (1978) ties this specifically to the role of multinational companies. 
-the new IlIrge British or multinlltionlll compllnies like ICI lind Dupont were neither Pllrt of the 
trllditionlll Unionist structure nor interested in sustllining lin IInti-Clltholic policy in the north which 
could IIct as II hindrllnce to exploiting developing possibilities of exploitlltion in the south. The north 
needed to be 'rlltionlliised'- (p 123) 
The lack of any serious attempt to explain the connections between these processes, 
or to provide evidence for them, did not prevent this explanation being accepted 
uncritically by much of the left. As Marlowe and Palmer point out, this analysis was 
shared by both anti-imperialists (Troops Out Movement, 1974; 18 Purdie, 1972) and 
anti-republicans (Stewart, 1975). Their criticism of the superficiality of this argument 
and the inconsistency of its approach to British imperial interests is well made_ 
There was no reason why Britain's relations with the South (which she had dominated 
economically since partition) should have been held up by the sorry state of Catholics 
in Northern Ireland. No Dublin government had done anything positive to promote their 
interests, or put pressure on Britain to do so. 
-Both London lind Dublin hltd plllyed Pontius Pilllte on the North for fifty yellfS· (Lee p430). 
The suggestion that Britain promoted reform is also wide of the mark. Before it was 
forced into activity in 1969, Britain preferred to have as little as possible to do with 
Northern Ireland. The Wilson government came to office 
·unencumbered by IInything thltt could properly be described ItS • Northern Irelend policy· (Sew .t 
.1, 1986, p10). 
Labour's Home Secretary visited Northern Ireland for only half a day between 1964 and 
August 1969, when troops were sent onto the streets. Rather than take responsibility 
for reform itself, the Labour government appears to have given uncritical support to 
O'Neill's modernising project. Wilson wrote in 1965 
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"I WBS anxious that the Ulster Unionist government under Captain O'Neill should be encourll(Jed to 
press on with their programme of ending discrimination in housing allocations and jobs and generally 
improving the lot of the minority of Northern Ireland. Since coming into office he had by Northern 
Ireland standards, carried through a remarkable programme of eBSement" (quoted in Sew et al p 11 J. 
In its belief in O'Neill's ability to carry out reforms the government 
"relied on the fllcile notion of a division between liberalising reformists and 'right wing 
extremists'''(ibid, p 13). 
which failed to take account of the way in which sectarianism was embedded in the 
structures of the state. Sectarianism was seen as irrational prejudice, rather than a 
material reality in Northern Ireland society. 
In criticising this prevalent belief in the reforming tendencies of British policy, Marlowe 
and Palmer fall into an opposite error. They pose an unchanging analysis of British 
domination, in which the maintenance of sectarian divisions within Northern Ireland is 
elevated to the main project of imperialism. 
"No imperialist power on earth will voluntarily unite the working class of an oppressed nation under 
its control. Thus the border is the blJsis of Sritllin's domination of Ireland. " (p 1 1 J 
Both positions take a one-sided view of the relationship between sectarianism and 
capital accumulation, since they lack an appreciation of the way that sectarian divisions 
were bound up with class formation. Sectarianism is functional to capital as Marlowe 
and Palmer demonstrate, but can also come into contradiction with it, and the 
relationship is a historically changing one. The rise of the civil rights movement and the 
response of the Unionist state to its demands represented a crisis in these relationships 
which remains unresolved. 
The Development of the Civil Rights Movement 
The civil rights campaign became a mass movement in 1967 with a series of 
demonstrations. The first march, from Dungannon to Coalisland, scene of the protest 
against discrimination in housing, was peaceful. The next, in Derry on 5th October, 
brought a brutal response from the forces of 'law and order'. 
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Marching in Northern Ireland is crucial to maintaining ethnic boundaries. In Derry City 
the triumphalist parade of the City Walls by the Orange Apprentice Boys is part of an 
annual ritual celebrating the defence of the Protestant settlement. No parade of 
non-Unionists had ever taken place within Derry's walls: this was Protestant territory. 
The march was banned, but this only increased support. The violence meted out by the 
paramilitary RUC was, to the chagrin of the British and Stormont governments, watched 
on television around the world. Many people in Britain came for the first time face to 
face with this regime which was part of the British state. 
As the movement gathered pace, so too did Protestant reaction. O'Neill's alleged 
'softness' on the obstreperous taigues" lost him support both inside his government 
and in the wider Protestant community. The extreme right began to organise. The Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) was resurrected and murdered a number of Catholics. Sectarian 
rioting in Derry and Belfast left thousands homeless. Territorial segregation increased 
as people were forced out of their homes, or moved into their own ghettoes for 
security. In the 1950s, Ian Paisley had helped establish Ulster Protestant Action whose 
aim was 
"To keep Protestants and loyal workers in employment in times of depression, in preference to their 
fellow Catholic workers" (Farrell p233). 
This organisation, renamed the more innocuous-sounding Democratic Unionist Party, 
became more active in the 1960s. Paisley established the Protestant Telegraph, a 
"vitriolic anti-Catholic" paper, while Paisleyism itself 
"is not only fundamentalist anti-Catholicism, but fundamentally anti-Catholic" (Lee p427). 
Paisley had strong connections with UVF members convicted of sectarian murders, but 
managed to distance himself sufficiently to avoid being implicated (Farrell p 237). He 
has been elected both to Westminster and the European Parliament, and remains one 
of the major figures in Northern Ireland politics, outlasting several leaders of the official 
Unionist Party. 
In November 1968, O'Neill announced a package of reforms, but these failed to meet 
the demands of the civil rights movement. Radical elements, led by People's 
Democracy, planned to march from Belfast to Derry, beginning on New Year's Day, 
1969. The march was not banned, but was harassed throughout its route by Loyalists, 
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in collusion with the RUC. The climax came at Burntollet Bridge, when the marchers 
were ambushed. It was later established that nearly a hundred of the attackers were 
off-duty B Specials (Farrell, p251). 
The march crystallised the civil rights movement around the demand for one man one 
vote. Although O'Neill finally accepted this principle, his position within the Unionist 
Party was so weakened that he was forced to resign. Civil disorder was widespread. 
The new Prime Minister, Chichester Clark, continued O'Neill's policy of promising 
reform coupled with repression of the Catholic community. 
A crisis came with the Derry Apprentice Boys parade in August. The event was usually 
accompanied by attacks on Catholics. This year a Bogside Defence Committee was 
formed to protect Catholic areas, and the invaders were forced out. The Battle of the 
Bogside brought British troops onto the streets. James Callaghan, who took the 
decision to deploy the troops, explained his reasons in his memoirs. 
" .. Anthony Peacocke, the Inspector-General, feared that the police would be unable to contain the 
Bogside for much longer and that if troops were not made available the police would be compelled 
to retreat from their position in front of the barricades to Victoria Police Station. They feared that 
the centre of the city would then be invaded by a riotous mob .... An hour later .. the 
Inspector-General wetS ... formally etSking for the BSSistance of troops, and that was the meSSll(Je I 
receivfld in thfl air. "(CalllJ(Jhan, 1973). 
The British government agreed to the request. The troops were initially welcomed by 
many Catholics who saw them as protecting Catholic areas from Protestant 
para-militaries. But the honeymoon soon turned sour. The promised reforms were too 
limited and too late. Increasingly the army was used to repress the Catholic revolt. 
Universal suffrage in local elections was introduced, and housing was taken from local 
authority control, but nothing was done about employment discrimination. More 
importantly, Unionists were left in charge of the repressive apparatus. The B Specials 
were disbanded, but former Specials were allowed to join the new Ulster Defence 
Regiment, which has always been overwhelmingly Protestant. The Unionist parliament 
was left to introduce reforms which struck at the heart of its existence. 
"British policy now proceeded on thellSSumption th.t the struggle was lISSentiai/y .JJout civil rightJI, 
not .bout politice! power, end th.t the two could be separ.ted" (Lee, p430J. 
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The irreconcilability of these two became increasingly evident as the revolt continued. 
The policy of containing the revolt and gradual reform came to be seen by the Catholic 
community as defending the Unionist regime. The IRA, practically defunct at the start 
of the civil rights movement since an abortive and unpopular campaign in the 1950s, 
rearmed and reorganised. 
Such momentum for reform as the British government had mustered in the heady days 
of 1969 quickly ebbed away as the prospects of a 'quick fix' became more unlikely. By 
1970 Callaghan was telling the House of Commons that Catholics had exhausted the 
sympathies of the government with their 
"concentrlltion on the imllgined lind relll grievllnces lit times to the complete exclusion of the 
mellSures of progress which lire being mllde in this country" (Sew et III, 1985, p23J. 
With the election of the Conservatives later that year, Reginald Maudling became Home 
Secretary and in charge of Northern Ireland. His reported comment on returning from 
his first visit, "what a bloody awful country" (Lee p434), did little to suggest that the 
government would apply sensitivity to their Irish policy. 
This fear was justified when internment was introduced in August 1971. It was 
ineffective in security terms, netting hundreds of innocent people, and few active IRA 
members. Its propaganda effect was disastrous. The British government was accused 
in the European court of torturing internees. The court managed to support the 
government's own committee's findings, that there had been no brutality, only 'ill 
treatment' on the curious grounds that brutality was 
"lIn inhumlln or SIlVlI(JfI form of cfUfllty lind thllt cfUfllty implifls II disposition to inflict suffering, 
ooupl«/ with IndIff.,."". to tH p/NMI,./n",. vIotlm'. tHin." (BSSRS, '974, p3', myemph_isJ. 
But Britain's reputation was damaged internationally, and virtually the entire Catholic 
community was alienated from British policy. Civil resistance increased, as rate and rent 
strikes involved whole communities. The SDLP opposition withdrew from Stormont. 
Resistance culminated in January 1972, on what has become known as Bloody SundBY. 
During a huge civil rights march in Derry, fourteen unarmed civilians were shot dead by 
soldiers of the Parachute Regiment. Although the government convened yet another 
commission to explain away the circumstances, the pressure it unleashed was too 
great. Stormont was 'prorogued' for a year in March that year and never reconvened. 
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Direct Rule from Westminster had begun. Expected to be a temporary measure while 
a solution was put together, Direct Rule has continued for over twenty years. 
Conclusion 
The demands of Catholics for equal rights within Northern Ireland had proved 
irreconcilable with the Unionist regime. While the civil rights movement claimed only the 
most basic democratic rights, these demands inevitably raised the question of state 
power within a state based on sectarianism. 
In spite of the hopes of many of its activists, the movement had not been able to unite 
Protestant and Catholic workers in support of democratisation. Within the confines of 
the Northern Ireland state, these demands were seen as a threat to the material 
well-being of Protestants, while they struck at the heart of the Protestant state from 
which they derived their material privileges and their sense of identity. 
The demand for civil rights had remained therefore a predominantly Catholic campaign, 
while the ties of Protestants to Unionist politics had, with some individual exceptions, 
become stronger as their position came under threat. 
Although the demand for civil rights struck at the heart of the Unionist state, the 
movement did not challenge the central role of the Catholic Church in the community, 
nor the role of women within the Catholic family. As the hopes of peaceful reform 
faded, and the two communities became increasingly polarised, the focus of loyalty of 
the community remained around a religious identity. It has also perpetuated the 
counterposition of demands for rights for Catholics to rights for women. 
Notes to Chapter Three 
1. Thi. commitment may be challenged by a referendum on Article. 2 and 3 of the Con.titution which claim 
IOvereignty over the whole territory of Ireland, which i. being projected a part of the current attempt. to 
revive inter-Party talk. on the future of Northern Ireland. 
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2. The Twenty Six Counties declared itself a Republic in 1949, leaving the Commonwealth. Republicans 
prefer the original name Free Stllte, arguing that the term Republic implies that the national question has 
been completed. 
3. Mary Cullen (Maynooth College) speaking at the Alice Stopford Green History Conference, 29.3.1992. 
4. The Pale was the boundary of the English settlement. beyond which lived 'uncivilised' natives. Hence the 
expression 'Beyond the Pale'. 
5. There has been controversy about the nature of the pre-colonial land system. Some nationalists believe 
that a communal system prevailed, while others argue that a more hierarchical structure, similar to feudalism 
existed (see Beresford Ellis, 1985; de Paor, 1986). 
6. This position was suggested to me by Bill Rolston. 
7. See Marx's attack on the 'political economists' for their attachment to the notion of absolute rather than 
surplus overpopulation (Capital, vol 3, chapter 13). 
8. Speaker from Irish Women Workers Union, Alice Stopford Green Conference, 28.3.1992. 
9. The Irish Volunteers were founded in 1913 to defend Home Rule, in response to the formation of the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (Beresford Ellis, p206). 
10. The term suffrll(Jist was used by Irish campaigners who preferred to maintain a separate identity from 
the British suffrllgettes (Cullen Owers, 1991). 
11. Only 16.7 % of British adults claimed adherence to a Christian Church in the 1980s, according to the UK 
Christian Handbook. 
12. The government proposal to allow abortion in very limited circumstances was opposed by both 
campaigners for women's rights and anti-abortionists, and was defeated. But voters supported the rights of 
women to receive information about abortion, and to travel abroad for abortions, both of which represented 
progress on the existing formal position. 
13. This is how the contents of Bew et al (1989 are described on the cover. 
14. The 1 946 Labour government introduced universal suffrage in local elections. Stormont reatrictad the 
suffrage in 1946, excluding lodgers, two thirds of whom were Catholic. They also retained the property vote, 
giving company directors up to six votes. 
16. Lilian Murphy, former mill worker, speaking at Alice Stopford Green conference, 28.3.1992. 
16. The major reporta were Islea .. Cuthbert, 19615; Hall, 1962; Wilaon 1966; Quigley, 1976. 
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17. Mrs Gildernew, speaking at Alice Stopford Green conference, 28.3.1992. In Farrell's appendix describing 
key individuals, including both historical figures and those still alive, only 3 of 76 are women. 
18. I was one of the authors of this report. 
19. A racist term for Irish (Catholics). 
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Chapter Four 
Economic Policy Under Direct Rule 
Introduction 
During the twenty years of Direct Rule, the Northern Ireland economy has undergone 
a dramatic decline. At the beginning of the 1970s, manufacturing output expanded 
more rapidly than in Britain, as state policy proved successful in attracting multinational 
investment. By the 1990s, the hope that new modern companies would replace 
declining indigenous industry as the basis for a thriving economy had proved illusory. 
New inward investment had all but dried up, while more than half the branch plants 
established in the 1960s had closed. The economy is increasingly dependent on both 
public employment and state support to maintain private employment. According to 
Rowthorn and Wayne, writing in 1988, the situation had reached the point where 
"It would be little exaggeration to describe Northern Ireland in the late 1980s as a workhouse 
economy. A large part of its population is unemployed. Those who are not are chiefly engaged in 
servicing or controlling each other" (p 98). 
Changes in the way in which data is collected and the categories used prevent straight 
forward comparison of economic indicators (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 1990, p47). 
Employment statistics are notoriously problematic, tending to underestimate 
unemployment, particularly of women. There wee no less than 29 changes in the 
definition of unemployment during the 1980s, all but one of which reduced the official 
count (ibid, p55). The Unemployment Unit's figures for unemployment in Northern 
Ireland are approximately 30% higher than the official figures (ibid, p58). 
In spite of these limitations, official figures do give some indication of economic 
performance in the 1990s, and the extent of the problems facing the economy. 
Northern Ireland is the slowest growing region of the United Kingdom. Gross Domestic 
Product actually declined in 1990 (NIEC, 1992a, p9). In that year, GOP per head was 
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only 75.4% of the UK average, lower than any other region. This represents a decline 
from nearly 80% of British levels in the early 1980s (ibid, p 11). 
Low GDP is a result both of low productivity, and the small proportion of the population 
in work. The dependency ratio is higher, while Northern Ireland also has the highest 
proportion in the UK of people of working age outside the labour force (Gudgin & Roper, 
1990)' a result of lower labour force participation, and higher unemployment. 
Redundancies rose by over 90% in 1991 (NIEC, 1992a, p 25). Unemployment in 
Northern Ireland has consistently been at least 2 percentage points above the next 
highest UK region, the North of England. In the last quarter of 1992, it stood at 14.7%, 
compared to a UK average of 10.1 %, and a rate of 11.6% in the North of England 
(Economic Trends). 
Poor economic performance is matched by low living standards. Income per capita 
remains the lowest in the UK. In 1989 it was 87.7% of the UK average, although 
household income is above average due to large family size (Social Trends, 1992). 
Average hourly earnings remain substantially below British levels (New Earnings 
Survey). Distribution of earnings was more uneven: the proportion of tax payers earning 
less than £7,500 was 36.9% in 1989-90, compared to a UK figure of 29.0%. At the 
top end, however, the figures were much more similar; 16.6% in Northern Ireland 
earning more than £20,000, compared to a UK average of 18.5% (Regional Trends). 
The causes of economic decline do not lie solely within Northern Ireland. The world 
economy suffered severe recession in the 1970s, precipitated by the oil price rise of 
1973. But underlying the immediate crisis was the exhaustion of the post war 
expansion based on the triumvirate of 'Taylor, Ford and Keynes' (Grahl & Teague, 
1989, p37).' The UK economy was severely affected, especially in manufacturing and 
this problem was magnified in Northern Ireland. 
During the 1970s substantial restructuring and internationalisation of production took 
place. There was a rapid expansion in the number of production units as newly 
industrialising countries (NICs) sought foreign investment. Northern Ireland was faced 
with stronger competition for new investment while the nature of the new branch 
plants which had been established in the 1960s made them vulnerable to closure. While 
some NICs developed a strong industrial base through strategic state intervention 
(Amsden, 1990), Northern Ireland's industrial policy was largely confined to providing 
grants and subsidies for private capital. As European integration develops, the problems 
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of Northern Ireland's position as a peripheral region of a peripheral state have 
intensified. 
Internationalisation of production has been accompanied by a convergence of economic 
policy in Europe and a substantial rightward political shift, as the material basis for the 
post-war social democratic 'one nation' consensus crumbled. In Britain, economic 
liberalism has been combined with authoritarianism (Gamble, 1988) and explicit 
anti-feminism (ten Tusscher, 1986). 
The British social democratic consensus was never inclusive in reality. Women's 
dependence on a male breadwinner was assumed in the structures of benefit and family 
policy, while black people and other ethnic minorities were excluded (Williams, 1989). 
But in Northern Ireland an explicit 'two nations' ideology has always been dominant. 
The attempt to replace traditional industry with new Fordist production under Unionist 
rule recreated sectarian working practices in new forms, while Catholics remained 
excluded from full citizenship. But when formal social democracy was imposed with 
direct rule, the economic basis on which it might have survived was already 
disappearing. 
The 'Troubles' and the severe economic crisis have made it politically impossible to 
implement the full rigours of the neoliberal agenda. Not only was Northern Ireland 
spared Thatcher's 'flagship policy' the Poll Tax, but the government found itself in the 
position of implementing much stronger equal opportunities legislation (in relation to 
religion) than its predecessors, while dismantling the powers of British local authorities 
in this area. Nevertheless, since the mid 1980s, public spending cuts and deregulation 
have been introduced, widening economic inequalities. These disparities inevitably 
reflect the continuing structural differences based on class, gender and religion. 
This chapter will trace some of the key economic changes during the period of direct 
rule, while their implications for gender and sectarian divisions will be discussed further 
in the following chapter. 
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Direct Rule and British Policy 
When Stormont was prorogued, its legislative and executive powers were transferred 
to Westminster. A Secretary of State of Cabinet rank was placed in charge of the 
Northern Ireland Office, and the responsibilities of the eight local departments were 
allocated to Ministers of State. A thrice weekly meeting of ministers, senior civil 
servants and the heads of the security forces was instituted, "thereby unifying civil, 
police and military administration" (Elliott &. Wilford, 1987, p295). 
legislation was controlled from Westminster. Ares formerly under the control of 
Stormont became the subject of Orders in Council. While there were various provisions 
for consultation with local interests, these Orders could not be amended, and there was 
no direct local accountability. 
Local government, object of some of the most bitter complaints from the civil rights 
movement, had already been stripped of many of its powers. Housing was placed under 
the Housing Executive in 1971. New local boundaries came into force in 1971, reducing 
the number of authorities from 73 to 26. With Direct Rule, local authorities lost all their 
major functions: their powers were confined largely to leisure and street cleansing. 
Education came under five regional education and library boards; responsibility for 
health and social services was combined under four regional boards. These bodies 
contained a minority of elected councillors, appointed at the discretion of the relevant 
minister. 
Financial relations with Britain were simplified, with the institution of the block grant 
system. Revenue comes from three sources: the attributed share of UK taxes minus 
reductions for reserved services; non tax revenue; and grants from the Treasury. 
Spending priorities are determined by UK ministers, in line with UK priorities. Spending 
has continued on a parity basis, and local needs have ensured a higher than average per 
capita public spending. 
Direct Rule was intended as a temporary measure, pending a political settlement. The 
preferred British solution was devolved local government involving power sharing. There 
have been six major constitutional initiatives,2 the last of which, inter-party discussions 
initiated under Peter Brooke, broke down in November 1992. None has succeeded in 
producing more than a temporary reversion from Direct Rule. All have attempted to find 
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a settlement within the present state boundaries, but within this structure, the positions 
of the two communities (whatever their internal differences) have proved irreconcilable. 
The Anglo Irish Agreement, signed in 1985, for the first time acknowledged the 
Republic's interest in Northern Ireland. But the wording 
·is so imprecise, its success or failure rests on how it is sold to each of its target audiences· 
(Ro/ston, 1987, p59) 
While the British government hailed it as marking the end of the Republic's claim for 
national unity, the Southern government presented it as a defence of the nationalist 
aspirations of Northern Catholics (ibid, p58). Its survival therefore rests on the ability 
of the politicians to convince their own communities that they have made no meaningful 
concessions. Any developments remain largely symbolic. 
Northern Ireland politicians are in the peculiar position of regularly fighting elections 
which - even if they win them - cannot bring them direct political power. They have in 
effect been reduced to 'lobbyists' over the communal share out of jobs (O'Dowd, 
1987), with no part in forming the policies which determine the size of the job total. 
Although wining seats at Westminster elections cannot give them control over the 
policies implemented in Northern Ireland, these elections are fought almost entirely on 
local issues, by parties which exist only in Northern Ireland. Sectarian voting patterns 
remain firmly in place.3 
The Conservative Party made some attempt to organise in the last general election 
(1992), putting forward candidates in all constituencies except West Belfast. But its 
involvement was marginal, and its vote (6.1 % of the total) largely irrelevant. The Labour 
Party retains its formal support for Irish unity. It does not organise as a party in 
Northern Ireland, since this would give tacit support to the Union. But this policy 
probably reflects unwillingness to become involved with awkward issues as much as 
principled objection. 
Only local councils have some form of control, although their powers are minimal. 
Elections are sharply contested, since they provide an arena for political debate about 
issues far beyond the competence of the councils themselves. Sinn Fein has taken a 
number of council seats in recent years, and in spite of bitter opposition and threats of 
boycotts, Unionists have been forced to sit on committees with them. They have even 
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found common cause on some economic and social issues: all groups pressure for more 
public spending, and Belfast City Council unanimously opposed the decision by the 
management of the Royal Victoria Hospital Group to seek Trust Status. 
Unionist as well as nationalist politicians complain that the political structures created 
by Direct Rule resemble a colonial relationship. But unlike nationalists, they favour a 
local parliament based on majority rule. This would mean the return of Unionist 
(Protestant) rule. 
The powerlessness created by the constitutional situation is compounded for women. 
The 
"psst, and continuing, centrality of Catholic/Protestant relations in policy and research (which) hss 
obscured the realities of other forms of inequality to varying degrees, with gender inequality very low 
on the list. .. (Davies & McLaughlin, 7997, p5). 
No woman has represented a Northern Ireland seat at either Westminster or the 
European Parliament since Direct Rule, while most male representatives have taken a 
strongly anti-feminist position. There are no political representatives to take women's 
issues forward within the formal political process. 
There are few women councillors, and the lack of powers of local councils prevents 
them being a vehicle for promoting women's interests. There is no equivalent of the 
Women's Committees of local authorities which have provided a focus for promoting 
women's rights in Britain, including the provision of services such as child-care. 
Councils in Northern Ireland have no powers in this area. Britain has one of the lowest 
levels of publicly-funded child care in the EC. Within the UK, Northern Ireland has the 
worst provision, making it the most disadvantaged area within the EC (Hinds, 1991, p 
93). 
Tory and Labour policy under Direct Rule 
The emphasis of policy has differed under Tory and Labour administrations, but there 
has been more continuity than difference. Labour, anxious not to appear 'soft on 
terrorism', never challenges the consensus on security matters. Even where formal 
policy differs, as with the Party's opposition to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), 
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they have not campaigned for it. Neither party has wanted to make Ireland central to 
its platform, and this bi-partisanship has marginalised serious debate on in Britain. While 
most parliamentary debate is relentlessly confrontational, government statements on 
Ireland are greeted with respectful attention and even congratulations from the 
Opposition. 
The events leading to the abolition of Stormont - especially internment and Bloody 
Sunday - alienated virtually the whole Catholic community. British policy in the early 
years of Direct Rule aimed at containment of the revolt, reform, and the swift 
implementation of an internal solution. Of these three, only containment has been a 
constant feature, while with economic decline, the British state has been forced to play 
an increasingly interventionist role in the economy. 
The Tory administration which initiated Direct Rule attempted to devolve power as soon 
as possible thorough the creation of a power sharing Assembly. This Assembly was 
brought down under the subsequent Labour administration when Unionist opposition 
culminated in a strike organised under the umbrella of the Ulster United Unionist 
Workers Council, which the government was unable or unwilling to confront (see for 
example Boyd, 1984). 
Labour showed greater willingness to see Direct Rule as a semi-permanent arrangement, 
particularly after the failure of another constitutional initiative in 1977. Roy Mason, who 
became Northern Ireland Secretary in 1976, was unsympathetic to Catholic grievances, 
and told his first press conference 
"(u)nemployment, little new investment, too many businesses closing down, these are the questions 
which must receive priority" (Sew et aI, 1985, p89). 
Mason viewed the reform programme as essentially complete: his task was to 
concentrate on arresting economic decline. His 
"bumptious and insular arrogance made him relish his role as some sort of governor bringing 
enlightenment and prosperity to the benighted Irish" (ibid, p92J. 
In bringing 'normality' to Northern Ireland in the form of old-fashioned labourist politics, 
Mason did not address the structural inequalities in access to employment and services. 
Increased state spending did much to "underpin the reproduction of sectarianism" (ibid, 
p 95). His emphasis on building a strong economy was often more rhetorical than real. 
141 
Although Northern Ireland was spared the monetarist squeeze of the latter part of the 
Callaghan government, there was no serious strategy to tackle the chronic economic 
problems. 
Mason regularly announced that the IRA was defeated, and its supporters isolated. His 
triumphalism and uncritical support for the security forces increased nationalist hostility. 
In 1981 , when Labour was in opposition, Mason visited the dying hunger striker Bobby 
Sands to inform him that he would get no sympathy from the British labour movement. 
Sands had been elected an MP while on hunger strike, and Mason's action alienated 
many Catholics who were unsympathetic to the IRA. 
Labour policy was based on the notion that more jobs would solve the political problem. 
The Tories have pursued a more vigorous search for a political solution, seeing a 
political settlement as a precondition for economic recovery. This accords with one of 
Thatcher's favourite maxims, 'you can't solve a problem by throwing money at it'. 
The relationship of Thatcherism (and post-Thatcherism) with Northern Ireland has been 
contradictory. Thatcher's brand of 'two nations' conservatism has much in common 
with Unionism: she herself had a personal empathy with the Unionists, who, like her, 
are 'conviction politicians' (Morrissey & Gaffikin, p35). She demonstrated her disdain 
for Irish nationalism in her summary rejection of the proposals from the New Ireland 
Forum,4 "No, No, No". But she presided over what Unionists see as the greatest 
betrayal of their cause by a British government, the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The strategy 
of isolating republicans from their base in the nationalist community had led the 
government to make a deal with the 'Catholic nationalists' of the Republic. 
The political situation has also brought contradictions at the economic and social level. 
Unionist power was built on the use of the state apparatus to maintain privilege, and 
the economic decline of the past two decades has reinforced dependence on state 
subsidy. Conservative in social and political outlook, Unionist politicians are united (as 
are nationalists) in demanding increased public expenditure to shore up the economy. 
The strategy of undermining the credibility of critics of British rule has narrowed the 
possibilities for free market solutions, while in recent years the government has come 
under pressure from the Irish-American lobby to take more radical measures against 
discrimination. 
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Although in general terms, "unlike previous British governments, the Tories now do not 
regard Northern Ireland as a special case" (Rowthorn and Wayne p87), government 
spending has continued to rise under the Tories, and is a greater proportion of total 
output than anywhere else in the United Kingdom. In 1989, the Guardian's political 
commentator referred to "the Independent Keynesian Republic of Northern Ireland" 
(Morrissey & Gaffikin, p35). But government spending has taken specific forms as the 
Thatcherite agenda comes into conflict with the political structures and economic 
problems of Northern Ireland. While social spending and public sector employment have 
fallen, public expenditure remains overwhelming important as a direct and indirect 
provider of jobs. 
Economic Policy and The 'Troubles' 
Violence which has been continuing for the past 20 years has clearly played a part in 
economic decline. There have been a number of attempts to quantify its effect in terms 
of jobs lost. This is necessarily a speculative exercise: it involves estimating jobs lost 
directly due to bombing of premises; those lost due to plant closure where the political 
situation was a factor in the decision; and even more difficult, loss of jobs from new 
investment deterred by the violence. 
Fothergill and Guy (1990) in a study of branch plant closures during the 1980s, found 
that the 'Troubles' were not a significant factor in decisions to close in that period. But 
the major job losses came in the 1970s (NIEC, 1992b). Canning et al (1987) suggest 
that the 'Troubles' were responsible for the loss of 40,000 manufacturing jobs between 
1971 and 1983. Their calculation of the difference between actual jobs and estimated 
employment in the absence of the 'Troubles', is based on a comparison with the 
outcome in other UK assisted areas (p219). This estimate attributes all job losses 
unaccounted for by specific named factors to the Troubles. 
The NIEC argues that the decline in Northern Ireland's share of employment in externally 
owned manufacturing firms is evidence of the impact of the 'Troubles' on inward 
investment. In 1973, Northern Ireland had 3.6% of the UK total. This fell continuously 
to 1989, when it stood at 1.9%, a drop of nearly 50%. In contrast, the share going to 
Wales increased by 17%, while in Scotland, the share fell by only 10%, and started to 
recover in the late 1980s. 
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Table 4.1 - Share of UK Manufacturing Employment accounted for by non-UK owned 
enterprises, 1973 - 1989 
1973 
1989 
% change 
Northern 
Ireland 
3.6 
1.9 
-47.2 
Source: NIEC, 1992b, p 30 
Scotland 
11.9 
10.6 
·10.9 
Wales 
5.3 
6.2 
+17.0 
England Total 
79.2 
81.3 
+ 2.7 
100 
100 
Canning and his co-authors argue that the economic impact of the Troubles has not 
been wholly negative. 
"It is a mistake to blame these economic problems on the troubles. Indeed it could be argued that 
while the troubles hss led to a loss of manufacturing jobs, their net effect on the r8lJional economy 
hss been positive, due to the induced expansion of public sector expenditure lind employment. " 
(Canning et aI, 1987, p211). 
Table 4.2 - The Impact of armed conflict on Employment, 1970-1985 
agriculture 
manufacturing 
other industry 
non-govt services 
govt services 
Total 
Source: Rowthorn & Wayne, p94 
Change in employment 
due to conflict (OOOs' 
nil 
·46 
o 
+6 
+36 
-6 
% of 1970 
employment 
nil 
·25 
o 
+3 
+38 
-, 
Rowthorn & Wayne (1988) attempt to quantify these other jobs effects (Table 4.2). 
Their estimate of 46,000 manufacturing jobs lost (over a slightly longer period) is not 
dissimilar to that of Canning et at But unlike them, Rowthorn and Wayne view the 
redistribution of jobs, particularly the weakening of the industrial sector, as a serious 
problem, and the present conflict is "one of the greatest obstacles to a sustained 
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economic recovery" (p121). The difference lies not merely in numbers but in their 
treatment of the 'Troubles'. For Canning et ai, they are an 'external' factor, whose 
causes are outside the scope of the analysis. For Rowthorn & Wayne, the causes of the 
conflict are central to their concerns. 
While the economy been affected by political violence, the aim of 'defeating terrorism' 
has been a component in constructing economic policy. Richard Needham, then 
Economic Minister at the Northern Ireland Office, made this connection clear in 1989. 
"It has to be in our interests ... for us to try to get more jobs in West BelfBSt ... that is the way in 
which we will reduce the terrorist menace, by making people economically independent from 
terrorism. That is the prime strategic objective of the government. " 6 
In the 19705, particularly in the Mason period, economists and planners blamed the 
'Troubles' for economic decline, but a change of emphasis emerged in the 1980s. 
"'The troubles' have been redefined lIS a problem of perception and business confidence. In particular 
the 'distorted media image' of the province is attacked" (O'Dowd & Rolston, 1985, p219J. 
The development of the Belfast Enterprise Zone, and the Belfast Urban Plan were largely 
driven by the need to purvey a different image, in order to attract business. But 
"politicians have different messages for different audiences" (Rolston & Tomlinson, 
p50). Northern Ireland minister Nicholas Scott told parliament in 1987 
"The pattern of unemployment in West BelfllSt, in parts of Derry and Strabane and elsewhere reflects 
the IRA's hypocrisy when it complains about unemployment among Catholics in those towns and 
cities, yet we know that it has contributed more than any other single factor to that unemployment 
in Northern Ireland" (quoted in ibid, p46J. 
The new emphasis on encouraging local enterprise has been associated with greater 
politicisation of job discrimination. Local groups such as Obair and the West Belfast 
Economic Forum have been running more sophisticated campaigns for jobs in mainly 
nationalist West Belfast. This has brought some targeting of employment creation and 
training programmes in these areas. Pressure (and funding) from the United States has 
also been important. The Kennedy Enterprise Park in West Belfast, funded by US aid, 
was opened by the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1991. 
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But groups or individuals thought to have connections with republicanism have been 
marginalised. Political vetting has removed funding from suspect groups, or closed them 
down.6 The Catholic Church has proved a valued ally in the government's attempt to 
isolate republicanism, and has been given a major role in providing training schemes 
(ibid, p136). 
Industrial Policy 
Industrial development policy has been based since the 1950s primarily on subsidies 
and grants to private industry. The Industrial Development Board (lOB) took over 
responsibility for implementing policy in 1983, with the Local Enterprise Development 
Unit (LEDU) retaining responsibility for small companies (those employing less than 50 
people). While the level of state support is greater than in any other UK region, 
industrial policy has been 'pragmatic' (NIEC, 1991 a, p2), with little overall strategic 
planning. Private firms have been provided with grants and infrastructure, but have been 
largely unconstrained by intervention aimed at wider planning goals. The approach is 
characterised by an 
"unqualified faith in the private sector, and the ability of the market, to rescue the economy" 
(Morrissey & Gaffikin, 1987, p47J. 
A study of the relation between unemployment and the location of industry (NIEC 
1990a) suggested that employment creation is not being targeted at unemployment 
blackspots. 
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Table 4.3 - Unemployment and Job Creation, 1988 
% share of % share of Location 
jobs created NI unemploy- ratio 
by 1988 ment, 1988 
a b alb 
C Antrim 9.9 19.6 0.5 
Co Armagh 12.5 7.5 1.7 
Belfast 15.2 24.8 0.6 
Co Londonderry 29.4 15.8 1.9 
Co Down 16.2 17.7 0.9 
Co Fermanagh 6.9 3.4 1.7 
Co Tyrone 10.9 11.2 1.0 
Source: NIEC, 1990a, p 42 
There are also marked intra-regional differences in unemployment; for example Derry's 
favourable position may not be reflected at a more local level. In Belfast, which has 
almost a quarter of unemployment, the location ratio is very low. But even this hides 
large differentials within the city, with some areas doing even worse than implied in the 
above table. Of 180 external companies given aid between 1946 and 1980, only three 
were located in West Belfast (where male unemployment is well over 50% in some 
wards) and only one, Ford Motor Company, remains. 
By the 1970s, the relative success in attracting inward investment had come to an end, 
while firms which moved in during the 1960s were starting to leave. In response to 
economic decline, Labour applied expansionary polices. State employment grew rapidly, 
particularly in education and welfare, as services caught up with those in Britain. Public 
employment replaced manufacturing jobs, while subsidies to industry were increasingly 
used to maintain existing jobs rather than to create new ones. This process culminated 
in the nationalisation of the two major private sector employers, stronghold of the 
Protestant skilled male workforce, Harland and Wolf and Short Brothers. 
Industrial policy in the first half of the 1980s remained essentially the same, with job 
creation/retention the overriding priority. The Tories introduced Enterprise Zones, 
including one in Belfast, and one in Derry. These were aimed at attracting private firms 
through increased grants and tax exemption. This policy represented less change in 
Northern Ireland than it did in Britain: since Direct Rule, economic policy had been 
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directly administered by central government, with little local accountability. There was 
tacit agreement on the policy from local politicians, who tended to confine themselves 
to struggles over the location of jobs within Belfast rather than the principle itself. The 
specific extra advantages offered by the Enterprise Zone in Belfast were relatively 
minor. More important were the 'intangible' aspects (O'Dowd and Rolston, 1985, 
p221). These involved rebuilding the image of Belfast as a commercial centre, and 
attempting re-establish confidence in potential investors. 
By the late 1980s, the weakness of industrial strategy had become increasingly evident 
as attracting new inward investment became more difficult. The effectiveness of the 
policy was widely criticised, as the cost of creating and maintaining jobs soared (NIEC, 
1985, 1990 and 1992; Gudgin & Roper, 1990). 
The Pathfinder Process initiated by the Department of Economic Development (OED) 
was intended to develop a more targeted approach to industrial policy. The OED's 
document Building a Stronger Economy (1987) identified six weaknesses of the 
economy: lack of an enterprising tradition; deficiencies in training, work and managerial 
competencies; distance penalties and the small local market; small manufacturing 
sector, large public sector; dependence on public funds; the Northern Ireland political 
situation. Task forces were established to deal with the first five: the "Northern Ireland 
political situation" was clearly felt to be outside the scope of their inquiries. 
As a result, the target of job creation was replaced by that of creating 
'competitiveness'. As the NIEC points out, this goal is ill-defined, and has yet to 
impinge significantly on lOB policy. But in spite of the adoption of the fashionable 
vocabulary of the enterprise culture (OED, 1990) there has been little apparent change 
of strategy. 
One area of industrial policy in which Thatcherite policies have prevailed is privatisation. 
The companies nationalised under Labour have been reprivatised at a cost to the tax 
payer of £1.5 billion (NIEC, 1991a, p 18), while utilities such as electricity and 
telecommunications are now in private hands. 
Inward Investment 
Industrial strategy was geared almost exclusively towards promoting inward investment 
up to the 1970s. Only 8.5% of jobs promoted between 1947 and 1967 were in 
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indigenous companies (Rowthorn, 1987, pl16). This created dependence on 
multinational branch plants which proved vulnerable to closure, and were the largest 
component of manufacturing decline in the 1970s and 1980s. While a growing 
proportion of inward investment is now in the service sector, lOB policy has been 
targeted almost exclusively at manufacturing, and it is in this sector that data is most 
easily available (NIEC, 1992b, P 12). 
Teague (1987) describes the period 1958-1975 as a "virtuous circle" in relation to 
multinational investment. Investment expanded rapidly in the 1960s, with 27 United 
States projects established by 1968 (a rise of 20 over ten years). European companies 
were slower to invest, but there were 22 projects by 1975. (ibid, p162). According to 
Simpson (1983, p90) the main factors responsible for the 'virtuous circle' were 
1) full employment elsewhere in the United Kingdom 
2) some difference in earnings levels of labour costs 
3) government inducement 
4) lower energy prices 
A "vicious circle" set in the mid 1970s. The first and fourth factors above had been 
reversed, while earnings (2) which had risen more slowly than the UK average in the 
period 1956-1973 were now rising at a faster rate. Government inducements (3) 
however had increased, in spite of competition from other regions, and were 
approximately twice the level in other UK depressed regions (Rowthorn & Wayne). What 
Simpson called the 'local disorder' had also started to have a deterrent effect on inward 
investment. 
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Table 4.4 - Openings and Closures of Foreign Owned Units by country of Origin, 
1976-1985 
USA W Germ Rol o Euro Asia S Africa 
0 C 0 C 0 C 0 C 0 C 0 C 
1976 2 
1977 2 
1978 2 
1979 2 
1980 7 3 2 2 
1981- 6 12 3 4 9 8 6 3 
1985 
Total 17 17 4 6 10 9 11 3 0 0 
Source: Teague, 1 987, P 168 
Table 4.4 shows a slight net increase in foreign-owned units in the 1980s, as 
multinationals switched to acquisition rather than new investment (ibid, p169). By the 
late 1980s, there was an absolute decline in the number of foreign-owned plants (Table 
4.5). The fall was due to a reduction in US and Republic of Ireland plants, while EC and 
Far Eastern investment continued to grow. 
While Teague specifically excludes British capital from his definition of multinational, 
British-owned firms are included as inward investment by the NIEC (1992b) and Gudgin 
et al (1989). This classification effectively recognises the separateness of Northern 
Ireland from the British economy. For the purposes of the present work, it is useful to 
treat British firms separately from indigenous firms: British capital can be supposed to 
be similar to foreign-owned capital in that it is not wedded to the sectarian employment 
practices associated with Northern Irish-based companies. But in the discussion in 
Chapter Seven, investment from outside the UK or Republic of Ireland will be treated 
separately from other multinationals, since information on the number of firms, and 
employment in this category is more easily available. 
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Table 4.5 - Externally owned manufacturing plants by country of ownership 
Number % of total 
Country 1973 1986 1990 1973 1986 1990 
GB 290 148 121 83 61 68 
US 31 37 30 9 16 14 
Canada 4 4 4 2 2 
Ral 14 32 25 4 13 12 
Other EC 8 16 20 2 7 10 
Far East 0 4 0 0 2 
Other 3 6 3 2 2 
Total non GB 61 96 86 17 39 42 
Total 351 244 207 100 100 100 
(Note: Short Brothers, now owned by the Canadian Bombardier Company, is excluded) 
Source: adapted from NIEC, 1992b, p 14 
The number of British-owned plants dropped by 58% in this period, while the British 
share of inward investment fell from over 80% to less than 60%. Employment fell much 
faster than the number of plants (Table 4.6). Over the whole period 1973-1990, 
employment in British-owned companies fell by 63.9%; the decline of 22.9% in non-UK 
firms was less steep, but employment had already started to fall in the early 1980s, 
while plant numbers were increasing. 
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Table 4.6 - Employment in Externally owned manufacturing plants by country of 
ownership 
Employment % of total 
Country 1973 1986 1990 1973 1986 1990 
GB 64,446 22,331 23,269 73.6 63.6 66.6 
US 17,344 11,664 9.282 20 28 23 
Canada 606 808 961 1 2 2 
Rol 1,379 3,012 2,718 2 7 7 
Other EC 2,679 2,876 3,166 3 7 8 
Far East 0 13 1,496 0 0 4 
Other 1,280 967 224 2 
Total non GB 23,116 19,319 17,826 26.4 46.4 43.4 
Total 87,661 41,66041,086 100 100 100 
Note: Figures do not sum to 100 due to rounding 
Source: NIEC, 1992b, p 16 
Non-indigenous firms accounted for 53% of manufacturing employment in 1973, of 
which 29.8% was in firms which had moved in since 1945. Research by the NIERC 
(Gudgin et ai, 1989) showed a net decline of 66,900 manufacturing jobs between 1973 
and 1986. Of the 90,800 jobs lost, 55,800 were in the non-indigenous sector, the 
majority (41,000) through closure, and 14,800 through contraction of surviving firms. 
Over half the jobs lost in external firms (35,700) were from inward moves since 1945. 
Of 375 externally owned factories in 1975,181 had closed in 1986 (Fothergill & Guy, 
1990). Only 6,900 new jobs were created through inward investment, compared to 
17,000 in indigenous firms. By 1990, non-indigenous firms accounted for 38.6% of 
manufacturing employment. 
Large plants were often the most vulnerable. In 1973, 44.4% of manufacturing 
employees were in firms employing over 500, and another 21.1 % in firms employing 
between 200 and 499. Fourteen of the largest firms closed with the loss of 20,000 
jobs. These included five companies in the artificial fibre industry, which went from 
'star performer' to almost total collapse in the space of a few years (Rowthorn & 
Wayne). The average size of externally-owned firms has declined from almost 249 
152 
employees in 1973, to 198 in 1990. But this is still significantly larger than the average 
indigenous firm, which is estimated to have well under 50 employees (NIEC, 1992b, P 
27). 
A high proportion of external investment continues to be in traditional industry: in 1 990, 
34% was in textiles and clothing; and 17% in food, drink and tobacco. British 
investment is particularly concentrated in textiles and clothing. Traditional industry has 
declined continuously since the 1950s (Table 4.7). By 1990, employment in the three 
main sectors was less than a quarter of its 1950 level. 
Table 4.7 - Employment in Manufacturing (OOOs) 1950 to 1990 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 % change 
shipbuilding 24.2 24.1 9.8 7.5 2.5 -89.7 
textiles 72.8 58.0 44.8 25.0 9.6 -87.0 
clothing 32.6 26.1 24.6 17.6 17.3 -46.8 
total 129.5 108.2 79.2 50.1 29.3 -77.4 
traditional 
total non- 66.0 73.1 98.3 82.2 74.7 +13.0 
traditional 
total 195.6 181.3 177.6 132.3 104.0 -46.8 
manufacturing 
Traditional 88.2 68.7 44.8 37.8 28.2 
as % of total 
Source, adapted from NIEC, July 1991a, p11. 
The garment industry, in severe decline in the 1970s, stabilised in the 1980s, and 
employment in the 1990s is little short of its 1980 level. The industry is very diverse 
in terms of size of firms. There are a few large multinationals, while 65% of 
employment is in locally-owned firms employing less than 50. The 1980s have seen an 
increase in the number of small firms (McLaughlin & Ingram, 1991, pp2-3). 
The period also saw the rise and fall of 'non-traditional' manufacturing. Employment 
rose by nearly 50% up to 1970, but in the subsequent two decades fell by 30%. It was 
when this sector went into decline that total manufacturing employment started to 
collapse. Electrical and instrument engineering makes up 18% of externally-owned 
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investment. Employment has declined since 1973 by over 45%, although it has 
increased since the trough of the mid-1980s. 
The Decline of the Branch Plant Economy 
The decline in manufacturing 'involved the heart of the modern branch plant sector' 
(Fothergill and Guy, 1990). Their study of branch closures covered 49 plants. The 
results suggest that peripherality was the major factor in the decision to close. Branch 
plants playa marginal role in most companies, and are the first to go in a recession. 
Although the plants which closed were large in Northern Ireland terms, their links with 
the local economy were underdeveloped. Most had few local roots; only 10% had R&D 
functions, and 12% HQ functions. 
Other studies have pointed to the preponderance of low level functions in Northern 
Ireland plants. Only 24% of employees in manufacturing in 1987 were professional, 
technical or managerial and administrative, compared to 35% in Britain, creating a 
reliance on expatriates in top level jobs (ibid). McGuire, (1987) found that no scientists 
were employed in telecommunications plants in Northern Ireland. The mainly female 
production workers were most vulnerable to cuts in employment and restructuring in 
recession. 
Fothergill & Guy conclude that the majority of plants in their study were closed due to 
general problems of the firm or industry, rather than reasons specific to Northern 
Ireland. But once a closure was decided upon, the peripherality of the Northern Ireland 
plants, and the extra costs of transport and organisation imposed by the location, made 
them vulnerable. The 'Troubles' accounted for only 4% of lost employment. They 
suggest however that this could be underestimated, since firms may be reluctant to 
give this as a reason. 
An industrial strategy which concentrates on aid to new investors has brought in 
companies with little long term attachment to the Northern Ireland. State policy has not 
played an interventionist role in integrating them into the local economy. Fothergill & 
Guy argue that the firms do not plan a short stay, but because they do not build up a 
strong dependence on the local economy, and lack locally-based senior management, 
they are vulnerable. 
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Some of the new smaller externally owned firms have a better record of survival, but 
their impact on total employment is marginal. The most rapidly growing group has been 
new indigenously owned firms. 2,000 new companies were established between 1973 
and 1986, employing 17,000, people (one in six of manufacturing employment). These 
firms rely more heavily on local markets and supplies, but are vulnerable to 
displacement by large multinationals (Gudgin et ai, 1989). 
Productivity 
Productivity has remained below British levels, in spite of restructuring and cuts in 
employment which brought a rise in output per worker of 41 % between 1973 and 
1985 (Rowthorn & Wayne, p80). On the basis of the 1984 Census of Production, 
Hitchens & Birnie (1989) calculated that wages per employee in manufacturing were 
89% of British levels, but that this was offset by a gross value added (GVA) of only 
74%, which combined to give a relative unit labour costs of 121 %. The 1989 Census 
of Production shows that per capita wages and salaries had fallen relatively, to less than 
85% of the UK average, and were the lowest of any UK region. Net output and GVA 
per capita were also the lowest in the UK, but GVA had risen relative to the UK 
average, to just over 77%. Unit labour costs therefore remain considerably above British 
levels, but the difference has been reduced to 111.2 %. 
Table 4.8 - Wages and Productivity in Northern Ireland and UK, 1989 
Wages and salaries 
Net output 
GVA 
Unit labour costs 
Nlas % of UK 
84.5 
75.3 
77.2 
112.0 
Source: Calculated from Census of Production, 1989 
There is wide variation between industries, but GVA is well below the UK average in 
the majority, and above it only in instrument engineering, food, and processing of rubber 
and plastics. The worst performer is motor vehicles and parts, where GVA per capita 
is 46.7% below the UK average. Hitchens & Birnie (1990) found productivity across a 
range of industry averaging 80% of the British level. He attributed a quarter of this 
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difference to concentration in low productivity industry. But even when other factors 
such as high energy and transport cost, and low economies of scale were included, only 
50-60% of the difference was accounted for. 
Fothergill & Guy's study found that low productivity was not a major factor in 
determining withdrawal of overseas investment. They suggest that where this was a 
factor it was generally associated with serious strikes. Subsidies to private companies 
offset higher unit costs. Grants equalled 25 % of manufacturing output during the 
1980s, or 20% if Harland & Wolf and Short Brothers, then in state ownership, were 
excluded (Hitchens & Birnie, op cit). Ford, the largest producer in the poorest 
performing sector, motor vehicles and parts, received over £7 million in the year 
1990-91 (lOB Annual Report, 1991). 
Productivity in non-UK companies is higher than in UK companies (British or Northern 
Irish). Non-UK plants accounted for 17% of employment in manufacturing, but 25% of 
net output, and 28% of gross value added (NIEC, 1992b, p16). Productivity differentials 
reflect higher levels of investment, with foreign companies accounting for 23% of net 
capital expenditure. 
The Cost of Jobs 
Jobs created through inward investment have been won at enormous cost. Between 
1986-7 and 1991-2, the average cost of jobs promoted by the lOB through inward 
investment was £20,344, almost double the average male earnings of £12,800 (NIEC, 
1992, P 53). Northern Ireland's incentives are generous in comparison with the EC, 
with only Italy's spending per head on regional grants higher (NIEC, 1990a, p20). 
Table 4.9 • Cost of Jobs supported by the lOB, 1990·1 
Type of job C08t per employee (£) 
Home Indu8try 
Inward Inve8tment 
Renewed Job8 
Maintained Job8 
Source: lOB Annual Report, 1990-1 
14,216 
11,868 
6,146 
26,000 
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In 1990-1, the lOB spent £70,784,000 on grants, and £19,097,000 on promotion and 
administration. Twenty one private companies received more than a £ 1 million in 
Selective Assistance, which included grants for maintaining existing jobs as well as for 
promoting new ones (Table 4.9). The grant figures underestimate the true level of 
support, since firms also benefit from provision of infrastructure and factory sites, and 
concessions on rates and rent (Fothergill & Guy, op cit). 
The proportion of lOB assistance going to existing companies has risen to 90% (NIERC, 
1990a). The IBO claimed 3,366 jobs promoted in 1990-1, including only 258 through 
inward investment. The 1991-2 End of Year Statement claims 430 new jobs promoted 
through inward investment, against a target of 1,800. This included 350 'non-selective 
financial assistance jobs' for which it claims credit. Next year's targets are rather more 
cautious, with the aim of ten projects 'with potential for 1 ,800 new jobs'. 
Job Promotion is itself a poor indicator of performance. It refers to expected job 
creation during the lifetime of a project: these jobs do not necessarily materialise. 
Indeed, firms have an incentive to exaggerate expected employment in applying for 
grants. The NIEC (1990a) estimated that between 1982/3 and 1987/8 only 40.5% of 
jobs promoted had been created (47.6% if the failed Lear Fan project is excluded). The 
performance of LEOU (71 %) was substantially better in this period. In response to this 
criticism, the lOB now publishes figures for job creation. 
Table 4.10 - Jobs created as a percentage of jobs promoted. 1986/7 - 1990/1 
1986/87 1987/88 1988189 1989/90 1990/1 
79% 60% 68% 26% 12% 
Source: lOB. Annual Report, 1990-1991 
The report points out that the average period for planned build-up of jobs in a new 
project is three years, and those in later years have not yet reached their full potential. 
Nevertheless, while the year 1986/7 shows a high success rate, this dropped in the 
following year when according to this criterion plants should have been running at full 
capacity. 
The success rate in achieving job promotion targets has been highly variable. Between 
1982 and 1988, US firms achieved less than 10% of their planned targets, producing 
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the 'extraordinarily high' cost per job of £205,000. When Lear Fan is excluded, this fell 
to £31,000 (NIEC, 1992b, P 45). 
Employment is often fairly short-lived. The NIEC (1985) in a study of maintained 
employment between 1971 and 1983 estimated that the average duration of projects 
was 4.6 years, and of employment only 3.S years. The length of employment declined 
for successive annual cohorts; for those projects before June 1973 employment 
duration averaged 5.6 years, but this fell to 2.4 years for the 1979-80 cohort. 
The figures assume there are no deadweight jobs, that is none of the jobs 
promoted/maintained would have existed without this degree of financial assistance. 
They also imply that each is a net addition, and does not crowd out jobs elsewhere in 
the economy. Gudgin & Roper (1990) claim that only a quarter of job promotions could 
be judged as net additions. On the other hand, the multiplier effect of subsidised 
employment can create other jobs, though the impact of this is reduced by the low 
Northern Ireland multiplier (see Chapter Three). 
Private Services 
As manufacturing has declined, services have become increasingly important, 
accounting for over half of private sector employment, compared to just over 40% in 
1979. 
Table 4.11 - Private Sector Employment, 1979-88 
1979 1988 % 
number % number % chenge 
agriculture 21,050 6.6 19,550 6.8 - 7.1 
manufacturing 131,350 41.2 93.450 32.4 -28.2 
construction 37,750 11.8 26,400 9.2 -30.1 
services 128,700 40.4 148,800 61.6 +16.6 
Total 318,850 100 288,200 100 - 9.6 
Source: NIEC, report 82, 1990b, p8 
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The fastest growing areas have been hotel and catering (45% increase between 1979 
and 1988); business services (41 %); and other services (20%). Telecommunications 
was privati sed in the 1980s, so the 4,750 employed in 1988 represents a transfer from 
the public sector. Banking and insurance (3%) and retailing (6%) grew much more 
slowly, while employment in wholesale distribution and transport fell by 5% and 6% 
respectively (ibid, p11). 
Although services now account for the majority of private employment, their 
performance is weak relative to Britain. Employment growth started to diverge 
substantially from Britain in 1985, with performance particularly poor in business 
services and in banking and insurance, two of the fastest growing employment areas 
in the UK (ibid, p20). A later NIEC report confirmed the poor performance relative to 
Britain in business services. 
Table 4.12 - Increase in Private Financial Services Employment, March 1983-March 
1991 (%) 
SIC class 
Banking & Finance 
Insurance 
Business Services 
Renting of Movable 
Owning & Dealing in Real Estate 
Source: NIEC, 1992c, p63 
GB 
24.8 
16.9 
66.3 
31.8 
29.4 
NI 
7.1 
3.3 
54.5 
8.3 
22.2 
Although service employment has substituted for manufacturing, it is ultimately 
dependent on productive activity in the local economy. Business and financial services 
are tied most directly to the level of business activity. The weakness of service activity 
within the manufacturing sector was noted above, while the decline in manufacturing 
itself limits the growth of associated service employment. 
Financial services have been one of the main growth areas in the 1980s, particularly 
following deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s. But as a peripheral region of 
the UK Northern Ireland has little prospect of sharing permanently in that growth since 
it cannot develop as a centre itself. Its two major locally-based banks (Northern and 
Ulster) are subsidiaries of British banks, and the other major banks are based in the 
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Republic. Other financial institutions such as building societies, and insurance 
companies have headquarters outside Northern Ireland. 
Possibilities for growth are determined by: the expansion of the local economy; the 
encouragement of national or international institutions to locate in Northern Ireland; and 
exports by local institutions (ibid). None provide much hope in the foreseeable future. 
Forecasts for the local economy predict slow growth over the next few years. There 
has been a small amount of inward investment in back-office tasks in insurance, but 
wages in banking are higher than in Britain and transfer of functions to Northern Ireland 
is unlikely. Both have seen a decline in male employment and an increase in 
female-dominated data processing. Since financial institutions in Northern Ireland are 
themselves branch plants, there is no real scope for export of services. 
Services such as hotel and catering and retailing depend on the general level of 
spending, and are vulnerable during periods of recession. Nevertheless, the high 
proportion of two income households in Northern Ireland and the low house prices 
(relative to British levels) means that a large proportion of the population have high 
disposable incomes. During the 'Lawson boom', disposable incomes increased for a 
large proportion of the population, and with it demand for consumer goods and 
services. This has helped to bring about the re-generation of Belfast City Centre which 
has been central to government strategy during the past decade. 
Urban Planning in Belfast 
Belfast's commercial life ebbed away during the 1970s. Between 1969 and 1977, 300 
shops and offices were bombed, with the loss of 25% of city centre retail space 
(McDonagh, 1992). Population and incomes fell with the decline of local industry and 
the transfer of manufacturing employment to the new growth centres outside Belfast. 
Retailing moved outside the centre, as supermarkets were built in the outskirts, and 
Belfast's social life concentrated in the ghettos, or for the more prosperous, in the 
suburbs. 
The creation of the Belfast Enterprise Zone in 1981 marked a shift in official policy. The 
renaissance of Belfast city centre in the 1980s has been part of a planned 'return to 
normality'. Investment has been ploughed in to revitalise the retail core, while the 
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refurbishment of the Grand Opera House marks its development as an entertainment 
centre. In the official slogan Belfast is Buzzing. 
Planning has involved substantial public support in providing planning policies to direct 
investment to the city centre; facilitating private sector investment; and marketing the 
city centre (Berry et ai, 1991, p82). The Urban Development Grant, introduced in 1982, 
which provides 30% of total development costs (or up to 50% for enhanced UDG), and 
between 50 and 75% of construction costs and fees. By 1989, £42.9 million had been 
paid out (ibid, p83). 
In the five years to September 1990, schemes totalling £161 million had been 
completed in the city centre, primarily office refurbishment and retail and catering 
development; schemes totalling £225 million were under way; and £ 1 72 million were 
in the pipe line.7 The most important development is the Castle Court shopping precinct, 
the largest of its kind in Northern Ireland. 
The driving force has been the attraction of foreign capital. Image is crucial, as the 
planners aim to 
·cultivllte neutrlll post-modernist imll(Jes lind splices, which dilute the bllckwllrd.Jooking symbolism 
1111 too evident in the present. The pllln is thus, inescllpllbly, Pllrt lind pllrcel of British mllnll(Jement 
of the Northern Irelllnd conflict· (Greer Be Neill, 1991, p90J. 
An urban motor way serves as a 'moat' (ibid p 102) cutting off the city centre from the 
neighbouring ghettos of the Falls and the Shankill. The expanse of open ground around 
the motorway makes it extremely difficult for the IRA to disappear into Catholic areas 
after planting bombs in the city centre. A security check is permanently stationed at the 
entrances to the city centre. The brightness of the city centre is in stark contrast to the 
gloom of the narrow streets off the Falls Road, where lighting is kept deliberately low 
to allow soldiers to move about unseen (McDonagh, 1992). 
Outside the city centre, the symbols of territoriality remain. Paving stones are painted 
in green white and orange, or red white and blue, and corresponding slogans adorn the 
walls in Irish or English. 
These do not represent merely a symbolic alienation from the carefully contrived 
management of the centre. Massive unemployment reflects a level of economic 
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deprivation greater than any British city. West Belfast lost 9,4300 jobs between 1976 
and 1988 (Rolston & Tomlinson). According to official figures, unemployment in 
Catholic West Belfast was 39% in 1985 (46.5% for men); the equivalent rates for 
Protestant West Belfast were 30.1 % and 35%.8 
A new programme, Making Belfast Work was announced with great fanfare in 1988, 
but the funding is dwarfed by the spending to support private investment in the city 
centre. In the first year £ 10 million was available for the most 'disadvantaged areas of 
the city', with a further £55 million for the next three years.9 In 1990, the Northern 
Ireland Office announced spending of £22.5 million for 1990/1, half as much again as 
in the previous year.'o 
Schemes of this size can have little impact on an area where unemployment is so 
deeply rooted, and where at the same time, other government policies are sharpening 
economic and social problems. The programme is clearly part of a political strategy of 
winning the Catholic community away from the IRA, and more generally from 
Republican sympathies. The government calls for the involvement of "everyone who has 
a genuine interest in progress" ," but according to Obair 
"it trenspires thet the government's cleim to heve the consent of the people for its plans rests on 
the exclusion of critics BS not genuinely interested in development. "'2 
Public Sector Employment 
With Direct Rule, the link between local tax revenue and public expenditure was broken. 
Spending was based on an estimate of need, using British standards (Canning et ai, 
1987, p225). In December 1991, public sector employment stood at 201,315,38% 
of the total (NIEC, 1992a, p24). This represents a fall from its peak in the mid 1980s. 
In 1988, private sector employment accounted for two out of three jobs in Britain, 
compared to only 56% in Northern Ireland (NIEC, 1990b, p15). 
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Table 4.13 - Public and Private Sector Employment, 1960-1988 
1960 1974 1988 
Number Number Number 
Private Sector 352,200 78.4 333,750 65.9 288,200 66.3 
Public Sector 97,100 21.6 173,060 34.1 223,900 43.7 
Total 449,300 606,800 612,100 
Source: adapted from NIEC, 1990b, p7 
During the 1970s, public expenditure per capita rose rapidly both absolutely and relative 
to British levels (Table 4.14). Economic deprivation and the high dependency ratio 
increased demands on social spending. There was a period of 'catching up' with British 
levels of provision. The peripheral location increases the cost of transport and 
administration; and 'security' represents an additional major area of expenditure. As the 
NIEC argues, "strict adherence to the principle of comparability many not reflect these 
additional needs" (ibid, p36). When these are taken into account, public spending is 
only marginally above British levels (Morrissey & Gaffikin, p80). For example, in June 
1990, over 10% of employees were in public administration or defence, almost as 
many as in education, and more than those employed in health. When similar 
programmes are compared, Northern Ireland's share of UK public expenditure is seen 
to have fallen from 3.9% in 1987-8, to 3.5% in 1992-1993 (NIEC, 1992, p36). 
Table 4.14 - Public Spending per capita in Northern Ireland (England = 100' 
1969-60 88 
1962-63 92 
1965-66 97 
1968-69 103 
1971-72 111 
1974-76 112 
1976-77 136 
1977-78 141 
Source: Treasury Needs Assessment Study, 1979 (quoted in Simpson (1983)) 
The share of health, education and public administration in total employment rose 
rapidly after Direct Rule, from 25% in 1971 to over 38% by 1983, more than double 
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its 1951 share. But the rise in public spending has also been driven by the weakness 
of the private sector, particularly manufacturing, and the political situation. This rise 
was reversed in the second half of the 1980s. Public sector employment fell by 8,708 
between 1983 and 1990, almost all of it (over 8,000) male. Most of the fall came in 
two areas: 'bodies under the aegis of the Northern Ireland government', which includes 
health and education; and public corporations as a result of privatisation. Northern 
Ireland Central Government showed a slight increase, but if the 5% increase in the 
prison and police services is excluded, employment in this area fell. Total employment 
has continued to fall, to 201,315 in December 1991 (NIEC, 1992a, p24). 
Table 4.15 - Public employment by sector, 1983-1990 
1983 1990 
m Total m f Total %c:hsvI 
NI Central 34,676 13,349 48,025 34,011 14,366 48,377 +0.7 
government 
(RUC & prison) 15,234 3,059 18,293 15,885 3,321 19,206 +&.0 
Bodies under the 29,836 93,195 123,031 27,300 91,749 119,049 -3.0 
aegis of NI central 
govt 
UK central govt 3,502 2,744 6,246 3,507 2,810 6,317 +1.0 
Local govt 7,796 2,221 10,017 6,624 3,015 9,639 -4.0 
public corps 20,331 5,077 25,408 16,681 3,956 20,637 -18 
Total 96,141 116,586 212,727 88,123 115,896 204,019 -4.0 
Source: Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1992 
The extent of employment growth in services (both public and private) must be viewed 
with caution. A large part of the expansion, particularly of women's employment, has 
been in part-time work, so the net effect on total hours worked is much lower than the 
number of employees would suggest. Trewsdale has estimated that if part-time 
employees are weighted as half a full-time employee, there was no increase in jobs 
between 1971 and 1986.13 
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While public employment has fallen, public expenditure has risen to support private 
employment. Half of public spending goes on transfer payments and social spending. 
By 1983, only 54% of expenditure was financed from Northern Ireland taxation 
(Canning et al p223). The public sector deficit (the 'subvention') was estimated at 
approximately 25% of GOP in 1987 (Gudgin & Roper, 1990). This is greater than the 
regional imbalance in production of goods and services, due to a capital outflow in the 
form of pension funds, company profits, estimated as approximately 5% of GOP (ibid). 
The sectoral shares of public spending and the distribution of public sector employment 
has taken specific forms, since 
-the government must work through the particular form the British stllte tllkes in the province-
(O'Dowd, 1987, p184). 
The two communities interact with each other via the state, and are incorporated into 
the state in different ways. There are specifically 'Catholic women's jobs' in the state 
sector (such as nursing) and 'Protestant men's jobs' (security services). Public 
employment has been shaped by sectarian and gender divisions, but it has also been 
important in reproducing and transforming these divisions. 
Economic Prospects 
The NIEC's latest Economic Assessment (April 1992) contains 
-whllt is probably the most gloomy lISSessment of the Northern Irelllnd economy thllt the Council 
has produced since the IlISt recession in the esrly 19808- (NIEC, 199211, pp49-50J. 
The optimism of its previous assessment had been tempered by acknowledgement that 
the relatively good performance was due more to underlying weaknesses -
comparatively small manufacturing sector, low export propensity, high public support 
for the private sector - than strengths (NIEC, 1991). By 1992, these weakness had 
ceased to protect the economy from the impact of the UK recession, which hit Northern 
Ireland with increased force. 
Gudgin & Roper (1990) forecast an annual rate of growth of 1.8% between 1989 and 
1995, compared to 3.4% from 1984 to 1990. They predict that unemployment will 
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remain above 14% throughout the first half of the 1990s, while job creation will reach 
only 1,000 per annum, compared to 3,000 between 1984 and 1990. 
But even this small increase will not take 1,000 people off the unemployment register: 
expansion in employment increases labour force participation and reduces migration. 
Traditionally, migration has disguised the real level of unemployment: between 1973 
and 1986, it represented an equivalent of one eighth of the working population (ibid). 
According to NIERC's estimates, creation of three jobs is necessary to take one person 
off the register, compared to two in Britain. These estimates assume a continued annual 
migration of over five per thousand, and a decline in the participation ratio. 
The Northern Ireland economy is characterised by huge dependence on state subsidies; 
a decline in industrial capacity, particularly with the loss of multinational investment; 
and the predominance of service employment, the majority of which is tied to 
government spending. A reduction of subsidy would have to be matched by a 
spectacular increase in industrial output and productivity or it would involve cuts in 
living standards which would be politically unacceptable (Teague, 1989). The branch 
plant economy is particularly vulnerable, and there have been some spectacular failures. 
Although there has been an attempt to target industrial policy, there is little sign yet 
that the agencies have learnt to "pick winners" (Canning et al 1987). 
While most economic commentators share these depressing prognostications, they 
differ in their proposals for the way forward. These programmes are influenced by the 
view they hold about the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, although this may 
not be made explicit. There is one general area of agreement: economists tend to favour 
a continuation of government support, and are more sympathetic to Keynesian-inspired 
policies than to reliance on pure market forces. 
Gudgin and the economists at the NIERC favour greater integration with the UK 
economy, pinning their hopes on recovery in Britain. They favour measures to improve 
competitiveness while increasing the mobility of labour, including migration, through 
improved information and training. Teague (1987) on the other hand favours greater 
integration with the Republic of Ireland initially through coordination of industrial policy 
and improvement of communications between the two. He sees this as a process of 
'rolling integration' (p180) which would not depend on prior political change. This 
position is remarkably similar to that put forward by the Chairman of the Ulster Bank 
in a recent speech to businessmen from both sides of the Border. He suggested that 
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significant progress had been made in transport and communications to facilitate the 
growing cross-border trade, and argued for increased inter-government support for 
private initiatives. But he stressed that 
"milking II relllity of the islllnd economy is dependent on there being no politiclllllgenda, overt or 
hidden." I .. 
Canning et al (1987) also argue against the desirability of changing the constitutional 
position. They look to policy changes within Northern Ireland itself, rather than to 
Ireland as a whole, for improvements in economic prospects. 
"It is possible to pursue II relllistic economic policy in Northern Irelllnd lIimed lit long-run economic 
recovery despite the troubles" (p235J 
They favour an industrial policy which concentrates on sectors with long-term potential 
for growth. A similar position is adopted by the NIEC. They argue that in order to ensure 
that resources produce the highest return, this process 
"cllnnot be left to the efforts of privllte industry lind the workings of the mllrketplllce with IIbsolute 
confidence in the outcome" (p76J. 
While some of their work is critical of existing government policy, they do not raise 
questions about the political position. Rowthorn & Wayne on the other hand, although 
suggesting the possibility of some improvement within present structures, argue that 
"To be fully effective, IIny mellSures intended to stimulllte the province's economy must be 
IIccompllnied by politiclIl initilltives to end the conflict" (p 126J. 
Conclusion 
Economic policy in Northern Ireland, even under Direct Rule, is conditioned by the 
structures created at partition. While much economic analysis treats the 'Troubles' as 
an 'external factor' economic policy is inseparable from the political situation which 
gave rise to them. 
The creation of the state reflected a particular configuration of class and economic 
interests, and rested on a particular level of accumulation. The economic base for the 
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state was already beginning to weaken at the time of partition. The years of Direct Rule 
have seen a further erosion of that base, and increasing dependence on British 
economic support. The most widespread consensus in Northern Ireland's political life 
rests on support for continued public spending. 
The limits to accumulation within existing boundaries have led to a tentative search for 
solutions which move outside the present structures. But the fear on the part of 
proponents of this strategy of any explicit political agenda reflects the continuing 
irreconcilability of the divisions which the Northern Ireland state entrenched. It remains 
doubtful whether any substantial progress can be made without tackling the root of 
these differences. 
Notes to Chapter Four 
1 . "The paradigmatic productive unit, then was the Fordist factory, where standardized consumer goods were 
mass-produced by semi-skilled operatives subject to detailed Taylorist supervision. The trajectory of advance 
was to raise output per worker through progressive mechanization and an ever more detailed sub-division of 
labour along the assembly lines .... Keynesian demand management which guaranteed the high sales volumes 
needed to maintain profitability while being itself sustained by the dynamic response of productivity to output 
growth which ... gave such policies a development significance beyond short-run stabilization. Thus Coriat 
sees Frederick Taylor, Henry Ford and John Maynard Keynes as a closely united triumvirate." (Grahl & 
Teague, 1989, p37, my emphBSis) 
2. The fir8t five of these are discussed in Elliott and Wilford, 1987, pp 296-303 
3. In the 1992 genaral election, Unionist Partie8 received an average of 60.93% of the vote; nationalist 
partie8 (SDlP and Sinn Fein) an average of 31.62%. Between them, the8e partie8 accounted for 82.6% of 
the total vote. Of the re8t, the majority (9.66%) went to the middle of the road 'non-8ectarian' Alliance Party. 
But the party gained it8 highest vote8 in 8trongly Protestant constituencie8, in which the SDlP did not put 
up candidate8 (East Belfast 29.76%; Antrim East 23.27%; Strangford 16.94%). The next large8t 8hare 
(6.1 %) went to the Con8ervative Party which also won it8 highe8t vote8 in con8tituencie8 without nationalist 
candidate8. It 8eem8 plau8ible that Catholic8 in the8e constituencies would have voted for a 'non sectarian' 
candidate rather than a Unionist Party. 
4. The New Ireland Forum was established by the main political parties in the South, on the initiative of the 
SDlP, in 1983. The Forum produced a report in 1984 detailing a number of alternative constitutional 
proposals for Irish unity. 
6. Quoted by M. Tomlinson, speaking at a conference entitled Is West Belfast Working 7 organi.ed by We8t 
Belfa8t Economic Forum, June 1990 
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6. Douglas Hurd, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, said on June 27th 1985 
"there are cases in which some community groups, or persons prominent in the direction or 
management of some community groups, have sufficiently close links with paramilitary organisations 
to give rise to a grave risk that to give support to those groups would have the effect of improving 
the standing and furthering the aims of a paramilitary organisation, whether directly or indirectly. I 
do not consider that any such use of government funds would be in the public interest, and in any 
particular case in which I am satisfied that these conditions prevail, no grant will be paid . • (Quoted 
in Obair, Briefing Paper no 4, November 1990J. 
In March 1992, shortly before the general election, the Irish language organisation Glor no nGael had its 
funding restored after a major public campaign against political vetting (Irish News, 28th March, 
19921.economic issues. 
7. Unpublished figures, from Department of Planning, Queen's University, Belfast 
8. 'Socio-Economic Conditions in West and North Belfast' (p61 in Making Belfast Work, Northern Ireland 
Office, 1988 
9. abair, Briefing Paper no 1 (undated I The Making Belfast Work Initiative, p 1 
10. Press statement, Northern Ireland Information Service, 9th April, 1990. 
11. ibid, p 4. 
12. abair, Briefing Paper no 1, p 2 
13. Seminar paper on part-time employment by Janet Trewsdale, Queens University, Belfast, 20th March, 
1992. 
14. Dr W. Quigley Ireland, an Island Economy, 1992 
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Chapter Five 
Equal Opportunities Legislation and Direct 
Rule 
Introduction 
Since the abolition of Stormont, 
"the Government of Northern Ireland has been under the direct authority of British Ministers and civil 
servants who have not been directly associated with either of the two sections of the community 
in Northern Ireland and who might be expected to have been free from any religious or political 
partiality of the kind alleged under previous Unionist administrations" (Standing Advisory Committee 
on Human Rights (SACHR), 1987, p13). 
Most British politicians assumed that a 'neutral' administration independent of the 
sectarian structures of the Unionist state would be able to overcome sectarian division. 
But the social democratic foundations of British public policy in that period, or what 
Osborne and Cormack (1983) call the "new liberalism", was ill-equipped to deal with 
the Northern Ireland situation. Social democracy presumes a basic consensus which 
gives state policy legitimacy. This consensus was notably lacking in Northern Ireland, 
and as Osborne & Cormack themselves point out, the 'new' liberal voice had rarely been 
heard. Some academics were content with this situation. Boal notes that 
"many of the gains in working-class conditions in Northern Ireland, certainly since the Second World 
War, occurred without the need (sic) for combined working-clas action in Northern Ireland itself" 
(cited in ibid p 19). 
The profound ignorance which characterised British politicians in relation to Northern 
Ireland led them to underestimate the depth of sectarian division. The Cameron 
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Commission established in 1969 to investigate the causes of civil unrest had accepted 
that discrimination against Catholics in jobs and housing 
"had substantia' foundation in fact and were in a very real sense an immediate and operative 
demonstrations and consequent disorders" (cited in McCormack & 0 'Hara, 1990, p 1) 
But subsequent legislation 
"was a response to the perception of discrimination which was widespread in the Catholic 
population. rather than a recognition of the reality of that discrimination as it had been by the 
Cameron Commission. (ibid, p 1) 
The view prevailed that 
"Institutions would be necessary in the transition period to mop up the residua' elements of sectarian 
practice, but in the long run technocracy needed no reformist institutions directly geared towards 
eradicating sectarianism" (Rolston, 1983, p 199). 
But these hopes proved illusory. The Catholic/Protestant differential in unemployment 
remained as high in the 1980s as it had been in the early 1970s (SACHR, 1987), a 
graphic illustration of continuing division. The series of reforms which belatedly granted 
the main demands of the Civil Rights movement did not put an end to resistance to 
British rule. The armed struggle of the Provisional IRA has continued for over twenty 
years. Although its intensity has varied, and the level of active and passive support has 
ebbed and flowed, the government has not succeeded in isolating the Provisionals from 
its core of support, or broader sections of the Catholic community from Republican 
sympathies. 
Political and economic crisis has forced the current Conservative administration into a 
number of policies which are inconsistent with each other, and contradict some of its 
most cherished neoliberal positions. While working class Catholics, particularly women, 
have suffered disproportionately from Thatcherite polices, legislation to combat religious 
discrimination has been strengthened. The Fair Employment Commission has been given 
powers to monitor the religious composition of employment, and to enforce contract 
compliance, a practice made illegal in Britain on the grounds that it interferes with 
market forces. 
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Pressure to strengthen anti-discriminatory legislation came not only from internal 
developments, but through international action, particularly from the powerful Irish 
lobby in North America. Shareholder campaigns have led some US-owned companies 
to adopt anti-discriminatory employment practices in advance of the legislation. 
Legislation on religious and sex discrimination has been separate, as has the operation 
of the bodies charged with promoting sex equality, the Equal Opportunities Commission 
for Northern Ireland (EOCN!) and religious equality, the Fair Employment Commission 
(FEC) formerly the Fair Employment Agency (FEA). Until the Fair Employment Act of 
1989, powers in relation to religious discrimination were weaker than those on sex 
discrimination. The 1989 Act strengthened the revamped FEC, and though critics argue 
that it does not go far enough (for example McCormack & O'Hara, 1990), its powers 
considerably exceed those of the EOCNI. 
The British Sex Discrimination Act (imported to Northern Ireland in 1976) and the Race 
Relations Act share an "almost identical statutory framework" (Gregory, 1987, p1). The 
Race Relations Act does not apply in Northern Ireland. The small but growing black and 
ethnic minority population receives no specific protection in law. A campaign for the 
extension of legislation against racial discrimination begun with a conference in 1991.' 
This framework was not followed in the first Fair Employment Act of 1976, which did 
not for example outlaw indirect discrimination. The 1989 Act, on the other hand, gave 
the FEC many powers for which those concerned with sexual and racial discrimination 
have been campaigning. But the government has been reluctant to discuss extending 
these powers to other areas, or "over the water" (Cormack & Osborne, op cit), 
·prefe"ing to confine the mellSures IJnd depict them lIS of relevlJnce only to Northern Ire/end's 
·specilJ" problems of sectlJriBnism· (MlJxwell, 1991 p91). 
The continued separation of the two bodies was a response to lobbying from the 
EOCNI, which feared that sex discrimination would be given low priority in a joint 
equalities body (Osborne and Cormack, 1989). The SACHR report of 1987 
recommended that the 
·seplJrlJte bodies operlJting in the IJrtNIS of religion IJnd sex should in future be encourll(/ed to 
co-operlJte in certlJin respects· (SACHR, 1987 p811 
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The two bodies shared offices when they were first established and there was some 
formal liaison through the Chairs of each organisation sitting on the board of the other. 
But this contact had little impact on the work of either body.2 The offices are now 
separate, although within a few doors of each other, and their work has tended to 
follow different paths. 
This chapter will discuss the provisions of equal opportunities legislation in Northern 
Ireland, and the experience of its implementation. The legislation, and the agencies it 
established, have many critics. The FEA/FEC in particular has been the subject of heated 
public debate. These criticisms also raise wider questions about the possibility of 
successful reform within Northern Ireland. 
Fair Employment legislation 
The first anti-discrimination legislation was enacted with the foundation of the Northern 
Ireland state. Section Five of the government of Ireland Act 1920 provided that 
Parliament could not legislate 
"so as either directly or indirectly to establish or endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free 
exercise or give a preference, privilege or advantege, or impose any disability or disadvantege on 
account of religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical status" (SACHR, 1987 p 8). 
This formal position made little difference to the way the state operated in practice. The 
safeguard was invoked only once, in 1929. Catholics had so little trust in the possibility 
of receiving justice from the Stormont regime that this article remained virtually a dead 
letter. The British government refused to respond to complaints against the Stormont 
authorities, and did nothing to ensure that the principle was adhered to (see Chapter 
Three). But as the civil rights movement developed into a mass civil resistance 
campaign, provoking international concern, it was forced to intervene. The principle of 
equality was articulated in what became known as the 'Downing Street Declaration': 
"every citizen of Northern Ireland is entitled to the same equality of treatment and freedom from 
discrimination as obtains in the rest of the United Kingdom i"espective of political views or religion" 
(par. 6, 20th August 1969). 
Action was promised on public employment; incitement to hatred; fairness in public 
housing; redress against public bodies; electoral reform. This led to a series of reforms,3 
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both before and after Direct rule. But the Fair Employment Act of 1976 was the first 
to deal specifically with employment. A Working Party was established in 1972, chaired 
by the employment minister, Van Straubenzee, to 
"consider what steps, whether in regard to law or practice, should be taken to counter religious 
discrimination where it may exist in the private sector of employment in Northern Ireland" (SACHR, 
p 11). 
The report expressed no view on the reality or extent of discrimination, declaring 
"It was not our function to PBSS judgement upon what mayor may not have happened in 
employment practices in the PBSt" (cited in Cormack & Osborne, 1983, p 18). 
The Committee believed some legal machinery was necessary to outlaw discrimination, 
and to support an equal opportunities policy "resting on upon the vision of an open, free 
and just society" (cited in McCormack & O'Hara, p23). But it proposed that 
discrimination should be dealt with primarily on an individual basis through the civil 
courts. Influenced by US experience, it proposed positive action to increase Catholic 
representation in employment, but opposed all forms of quotas which it described as 
'immoral'. 
"In short, it attempted to provide a blUeprint for equality which apportioned no blame and to which 
no fair-minded person could object. " (ibid, p24). 
This sentence encapsulates the reasons for the failure of the legislation in the face of 
structural sectarianism. 
Although the committee's report was published in 1973, legislation was delayed until 
1976. Most of its recommendations were incorporated into the Fair Employment Act, 
but its scope was extended to include the public sector. 
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The 1976 Fair Employment Act 
The main provisions of the Act included: 
1. The establishment of a Fair Employment Agency (FEA) under the Department of 
Economic Development, with a predicted annual budget of £280,000, and a 
staff of 40. 
2. The prohibition of 'unlawful discrimination' in employment. Individual complaints 
to be investigated and adjudicated by the FEA. Other acts, such as 
discriminatory job advertisements, were declared unlawful. 
3. The FEA was empowered to carry out investigations of employment practices 
of individual employers, and to recommend affirmative action 
4. The FEA was required to promote equality of opportunity, through dissemination 
of a Guide to Manpower Policy issued by the OED, and a 'Declaration of Principle 
and Intent' which employers were to be encouraged to sign (this was not made 
compulsory). 
5. Exemptions were made for large groups of employees, including clergymen, 
teachers, and the security services. Other employers could apply for exemption 
on the grounds of 'security' considerations. 
The FEA had few friends in Northern Ireland. As Cormack and Osborne (1983) put it, 
"It is fair to say that the FEA and the policies out of which it arose, do not enthuse and excite the 
minds of most politicians in Northern Ireland" (p 19). 
Unionist politicians and such bodies as the Chamber of Commerce expressed varying 
degrees of hostility to the legislation in principle, and only 10 of the 26 District Councils 
had publicly declared support for the principle of equal opportunities by 1988. The term 
'reverse discrimination' was applied to any attempt to increase Catholic representation, 
even though quotas were rigorously excluded from the legislative framework. 
"When there hIlS been 10ng-8tlJnding inequality IJny concrete step to counter it nece8SIN;/y 1IPPHf'8 
lIS 'reverse discrimination' to the holders of IJncient privileges" (Goldring, p67). 
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Nationalist politicians, even those on the constitutional wing, were sceptical of its 
probable effectiveness. In Northern Ireland, where politics had centred around the 
constitutional question, it was unlikely that Catholics would look to a state body to 
redress their grievances. 
But those people who both wanted to see legislation work and believed that it could, 
were also often severely critical of the Act, and of the operation of the FEA. Christopher 
McCrudden, who carried out an inquiry into the staffing and administration of the 
Agency, concluded 
"The experience of the legal enforcement of the FEA is therefore a depressing picture of a massive 
task, of the possibility of change, but of an Agency which has failed to meet that challenge" 
(McCrudden, 1983, p220). 
Criticism has covered a wide range of issues. Some have argued for strengthened 
legislation. Others have concluded that the FEA's failure proves that Northern Ireland 
is irreformable. The distinction between these positions can be blurred: Graham (1984) 
argues both that "it is a fallacy to assume that Equal Opportunities institutions have had 
or can have any positive impact on patterns of inequality in NI"; and that the "history 
of the Agency has been one of complete failure, lost opportunity, and a total lack of 
credibility" (p 43). 
A Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (SACHR) had been established in 
1973 to advise the secretary of state on the law on religious discrimination. In 1985, 
in response to mounting evidence of the failure of reform, the Commission informed the 
Secretary of State of its intention to carry out 
"a review of the IIdequllcy lind effectiveness of existing 'IIWS and institutions in securing freedom 
from discrimination and furthering equality of opportunity in Northern Irelllnd" (SACHR, 1987 p2). 
It commissioned a study from an independent research body, the Policy Studies Institute 
(PSI), on the extent of inequality. The report, based on the latest official labour market 
figures and a new survey of workplaces practices, pointed to continuing major 
inequalities on the basis of religion. 
While SACHR itself steered a neutral path, its report detailed a series of criticisms which 
had been made both of the legislation and the operation of the FEA, together with the 
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FEA's response. It made 123 detailed recommendations arising from the review. 
Concern centred on the following areas. 
a) A lack of Strategic Direction and administrative control 
Donald Graham, (1984) a former FEA staff member, writes of 
-Agency sloth, ineptitude, incompetence, the absence of any political will by government or the 
Agency and an overriding desire not to offend vested interests inside and outside the boardroom-
(p42). 
He describes a series of disputes between the FEA chair, board members and staff, 
which culminated in McCrudden's investigation. Graham's attack is wide-ranging, 
displaying the anger generated in a bitter internal dispute. He concludes that even 
strengthened legislation could have little effect on sectarianism. His criticisms of FEA 
administration are echoed in more measured tones by others who believe that Northern 
Ireland is reformable through strengthened and properly implemented equal 
opportunities legislation. 
A striking failure was that the Agency never developed to the size envisaged in the Act. 
The initial budget in 1977 was only £81,000, (less than a third of the expected level), 
and did not exceed the original estimate in money terms until ten years later, after the 
SACHR investigation. The staff was then increased to 20, still only half that envisaged 
in the legislation, reaching 31 in its last year. The FEA claimed that the Department of 
Finance and Personnel held up authorisation of new staff, but its general response was 
apologetic. Rather than fight for increased spending on the grounds of the importance 
of the work which needed doing, it defended itself from Unionist attack on the grounds 
that it did not cost very much. 
The Agency was also criticised for lacking a clear set of goals and timetables. It refused 
to adopt the numerical goals in appointments which the Van Straubenzee Committee 
following US experience, had recommended. The staff did not have clearly defined job 
areas. As Graham's contribution illustrates, this situation led to demoralisation and 
frustration. McCrudden (1983) also suggests that 
-The current assumption of the Agency IIPPtNIFB to be that there Me severe limitations to what can 
be done to increllSe equality of opportunity in a situation of economic decline- (p218J 
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SACHR points to a lack of clarity in the criteria used to decide to launch company 
investigations, and differences in the range of coverage of investigations. McCrudden 
argued 
"most investigstions, however, hsve seldom been psrt of s coherent plsn thought out in sdvsnce 
snd followed consistently" (ibid p212J 
This partly resulted from the staff's own lack of experience of working in an equal 
opportunities framework, which was so alien to the predominant culture in the Northern 
Ireland labour market. In the 1980s, the number of investigations and the range of 
issues taken up increased. Reports were produced more quickly and are publicly 
available. A number of more general research reports were commissioned which provide 
valuable evidence of the extent and patterns of disadvantage. 
b) Failure to pursue individual complaints effectively 
Problems in this area arise, as in sex discrimination cases, due to limitations of the 
legislation. In particular the individual nature of the complaints procedure places the 
burden of proof on the complainant, and imposes a heavy cost in time and emotional 
energy on complainants. The first Fair Employment legislation did not outlaw indirect 
discrimination. It was not sufficient to show that a better qualified person had been 
turned down for a job: intentionality had to be proved. Underrepresentation of Catholics 
in a workplace could not be used as evidence of discrimination. This form of legislation 
is quite ill-equipped to deal with structural sectarianism which does not depend on 
individual acts of discrimination. 
In the Agency's first four years, only 216 complaints were received. By the end of 
March 1981, it had made 10 findings of discrimination (McCrudden, 1983). Of 605 
investigations between 1976 and 1988,52 (8.6%) were upheld. But the County Court 
was reluctant to support even this tiny number of complainants. Of 20 cases decided 
up to May 1988, the FEA's finding was overturned in 9 appeals by the respondent, but 
only one where the appeal came from the complainant. The FEA's finding was upheld 
in 5 appeals by the complainant, and 5 by the respondent (McCormack & O'Hara, p30). 
Critics argue that the problems lay not only with the legislation, but with the FEA. The 
barrister in charge of complaints claimed that the success rate could have been 
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increased from 7% to 20%, on the basis of evidence collected by the Agency, 
according to an undated memorandum quoted by Graham (1984, pp44-5). 
SACHR criticises the close association of investigation and adjudication functions in the 
FEA, with the same staff involved in both. The Agency was required to be impartial at 
the initial hearing, but to defend the decision at appeal. This confusion of roles inhibited 
the FEA from publicising the results of cases. The respondent was guaranteed 
anonymity even if found guilty of discrimination. This seriously weakened the pressure 
that the FEA was able to place on employers. Many involved in sex discrimination cases 
have seen the main benefit from litigation as the indirect effect it has in pressurising 
employers to improve practices (Maxwell, p75).4 
An individual complaints system is quite inadequate to deal with the horizontal and 
vertical religious segregation in Northern Ireland. The "chill factor" prevents people 
applying for jobs in certain areas or firms. As Cooper explains 
"the bulk of complaints .... come not from the areas of employment where the grossest imbalances 
take place but from areas where both communities have access to employment" (cited in Booth " 
Bertsch, t 989, p38J. 
Moreover, a major obstacle to the successful pursual of complaints in Northern Ireland 
is the widespread distrust among the disadvantaged community of any state body. But 
unless the Commission is seen as a body worth trusting with complaints, it cannot 
operate effectively (Graham,op cit, p53). 
The general picture is of reluctance by individuals to make complaints; reluctance by the 
FEA to make findings of discrimination; and reluctance of the courts to uphold these 
findings. 
c) Preference for ""uasion rather than for using the full range of legal rameclel. 
Rolston (1983) describes Agency members as 
"middle-of-the road types, businessmen, trade unionists, etc, aI/ of them (Jovernrmmt-IIPpointfld, and 
most of them ."pointed on the basis of their respectability. Such people are undoubtedly inclined 
to move in the slime ideolO(Jic" lind politic" (not to mention socilll) sp~ .. mMY of the 
respondents with whom they de"· (p212J 
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Their natural inclination is to smooth things over and come to agreement, rather than 
to become involved in formal legal proceedings. There was also, particularly in the early 
days, a marked distaste for publicising the results of investigations, which were not 
seen as 
"a contribution to public debate. Their target audience is not the public, but the employers 
investigated, and the investigations thus become part of the refined and 'gentlemanly' discourse 
between employers and Agency members" (ibid p2 T 5J. 
This approach was justified by the Chairman on the grounds that the co-operation of 
employers was necessary in order to help them develop better practices, since the 
legislation did not give much power of enforcement (SACHR, p122). But proceeding 
from an approach which lacked clear goals and targets, the process was ad hoc and 
open to abuse. 
SACHR reports criticism that too little attention had been paid to investigations into the 
private sector in the early 1980s. The public sector was thought to be an easier target, 
even though some (for example the Southern Health and Social Services Board) refused 
to assist with monitoring (ibid, p115). 
The FEA was often reluctant to state explicitly whether its investigations had shown 
that discrimination existed. The report of an investigation into the Belfast Telegraph 
hints that the paper had failed to provide equality of opportunity, but the affirmative 
action programme agreed with the Agency recorded only that it had "confirmed its 
equal opportunity policy and its compliance with the requirement of the 1976 Act" 
(McCormack and O'Hara, p31). The Agency explained its reluctance to publicise 
instances of discrimination by arguing that it did not want to discourage minorities from 
applying to these employers. But SACHR concluded that a reassessment of the strategy 
was essential. 
"Though there lire some employers who lire undoubtedly hostile to leglll intervention, there life II 
greater number who frllnkly recognise thllt encoureging provision of equillity of opportunity by leglll 
mellns is both necessllry lind important- (p 125). 
The Declaration of Intent did not give formal powers, but even within its limitations, it 
was not used effectively. The certificate was not removed from a single employer. It 
has been argued that it was used by employers to deflect scrutiny rather than as a 
means of developing progressive policies (Booth & Bertsch, p35). So seriously was it 
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taken, that the FEA chose a printer for its own Guide to Manpower Po/icy who had not 
signed the Declaration (Rolston, op cit, p216). 
d) The FEA bowed to pressure from local and British politicians. 
While complaining about its alleged anti-Protestant bias, Unionist politicians have been 
quick to demand that the FEA investigate complaints by Protestants against Catholic 
employers (ibid, pp217-9). Graham describes how an anonymous complaint against a 
small Catholic firm was passed on by the Democratic Unionist leader, Ian Paisley. 
Government ministers demanded an inquiry, which was carried out by the FEA Chair. 
According to Graham, procedures were breached, with a copy of the report going to 
Paisley before the Agency board (op cit, pp46-7). 
In defending itself against Unionist attack, the FEA has been defensive. Not wanting to 
appear to favour either side, it has been accused of being more rigorous in pursuit of 
Catholic firms in which Protestants are under-represented than of discrimination against 
Catholics. 
While intervention by Unionists is to be expected, more worrying is interference by 
ministers of the government in whose name the FEA is supposed to combat 
discrimination. This calls into question the whole relation between equal opportunities 
legislation and the state. 
There have been well documented cases of ministerial attempts to block investigations 
in both public and private sectors. The FEA delayed an investigation of the Northern 
Ireland Civil Service (NICS) at the request of the minister, Hugh Rossi (SACHR, p116). 
Although an analysis in 1972 had shown that Protestants occupied 95% of all senior 
posts in the NICS (Graham, 1983, p66), the investigation only went ahead when the 
Dublin-based Hibernia magazine exposed what it described as a "sinister attempt at 
ministerial blackmail" (ibid p67). Even then, though the initial investigation found a 
failure to afford equality of opportunity, the report was revised in the light of figures 
provided by NICS itself (Booth & Bertsch, p39). 
The concern of ministers in relation to the private sector appears to have been with the 
image projected overseas. Fear of offending actual or potential investors was behind the 
attempt by the Department of Manpower Services to block investigations into Ford and 
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Short Brothers in 1979 (McCrudden, 1983). Graham writes of an inquiry in the 
Engineering Industry which begun in 1977, but was still incomplete in 1983. The final 
report was published in 1983. The continuing equation of Catholics with disloyalty is 
evident in the report by Cooper of his meeting with Labour's Northern Ireland minister, 
Don Concannon: 
"Whst the Minister wished to mske clesr WBS the importsnce of Ford in NI ... Minister is anxious thst 
the Agency's investigstion should not csuse sny security problems" (Grshsm, 1984, p48J. 
Pressures occurred under both Labour and Tory governments. They demonstrate a lack 
of commitment of both parties to pressing for real change. Far from supporting the FEA 
in tackling discrimination, they undermined its work. Very little public support was given 
to anti-discrimination measures. On the contrary, the impression was given that the 
problem had been sorted out. 
While the rhetoric of fairness was used, the national security exemption left intact the 
repressive apparatus. By issuing a statement that a particular action was necessary on 
national security grounds, the Minister was able to prevent any potentially embarrassing 
investigation. The FEA remained subordinate to the Department of Economic 
Development (OED), which controlled its budget and its staffing. The OED is part of the 
NICS, and the history of its own FEA investigation did not create much confidence in 
its impartiality. 
Pressure for Change 
As the above discussion suggests, the initiative for re-evaluating the Fair Employment 
legislation did not come from the British government's own concern at lack of progress. 
Most commentators agree that the crucial factor was international pressure, especially 
from the United States. Only one significant measure was enacted before the US 
campaign developed. In 1981 , firms tendering for government contracts were required 
to comply with Fair Employment practices. This strengthened the potential for using 
investigations as a means of increasing equality. 
Osborne and Cooper (1989) argue that the success of some FEA action in revealing 
patterns of inequality was also important. When it was eventually carried out, the NICS 
investigation revealed a profile of inequality at all levels. The Civil Service established 
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a monitoring system, (a major feature of the new legislation), and since 1986 has 
published an annual Equal Opportunities Report. But the failure to produce goals and 
targets weakens its effectiveness, while it has been argued that the credibility of the 
policy is undermined by the fact that it is self-monitoring, with the Equal Opportunities 
Unit part of the NICS itself (McCormack & O'Hara, p32). 
In 1986 a OED consultative paper officially acknowledged the religious differential in 
unemployment rates for the first time. The SACHR report added weight to the pressure 
for change, through its critique of existing legislation, and the inequalities revealed in 
the PSI survey. The report concluded with a call for an interim target of reducing the 
male unemployment differential from 2 and a half to 1 and a half in 5 years (p42). 
Most important was the U.S. campaign initiated by the Irish American lobby. The 
politics of shareholder pressure is well established in the United States, and had been 
used against Apartheid in South Africa. This experience was used in the campaign to 
pressurise firms investing in Northern Ireland to tackle discrimination. 
The Irish lobby had been active on the issue since the late seventies. In 1978, the 
Washington-based Irish National Caucus raised the question of discrimination in the US 
Congress. Added impetus came from the international publicity surrounding the IRA 
Hunger Strikes of 1981. In 1984, Shorts was a leading bidder for a US government 
defence contract. The Irish lobby campaigned to prevent the company being awarded 
the contract on the grounds of its history of discrimination against Catholics. When the 
company won the contract, it was conditional on the implementation of an equal 
opportunities programme (Booth & Bertsch, p56). As part of affirmative action, it 
announced that it would open a factory in West Belfast (McCormack & O'Hara, p35). 
A campaign of disinvestment in Northern Ireland would have been problematic in view 
of the implications for job losses, when unemployment was very high (Mccormack & 
O'Hara, p35). Unlike South Africa, no local group was calling for such a boycott. The 
campaign therefore focused around the MacBride Principles, a set of anti-discrimination 
practices modelled on the Sullivan Principles which had been developed in relation to 
South Africa. They differed in that they were "designed to supplement inadequate and 
unenforced legislation forbidding discrimination" (McCormack & O'Hara, p37). They 
were not radical proposals, indeed "compared to the more vigorous US laws, are mild 
to the point of blandness" (ibid, p39). They called for positive action to improve the 
representation of the minority community, but not for targets, or quotas. 
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The MacBride Principles originated in the office of the Comptroller of New York, 
Harrison Goldin. They took the name of their chief sponsor, Sean MacBride.5 In a long 
career, MacBride had been a UN Commissioner; won both the Nobel and Lenin Peace 
Prizes; helped found Amnesty International; been an Irish government minister; and 
Chief of Staff of the IRA. His international standing gave credibility to the principles, but 
his former connection with the IRA was, predictably, used by the British government 
and Unionists to discredit the campaign and its supporters. 
The MacBride principles gained considerable support in the United States, including 13 
states legislatures, the trade union movement (AFL/CIO), and many Church 
organisations of all denominations. The campaign put pressure on US companies which 
had previously shown little concern about sectarian practices. Few actually signed the 
principles, and shareholders were never able to win a vote against opposition from 
company management. But the campaign was able to muster sufficient support to 
negotiate with companies about their employment practices. Ford, for example, had 
been the subject of an FEA investigation and is the only US company to be found guilty 
of discrimination. In 1987, to preempt a shareholder resolution, Ford carried out a study 
of its workforce and adopted an affirmative action programme similar to the MacBride 
principles. Since this time it has produced an annual report on Fair Employment for its 
shareholders (see Chapter Seven). 
The British government waged a campaign against the Principles which - in money and 
energy expended - was in marked contrast to its grudging activity against discrimination 
itself. The £400,000 budget for this campaign over a four year period was described 
as "chicken feed" by a representative of the British embassy, Mr Cowper-Bowles, at a 
conference on MacBride (Investor Responsibility Research Center, (lRRC), 1990, p21). 
It may have appeared as chicken feed to his US audience, but it was considerably more 
than the annual budget of the FEA even at its height. Patrick Doherty, who drafted the 
MacBride principles talked of a "no expense spared campaign" and of a Minnesota 
lobbyist who submitted a bill for $100,000 (Booth & Bertsch, p68). 
The FEA itself was used in this campaign. The Agency's Chair spoke in the United 
States at meetings organised by the Northern Ireland Office in order to counter support 
from American politicians for the MacBride Principles.8 
The government claimed that the MacBride campaign was detrimental to foreign 
investment, that the principles created 'hassle' for potential investors, and would deter 
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them from seeking to invest in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, campaigners 
argued, as SACHR had done that 
"The achievement of full equality of opportunity is also important if Northern Ireland is to be 
perceived abroad as an attractive place for investment" (SACHR p43). 
An interesting insight into British government tactics is revealed in the transcript of the 
1990 MacBride conference. Cowper-Bowles began his presentation with a claim that 
he agreed with '98%' of the points made by Patrick Doherty, throwing in for good 
measure a sneer at the backward 'tribal' customs of Protestants. He claimed that the 
"spirit and 90% of the letter of Macbride principles" was embodied in the 1989 
legislation (lRRC, 1990, p13), but, questioned about the British government's opposition 
to the principles, went on to say that they 
"resent the fact that people over here are playing politics .... that people over here are telling the 
democratically elected representatives of the people of Northern Ireland what they should be doing" 
(ibid, p 10). 
He ended the debate with the standard abuse used to rubbish government critics on 
Ireland, calling the MacBride campaigners "evil people with evil ends" (ibid p 27). 
Much of the opposition to the campaign centred around the issue of whether the 
Principles called for reverse discrimination and were therefore illegal under existing 
legislation. Although the campaign produced an 'amplification' to clarify the ambiguity, 
American Brands (whose subsidiary, Gallaher, is a major Northern Ireland employer) 
refused to accept a shareholders motion, claiming that it was illegal. In 1986 the 
company lost a court battle on the issue. The company's arguments were the same as 
those of the British government, and the loss seriously weakened the government's 
case against MacBride. Peter Archer, ac, Labour's Northern Ireland spokesperson, 
appeared as a witness for the campaign. 
In spite of official British hostility, the US campaign forced the government to prepare 
proposals to amend the legislation. These subsequently became the 1989 Fair 
Employment Act. Press reports of the new legislation, acknowledged the US role. The 
Independent for example argued that 
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WConcern among foreign investors about religious discrimination in Northern Irelllnd WIIS 
acknowledged by the Secretary of State for Northern ire/lind ... lIS the prime motive behind 
government pltms for more stringent fllir employment IlIws W (cited in McCormllck & O'Hllrll, p69J. 
The 1989 Fair Employment Act 
The strength of the Act compared to other UK anti-discrimination measures represented 
a desire to maintain all-party consensus in Britain and Northern Ireland in response to 
the US challenge Osborne & Cormack (1989). Concern to maintain the traditional 
bi-partisan approach on Ireland led the government to accept some amendments to its 
original draft, but these were not in the end enough to secure opposition support. The 
Act is weaker than the FEA wanted in several respects, and was described by 
McCrudden as "fatally flawed" (Booth & Bertsch, p 49). It can be argued that the 
measures 
wconstituted the least that the Government felt WIIS necessary to defuse criticism" (McCormllck & 
O'Hllrlfl, p63). 
The Act's main provisions are: 
a) The establishment of the Fair Employment Commission (FEC) to replace the Fair 
Employment Agency (FEA, 
The FEC has an expanded staff and budget, and greater powers. The budget for 
its first year was £1309,000, rising to #1,519,00 in 1991, when 51 people 
were in post (FEC, 1991). All FEA staff were transferred to the FEC, including 
the Chair. The FEC is responsible to the DED. 
b) Monitoring 
Annual monitoring of the religious composition of the workforce of private firms 
and public sector bodies is compulsory. In the first two years, this applied to 
firms with more than 25 employees; in 1992, it applied to firms employing more 
than 10. Failure to monitor is a criminal offence, punishable by a fine. Firms 
employing over 250 are required to submit information on job applications and 
appointments. All registered employers must review recruitment training and 
promotion practices at least every three years. In 1992 individual firms' 
monitoring returns were published for the first time. 
186 
c) Affirmative Action 
The FEC has powers to investigate employment practices, linked both to the 
monitoring exercise, and to other reviews it may require. The FEC can require 
affirmative action measures, goals and timetables to remedy 
underrepresentation. The FEC is required to promote a new Code of Practice 
drawn up by the OED, and to advise employers on carrying out their reviews of 
employment practices. 
d) Contract compliance 
An employer can be disqualified from receiving public contracts for failure to 
register with the Commission; or submitting incomplete or false monitoring 
returns. 
e) Fair Employment Tribunal 
This new body takes over the FEA's role in relation to individual complaints of 
discrimination, with powers of adjudication, enforcement and appeal, and can 
order compensation up to £30,000. 
f) Indirect Discrimination 
The Act outlaws indirect discrimination. 7 This can be the subject of individual 
complaints 
The government has not been able to defuse criticism of the Act either at the time of 
its passage or afterwards. Concern has focused on a similar range of issues to the 
previous legislation. 
a) Lack of clear targets 
The target of reducing the male unemployment differential called for in the SACHR 
report was not included. The Act makes no commitment to a timetable for change. It 
also excludes any use of quotas, which had also been rejected by SACHR. But for some 
on the receiving end of discrimination, this makes the act of limited value.Bln Goldring's 
view 
"the difference between IIffirmlltive IIction lind reverse discriminlltion lies in the result. OuotllS IIrfl 
tllfgets thllt hllve befln rflllched lind reverse discriminlltion is IIffirmlltivfl IIction thllt works" fop cit 
p58} 
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bl Weakness of 'Affirmative Action' 
The role and legality of affirmative action is very unclear. The overriding principle in the 
Act is the merit principle which is incorporated into the new Code of Practice for 
employers in spite of criticisms at the White Paper stage (McCrudden, 1990). By 
refusing to exempt affirmative action programmes from the duty not to discriminate, 
measures which have the effect of increasing the chances of Catholics were open to 
challenge in the courts for the first time. 
This marks a step backward from the previous law, contrasting with the permissibility 
of affirmative action in British race and sex discrimination laws. Affirmative action 
becomes subordinate to "systematic and objective recruitment", which "gave the 
impression that the selection of candidates was an exact science" (McCrudden, 1988, 
p167). This process 
-did not rest on an assessment of sectarianism. Technocracy by definition is rational and therefore 
non-sectarian. - (Rolston, 1983, p 199) 
But fairness and objectivity, even of the most scrupulous kind, are not sufficient in a 
situation of structural disadvantage. This system "shifts the onus of responsibility for 
unemployment or lack of career advancement to the Catholic/nationalist community" .9 
While 'objective recruitment' is promoted, it is nevertheless not made a legal 
requirement to follow the procedures outlined in the Code of Practice for employers. 
There is for example no obligation to advertise vacancies. 10 
The maintenance of a workplace free of manifestations of sectarianism is also not made 
a legal requirement (Booth & Bertsch, p52). Intimidation, and fear of intimidation, has 
been labelled the 'chill factor' in fair employment literature (OED, 1991, p9). In the PSI 
(1987) survey of Perceptions and Views, 23% of Catholics and 10% of Protestants 
reported that they had been victims of sectarian attack, but it was much more common 
among young men in Belfast. Actual attacks in the workplace are less common than 
fear of intimidation, but there are persistent reports of serious incidents (Rolston & 
Tomlinson, p65), which have succeeded in maintaining almost entirely segregated 
workforces in some areas. 
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c) Dependence on the Department of Economic Development 
The FEC is not independent, but directly responsible to the OED, which appoints 
members of the Board and controls the budget. Given the history of the OED in ignoring 
the needs of the most disadvantaged groups in its employment strategy," this is not 
encouraging (see Chapter Four). 
The potential for conflict of interest between its developmental pro-business, and its 
monitoring roles are serious (Booth & Bertsch, p51 ). Graham points out that this conflict 
extends into the Commission itself: 
"You wouldn't expect the CRE (Commission for Rllcial EqulllityJ to be wheeled out to 
reassure potential foreign investors about racism in Britain, but the Chllir of the FEC has been used 
in thBt role in the United StBtes. " 12 
The OED was charged with drawing up the draft code of practice and must approve any 
changes to it. In its draft code it referred to an Advisory Section which would be 
"distinct and separate" from other areas. The advice sought and given is confidential 
to that section and is not divulged to the rest of the Commission (McCormack & 
O'Hara, p69). Labour's spokesperson on Northern Ireland, Kevin McNamara, attacked 
this proposal, describing it as creating a "Chinese Wall" within the Commission. Since 
the OED has a right to all information held by the FEC. The potential for suppressing 
awkward investigations is enormous. 
Another potentially worrying indication of the role of the OED is the research on fair 
employment is currently under way, funded by the Policy and Planning Research Unit 
of the NICS. This is being carried out by the NIERC,'3 a body whose director has 
publicly expressed hostility to the FEC's commitment to reducing the unemployment 
differential, and whose Director was used by Belfast City Council to defend it against 
charges of discrimination after an FEC inquiry.'· 
d) Security Exemption 
The Act continues the exemption of the security forces (and teachers) from the Act, in 
spite of lobbying from the FEA and others. This crucial area remains a Protestant 
stronghold. Furthermore, the section of the 1976 Act which permitted exception if an 
action was deemed in the interests of national security has been maintained. A 
certificate issued by the Secretary of State prevents the FEC from carrying out 
investigations. 
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A recent case involved the newly privati sed Northern Ireland Electricity Company, which 
withdrew a contract from a firm when it discovered that it was Catholic-owned. The 
Minister, Tom King, intervened to prevent an investigation because of "concern over the 
safety of a vital public utility" (Irish News, 1991, cited in Irish National Caucus (INC), 
1992, p13). The decision was challenged in the courts by the FEC, but the case was 
lost on the grounds that the RUC and the OED had conducted inquires which supported 
the Minister's decision (ibid). 
The law permits discrimination against "supporters of terrorism", an elastic term in 
Northern Ireland, which can be used to include - as one MP suggested in the discussion 
on the bill - anyone who votes for Sinn Fein (lRRC, 1990, p5). This could be used to 
discriminate against people living in strongly-Republican areas.'5 
These provisions maintain the notion of Catholic 'disloyalty', which is at the heart of 
the constitutional issue. 
The act fails to address the roots of sectarianism. The FEA/FEC has been keen to stress 
that segregation affects workplaces across the board, and that there are many where 
Protestants are underrepresented. Laudable as the aim of integrated workplaces is, this 
position tends to imply that sectarianism is a problem of which both sides are equally 
guilty. Rolston (1983) points out that one of the first statements made by Peter 
Newsam as chair of the British Commission for Racial Equality was racism was a 
problem of the white community. A similar statement from the FEC is unthinkable. The 
Act promotes an abstract notion of fairness which by 
-asking individuals to accept the pursuit of equality as limited to the sale of their labour power on 
grounds of formal equal access at the point of entry to the labour market not only ignores the 
question of an already existing unequal sectarian marketplace, ... ... but unnecessarily defines the 
limitations of policy change to the framework of the marketplace- (Graham, 1983, p74J. 
But this evenhandedness is excluded from the security services and 'sensitive' areas, 
which can be defined as such by Ministers and civil servants with no right of public 
scrutiny. While some changes in work practices may be expected, the key institutions 
of Protestant rule remain intact. 
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Sex Discrimination 
Sex discrimination is not so high on the official political agenda, and this is reflected in 
the budget and powers of the two equality bodies. There has been no pressure from 
abroad similar to the MacBride campaign to increase powers against sex discrimination, 
although the EC has initiated some of the changes which the British government has 
reluctantly incorporated into legislation in Britain and Northern Ireland. 
Women in Northern Ireland have not been able to wage campaigns capable of forcing 
the government to take action on these issues. The national question has not only 
eclipsed women's campaigns, but has also served to undermine women's ability to 
organise in their own interests (Evason, 1991). 
The legislation on sex discrimination was not designed for Northern Ireland itself, but 
was imported from Britain. The legislative framework in which the EOCNI operates is 
broadly similar to that in Britain, with minor differences in administrative structures for 
example in pursuing individual complaints (Lester, 1990, p12). But the environment in 
which the two bodies operate is different, and the position of women in many areas 
quite dissimilar. 
The EOCNI probably plays a relatively more important role in relation to promoting 
women's issues than does its sister organisation in Britain. Its chair, Mary Clark Glass 
has given the organisation a high profile through public statements on issues concerning 
women. HI She has described the organisation as 'proactive', citing for example the fact 
that EOCNI produced the first publication in the UK on sexual harassment issued by a 
statutory body (Clark-Glass, 1990). 
Direct Rule has deprived women in Northern Ireland of access to 'legitimate' political 
power (see Chapter Four). In this situation the EOCNI provides one of the few arenas 
for the promotion of women's concerns. But although sectarianism is so much part of 
women's lives, and has major implications for women's rights, religion is rarely 
addressed directly in EOeNI publications or publicity material. 
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The Legislation 
The legislative framework is contained in three main provisions: the Equal Pay Act of 
1970; the Sex Discrimination Order of 1976; and the Equal Value amendment of 1984 
which became law in the United Kingdom following a ruling by the European 
Commission. Each added new powers, but retained the common framework which 
"focuses only upon unequfll contrflctufll terms find conditions of employment. It left untouched equal 
opportunities outside the contrflct of employment" (Lester, p 13). 
The Equal Pay Act made it illegal to discriminate in pay between people doing "the same 
or broadly similar work" or work defined as equivalent by a job evaluation scheme. 
While it led to an immediate increase in women's hourly earnings relative to men in 
Britain (from 63.1 % in 1970 to 75.5% in 1977) the increase was not sustained, and 
by 1985, the increase was partially reversed with the ratio falling back to 74%. The Act 
had "outlived its usefulness" by the 1980s (Gregory, p23). 
The Sex Discrimination act included the concept of indirect discrimination imported from 
the United States. This 
"represented a major departure in legfll ideology. It broke with the trflditionfll method of reducing 
social conflicts to questions of individual guilt find innocence find sought instefld to identify find 
remove the historical and structural impediments to equality" (Gregory, p36). 
Indirect discrimination potentially offered a much broader framework of remedies, not 
open in relation to Fair Employment at the time. It provided the possibility of a challenge 
to rules on for example part-time working, which -though formally applying to both 
sexes equally - in practice have a disproportionate impact on women. But the new act 
was "'wrapped' around" the Equal Pay Act (Lester, p13) and retained the same 
individual framework. Divorced from the American context, where 'class actions' are 
permissible, its impact was seriously weakened (Gregory, p35). 
The Equal Value legislation amended the 1970 Equal Pay Act. The 1970 Act had done 
nothing to remedy low pay for women in segregated employment, who could not claim 
comparison with men. One result had been to increase segregation as employers used 
the five and a half year transition period before implementation to reshuffle workers in 
order to avoid having to pay women workers more (Gregory p22). The concept of Equal 
Value is intended to remedy the situation 
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·where jobs are identified as being appropriate for women, the very designation carries with it an 
inference that the jobs are of lesser value than the jobs performed by men despite the skill, effort 
and responsibility attached (Rubinstein, p22J. 
Women are given the job title 'cook' while men are 'chefs'; women are 'shop 
assistants', men 'salesmen' (ibid). 
Unfortunately the legislation remains, in the words of the EOCNI 
·complex, cumbersome and unworkable and results in unacceptable delays which lead to inordinate 
legal costs" (EDeNI, 1991, p12J. 
Of 4,000 equal value applications in the UK in the five years after the law took effect, 
20 cases were concluded, including one in Northern Ireland (Maxwell, 1991, p75). The 
continued focus on the individual complainant places a considerable burden on that 
person, requiring persistence and a willingness to undergo what can often be a painful 
public scrutiny of every aspect of their working lives. As the Alison Halford case 
demonstrated, the burden of proof continues to rest with the complainant, although the 
relevant evidence may be accessible only to the employer. The European Commission 
proposed a directive placing the burden of proof on the employer, which was vetoed 
by the British government. 
The law requires that the complainant find a male 'comparator' employed either in the 
same establishment or another of the same or associated employer, provided common 
terms and conditions of employment apply. An employer can argue that the claim is 
invalid if an objective evaluation has been carried out. This must be 'analytic', involving 
an examination of various dimensions of the job such as skill, effort and responsibility. 
But as Rubinstein has pointed out 
"An 'acceptable' job evaluation is commonly regarded lIS one which broadly replicates the ex;sting 
wage hierarchy of jobs. This is not surprising, since were it not the clISe there would be something 
radically wrong with the previous structure" (p23). 
This hierarchy will tend to reflect the prevailing social norm, that women's work is of 
less value than men's. Rubinstein points out that while the British EOC expressed 
concern at the tendency to undervalue women's work in these schemes, an example 
of this same bias was contained in their own pamphlet, Job Evaluation Schemes Free 
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of Sex Bias. In comparing the work of a maintenance fitter and a nurse, he argued they 
had undervalued the nurse's job (p24). 
Many of the recent legislative developments have followed European Commission 
rulings. There have been two Programmes of Action on equal opportunities for women 
(the second from 1986-1990) and a series of EEC directives: on equal pay (1975); 
employment (1976) state social security scheme (1979); occupational social security 
schemes (1986) and the self-employed (1986). The Equal Value legislation itself 
followed a European Commission Directive (LRD, 1990). 
The UK is the only EC country which has not signed the Social Charter Y This is not a 
particularly radical document, and many proposals are existing practice in some member 
states. But its implementation would have significant benefits for women in the UK, 
which in many areas is at or near the bottom of the league in terms of women's rights. 
The Social Charter states that "equal treatment for men and women shall be assured" 
and recommends action be intensified to ensure equality in "remuneration, access to 
employment, social protection, education, and vocational training and career 
development". The second draft was amended to include the words: 
"such action shall imply the development of IImenities enabling those concerned to reconcile their 
occuplltional and family obliglltions more ellSily" 
As implied in the support for 'amenities' to reconcile family and work obligations, equal 
treatment requires not just removal of formal discrimination, but provision of specific 
facilities and conditions. But, like much of the Social Europe programme, 
implementation of equal opportunities proposals has been very slow compared with 
progress towards the Single Market, an emphasis which is not merely due to Britain's 
opposition (Grahl & Teague, 1989). 
The majority of legislation is concerned with paid work, but the problem for many 
women is lack of access to the formal labour market. Much of women's work is unpaid, 
as women continue to bear the major burden of domestic labour and caring 
responsibilities (McWilliams, 1991). Caring responsibilities also dictate that nearly half 
of women in the labour force are part-time workers. Those working less than eight 
hours a week are unprotected, while those working under 16 hours are entitled to 
limited protection. This means that 
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"part-time workers, the V8St majority of whom lire women, mllke up II vulnerllble, unprotected lind 
grossly underpaid section of the workforce ... equality legisilltion in Europe must be viewed from II 
highly critical perspective, in particular in its relevance to this marginalised section of the female 
workforce" (Barry & Jackson, 1988, p 91). 
It was the 1976 legislation which established the statutory Equal Opportunities 
Commission, with a separate body in Northern Ireland, the EOCNI. The Commission has 
powers to: 
a) pursue individual comPlaints of discrimination 
The most widely publicised aspect of the EOC's work has been the legal advice and 
support given to individual complainants as cases have progressed through the courts. 
This support is cash-limited, and the Halford Case used up half its annual legal budget 
of £600,000, which meant that pressure to settle the case on unfavourable terms 
became overwhelming. 18 
b) carry out formal investigations 
The legislation gives powers to make formal investigations where discriminatory 
practices are suspected. This has generally followed complaints. If unlawful 
discrimination is found, the Commission can issue a non-discrimination notice, and seek 
injunctions to restrain employers from acts of persistent discrimination. But in the first 
decade of the EOC's existence, only eight investigations were attempted, which 
resulted in six reports, and only one non-discrimination notice. The EOC commissioners 
in Britain have been reluctant to engage in confrontation with employers, preferring to 
ensure cooperation (Gregory, p126), an approach similar to that defended by the FEA. 
The EOC has no powers comparable to those of the new FEC to monitor employment 
patterns. Furthermore, their investigations have frequently been hobbled by the courts, 
which has ensured that the Commission takes a cautious line. 
c) promote education and "Barch and glye advice 
Under this heading the Commission has powers to organise promotional and publicity 
campaigns. It can also fund organisations which aim to promote equality of opportunity 
and to commission research into the nature and extent of sex discrimination. 
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The Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland (EOCNI) 
In contrast to the British EOC, the EOCNI has 
"traditionally given a high priority to supporting individual csses, and hss adopted a distinctly litigious 
stance where s csse rsises any new point of legal principle, compsred with its counterpart in Grest 
Britsin, which in the psst hss preferred to operate at the level of exhortation" (Maxwell, 1991, p85J. 
The Women's officer of NUPE is currently a Deputy Chair of the EOCNI, and the union 
has supported its members at the Royal Victoria Hospital (RVH) in the longest running 
equal value case in Northern Ireland. The policy, which as 
"part of a general strstegy against low wsges, is clearly exceptional" (ibid, p8t J. 
The case concerns the claim of five domestic assistants at the hospital that their work 
is of equal value to that of male porters and groundsmen who are on higher grades. The 
claim was lodged in 1985. The women won a partial victory when a court ruled in 1989 
that the employer, the Eastern Health and Social Services Board, could not import the 
results of a British job evaluation into Northern Ireland. The court required a report from 
an independent expert, but this report has still not been produced. The case continues 
into its seventh year. I interviewed the main complainant, and others involved in this 
case, which will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
The EOCNI's Annual Report 1990-1 lists 22 equal value cases which it has pursued 
since the legislation. Of these 4 have been won, and one lost; in one case involving 8 
claimants, 3 had their claim upheld, 2 were settled and 3 withdrew; 6 others have been 
settled, and 10 are continuing. While the actual case history in equal value cases has 
been disappointing, Maxwell argues that it provides the scope for "radical reappraisals 
of the work traditionally done by women" (p91) and that the indirect impact of publicity 
surrounding the cases, has raised awareness and recognition that "women's jobs" may 
be undervalued. This view is supported by those people (both women and men) I spoke 
to at the RVH. 
The report reveals a range of activities and concerns. The contrast is quite marked with 
that of the FEC, whose activities are largely concerned with pursuing the legislation 
through promoting monitoring, and advice work for firms, as well as pursuing 
complaints. The legislation is concerned, as is the fair employment legislation, with the 
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labour market contract, but recognition of structural disadvantage in relation to sex 
appears to be more explicit. The EOCNI's programme for 1990-5 sets out seven 
priorities: Equal Pay - prioritising low paid workers: Contractual Terms: Working Parents 
(including workers with other caring responsibilities); Non-traditional working areas; 
vertical segregation; sexual harassment; the National Curriculum (EOC, 1991, p1). 
Research has been commissioned on some of these, as well as publicity and information 
campaigns. 
Another major concern has been the impact of government legislation on women. The 
adverse effect of compulsory competitive tendering, for example is an issue on which 
the EOC has made representations (ibid, p26), while the Commission has also raised 
concerns in relation to European Community Directives on Part Time working. '9 
The report notes an increase in the number of employers asking for advice on equality 
issues. Many requests follow settlement of complaints of discrimination. They include 
the Ulster Bank, a subsidiary of National Westminster (see Chapter Seven). 
The EOeNI has had to playa more proactive role in promoting equality issues, in the 
absence of other bodies such as women's committees which have been important in 
Britain. It runs a seminar programme for personnel officers on equality in the work 
place, such as flexible work practices. The numbers attending are quite impressive, but 
they are confined almost entirely to the public sector. 20 The numbers involved in flexible 
working arrangements are small by British standards, but the increase in women's 
labour force participation, particularly in professional public sector occupations, has 
meant that these practices are developing. 
In a cautious conclusion to the last of the 'Womanpower' series, Trewsdale (1987) 
argues that the equality legislation "although not ideal, has contributed to improving 
women's position in employment since the mid-1970s" (p47). But the main problems, 
she argues, remain sex segregation in the labour market, and the large number of 
low-paid workers who remain outside the official statistics. 
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Conclusion 
The EOCNI and the FEC share the task of attempting to overcome disadvantage through 
a legislative framework based on the notion of formal equality, which is confined largely 
to the labour market contract. At this level the two are mutually supportive: an equal 
opportunities policy which develops objective criteria for recruitment should help both 
women and Catholics by breaking down the old (Protestant) boy networks which 
excluded women and Catholics. This was a view put to me by those concerned with 
fair employment issues.21 
But recognition of common areas in promoting equality practices has not led to a 
combined approach. At the most practical level, the separation of issues is perpetuated 
in the research and statistics which each collect. Little of the EOCNI material contains 
information on religion, while the FEC does not publish the detailed results of its 
religious monitoring broken down by gender. This proved problematic in collecting 
material for the following chapters. 
The different political pressures and priorities of the two organisations have not been 
conducive to a greater level of cooperation. There is resentment by the EOCNI at its 
relative powerlessness. The view was expressed to me that men had forced the issue 
of sectarianism onto the agenda through violence, whereas women's issues were 
neglected. 22 
The EOCNI has largely avoided the issue of religion divisions. A recent survey of 1 ,000 
women which it commissioned has been used as the basis of a book on women's 
working lives. But although the questionnaire contained a question on religion, none of 
the authors chose to take up the issue of religious divisions. 23 There has been some 
recognition recently of the need to examine the specific problems of Catholic women 
by some researchers (see for example McWilliams et al) but very little work has been 
published. 
To move out of their separate spheres would raise the question of the deep-seated 
structural nature of these divisions and call into question the limited framework of legal 
equality within which both work. 
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Equal opportunities legislation represents a 'one-nation' project, requiring a degree of 
social consensus on the goal of equality, and a general acceptance of the legitimacy of 
state intervention. In Northern Ireland the state was built on a 'two nations' project in 
which the exclusion of Catholics was not incidental, but central to its existence. The 
effectiveness of equality legislation in these circumstances is likely to be severely 
limited. 
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Chapter Six 
Labour Market Inequality, 1971 - 1991 
The economic and social developments discussed in Chapter Four have brought 
substantial changes in the structure of the labour market. Increased public expenditure 
in the 1970s, and the shift in employment towards public and private services, 
expanded employment opportunities for women and for Catholics, quite apart from the 
impact of equality legislation. 
This chapter will examine patterns of religious and gender disadvantage in the labour 
market in the twenty year period of Direct Rule, in order to assess the extent of 
continuity and change. This will be based primarily on global figures, and is intended as 
background to the more detailed discussion of private sector firms in Chapter Seven and 
the public sector in Chapter Eight. The first part is concerned with access to the labour 
market; the second with the type and status of work done by those in employment; the 
third with income and living standards. 
The Census of Population is the most comprehensive data source. It includes figures for 
economic activity, occupations and other labour market information broken down by 
gender and religion. The 1981 Census provided the first opportunity to assess the 
general impact of the 1976 Fair Employment Act. Only the Summary Report of the 
1991 Census is so far available, and the information contained is much more limited. 
Assessing the religious composition of the population from the census is a complex 
problem. Response to the religious question is voluntary: there was a 7.3% refusal rate 
in 1991, compared to 18.5% in 1981 and 9.4% in 1971. The census does not use the 
category Protestant: responses are broken down into Roman Catholic; the three main 
Protestant denominations (Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, Methodist); Other 
Denominations; and Not Stated. The overwhelming majority of the last group consists 
of smaller Protestant denominations, but it also includes non-Christian religions. The 
latter have been growing in recent years, but their total numbers still represent only 
0.17% of the population. The 1991 Census included a new category None, in which 
3.8% of the population placed themselves. 
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The percentage of those who stated their religion as Catholic underestimates the 
proportion of people 'from the Catholic community' since some will place themselves 
in the Not Stated and None categories. In the analysis below, the percentage of 
Catholics and Protestants will normally be calculated as a percentage of people who 
stated a religion (ie excluding Not stated and None). This is still likely to underestimate 
the Catholic proportion, since it makes the implicit assumption that the religion of 
non-responders is distributed in proportion to their numbers in the population. This is 
unlikely to be the case; it seems plausible that there is a greater degree of hostility to 
the state from Catholics, who are more therefore more likely to refuse to answer this 
question. 1 There was an estimated 2% non-enumeration in the 1981 Census which was 
also thought to be primarily in Catholic areas (Osborne & Cormack, 1987 p1). No figure 
is available for 1991. 'Other Denominations' will be counted as Protestant. The latter 
overestimates Protestant numbers, but the difference is very small, and will tend to 
balance the underestimate of Catholics. 
The proportion of Catholics has risen during the period. Those stating their religion as 
Catholic increased from less than a third in 1971 to nearly 40 % in 1991. The high 
refusal rate in 1981 is reflected in a fall in the Catholic proportion, both of the total 
enumerated, and of the total excluding 'non stated'. 
Table 6.1 - Religious composition of the population, 1971-91 (%) 
1971 
1981 
1991 
Catholic 
31.4 [36.741 
28.0 [34.331 
38.4 [43.14) 
Protestant 
69.2 [64.26) 
63.6 [66.67) 
60.6 [66.86) 
Note: figures in brackets refer to proportion of Catholic. and Prote.tants when other categories are excluded. 
Prote.tant includes 'Other Denominations'. 
Source: Census of Population for 1981 (Religion Report); 1991 (Summary report) 
Other sources have been used to analyse changes since 1981. These include the 
Continuous Household Survey, which began in 1983. It samples approximately 1 % of 
households annually, and includes a religion question. The latest available report was 
for 1989. The Labour Force Survey, conducted annually in all EC member states, also 
samples 1 % of domestic properties. In Northern Ireland it includes a religion question. 
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Most analyses of religious discrimination are based on the above sources, although the 
PSI also carried out its own survey of attitudes in the workplace in its work for SACHR. 
The same data sources have been used for research into changes in women's 
employment. The EOCNI's 'Woman power' series relies largely on the Labour Force 
Survey, while Trewsdale's study of religion and gender was based on census data. The 
EOCNI commissioned a survey in 1990 (Kremer et ai, 1990) in which 1,000 women 
were interviewed about their working lives. Some unpublished data from this survey is 
used below. 
Access to the Labour Market 
Unemployment 
The Religious Differential 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the data on the unemployment 
differential is that very little has changed since 1971. While unemployment in general 
has risen with economic decline, it has not produced "equality of misery" (Osborne & 
Cormack, 1987, p71) between Protestant and Catholic. As Rowthorn & Wayne (1988) 
put it, Protestant unemployment rose only to 
·the level considered normal for Catholics at the height of the economic prosperity in the early 
19708· (p110). 
This suggests that, as well as 'equality of misery' being a myth, the reverse side of the 
coin, equality of prosperity, is equally unlikely. The differential has remained remarkably 
constant since 1971 in percentage terms, in spite of changes in the overall level of 
employment. 
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Table 6.2 - Religion and Unemployment 1971-1991 (%) 
1971 1981 1991 
c p diff c p diff c p diff 
(c/p) (c/p) (c/p) 
male 17.3 6.6 2.82 30.2 12.4 2.48 28.4 12.7 2.24 
female 7.0 3.6 1.94 17.1 9.6 1.78 14.6 8.0 1.81 
Source: Figures for 1971 & 1981 from Osborne and Cormack. 1987. p 72; figures for 1991 calculated from 
1991 Census (Summary Report). 
The proportionate differential between Protestant and Catholic decreased slightly in the 
1970s as the general level of unemployment grew, although in absolute terms it 
increased by over 7 points for males, and 4 for females. The proportionate and absolute 
gap for males is lower in 1991, while it has risen slightly for females. The 1991 Census 
included a new category on a government employment of training scheme. A higher 
proportion of Catholics than of Protestants were on these schemes. Adding this 
proportion to the unemployment rate raises the proportion of Catholic males out of work 
to 31.46% and the Protestant male rate to 14.22% (both higher than the 1981 
unemployment rate). The female figures are 16.71 % for Catholics and 9.35% for 
Protestants (slightly below the 1981 rates). The Labour Force Survey for 1991 gives 
different estimates of unemployment, producing a differential of 2.56 for males, and 
1.83 for females. 
The officially recognised differential for women is considerably lower than for men, and 
it is the male rate which has become the key target for policy. But Catholic female 
unemployment has remained nearly double that of Protestant females, and has been 
consistently higher than that of Protestant males. Catholic women clearly suffer 
disadvantage in access to the labour market on account of their religion. 
Women's unemployment tends to be underestimated in official figures. In Kremer's 
1990 survey for the EOCNI, of 566 women not in paid work, 82 were registered as 
unemployed. But of these only 48 described themselves as unemployed; the rest stated 
that they were sick, or looking after dependents. On the other hand, 38 of those not 
registered described themselves as unemployed. This demonstrates the elastic nature 
of women's labour market activity, and the difficulty in categorising unemployment. 
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Catholic unemployment in 1981 was higher in every District Council area except 
Castlereagh. This was true for both men and women, except that Protestant female 
unemployment was higher than Catholic in Carrickfergus. The male differential varied 
from 1.20 in Carrickfergus to 3.01 in Cookstown. For females, the differential was 
highest in Antrim (2.12) and lowest in Moyle (1.07). Protestant female unemployment 
was nearly three times higher in Castlereagh, a marked exception to the general trend 
(1 981 Census). 
In Belfast, unemployment is concentrated in Catholic-dominated wards. Wards where 
unemployment was over 25% contained 57% of the city's Catholic population, and 
16% of the Protestant population in 1981 (Rowthorn &. Wayne, p117). Local studies 
suggest that the real unemployment rate in West Belfast is much higher than indicated 
by official figures. Estimates were as high as 86% for all adults in mainly-Catholic 
Ballymurphy (1983), and 61 % in the Lower Falls (1986/7); a much lower figure of 20% 
was estimated for the mainly Protestant Shankill (1987), although this is still above the 
official rate. (Rolston &. Tomlinson, p71). These figures should be treated with caution, 
but they point to a sizeable gap between the official figures and the reality. Comparable 
figures are not yet available from the 1991 Census. 
The PSI study undertook a statistical analysis of the reasons for the unemployment 
differential, estimating the contribution of various factors which have been used to 
account for it. They found "no evidence" to support the view that Protestants are more 
committed than Catholics to work. The 'chill factor' was thought to be significant, 
while Protestant domination of the security forces, which employ approximately 5% of 
the working population, accounted for a considerable part of the difference. 
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Table 6.3 - Factors Responsible for Unemployment Differential (%) 
Regional factors 
Educational qualifications 
Age profile differences 
Family size 
Class differences 
Dual labour market 
Total 
Observed unemployment differential 
Difference attributable to religion 
Source: SACHR. 1987. pp24-35 
1.0 
1.4 
1.7 
2.1 
4.1 
2.0 
.lU 
20.2 
7.9 
Some of these factors, in particular the different class profiles and the dual labour 
markets in the two communities, are part of the problem requiring explanation, rather 
than part of the explanation. Even if they are included as explanations, there remains 
a substantial difference. The report concludes that 
Win the absence of other plausible explanations, it is reasonable to suppose thllt religion is the most 
likely expillnatory fllctorW (ibid, p35J. 
Religion was regarded as a residual. The researchers did not attempt to test this directly 
by carrying out experimental job applications, as has been done in Britain to gather 
evidence of racial discrimination. In a statement indicating continuing sensitivity on the 
issue, the authors assert without explanation that this was deemed 
-not to be II suitllble form of resellrch to conduct lit this time in Northern Irelllnd- (p34J. 
Age Profile 
The age profile of the unemployed differs between the two communities. Whereas for 
Protestant males, unemployment is almost twice the Protestant average in the youngest 
age group, Catholic unemployment remains virtually the same in all age groups. The 
religious differential is therefore greater for older men. The same pattern applies to 
women, with Catholic women's unemployment twice that of Protestants for those over 
the age of 25. 
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Table 6.4 - Unemployment rates by age group 1991 
16-24 
25-39 
40-64 
C 
26 
23 
21 
Male 
P 
15 
8 
8 
diff 
1.73 
2.88 
2.63 
Source: Labour Force Survey for 1 991 
C 
12 
12 
10 
Female 
P 
8 
4 
5 
diff 
1.5 
2.0 
2.0 
A more complex pattern emerges from the CHS data, which breaks down the youngest 
age group into' 6-' 8 and' 9-24 (these figures do not distinguish by sex). They show 
that while unemployment is actually lower among Catholics than Protestants in the 
younger age group, there are 9% more Protestants working, while Catholic 
unemployment is kept low by a higher staying on rate at school. By 19, when most 
people from both communities have left formal education, different access to the labour 
market is reflected in higher Catholic unemployment. 
Table 6.5 - Employment Status of 18-24 year olds, 1985-7 (%) 
16-18 
C 
Working 19 
Unemployed 11 
in education 56 
training scheme 11 
keeping house 
permanently unable 0 
to work 
Totel 100 
Source: Continuous Household Survey, 1989 
P 
28 
12 
47 
10 
2 
0 
100 
C 
45 
27 
8 
1 
17 
100 
19-24 
P 
63 
15 
8 
0 
12 
0 
100 
The most striking figure is the difference of 18% between the two communities in the 
number who have found a job in the older age group. As Murray & Darby point out, 
-The mlljority of Protestllnt boys lellrn of IIvllilllble jobs through p",enfs lind rel.fives, MId if 
Protestllnfs presently hold II disproportionllte shllre of the job m",ket, then there seems little chMlce 
in the nellr future of rectifying the imblllllnce in employment which seems to exist betwfJfHJ the two 
mein religious groups - (cited in Cormllck " Osborne, 1983, p225). 
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This is borne out in the PSI survey, which found a high proportion of informal 
recruitment procedures: 49% of skilled manual vacancies were filled in this way, and 
45% unskilled of semi-skilled. Murray and Darby refer specifically to boys, and it is the 
typically 'male' jobs in which this form of recruitment practice has been most widely 
discussed, especially through the male-dominated Orange Lodges. But the female 
differential suggests that similar exclusionary practices apply for women. Trewsdale 
(1983) for example mentions the exclusion of Catholic girls from finance through 
recruitment concentrated on Protestant schools. It seems unlikely that these practices 
can be eliminated, particularly in smaller companies, while the FEC's Code of Practice 
remains voluntary rather than a legal requirement on companies. 
There has been limited time to see any impact from the new legislation. The FEC reports 
a small rise in the proportion of Catholics in the companies they monitor (0.4% for men 
and 0.5% for women) between the two years 1990 and 1991 when monitoring has 
taken place (FEC, 1992, p5). But they also report an increase in the Catholic labour 
force. Osborne & Cormack (1987) argue that 
"the expectation for marginal rather than wholesale occupational change is suggested by experience 
in the United States" (p2J. 
and that change should be looked for among newer entrants, who have entered a labour 
market where commitment to equal opportunities in public policy exists (ibid, pp2-3). 
But the figures in the last table suggests that young Catholics are still finding it 
considerably harder to gain employment. 
Education and Unemployment 
Unemployment is related closely to levels of educational attainment, with 
unemployment highest among those without academic qualifications. But there is no 
obvious relationship between the religious differential and educational achievement. 
According to the 1991 census, the lowest male differential is at level 1 (those with 
higher education qualifications). This is the only group in which Catholic unemployment 
is less than twice the Protestant rate. But the next lowest differential is at the other end 
of the educational scale, level 7 (no qualifications) and the highest for those with level 
5 (0 level and equivalents). For females, the lowest differential is again for those with 
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level 1 Qualifications, but the highest is among those with level 4 (BTEC National and 
equivalents) where the Catholic rate is more than double the Protestant rate. 
Table 6.6a - Male Unemployment rates by religion and education level, 1991 (%) 
Catholic 
Prot 
Diff 
Level 1 
4.8 
2.8 
1.71 
Level2 
7.6 
3.1 
2.42 
Level3 
15.1 
6.4 
2.38 
Level4 
11.1 
4.6 
2.47 
Level6 
17.7 
7.0 
2.53 
Level6 
25.8 
11.2 
2.30 
Level7 
36.3 
17.3 
2.10 
Table 6.6b - Female Unemployment rates by religion and education level, 1991 (%) 
Catholic 
Prot 
Diff 
Level 1 
4.6 
3.6 
1.25 
Level2 
6.4 
4.3 
1.49 
Level3 
8. 
4.3 
2.05 
Source: 1991 Census, Summary Report 
Level4 
9.2 
4.2 
2.19 
Level6 
9.4 
6.6 
1.71 
Level6 
16.3 
10.2 
1.80 
Level7 
20.9 
10.7 
1.95 
These figures tend to confirm the findings of the PSI report, that difference in education 
levels could explain very little of the religious difference in unemployment. For 
Catholics, possession of a higher education Qualification reduces considerably the 
chance of unemployment both absolutely and relative to Protestants. But this does not 
appear to apply to other Qualifications, where Catholic disadvantage remains. 
Long-Term Unemployment 
Catholics, as well as experiencing higher unemployment, are more likely to stay 
unemployed for longer periods. In 1991, more than half of Protestant unemployed had 
been out of work for less than a year, compared to 39% of Catholics. 
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Table 6.7 - Long Term Unemployment 1983-1991 (% of unemployed out of work for 
more than 2 years) 
1983 1991 
Catholic Protestant Catholic Protestant 
44 33 48 34 
Source: 1983 figures. CHS data; 1991 figures. LFS Religion Report 
Long-term unemployment remains a disproportionately Catholic phenomenon. In his 
study of two Belfast housing estates, Howe (1990) found differing attitudes to 
unemployment in the two communities. In Protestant East Belfast, 50% of the 
unemployed men he interviewed had worked in manufacturing, and expected to get 
work in that area again. They were not attuned to the possibility of mixing earnings and 
benefits, expecting legitimate employment. In Catholic West Belfast, only 34 of the 441 
male 'heads of household' in the estate studied had jobs in manufacturing. Unemployed 
men did not expect to find formal employment; doing the doub/e 2 was more common, 
and viewed with "less opprobrium". But Howe stressed that although this was seen as 
a 'way of life' it does not substitute for formal employment, or provide a viable 
economic option. 
Economic Activity 
In common with all European countries, female labour force participation in Northern 
Ireland has increased, while male has declined over the past twenty years. But Catholic 
activity (both male and female) remains significantly lower than Protestant. In 1991 , the 
participation rate of Protestant males aged 16-64 was 87%, compared with 79% for 
Catholic males. The corresponding figures for women were 65% and 56% (LFS, 1991). 
The low Catholic activity rate compounds the higher unemployment to reduce the 
proportion of Catholics in work. On 1991 LFS figures, Catholic men are less likely to 
be in work than Protestant women, in spite of a substantially higher activity rate. 
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Table 6.8 - Proportion of population of working age in work. 1991 (%) 
Activity rate 
Unemployment 
% in work 
Male 
79 
23 
60.8 
Source: LFS Religion Report, 1991. 
Economic Activity by Age Group 
Catholic 
Female 
56 
11 
49.8 
Male 
87 
9 
79.2 
Protestant 
Female 
65 
6 
49.8 
Activity rates show distinctive paths for the two communities. For both men and 
women the lower participation of Catholics in the younger age group is partially 
explained by the greater number who gave study as the reason for not being in the 
labour force. But the widest disparity for women (17%) is at 35-44. when many women 
are still looking after children. 
Table 6.9 - Economic Activity by Age Group (%). 1991 
Males Females 
C p Diff C P Diff 
16-24 68 77 9 62 60 8 
26-34 91 96 & 64 72 8 
36-44 90 96 8 56 72 17 
45-69/64 70 83 13 51 68 7 
Source: ibid 
The differential for men is highest in the oldest age group. with only 70% of Catholic 
men over the age of 45 in the labour force. This suggests the effect of discouragement 
through long term unemployment. Taking the unemployment rate of 21 % for all men 
over 40. this figure means that not many more than half (55.3%) of Catholic men over 
this age are in work. 
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Economic Activity and Partner's Employment Status 
Campbell et al (1990), using figures from the 1985 Labour Force Survey, show that 
single Catholic women have a slightly higher participation rate than Protestants, while 
for married Catholics the rate is over 10% lower than for Protestants. Taking only 
married women with children under six years old, the Catholic rate is 30.6% compared 
to 41.9% for Protestants, with the discrepancy greatest for the youngest age group 
(23.9% for Catholics; 41.8% for Protestants). 
Part of this differences lies in the larger average family size of Catholics. The 
Continuous Household Survey (1989) gave details of the number of children born to 
married and cohabiting women of child-bearing age (1 6-44). In 1986-7 the average 
number of children already born to Catholics was 2.8, and to Protestants 2.0. Catholics 
expected to have an average of 3.4 children when their families were complete, 
compared with a Protestant average of 2.5. Clearly the number of children a woman 
has affects her ability to combine work and child-care, particularly in the absence of 
adequate state support. 
McWilliams (1991) argues that women's economic activity is affected by their partner's 
economic status. The benefit system creates a disincentive for married women to work, 
since husband's benefit is lost when a wife's earnings exceed a very low threshold. 
This is particularly important for part-time work, where potential earnings are 
insufficient to compensate for loss of benefit. She shows that a woman is more likely 
to be in paid employment if her husband is working, and suggests that 
-ths psrcsntll(Je of unemployed couples is higher IImongst Clltholics whilst dU1l1 sllrnsrs IIfS more 
likely among Protestants, particularly whers the sscond earnsr works part-tims- (p28). 
She does not produce any direct evidence for this, but it seems plausible given the 
unemployment differential. The EOCNI 1990 survey gives support to this view. For both 
Catholics and Protestants, economic activity was more than twice as high if the partner 
was in work, and the partners of Protestant women were more likely than those of 
Catholics to be working: 82% compared to 66%. 
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Table 6.10 - Employment Status of women in relation to partner (%) 
C8tholic Protest8nt 
full- part no p8id full- P8rt no p8id 
time time work time time work 
Partner in 30.8 26.6 42.6 30.8 35.2 34.0 
paid work 
P8rtner not 12.6 13.8 73.6 14.3 10.0 75.7 
in paid work 
Source: Kremer et 81 (1990). unpublished data 
The effect of higher unemployment among Catholic men was lower economic activity 
for Catholic women: the activity rate for Protestant women was 34.2% (full time) and 
23.0% (part time), compared to Catholic rates of 29.5% and 17.8%. This produced a 
higher proportion of unemployed couples among Catholics: of women living with 
partners, 25% of Catholics were in unemployed couples, compared to 13.8% of 
Protestants. 
McLaughlin (1986), in a survey carried out in Derry, found that the 'female 
breadwinner' image is a myth "and that most unemployed couples were concentrated 
in the Catholic ghetto of the Creggan" (p 43). Far from women replacing their husbands 
in employment, they are more likely to be unemployed or inactive themselves. 
While partners' economic status and family size seem to be significant factors in 
explaining Catholic women's lower activity rate, the evidence produced so far cannot 
explain all the difference between the two rates. The construction of the labour market 
itself must be important. 
Part-time Work 
The proportion of jobs which are part-time is lower than in Britain, 37% compared to 
42% in 1987 (McWilliams, 1991, p32)' but the growth of part-time employment in 
Northern Ireland was higher than in Britain between 1971 and 1989. According to 
Trewsdale, the typical part-time worker is a married women over 35 years old, in the 
service sector. But 23.8% of part-time workers are men, of whom nearly half are over 
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55 years 01d. 3 In 1981, 84.9% of female part time workers were in either distribution 
(26.1%) or 'other services' (58.8%), with only 8.3% in manufacturing (LFS, 1981). 
The Labour Force Survey for 1991 shows different patterns of part-time working by 
religion. Catholic men are more likely than Protestant men to be working part time; the 
reverse is true for women. 
Table 6.11 - Number of hours worked per week (% of employees) 
Males Females 
Hours worked C P C P 
1-15 3 14 16 
16-30 9 3 24 27 
over 30 88 98 82 67 
Source: LFS. Religion Report. 1991 
The relatively high rate of Catholic male part-time work probably reflects the difficulty 
of finding work. Taken together with the percentage in each community in employment, 
it further reduces the percentage of Catholic men in full-time work, while slightly 
increasing Catholic women's share. 
Table 6.12 - Proportion of population of working age In full-time work. 1991 (%) 
% in work 
% In fug-tlme 
Males 
60.8 
63.6 
Catholic 
Source: Calculated from tables 6.8 and 6.11 
Females Males 
49.8 
30.8 
79.2 
78.0 
Protestant 
Females 
61.1 
34.8 
Only just over half of Catholic men of working age are in full-time employment, 
compared to over three quarters of Protestant men. If the incidence of part-time work 
were constant throughout the age groups, this would imply that only 48.7 % (less than 
half) of Catholic men over the age of 44 are in full-time work. Since male part-time 
workers are disproportionately in the older age groups, this would reduce the figure still 
further. 
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While state social policy is geared to the notion of a 'male breadwinner', only just over 
half of Catholic men (and less than half in the older age group) are in the minimal 
position to perform that role. This is not compensated for by Catholic women's 
earnings, since they are less likely to be in work than Protestant women, particularly 
if their husbands are unemployed. The figures suggest a massive dependence on 
benefits, and consequent economic hardship. 
The Labour Market 
Osborne & Cormack (1987) argue that Catholic disadvantage is concentrated mainly in 
the unemployment differential, and that the pattern of employment for those in work 
is more equal (p17). But although unemployment shows a larger proportionate 
difference than any other indicator, and there is evidence of improvement in some 
occupational groups, the labour market remains highly structured by religion and gender, 
and Catholic disadvantage remains. 
Sectoral distribution 
The classification of industrial divisions has changed since 1971, but it is possible to 
see continuity of industrial specialisation. An FEA analysis of the 1971 returns (1977) 
showed substantial overrepresentation of Protestants in most sectors, particularly those 
of higher status. Catholics were overrepresented only in mining, construction, leather 
goods and clothing; employment in agriculture and miscellaneous services was roughly 
proportionate to the population. 
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Table 6.13 - Proportion of Catholics in selected industrial orders, 1971 
Shipbuilding and marine engineering 4.8 (5.1 ) 
Vehicles 11.7 (12.8) 
Gas, electricity, water 15.4 (16.6) 
Textiles 23.6 (26.6) 
Clothing & Footwear 40.1 (44.2) 
Construction 37.0 (41.2) 
Insurance, banking, finance, other services 16.2 (17.7) 
Public administration & defence 19.6 (21.6) 
Miscellaneous services 31.8 (34.8) 
Total population 31.4 (34.7) 
(Note: first figure is for % defining themselves as Catholics; figures in brackets for % excluding not stated) 
Source: FEA (1977) 
In general the most heavily Protestant-dominated sectors were also male-dominated, but 
there were some specifically Protestant female and Catholic male areas. Ship-building, 
engineering and public utilities are the traditionally Protestant male manual strongholds, 
while Protestant males predominated in public administration. Within the manufacturing 
sector, there were significant differences in the Catholic representation between 
clothing and footwear (which accounted for 11.3% of female employment), and textiles 
which is more Protestant and employed more men. Insurance and banking was a 
Protestant sector for both sexes, while distribution was a major employer of Protestant 
women, accounting for 16.6% of female employment, of which 70.4% ((76.0) was 
Protestant. Professional and scientific services (24.7% of female employment) and 
other services (12.8%) were more evenly mixed, and included the Catholic female jobs 
of teaching and nursing. Construction was a Catholic male occupation. 
The figures for later periods are not strictly comparable since the classification of orders 
has changed. Osborne and Cormack in their analysis of the 1981 Census show that 5 
sub-divisions accounted for nearly half of both Protestant and Catholic male 
employment. While four of these were the same for both groups, their order of 
importance was different. 
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Table 6.14 - Male Employment by Industrial Order 1981 (% of employees in each 
sector' 
Protestant Occupations 
Industry 
Public administration 
defence, social security 
Construction 
Agriculture & 
horticulture 
Retail distribution 
Manufacture of 
transport equipment 
Total 
% of Prot 
employees 
14.9 
9.8 
7.6 
7.6 
6.3 
45.8 
Source: Osborne & Cormack, 1987, pp 42-43 
Catholic Occupations 
Industry 
Construction 
Agriculture & 
horticulture 
Public admin· 
istration etc 
Retail 
distribution 
Education 
Total 
% of Catholic 
employees 
16.7 
B.8 
B.8 
7.6 
7.4 
48.2 
Catholic males were slightly more specialised than Protestants. The difference in public 
administration and defence, the largest employer of Protestant men, is mainly 
accounted for by the security forces, which are overwhelmingly Protestant. The figures 
reflect the decline in the traditional industrial base, and the rise in services, particularly 
the state sector. The growth of new industries is reflected in the importance of 
manufacture of transport equipment, which remains largely Protestant. This group also 
includes the Protestant strongholds Short Brothers and Harland & Wolff, which were 
nationalised at the time and heavily subsidised. 
Women were more specialised than men, particularly Catholic women: 59% were in 
other services, compared to 49% of Protestant women. Protestant women continued 
to be overrepresented in finance and distribution, and in metal manufacture. Much of 
Catholic women's overrepresentation in services stems from 'Catholic women's' jobs: 
medical and other health services (including nursing) employed 19.2% of Catholic 
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women compared to 13.5% of Protestants; education employed 18.2% and 13.4% 
respectively (Osborne & Cormack, p45). 
No comparable figures are yet available from the 1991 Census. Some information is 
given in the 1991 Labour Force Survey, but this uses very broad sub-divisions. The 
proportion of Catholics in the labour force had risen to over 40% by this time, so these 
figures show continuing underrepresentation of Catholics in manufacturing, and 
overrepresentation in construction. 
Table 6.15 - Employees by religion and industrial sector, 1991 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Services 
Source: LFS Survey, 1991 
Occupation 
Catholic (%) 
30 
60 
40 
Protestant( %) 
70 
60 
60 
Occupation is closely tied to status and class, although there is considerable blurring 
within categories (for example nurses and nurse administrators are in one group). There 
have been substantial changes in the way occupations are classified since 1971, so 
direct comparison is impossible. Aunger, in his study of the 1971 Census, attributed the 
existence of a Catholic middle class to the high degree of social segregation, which 
ensured that professionals and small business people were needed to service each 
community. He observed that 
"those non-mlJnulJl occuplJtions which have the largest proportions of Catholics, relative to the total 
number employed in the occupation. tend to be lower status occupations compared to those which 
have the highest proportions of Protestants" (cited in FEA. 1977. P '3J. 
He also pointed out that 'Catholic occupations' tend to be female and 'Protestant 
occupations' male. The classification of occupations changed between 1971 and 1981 
making direct comparison impossible. But calculations from the 1981 census show that 
similar patterns persisted. The high level of 'non stated' distorts the figures, particularly 
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in certain groups. The religious proportion has been taken by excluding the 'non stated' 
group from the total. 
Table 6.16a - Catholic and Protestant occupations, 1971 
Total % % 
Employed female Catholic 
Catholic occupations 
publicans 2,026 21 73 
waitars 2,145 84 50 
hairdressers 2,928 76 49 
domestic housekeepers 1,582 100 48 
nurses 12,249 90 43 
primary, secondary teachers 15,726 63 39 
Protestant occupations 
company secretaries 347 16 7 
'police officers and man' 4,046 3 10 
chemists, biologists 711 11 11 
engineers 3,282 3 12 
managers 10,312 6 12 
senior government officials 1,383 10 13 
Sou~e:FEA, 1977, p13 
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Table 6.16b - Catholic and Protestant occupations, 1981 
Total % % 
Employed female Catholic 
Catholic occupations 
Managers, 3,198 33 40 
Waiters, bar staff 3,296 69 44 
Hairdressers, barbers 1,776 91 44 
Nurse administrators, nurses 19,008 92 42 
Primary, secondary teachers 21,890 63 41 
Protestant occupations 
Marketing, sales, 3,783 16 14 
advertising etc 
Policemen, firemen (sic) 5,762 8 7 
prison officers 
Engineers 3,962 3 15 
Scientists, physicists 1,608 19 18 
mathematicians 
Teachers (higher education) 2,347 24 21 
General administrators 2,058 14 16 
national govt 
Source: 1981 Census 
Osborne & Cormack (1987) argue that although in general Catholic occupations tend 
to be of low status, three of the most Catholic occupations are in high status groups 
(managerial, supervisory and legal), which represents a significant advance over 1971 
(p56). But this comment is over oPtimistic. The managerial and supervisory professions 
they refer to are relatively low status within these groups (managers of hotels and 
clubs, which includes publican, a traditional Catholic occupation; and catering 
supervisor which is 60% female). A more appropriate indicator is the overall proportion 
in management. Women represent 13% of this group, and Catholics are in a minority 
of 21 %. The law has always been a Catholic profession since lawyers tend to serve 
their own community. 
Nursing is a 'Catholic women's occupation' which provided increasing opportunities as 
the welfare state expanded. But 59% of male employees were Catholics. Catholic males 
were also overrepresented in school teaching (43% of male teachers), but were only 
19.5% of teachers in higher education. The latter is of higher status, and also religiously 
mixed, whereas at secondary level each group services its own community. The figures 
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reflect the tendency for Catholic men to enter traditionally 'female' occupations, as they 
have been excluded from the more 'male' occupations. 
Table 6.17 - Religion and Occupation Order, 1981 (% of Catholic Employees) 
Total Male Female 
1. Professional & related 19 19 19 
supporting management 
2. Professional & related 37 35 38 
in education, welfare and health 
3. Literary, artistic, sports 23 25 20 
4. Professional % related in 18 18 22 
science, engineering etc 
5. Managerial 25 26 24 
6. Clerical and related 24 25 24 
7. Selling 23 23 23 
8. Security and protective 13 13 11 
9. Catering. cleaning. other 32 39 31 
personal services 
10. Farming 28 29 15 
11. Materials processing 33 33 34 
(excl metal and electrical) 
12. Processing (metal & electrical) 22 22 25 
13. Painting. assembling etc 27 30 23 
14. Construction. mining 42 42 41 
16. Transport operating 29 29 21 
16. Miscellaneous 31 31 30 
Source: 1981 Census 
The Catholic share of the economically active population was 31.3% (34.3%) so the 
table suggests that Catholic were underrepresented in all occupational groups except 
2, 9, 11, 14 and 16. Representation of Catholic men was significantly higher than that 
of women in 9 and 13 which are low status occupations. Catholic women are better 
represented in 2 and 4. which are of higher status. 
Occupational classification changed yet again at the beginning of the 1990s, replacing 
the previous classification with nine groups, "with an explicitly hierarchical structure" 
(Labour Force Survey for 1991, p17). The 1990 LFS Survey gives the latest information 
based on the previous occupation classification, under very broad headings. Because 
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of the relatively small size of the survey, some groups were too small to be included. 
This information is not broken down by sex. 
Table 6.18 - Religion and Occupation Order, 1990 (% Catholic Employees) 
2. Professional & related in education, 
welfare and health 
5. Managerial 
6. Clerical and related 
7. Selling 
9. Catering, cleaning, other 
personal services 
11. Materials processing 
(excl metal and electrical) 
12. Processing (metal & electrical) 
15. Transport operating 
Source: LFS, Religion Report, 1990 
% Catholic 
45 
26 
31 
33 
44 
42 
37 
36 
There are substantial differences from the 1981 Census figures, which are too big to 
reflect entirely changes in the nine-year period. The sample size for the 1990 survey is 
too small (4001 responses) to give accurate estimates at this level of disaggregation. 
The large non-response to the religion question, may well mean that the Catholic share 
in employment in particular sectors is underestimated. Finally, the Catholic share of the 
economically active population increased from 31.3% (34.3) - again probably an 
underestimate - to 40% in 1990. Given these problems which makes meaningful 
comparison difficult, the two sets of figures indicate similar areas of representation in 
the two years. 
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Table 6.19 - Religion and Occupation, 1991 (% Catholic) 
Total Economically active 36.1 (39.91 
1. Managers and Administrators 28.1 (32.21 
2. Professional occupations 36.2 (42.01 
3. Associate Professional 35.7 (41.61 
and Technical 
4. Clerical and Secretarial 29.6 (33.61 
6. Craft and related 38.2 142.91 
6. Personal and Protective 29.2 (33.21 
7. Sales occupations 29.0 (32.91 
8. Plant and Machine operatives 34.1 (38.61 
9. Other Occupations 36.1 (40.01 
Source: 1991 Census, Summary Report 
The Summary Report of the 1991 Census gives the religious composition of 
occupations based on the new classification, but the figures so far available use only 
the broad categories. These are of little use for comparing occupations over time in the 
Northern Ireland context. They combine for example personal services with protective 
services, which is particularly problematic in the context of 'Catholic' and 'Protestant 
jobs'. This shows Catholic underrepresentation in the highest status occupation (SOC 1 ); 
in the 'Protestant occupations' clerical (SOC4) and sales (SaC7); and in personal and 
protective (SaC6) which includes the security forces. 
Occupational Status 
Aunger concluded from his study of the 1971 Census that 
"Protestllnts lire disproportionately represented in the non-manuiliand skilled manuill occuplltions, 
while Catholics lire disproportionlltely represented only in the semi-ski/led, unskilled lind unemployed 
cltlSSes ... lt is pllrticularly noteworthy thllt, while the median ProtflStllnt is II skilled manual workers, 
the median Catholic is a semi-skilled mllnuill worker" (cited in FEA, p 12). 
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Table 6.20 - Occupational Class and Religion, 1971 
% Catholic % Protestant 
Professional Managerial 12 15 
Lower grade non-manual 19 26 
Skilled manual 17 19 
Semi-skilled 27 26 
Unskilled. unemployed 25 15 
Total 100 100 
Source: ibid. p 12 
While it is not possible to compare them directly, the CHS figures for Socio-economic 
group suggest a similar pattern 
Table 6.21 - Socioeconomic group by religion, all persons over 16 
1983-4 1985-7 
C P C P 
Professional managerial 4 8 5 11 
Other non manual 23 30 21 29 
skilled manual 20 21 20 20 
semi-skilled manual 26 23 28 23 
unskilled manual 11 8 9 7 
Insufficient information 15 9 16 10 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: CHS. 1989 
These latter figures should be treated with caution due to the small sample size. The 
large percentage changes between the two periods, particularly in professional 
managerial, suggest sampling error. The high number of insufficient information includes 
those who have never worked, a larger group among Catholics. 
Osborne and Cormack's analysis of the 1981 (1987) census based on the Registrar 
General's classification shows similar patterns of difference (pp 20-28). The more 
recent results from the FEC suggests that there has been some movement. Taking 
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sacs 1 and 2 together as senior jobs, the FEC reports an increase from 31.5% to 
32.4% in the Catholic share from the previous year. Given a Catholic share of 35.3% 
of the monitored workforce, this represents a small but significant underrepresentation. 
These broad groups conceal substantial differences within categories. An FEC survey 
of senior public sector staff in 1990 showed that of employees earning over £35,000, 
78.4% were Protestant; the figures for those earning between £25,000 and £35,0000 
was 78.3% (FEC, 1990, p12). 
Another issue of concern to the FEC is the high degree of religious segregation shown 
by their monitoring returns. Of 1,758 private firms returning monitoring information in 
1991,273 (employing 16,216 people) had a workforce consisting of 95% or more of 
one religion. They report that 60% of employees in single-site companies work in firms 
with substantial under representation of one community (FEC, 1991, p8). 
While there are no comparable figures for the overall level of gender segregation, 
studies commissioned by the EOCNI have pointed to a high degree of both horizontal 
and vertical segregation in specific industries (see for example Ingram & McLaughlin, 
1991; McGuire, 1987; Maguire, 1989). The clothing industry employs 16% of 
manufacturing employees. McLaughlin and Ingram found that 83% of the workforce 
was employed in highly sex-segregated occupations. Of 47 occupations on which data 
was collected, only five were not sex-segregated (p13). Maguire noted that although 
the workforce in retailing is 61 % female, this was not evenly distributed. Women were 
83% of staff in chemist shops, for example, but only 17% in motor vehicles and parts 
(p38). A survey of retail occupations in Belfast revealed that women were 64% of total 
staff, but only 32.2% of managers, and 26.5% of professional staff (ibid, p46). 
Respondents to the 1990 EOCNI survey were asked if they mainly worked alongside 
men, women or both. Just over a quarter (26%) said they worked with women; 58% 
with men and women; 10% worked alone; and 4% worked with men. 
Education 
The pattern of occupational specialisation by gender and religion appears to be 
reproduced partly through the education system. Osborne's 1985 study of religion and 
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education qualifications found a continuing tendency for Catholics to specialise in the 
arts and humanities, particularly among girls. 
A small scale survey of job choice among secondary school pupils in Derry found 
continuing differences in aspirations. Although the numbers involved were small, and 
the range of occupations chosen limited, it illustrates the generally lower levels of 
expectation among Catholics. 50% of Protestant boys wanted to be foremen, as 
opposed to only 15% of Catholics. Teaching is by far the most popular non-manual 
occupation for Catholics, but less popular for Protestants. Another striking difference 
is the 10% of Catholic boys who chose the traditionally 'female' occupation of nursing, 
which was not chosen by any Protestant boys. 
Table 6.22 - First choice of jobs of secondary school pupils (%) 
Catholic Protestant Catholic Protestant 
Boys Boys Girls Girls 
Bricklayer 30 15 0 0 
Secretary 0 0 25 15 
Nurse 10 0 15 15 
Civil Servant 0 10 0 10 
Bank Clerk 10 0 0 20 
Teacher 35 26 60 36 
Foreperson 15 60 0 5 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Mcllwaine. 1992 
Attitudes to Work 
Differences in the labour market experience of Protestant and Catholic women cannot 
be explained by the persistence of 'traditional attitudes'. A study for the EOCNI (Kremer 
& Curry, 1986) found that on a standard I Attitudes to Women' scale, Catholics were 
noticeably more liberal than Protestants. This was true of both sexes, but was more 
significant for women. Catholic women had more progressive views, both in terms of 
work and general social attitudes. The most liberal views were held, however, by those 
who stated their religion as 'none' (p 27). The authors point out that overall attitudes 
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did not differ significantly from those measured in British surveys (p31). The crucial 
difference was that 
-the younger male population do not seem to be as imbued with the spirit of liberalism lIS lire their 
female counterparts ... (and) ... without the liberal lead normally provided by the young, or indeed 
the middle and professional classes then traditional attitudes and stereotypes are undoubtedly going 
to persist that much longer- (p5 7). 
It would appear that it is those people likely to be in positions of influence within the 
labour market who are most resistant to change. In a cautious conclusion to the last of 
the 'Womanpower' series, Trewsdale argues that equality legislation "although not 
ideal, has contributed to improving women's position in employment since the 
mid-1970s" (p47). The main problem, she argues, remains sex segregation, and the 
large number of low-paid and part-time workers, many of whom remain outside official 
statistics. 
Income 
Religious Differences 
Figures are available for income, broken down by sex or religion but not both. The CHS 
provides figures for 1986-7 on personal income, based on self assessment of employed 
adults, by religion. These showed a significant difference in distribution between the 
two communities 
Table 6.23 - Personal income, employed adults 1986-7 (%) 
£ Catholic Protestant 
< 2,000 16 13 
2,000 - 3,999 22 18 
4,000 - 6,999 26 23 
6,000 - 9,999 26 24 
10,000 - 14,999 10 14 
16,000 and over 3 7 
Total 100 100 
source: CHS Monitor, 1989 
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While almost two thirds (63%) of Catholics earned less than £6,000, the figure for 
Protestants was 54%. More than one in five (21 %) Protestants earned over than 
£10,000 compared to just over one in eight (13%) Catholics. These figures are for 
people in work, and therefore do not take account of different levels of unemployment. 
Table 6.24 - Gross household income from all sources, 1986-7 (%) 
£ Catholic Protestant 
< 2,000 8 6 
2,000 - 3,999 31 24 
4,000 - 5,999 20 17 
6,000 - 9,999 21 20 
10,000 - 14,999 12 18 
15,000 and over 9 14 
Source: CHS Monitor, 1989 
The addition of all household incomes reduces the numbers in the lowest category, but 
in spite of the larger average household size of Catholics, household income displays 
greater disparity than personal income. There are 59% of households earning under 
£6,000, compared to less than half (47%) of Protestant families. At the upper end, just 
over a fifth (21 %) of Catholic households have incomes of more than £ 10 ,000, 
compared to almost a third (32%) of Protestant households. The difference at the 
bottom reflects different rates of unemployment, while at the top there is a larger 
proportion of two income families among Protestants. 
Difference in household income is reflected in ownership of consumer durables. 
Protestant ownership for each item listed by the CHS is equal to or greater than 
Catholic. The difference tends to be greater for newer products, such as microwave 
ovens (8% difference) electric food mixers (18%) or freezers (26%). But even for the 
telephone, which many now regard as a necessity, there is a 15% differential. Car 
ownership is significantly lower for Catholics (52% compared to 61 %). Access to a car 
is important in determining travel to work distance. There are differences in the 
standard of accommodation, with for example 13% of Catholics overcrowded, 
compared to 4% of Protestants. 
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Gender Differences 
Women's hourly earnings have increased from 69.7% of men's in 1974, to 78.6% in 
1989 (EOeNI, 1990). Average weekly earnings in 1991 were 80.2% of men's. But 
non-manual earnings were only 70.5%, and manual 72.5% (Annual Abstract of 
Statistics, 1991). The higher average figure is because there are a greater proportion 
of women in the higher paid non-manual occupations. 
Table 6.25 - Gross weekly earnings (including overtime) 1981-91 
Lowest Decile 
£ % of median 
Manual Men 1981 71.3 69.0 
1991 122.4 62.5 
Non-manual men 1981 78.8 55.0 
1991 141.6 45.8 
Manual Women 1981 48.3 69.8 
1991 91.8 71.2 
Non-manual 1981 53.1 62.9 
women 1991 111.0 55.3 
Source: OED, unpublished figures 
Median 
£ 
103.4 
195.9 
143.3 
309.4 
69.2 
129.0 
84.4 
200.6 
Highest Decile 
£: % of median 
157.0 161.8 
323.0 164.9 
262.9 183.6 
623.4 169.2 
100.9 146.8 
201.4 156.1 
168.2 187.4 
349.1 174.0 
For all except manual women, employees in the bottom decile were earning 
proportionately less in 1991 than in 1981. This latter change was small (1.4%) whereas 
the increase in disparity ranged from 2.4% to 9.2%. At the top of the scale, the spread 
decreased for non-manual workers, but increased for manual workers. The figures 
include only full-time employees; the spread in earnings would have been larger had 
part-time employees been included. 
The impact on the male-female differential is mixed. Between 1981 and 1991, the gap 
in median earnings widened for manual, and narrowed for non-manual workers. At the 
lower end, the differential became lower, while it widened at the top for non-manual 
workers. The median income of female workers in both cases was less than two thirds 
of the male rate. 
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Table 6.26 - Women's earnings as percentage of men's 
Manual 
Non-manual 
1981 
1991 
1981 
1991 
Source: calculated from above 
Lowest 
Decile 
67.7 
75.0 
67.4 
78.4 
Median 
66.9 
65.9 
58.9 
64.8 
Highest 
Decile 
64.3 
62.4 
60.2 
66.7 
Taken together the two sets of figures suggest that Catholic women suffer doubly from 
low income in work, as well as being less likely to be in formal employment than any 
other group. 
Unpaid Labour 
The burden of unpaid domestic labour continues to fall overwhelmingly on women. 
Campbell et al (1990) found that men were unlikely to take responsibility for domestic 
labour even if they were not in paid work. Using CHS data, they found that among 
unemployed men whose wives were in work, only 16% described themselves as 
keeping house, while only 1 % did so if their wife was also unemployed. 
A survey of the sexual division of labour in the household undertaken for the study, 
showed a clear separation of male and female tasks. Women with children did 4 times 
more domestic labour than men; women without children did 2 and a half times more. 
On average women with children spent 51 hours per week on housework and childcare, 
compared to 13 hours for men. Even where the woman was in paid employment she 
still carried the bulk of domestic responsibility, reducing her leisure time, and 
reorganising domestic tasks to evenings and weekends. 
Conclusion 
The figures discussed above suggest that in spite of equality legislation and the 
expansion of state employment, patterns of disadvantage by both sex and religion 
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persist. The most obvious indicator is the continuity of the unemployment differential, 
while income levels show economic disadvantage both for those in work and outside. 
Current legislation makes individually motivated acts of religious or sexual discrimination 
more difficult, but patterns of disadvantage and segregation have been laid down over 
a considerable number of years and 
"led to the acceptance of patterns of advant8{Je, exclusion and segregation BS part of every-dlJY life 
... current patterns can be the result of pBSt discrimination sustained by contemporary prlJctices and 
behlJviour which are not overtly discriminatory" (Osborne 81 Cormack, 1983, p228) 
Although most commentators believe that Catholic women suffer disadvantage primarily 
on account of sex, Campbell et al (1990) found that 
"Catholic females still suffer problems on account of their religious denomination lIS well BS their 
gender. This is reflected in their status within, rather than their exclusion from, certain occupations" 
(p70) 
The greatest degree of difference is in access to the formal labour market, with Catholic 
men unable to take on the 'breadwinner' role, while Catholic women are not able to 
substitute in this role. But the figures also reveal a continuing pattern of specialisation 
by those in work by occupation and industrial group. This reflects the differential 
relation of each group to the state and the labour market. 
Notes to Chapter Six 
1. According to Compton's estimates of the religion of non-respondents, these were disproportionately 
Catholic in 1971, and more evenly distributed in 1981 (cited in Cormack & Osborne, p11. But even if these 
estimates are accepted, they do not necessarily apply to each individual region. 
2. This phrase is used to describe people who are engaging in informal paid employment while claiming 
benefit. 
3. Seminar paper on PlJrt-time Employment by J. Trewsdale, Depertment of Economics, QUB, March 20th 
1992. 
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Chapter Seven 
Private Sector Employment 
Introduction 
The next two chapters examine in more detail sections of the private and public sectors, 
in order to gain a more detailed understanding of the patterns of religious and gender 
disadvantage revealed in Chapter Six. 
This chapter is concerned with the private sector. It concentrates particularly on 
multinational companies, in an attempt to provide some empirical evidence for the 
continuing debate about the relationship between multinationals and sectarianism. As 
Teague (1987) argues, there has been a tendency on both sides of the anti-
imperialist/revisionist debate to view multinationals as homogeneous, with a common, 
and uni-dimensional, impact on socio-economic conditions, in particular on sectarianism 
(p165). The material discussed below shows a more complex picture. 
The existence of the MacBride campaign is itself evidence that multinational 
corporations do not automatically undermine discrimination. Patrick Doherty, speaking 
for the campaign, put it like this: 
"when American companies were opening facilities, it becllme a question of when in Rome, do lIS 
the Romans do, and it WIIS fIIirly ellSY to (even in some clISes inadvertently), fall into II system in 
which sectarianism WIIS at the very lesst tolerated" (IRRC, 7990, p3). 
The campaign around the MacBride Principles and the subsequent Fair Employment 
legislation has forced these companies to examine their employment practices. They 
must make at least a formal commitment to equal opportunities, and are required to 
monitor the composition of the workforce regularly. But the actual implementation of 
employment practices varies, as policy depends on the corporate priorities of the 
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individual firm, and for example the degree of autonomy of the local plant. US firms 
tend to be decentralised relative to those from East Asia, and it is top management in 
these companies which displays the greatest sectarian imbalance.' The outcome of 
these policies also depends on the location of the firm within Northern Ireland, itself not 
a neutral issue. 
The Industrial Development Board (lOB), the body responsible for attracting foreign 
capital and negotiating state subsidies, does not appear to prioritise fair employment. 
Its Annual Report for 1990-91 makes no mention of religious, or of gender equality. The 
many pictures of prominent lOB personnel reveal an all male Board and top 
management, with a male director of every division. The only two women staff 
members pictured are identified merely by their division. The only reference to 'social' 
issues was a short section on Making Belfast Work headed Special Initiatives. This 
stated that the lOB is "playing its full part in the effort to address the serious problems 
in these areas" (p69), and reported that work had started on two advance factories in 
West Belfast. 
In the year 1990-1, just under 25% of new jobs assisted by the lOB were in Belfast. 
Sixteen companies which received more than £5,000 in assistance were based in 
Belfast: of these, eleven were monitored in 1991, while the others had not yet become 
established. The returns show that four of these firms, (with a total workforce of 159) 
employed less than 1 0 Catholics; another three had a significant underrepresentation 
of Catholics: Baker Hughes employed 262, of which over 90% were Protestant; the 
Cooperative Wholesale Society employed 562, (over 80% Protestant); Linfield Group 
employed 635 (over 70%). Catholics were in a majority in two small firms employing 
a total of 69. In the other two, Catholics were overrepresented: Platform which 
employed 141 (55% Protestant); and Ford, in West Belfast, employed 716 (58%). 
These figures suggest that lOB funds are serving to renew existing patterns of sectarian 
division rather than to challenge them. 
The first section of this chapter deals with the general pattern of employment in the 
private sector; the second part is concerned with multinational companies; the third part 
examines in more detail North American companies, including two individual firms; the 
fourth examines the British-dominated financial sector. 
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The FEe Monitoring Returns 
Most of the information in this chapter is based on the 1991 Fair Employment 
monitoring returns. Although compulsory monitoring of firms employing over 25 people 
begun in 1990, publication of the details of individual firms was delayed until 1992, 
with the second year's monitoring returns. This was published as the FEe's Second 
Research Report. 
The religious composition of individual firms is given, under the categories Protestant; 
Catholic and Non Determined. Employers have the responsibility for determining the 
religion of employees, and may use one of three methods: educational background 
(particularly primary school data); self-identification by the employee; or the residuary 
method - the use of 
-a number of pieces of information about an individual which, if known, can give II rellSonable 
indication of community bllckground- (FEC, 7992, p2). 
The non determined category includes those originating from outside Northern Ireland, 
as well as those for it was not possible to determine a religion. The FEe's methods are 
concerned with establishing community background rather than religious belief. This 
differs from the census, where the category none allows people to refuse a religious 
identification. 
The report gives details of 1708 individual firms2 employing over 25 people for which 
monitoring information was submitted, with a total employment of 196,940. Where 
there are less than 10 employees of one religious group, only the total number of 
employees is given. It also contains a summary of the monitoring returns, which gives 
global information broken down by sex, occupation and industrial structure. 
The data on individual firms is limited in a number of ways: most serious for the 
purposes of this work, it is not broken down by gender. The reason given by the FEe 
is the legal requirement that no individual's religion should be identified; breaking the 
data down further would make individual cell sizes too small to guarantee anonymity. 
Individual firms' returns give only the total numbers employed from each religious 
group, with no details of the occupational structure. They do not distinguish between 
part-time and full-time employees. A further problem is that in multi-site operations, an 
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apparently religiously balanced workforce may disguise high degrees of segregation on 
individual sites. 
The information excludes all firms employing less than 25 people, and any which did 
not submit returns although required to under the legislation. 3 Some smaller firms 
submitted information, which is included in the summary. Employment in these firms 
was less than 3,000, and the religious composition of the workforce is the same when 
they are excluded, so it is safe to assume that the patterns revealed in the general 
analysis are replicated for the firms for which individual information is available. 
The data below is supplemented with additional material, including reports of FEC 
investigations into individual companies and sectors; investigations carried out by the 
US-based Inventory Responsibility Research Centre on US firms (Booth & Bertsch, 
1989); and interviews with equal opportunities managers, and material supplied by 
individual firms. The FEe also supplied me with information on the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) of individual monitored firms, and the gender composition of large 
firms. 
The tables below are based on a combination of these sources. For those taken from 
the FEC's own analysis of the monitoring returns, the source given is Summary of 
Monitoring Returns with the appropriate page number. Others were constructed from 
individual firms' monitoring returns, and the source is given as FEe monitoring returns. 
In general, figures for religious composition are given in () brackets where they refer to 
the percentage of the total workforce; and in [] brackets where they refer to 
percentages of the total whose religion was determined (excluding non determined). 
The Monitored Workforce 
The monitored private sector workforce was 34% Catholic (35.1 % excluding the non 
determined category). The total workforce according to the 1991 Census was 35.22% 
Catholic (39.8% if the categories none and not stated are excluded). The figures 
suggest underrepresentation of Catholics, particularly Catholic men, in private 
employment. 
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Although an accurate figure for the non-monitored private sector workforce is not 
available, it is possible to make an estimate using figures for the workforce as a whole. 
In June 1991, there were 304,540 employees in employment excluding Other Services, 
which are predominantly public (NIEC, 1991 b, p22). This suggests a minimum of 
105,163 people in non-monitored private employment, or over a third of the private 
sector workforce. 
Table 7.1 - Religious composition of monitored workforce, 1991 
Protestant Catholic Non- Total 
Determined 
Male 73.551 37.059 4,464 115.074 
(63.9)[66.5) (32.21 (33.6) (3.91 (57.71 
Female 61.575 30.713 2.014 84.303 
(61.2) (62.7) (36.4) (37.3) (2.4) (42.31 
Total 125.127 67.772 6,478 199.377 
(62.8)[64.9) (34.01 (35.1) (3.21 (1001 
Source: FEC Summary of 1991 Monitoring Returns. p60 
Occupation, gender and religion 
Table 7.2 shows marked specialisations by gender and religion. 60.8% of male 
employees are concentrated in three occupations (SaCs 5, 8 and 1) while a similar 
proportion of women (59.7%) are in sacs 4, 8 and 7. Only 8 (plant and machine 
operatives) is common. Apart from 8, only 9 (other occupations) and 3 (associate 
professional and technical) employ comparable proportions of men and women. There 
are clearly male and female occupations. 
Differences in religious composition are smaller, but significant. Some discrepancies 
appear due to the exclusion of the non determined category. For example, 16.3% of 
SOC2 are non Determined presumably due to the large number in professional 
occupations who originate from outside Northern Ireland. 
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Table 7.2 - Private Sector Employment by Occupation 
Male Female Total Total 
p C P C male female 
SOC 1 : Managers 70.7 29.3 62.0 38.0 
and administrators [11.81 [9.61 [4.71 [4.81 [11.11 14.81 
SOC2: Professional 67.9 32.1 56.8 43.2 
occupations [3.71 [3.41 [1.71 [2.21 [4.11 12.11 
SOC3: Associate 74.1 25.9 60.3 39.7 
Professional & Tech [6.71 [4.71 [4.6) [5.1) [6.1) [4.9) 
SOC4: Clerical 72.3 27.7 70.8 29.2 
Secretarial 17.2) [5.5) [28.1) [19.5) [6.6) 124.81 
SOC5: Craft & 68.2 31.8 56.8 43.2 
Skilled Manual [27.61 [26.6) [9.31 [11.81 [26.6) 110.81 
SOC6: Personal & 60.8 39.2 55.4 44.6 
Protective Services [3.71 [4.8) [6.1) [8.3) [4.11 [7.01 
SOC7: Sales 67.5 32.5 64.8 35.2 
[7.4) [7.11 [15.2) [13.8) [7.2) [14.6) 
SOC8: Plant & Machine 63.2 36.8 56.7 43.3 
Operatives [22.2) [25.7) [18.61 [23.8) [23.1) [20.3) 
SOC9: Other 68.5 41.5 65.0 35.0 
[9.71 113.71 [11.71 [10.51 [11.0) [11.21 
Note: The first set of figures are for Protestant or Catholic a8 a percentage of those for whom a religion wa8 
determined. Figures in II brackets are for the proportion of each group in that occupation. 
Source: FEC, Summary of 1991 monitoring returns, pp54-6 
Catholic men are underrepresented (relative to their general under-representation in the 
monitored workforce) in all occupations except 6,8 and 9. The difference is fairly small 
in 2, 5 and 7; it is significant in , and 4; particularly large in 3. Catholic women are 
underrepresented in only three occupations, 4, 7 and 9, most significantly in clerical and 
secretarial work. This is the most numerous occupation for Protestant women, but only 
second for Catholic women. They are most highly represented in the low status 
personal services, but are also overrepresented in professional occupations and in 
manual occupations associated with manufacturing. 
Only clerical and secretarial appears to be a distinctly Protestant occupation, while 6 
(personnel and protective) and 8 (plant and machine operatives) are Catholic. But there 
are Protestant male occupations (', 3, and to a lesser extent 5); Protestant female (4); 
Catholic male (8, 9); and Catholic female (2, 6 and 8). 
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Employment by Industry 
Table 7.3 - Private Sector Employment by Industrial Sector 
Male Female Total Total 
P C P C male female 
SICO: Agriculture. 45.0 55.0 40.0 60.0 
forestry, fish (0.041 (O.OSI (0.021 (0.051 (0.051 (0.041 
SIC1: Energy, water 65.6 34.4 SO.O 20.0 
supply (0.051 (0.061 (0.021 (0.011 (0.051 (0.011 
SIC2: Minerals. 55.0 45.0 67.S 32.2 
chemicals (5.21 (S.61 (2.01 11.61 (6.21 11.91 
SIC3: Engineering 77.9 22.1 67.9 32.1 
Vehicles 123.31 113.11 IS.21 16.5) 119.S) 17.5) 
SIC4: Other 67.2 32.S 58.2 41.S 
Manufacturing 124.61 123.9) 129.21 135.31 124.11 131.3) 
SIC5: Construction 56.1 43.9 69.2 30.8 
Construction 17.91 112.41 11.11 (0.81 19.41 (1.01 
SIC6:Distribution, 65.1 34.9 65.4 34.6 
hotel. catering 117.11 118.21 (27.01 (24.01 (17.31 125.81 
SIC7: Transport. 67.2 33.S 60.7 39.3 
construction 16.01 (4.91 (2.01 (2.21 15.11 12.0) 
SICS:Banking. insur- 72.6 27.4 70.7 29.3 
ance. finance 19.71 17.61 112.3) IS.6) IS.S) 110.9) 
SIC9: Other Services 54.3 45.7 59.2 40.S 
17.0) 111.7) 11S.0) 120.9) 19.1) 119.5) 
Note: The first set of figures are Protestant or Catholic as percentage of those for whom a religion was 
determined. Figures in " brackets are for proportion of each group in that occupation. 
Source: FEC, Summary of 1991 Monitoring Returns. pages 60-61 
For both males and females the most numerous industry is 'other manufacturing', 
although it is more important for women. Nearly a fifth of men are in engineering and 
vehicle manufacture compared to one in twelve women. Concentration is significantly 
higher for women, with 87.5% of employees in four industries, compared to 70.3% of 
men. Catholic men are underrepresented in 3, 4 and 8. The difference is greatest for 
3: the second largest male employer, it is a distinctly Protestant male area. Banking and 
insurance shows sizeable Catholic underrepresentation for both sexes. Catholic women 
are overrepresented in 4, 7 and 9. Other manufacturing, employs over a third of 
Catholic women, but Catholic men are underrepresented in this sector. 
There are, therefore, Protestant male industries (3, 8); Catholic male (5, 9); Protestant 
female (8) and Catholic female (4, 9). 
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Size of Private Sector Firms 
The proportion of Catholics employed is inversely related to the size of firms. 
Table 7.4 - Religious composition by company size (%) 
No of Employees 
less than 51 
1-100 
101-260 
261 + 
Protestant 
61.4 
63.4 
64.1 
66.9 
Catholic 
38.6 
36.6 
36.9 
33.1 
Source: FEC, Summary of 1991 monitoring returns, p62 
% of Total Employees 
16.0 
17.0 
21.6 
46.6 
This trend continues for firms employing over 500, with the Catholic proportion falling 
still further. 
Table 7.5 - Employment in large firms (> 500 employees) 
Protestant Catholic Non-Determined Total 
Male 26,190 (69.6) 9,473 (26.2) 1,616 36,178 
Female 17,666 (58.8) 11,660 (38.8) 723 30,048 
Total 43,330 (66.4) 21,133 (31.9) 2,238 66,226 
167.71 132.31 
Source: Unpublished data from 1991 monitoring returns 
Total Catholic representation is lower in firms employing over 500 (32.3%) this is due 
to shortfall of Catholic males, while there is a higher proportion of Catholic women in 
large firms. 
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Table 7.6 - Religious and sex composition of employment by company size (% of total 
where religion was determined) 
No of 
Employees 
<500 
>500 
Male 
Protestant 
63.7 
72.7 
Catholic 
36.3 
27.3 
Female 
Protestant 
64.0 
60.2 
Source: Unpublished data from 1991 Monitoring Returns 
Catholic 
36.0 
39.S 
This imbalance reflects the phenomenon of predominantly Protestant male plants (for 
example engineering) and Catholic female plants (for example clothing) which are 
common in large companies. 
Religious Segregation 
The FEC reports that of the 1708 monitored firms listed, 814 (48%) had less than 10 
employees of one religion. The actual religious composition of these firms is not given, 
due to the requirement not to identify the religion of an individual. Of these firms, 559 
(68.7%) were mainly Protestant, and 255 (31.3%) Catholic. The majority (70.9%) were 
small with less than 51 employees. This means that the maximum percentage of the 
minority religion (ie if there were 9 employees) ranges from 34.6% to 18% for this 
group. Most of the other firms (25.3%) were in the 51-100 range implying a maximum 
minority representation of between 17.6% and 9%; 28 firms employed between 101 
and 250 (8.9% to 3.6%); three employed over 250. All the last three were Catholic: 
Sean Quinn which employed 271 (maximum Protestant percentage 3.3%); Glen 
Electric, 320 (2.8%); United Technologies, 739 (1.2%). 
These firms employed 39,379 people (19.8% of employees in monitored firms), of 
which 26,380 (67%) were in Protestant firms, and 12,999. (33%) in Catholic firms. For 
convenience, these are referred to below as Protestant-segregated or 
Catholic-segregated to distinguish them from the other group with a religious imbalance. 
The latter are firms where the religious composition is given but one religion is 
substantially underrepresented. These are referred to below as Protestant-dominated 
and Catholic-dominated. 
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Table 7.7 - Firms with less than 25% of one religious group 
% of majority Protestent-dominated Catholic-dominated Total 
religion no empl no empl no empl 
>90% 24 9,713 4 675 28 10,388 
80-89.9% 123 34,391 29 5,024 152 39,415 
75-79.9% 84 16,204 23 3,763 107 19,967 
Total 231 60,308 56 9,462 287 69,770 
Source: FEC Monitoring Returns for 1991 
This group employed over a third of employees (35%). Together with segregated firms, 
they total over a half (54.8%) of the monitored workforce. Even this underestimates the 
amount of segregation, due to multi-site operations. For example the US company Lee 
Apparel has an almost evenly balanced workforce (45.6% Protestant), but this is 
achieved with a predominantly Protestant plant at Newtownards (91.4% in 1988)' and 
a Catholic (97.5% in 1988) plant in Derry (Booth & Bertsch, 1989 p118). Segregation 
also has a gender dimension, with the Catholic workforce in Derry predominantly 
female, and the workforce at Newtonards predominantly male.4 
While most segregated firms were small, the latter group tend to be larger, including for 
example the largest private sector firm, Short Brothers. Most (80.4%) are 
Protestant-dominated, with 86.4% of the employees in this group. When the two 
groups are broken down by industrial sector, different patterns emerge for the two 
communities. 
Four of the 24 most Protestant-dominated firms (> 90%), including Harland and Wolff, 
are in engineering and vehicles, and fifteen in other manufacturing. Together these 
account for 88.8% of total employment. By contrast, there are only four firms with 
more than 90% Catholic employment; these are much smaller, with half the 
employment in other services. A more mixed picture emerges for those employing over 
80% of one religion. The Protestant firms are still dominated by manufacturing (56.3% 
of employment), with 36% in engineering and vehicles. But there is a significant 
proportion in distribution and banking, while none of the Catholic firms are in these 
groups. Over two thirds of employment in Catholic-dominated firms are in 
manufacturing, almost all in general manufacturing, and 61 % of this in the traditional 
Catholic industry, clothing. While the Protestant group includes some of the largest 
241 
companies in Northern Ireland, Catholic dominated firms are generally much smaller; 
only one firm employs more than a thousand, and four over 250. Four of the five are 
clothing companies. 
Table 7.8 - Employment by SIC (Protestant and Catholic-dominated firms) 
Protestant Firms Catholic Firms 
>90% >80% >90% >80% 
no empl no empl no empl no empl 
SIC2: Minerals 1 272 4 717 1 122 2 179 
& chemicals 4.2 2.8 3.3 2.1 25 18.1 6.9 3.6 
SIC3: Engineer- 4 3536 11 12650 -- 2 272 
ing, vehicles 16.7 36.4 8.9 36.8 6.9 5.4 
SIC4: Other 15 5088 30 6695 -- 12 3316 
Manufacturing 62.5 52.4 24.4 19.5 41.4 66.0 
SIC5: 1 353 11 1613 -- 6 665 
Construction 4.2 3.6 8.9 4.7 20.7 13.2 
SIC6: Distri- 1 139 32 5638 --
bution, hotel 4.2 1.4 26.0 16.4 
SIC7: Transport 2 325 2 166 
communication 8.3 3.3 1.6 0.5 
SIC8: Banking 24 5577 1 202 
insurance, finance 19.5 16.2 25 30.0 
SIC9: Other 9 1317 2 351 7 592 
Services 7.3 3.8 50 52.0 24.1 11.8 
Note: lower figures are percentages of each group in that SIC 
Source: FEC monitoring returns for 1991; unpublished data from monitoring returns 
Segregated firms are, with three exceptions, relatively small, and more evenly spread 
between industrial sectors. Over a third of Catholic firms are in other services, 
predominantly religious, education and community groups which serve the Catholic 
community. One in five Protestant-segregated firms are in this group. Protestant 
dominance of financial services is evident, with 48 of the Protestant firms in this sector, 
compared with only five small Catholic firms. 
These patterns reflect the structure of ownership of capital in Northern Ireland. A large 
number of small Catholic-owned firms employ mainly Catholics, and a similar relative 
number of Protestant firms. But the large firms tend to be Protestant-owned (either 
currently or in the past), and, except where they operate in overwhelmingly Catholic 
areas, have established exclusionary practices against Catholics. The large 
Catholic-dominated firms have a predominantly female workforce, whereas 
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Protestant-dominated firms are largely male. Exclusionary practices were aimed at 
maintaining both gender and religious dominance. 
Table 7.9 - Employment by SIC (segregated firms) 
Protestant Arms C.thollo Arms 
no empl no empl 
SICO: Agriculture 29 1 66 
forestry, fish 0.02 0.1 0.4 0.4 
SIC1: Energy, 1 37 
water supply 0.02 0.1 
SIC2: Minerals, 29 1127 13 469 
chemicals 6.2 4.3 6.2 3.6 
SIC3: Engineering 61 2198 20 1691 
Vehicles 9.1 8.3 7.9 13.0 
SIC4: Other 121 6346 43 1883 
Manufacturing 2.2 24.1 17.1 14.6 
SIC6: Construction 42 1696 41 1790 
7.6 6.4 16.3 13.8 
SIC6: Distribution, 146 6869 40 2099 
hotel, catering 26.0 26.0 16.9 16.1 
SIC7: Transport 18 863 2 108 
communication 3.2 3.3 0.8 0.8 
SIC8: Banking, 48 2043 5 163 
insurance, finance 8.6 7.7 2.0 1.2 
SIC9: Other Services 104 6063 86 4499 
18.5 19.2 34.1 34.6 
Source: FEC Monitoring Returns for 1991; unpublished data from monitoring returns 
Segregation and Location 
A marked difference emerges in comparing the location of these religiously segregated 
firms. The Summary Report of the 1991 Census gives religious composition for the 26 
District Council districts, which are the most detailed figures yet available for that year. 
This is only a crude measure of 'labour availability': there are major intra-regional 
differences in religious composition; while different occupational groups have different 
average travel to work distances, with higher status occupations tending to recruit from 
further afield. 
Table 7.1 Oa shows that all the large Catholic-dominated firms are in predominantly 
Catholic areas, while the reverse is not true (Table 1 O.b). There are 36 firms employing 
more than 250 people which are more than 80% Protestant: of these, 11 are in 
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predominantly Protestant areas, while 6 are in mainly Catholic areas. Of the rest, 7 are 
in Belfast, and 7 operate throughout Northern Ireland (generally with headquarters in 
Belfast) so their employment should approximate to the Northern Ireland average: 3 are 
on mixed sites, and 2 are in Craigavon, where the Protestant population is roughly the 
same as the Northern Ireland average. The existence of Protestant-dominated firms 
across Northern Ireland reflects Protestant control of political and economic power. 
Table 7.1 Oa - location of Catholic firms 
Firm Empl- Location 
oyment 
> 90% Catholic 
Belleek Pottery 1 22 Fermanagh 
Derry Londonderry Inner 169 
City Trust 
Newry & Mourne Co-op 202 
Aid (Community) 182 
Newry 
• 
>80% Catholic (>250 employees) 
Adria 
Arntz Belting 
Sherman, Ben 
Sca packaging 
City Shirt Co 
1047 Strabane/ 
Fermanagh 
260 Derry 
437 Derry/Armagh 
254 Newry 
391 Derry 
Catholic Segregated firms (> 250 employees) 
Glen Electric 
Sean Quinn 
United Technologies 
320 
271 
739 
Newry & Mourne 
Fermanagh 
Derry 
% Prot 
(work-
force) 
8.2 
9.0 
9.1 
9.9 
12.3 
12.4 
12.7 
15.7 
16.5 
% Prot 
(District 
Council) 
41.6 
25.4 
21.6 
35.1/ 
41.6 
25.4 
25.4/51.0 
21.6 
25.4 
21.6 
41.6 
26.4 
Note: Protestant percentages in District Council areas are of total for whom a religion was stated 
• Location unknown 
Source: FEC Monitoring Returns; 1991 Census (Summary Report) 
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Table 7.1 Ob - Location of Protestant firms (> 250 employees) 
Firm Empl- Location % Prot % Prot 
oyment (work- (District 
force) Council) 
>90% Protestant 
Sunblest bakeries 365 Belfast 96.4 54.9 
Henry Bros 353 Magherafelt 96.3 37.2 
Howden Sirocco 408 Belfast 95.3 54.9 
Harland and Wolf 2691 Belfast 94.3 54.9 
Ambler 298 Newtownabbey 93.8 84.7 
Dale Farm Dairies 472 NI, Belfast HQ 93.7 56.9/54.9 
N.I. Spinners 409 Ards 93.1 86.7 
Ulster Carpet Mills 605 Craigavon 92.9 55.2 
Berkshire Hosiery 408 Ards 92.6 86.7 
Hughes Tools 262 Belfast 92.5 54.9 
Campbell Henry 347 Newtownabbey 91.9 84.7 
Bairdwear 589 Down 91.2 37.2 
CV Carpets 340 Down 90.8 37.2 
3M Industrial tapes 272 Down 90.4 37.2 
Ewart Liddell 323 Down 90.1 37.2 
>80% Protestant 
Turkington 254 Craigavon 88.5 55.2 
Charles Hurst 453 NI, Belfast HQ 87.9 56.9/54.9 
Short Bros 8647 Belfast 87.6 54.9 
Gallaher 1574 Ballymena 86.8 79.6 
Supermac 253 Belfast 86.7 54.9 
Lummus Mackie 626 Belfast 86.3 54.9 
Henderson 327 NI 85.8 66.9 
Co-op 662 NI, Belfast HQ 85.5 56.9/64.9 
Securicor 660 Belfast/Omagh 85.2 54.9/31.6 
Crestacare 629 NI, Belfast HQ 85.0 56.9/54.9 
Camco 286 Newtownabbey 84.7 84.7 
Northern Telecom 1813 Newtownabbey/ 84.3 84.7/54.9 
Belfast 
Barbour Campbell 317 Lisburn 84.2 69.3 
Rfd 317 Lisburn 84.0 69.3 
J Graham 331 Dromore, Down 83.3 37.2 
Compass Services 965 Cookstown/ 83.0 43.1/54.9 
Belfast 
F.G. Wilson 590 Newtownabbey 82.6 84.7 
Cantrell 1St Cochrane 282 Belfast 81.6 64.9 
Dairy Produce Packer 343 Coleraine 81.3 74.7 
Northern Bank 2275 NI, Belfast HQ 81.1 66.9/64.9 
O'Kane Poultry 666 Ballymena 80.2 79.6 
Source: FEC Monitoring Returns; 1991 Census (Summary Report) 
Appointments 
Firms employing over 250 people were required to submit information on appointees 
in the last year. More males made applications (54.3%) but only 42.5% of appointees 
were male, indicating a lower success rate for male applicants. This reflects the decline 
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in traditional male employment and expansion of female employment, which means 
more men than women are competing for the same jobs. 
Table 7.11 - Applicants and Appointees to large firms (total) 
applicants appointees 
p c total p c total 
male 39,633 25,244 69,217 5,080 2,706 8,174 
female 31,118 24,556 58,307 5,966 4,708 11,066 
total 70,651 49,799 127,684 11,046 7,41419,240 
Note: totals include non-determined 
source: FEe Summary of 1991 monitoring returns, pp73-4 
Catholic women were overrepresented by 6.8% in both applicants and appointees 
compared to their share in the workforce, and the chance of being appointed was the 
same for both communities. Catholics men were significantly less likely than Protestants 
to be appointed, (with a 4.2% lower share of appointees than applicants). Even so, the 
Catholic male proportion of appointees was slightly above their representation in 
employment (1.3%). The disproportionate number of Catholic applications belies the 
suggestion that Catholics do not actively seek work. 
Table 7.12 - Religion and sex of applicants and appointees, 1991 (CHI) 
applicants appointees 
p c p c 
male 61.0 39.0 66.2 34.8 
female 66.9 44.1 66.9 44.1 
total 68.7 41.3 69.8 40.2 
Source: adapted from above 
Appointees are not spread evenly across occupational groups. The Catholic male 
proportion of appointees is higher than their proportion among employees in all SOCs 
except 5 and 9; they were only 18.1 % of appointees in 5 (Craft and skilled manual). 
Catholics were disproportionately represented in SOCs 1 and 2 (managerial and 
professional) but together they make up only 6.5% of all appointments. The largest 
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group of Catholic appointees is in sacs (plant and machine operatives) while for 
Protestant men it is saC5. 
For women the Catholic proportion of appointees is greater than the proportion of 
employees in all except 3,6 and 9. There are more Catholic than Protestant appointees 
in sacs 2 and S. SaC2 is a high status occupation, but it represents only 1.4% of total 
female appointments. SaC8 is lower status; it accounts for 28.7% of female 
appointments, but 36% of Catholic appointments are in this group, compared to only 
23.2% Protestant. 
A small increase in the proportion of Catholics appointments is evident, most 
significantly for women. But while Catholics are gaining a larger proportion of the small 
number of higher status appointments, patterns in the major sectors of employment are 
being perpetuated and even accentuated. Catholic men are dramatically 
underrepresented in skilled manual occupations, while the largest group of Catholic 
males is in unskilled and semi-skilled manual work. The pattern is not so clearly marked 
for women, but the biggest increase in employment for Catholic women is also in low 
status occupations. This is consistent with evidence from the 1991 Census, that 
Catholics with higher education qualifications are less disadvantaged relative to 
Protestants than those with other (or no) qualifications (see Chapter Six). 
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Table 7.13 - Private Sector Appointments by Occupation 
Male Female Total 
P C P C 
SOC1: Managers, 145 110 109 69 464 
administrators 56.9 43.1 61.2 38.8 
SOC2: Professional 116 81 44 68 413 
Occupations 58.9 41.1 39.3 60.7 
SOC3: Associate 268 115 228 108 761 
Professional/tech 70.0 30.0 67.9 32.1 
SOC4: Clerical, 333 173 751 376 1,679 
secretarial 65.8 34.2 66.6 33.4 
SOC5: Craft, 1,311 290 807 634 3,162 
skilled manual 81.9 19.1 56.0 44.0 
SOC6: Personal, prot- 295 232 351 257 1,202 
ective services 56.0 44.0 57.7 42.3 
SOC7: Sales 760 514 1,609 1,170 4,198 
59.7 40.3 57.9 42.1 
SOC8: Plant & 1,278 882 1,386 1,693 5,413 
machine operatives 59.2 40.8 45.0 55.0 
SOC9: Other 574 309 681 333 1,948 
65.0 35.0 67.2 44.1 
Note: Lower figures are percentages of total whose religion was determined 
Source: FEC Summary of monitoring returns, pp 78-9 
Appointees in large firms 
Although the average Catholic proportion of appointees is greater than the proportion 
of employees, a very uneven picture emerges from the returns of individual firms. 
Information on appointments was submitted by 123 firms employing over 250. For 65 
of these, the proportion of Catholics appointed was greater than their proportion in the 
workforce; for another 23, it was less; for 15, the difference was less than 1 % either 
way. The proportion of appointees in 20 firms was not published due to the requirement 
not to identify an individual's religion. For the three large Catholic-segregated firms the 
original proportion of Catholics was not available for comparison. The following tables 
compare employment and appointee proportions for the most segregated firms 
discussed above. No information is available on the most Catholic-dominated firms, 
since none employ more than 250. 
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Table 7.14a - Appointees in large Catholic firms 
>80% Catholic 
Empl- Appoint- Prot % Prot % of Diff 
oyment ments employees appointees % 
Adria 1047 177 12.8 9.6 3.2 
Arntz Belting 260 25 12.4 8.3 4.1 
Sherman, Ben 437 98 12.7 18.4 -5.7 
Sca packaging 254 1 15.7 nla 
City Shirt Co 391 94 16.5 13.0 3.5 
Segregated firms 
Glen Electric 320 119 nla 2.5 
Sean Quinn 271 18 nla nla 
United Technologies 739 390 nla 1.0 
Note: - sign indicates an increase in the Protestant percentage 
Source: FEC monitoring returns 
The most Catholic dominated firms are becoming even more segregated. These eight 
firms made 922 appointments, of which at least 831 were Catholic (the number is 
unknown for 2 firms). This represents 11.2% of all Catholic appointees. Excluding these 
firms would reduce the Catholic proportion of appointments from 40.2% to 37.5%. 
There was little overall change in the large Protestant firms, especially those with over 
90% Protestant workforces. The largest percentage changes in religious composition 
are generally where few appointments are made. Harland &. Wolff, the fourth most 
Protestant firm, made a large number of appointments, which actually increased the 
Protestant share slightly. Only one firm in this group (Dale Farm Dairies) made a 
substantial number of appointments with a significantly lower Protestant ratio. 
In the next group, there were some more significant changes. Crestacare (whose 
appointments were almost as large as total employment) Compass Services and 
Sec uric or all made over 150 appointments, with a significantly lower Protestant ratio 
among appointees. But there were three companies whose ratio increased, including 
two which made over 200 appointments. Short Brothers, the largest employer, made 
the largest number of appointments, (approximately a tenth of its total workforce). The 
Protestant composition was only 4% less than in the workforce as a whole: such a 
difference would change the overall workforce composition by only 0.4%. Northern 
Bank's appointees showed an increased proportion of Catholics. The other major British 
based bank, the Ulster Bank, whose workforce is less Protestant-dominated, (76.6%) 
appointed 170 people, 81.1 % of whom were Protestant. 
249 
Table 7.14b - Appointees in large Protestant firms 
Empl- Appoint- Prot Prot Diff % 
oyment ments % % 
(em pI) (appoin) 
> 90% Protestant 
Sunblest bakeries 365 27 96.4 88.5 - 7.9 
Henry Bros 353 58 96.3 96.6 0.3 
Howden Sirocco 408 11 95.3 63.3 -32.0 
Harland and Wolf 2691 549 94.3 95.0 0.7 
Ambler 298 95 93.8 93.6 - 0.2 
Dale Farm Dairies 472 244 93.7 86.3 - 7.4 
N.I. 409 153 93.1 92.6 - 0.5 
Ulster Carpet Mills 605 5 92.9 nla 
Berkshire Hosiery 408 262 92.6 93.1 0.5 
Hughes Tools 262 41 92.5 87.2 - 5.3 
Campbell Henry 347 35 91.9 nla 
Bairdwear 589 196 91.2 91.0 - 0.2 
CV Carpets 340 4 90.8 n/a 
3M Industrial Tapes 272 13 90.4 n/a 
Ewart Liddell 323 34 90.1 73.5 -16.6 
>80% Protestant 
Charles Hurst 453 55 87.9 73.3 -14.6 
Short Bros 8647 896 87.6 83.5 - 4.1 
Gallaher 1574 24 86.8 70.8 -16.0 
Supermac 253 86 86.7 85.7 - 1.0 
Lummus Mackie 626 3 86.3 n/a 
Henderson 327 37 85.8 63.9 -21.9 
Co-operative 562 14 85.5 n/a 
Securicor 560 156 85.2 74.0 -11.2 
Crestacare 529 528 86.0 76.0 - 9.0 
Camco 286 17 84.7 64.7 -20.0 
Northern Telecom 1813 67 84.3 71.0 -13.3 
Barbour Campbell 473 28 84.2 n/a 
Rfd 317 106 84.0 81.4 - 2.6 
J Graham 331 37 83.3 80.6 -2.7 
Compass Services 966 167 83.0 74.8 - 8.2 
F.G. Wilson 690 213 82.6 86.9 4.4 
Cantrell & Cochrane 282 137 81.6 87.2 6.4 
Dairy Produce Packer 343 74 81.3 73.6 - 7.7 
Northern Bank 2276 92 81.1 73.9 -7.2 
O'Kane Poultry 666 218 80.2 80.6 0.3 
Source: FEC monitoring returns for 1991 
Multi-national Corporations 
This section is concerned with firms based outside the United Kingdom and Irish 
Republic (see Chapter Four). These are referred to below as multinationals. The lOB 
gives details of the ownership of 56 overseas companies, which were included in the 
1991 monitoring returns. These companies employed 26,169 people, 13.1 % of the 
monitored private sector workforce. The largest group is US owned, both in terms of 
number of plants, and employees. The largest firm, Short Brothers is Canadian-owned. 
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Table 7.15 - Multinational firms by country of origin. 1991 
Country Number Employment 
United States 27 11,419 
Germany 7 803 
Japan 5 2,019 
France 4 1,392 
Denmark 3 183 
Switzerland 2 233 
Canada 1 8,647 
Korea 1 426 
Belgium 1 372 
Luxembourg 1 222 
Netherlands 219 
Portugal 149 
Finland 29 
Sweden 56 
Total 56 26,169 
Source: lOB Fact Sheet on Overseas Investment, November 1991; FEC monitoring returns for 1991 
The lOB lists a further 11 foreign companies investing in Northern Ireland. which are not 
yet included in monitoring returns: 5 from the United States; 2 from France; one each 
from Hong Kong. Canada. Japan and Indonesia. One US firm, the clothing company 
Fruit of the Loom, which is located in Derry. received the largest lOB grant in 1991 
(£12,805,000). 
Multinational investment by Industrial Sector 
The overwhelming majority (87%) of foreign investment goes into manufacturing, with 
98% in SICs 2,3, and 4. It has not become significant in the service sector, although 
it is an expanding area for transnational investment elsewhere (see eg Enderwick 
(1989). Banking and finance is dominated by British institutions, and to a lesser extent 
those from the Irish Republic (see below). The only significant private health care firm, 
Crestacare, is based in the Isle of Mann. This company has grown rapidly in recent 
years, in response to government encouragement of private medicine. 
Although some of this investment in manufacturing is in new high technology plants 
(such as BIS Beecom; Daewoo), the majority remains in traditional areas such as motor 
manufacture and clothing, which have suffered from strong competitive pressures. 
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Table 7.16 - Private Sector Employment by SIC - Total and Multinational 
Total Employment Multinational Employment 
Number % Number % of % of SIC 
MNC empl 
Agriculture 94 0.05 
Energy, water 71 0.04 
Minerals chemicals 8,734 4.4 2,765 10.6 31.7 
Engineering, 29,138 14.6 16,809 64.2 57.7 
vehicles 
Other manufacturing 54,169 27.2 6,071 23.2 11.2 
Construction 11,710 5.9 
Distribution 1,315 10.7 61 0.2 0.3 
Transport 7,589 3.8 106 0.4 1.4 
Banking, Finance 19,254 9.7 288 1.1 1.5 
Other Services 26,898 13.5 69 0.3 0.3 
Total 199,377 100 26,108 100 13.1 
Source: FEC Monitoring Returns; lOB Fact Sheet on Overseas Investment; unpublished data from monitoring 
returns 
Although multinationals' share of the monitored workforce in 1991 was only just over 
13%, and roughly 8.5% of the private workforce, it plays a dominant role in 
manufacturing, employing 57.7% in engineering, and 31.7% in minerals and chemicals. 
The composition of the workforce in these firms is therefore of considerable importance 
in itself. In addition, as some of the biggest companies in Northern Ireland, they are in 
a position to set the pace to some extent among employers, although lack of linkages 
between these and local firms (see Chapter Four) reduces their influence on the 
economy as a whole. 
Religious Composition 
There is no immediately obvious difference in the composition of the workforce 
between multinational and other private sector firms. Multinationals include 11 
companies with less than 10 Catholics, and one with less than 10 Protestants. Of those 
where the proportion of Protestants is known, it ranges from 12.4% to 92.5%. 
The four most Catholic-dominated firms are all Northern Ireland-based, and employ 
under 250 people. None of the three large Catholic-segregated firms is Northern 
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Ireland-based. The largest, United Technologies, is a United States subsidiary, and the 
other two are from the Irish Republic. Only one large company, Adria, employs over 
80% Catholics, and is Northern Ireland based. The others employ under 500, of which 
the largest is the British-owned Sherman; one is German, and the other two are 
Northern Ireland based. 
Table 7.17a - Ownership of large Catholic firms (> 250 employees) 
>80% Catholic 
Firm 
Adria 
Arntz Belting 
Sherman, Ben 
Sca packaging 
City Shirt Co 
Catholic Segregated firms 
Employment 
1047 
260 
437 
264 
391 
Ownership 
NI 
Germany 
British 
NI 
NI 
Glen Electric 320 Irish Republic 
Sean Quinn 271 Irish Republic 
United Technologies 739 U.S.A. 
Source: FEC Monitoring Returns; lOB Fact Sheet on Inward Investment: lOB Business Directory 
The majority of the most Protestant-dominated large firms are not locally-owned. Of 15 
employing more than 90% Protestants, two are US-owned; seven are British; six 
Northern Ireland-based. Of firms employing over 80% Protestant, four are US-owned; 
one Canadian; three British; and thirteen Northern Ireland. The largest employer in this 
group is the locally owned Harland & Wolff, once Northern Ireland's largest private 
employer, and under British state ownership until the late 1980s. But even though the 
period of nationalisation coincided with official fair employment policy, there is no 
discernible impact on its employment composition. 
Companies from North America (USA and Canada) account for 31.6% of employment 
in all firms employing more than 80% Protestants. 
Irish-based firms include, as might be expected, some of the most Catholic-dominated 
firms. Two of the large Catholic-segregated firms, both based in Derry near the border, 
are owned in the Republic. But they also include some highly Protestant dominated 
firms; Magee Clothing in Ballymena, employs 220 (90.3% Protestant); Glen Mouldings 
in Bangor employs 210 (87.8% Protestant). Investment from the Republic is unlikely 
ever to be significant in terms of the overall composition of employment. But what 
these figures show is that Irish firms tend to fit in with the prevailing patterns of 
employment rather than act as a force for change. 
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Table 7 .17b - Ownership of large Protestant firms 
> 90 % Protestant 
Firm Employment Ownership 
Sunblest bakeries 365 British 
Henry Bros 353 NI 
Howden Sirocco 408 British 
Harland and Wolf 2691 NI 
Ambler 298 British 
Dale Farm Dairies 472 British 
N.I.Spinners 409 British 
Ulster Carpet Mills 605 NI 
Berkshire Hosiery 408 British 
Hughes Tools 262 United States 
Campbell Henry 347 NI 
Bairdwear 589 British 
CV Carpets 340 British 
3M Industrial tapes 272 United States 
Ewart Liddell 323 British 
>80% Protestant 
Turkington 245 NI 
Charles Hurst 453 NI 
Short Bros 8647 Canada 
Gallaher 1574 United States 
Supermac 253 NI 
Lummus Mackie 626 United States 
Henderson 327 NI 
Co-op 562 NI 
Securicor 560 British 
Crestacare 529 British 
Cameo 286 United States 
Northern Telecom 1813 United States 
Barbour Campbell 317 NI 
Rfd 317 NI 
J Graham 331 NI 
Compass Services 965 NI 
F.G. Wilson 590 NI 
Cantrell & Cochrane 282 NI 
Dairy Produce Packer 343 NI 
Northern Bank 2275 British 
O'Kane Poultry 555 NI 
Source: FEC Monitoring returns for 1991; IDB Fact Sheet on Investment in Northern Ireland; Business 
Directory 
Appointees 
The sixteen multinational companies employing over 250 made 2,061 appointments in 
1991, representing 10.7% of total appointments, rather less than their share of the 
workforce. Of these 900, (43.7%) were Catholics, slightly above the private sector 
average. All but two firms showed an increase in the Catholic percentage in their 
appointments. Of these two firms, the percentage difference in one case was 
insignificant, and in the other the Protestant proportion increased by 7%, but there were 
only 33 appointees. The largest increase in the Catholic proportion was 37.2% for 
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European Components, whose appointments totalled 12% of its workforce. In other 
firms where the differential was large, the number of appointments was small. Short 
Brothers made the largest number of appointments: the proportion of Catholics 
increased, but by a small amount, and the impact on total employment was under half 
of a percent (see above). The other large number of appointments was in united 
Technologies. Of its 390 appointments, 4 were Protestants. 
North American Companies 
The 21 companies owned in the United States make up over a third of all multinational 
investment. If the Canadian-owned Short Brothers (which has also been subject to 
MacBride pressure) is included, this share increases to over three quarters. The 
MacBride campaign would be expected to have made these firms more responsive to 
changing their employment practices. The evidence so far does not suggest that this 
has yet brought about a major change in the composition of the workforce. US firms 
include some of the most highly Protestant-dominated as well as Catholic-dominated 
companies. North American companies also span the full range of size: the smallest, 
McDonnell Douglas, employs 29 people, while all the largest multinationals are North 
American: Short (8.647); Northern Telecom (1813); Gallaher (1574); and du Pont 
(1558). 
Some of these companies gave information on their workforce for a survey conducted 
in 1988 by the US-based Investor Responsibility Research Center (Booth & Bertsch, 
1989). It is possible to examine changes in the period immediately following the 1989 
Fair Employment Act. 
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Table 7.19 - Selected US Companies. composition of employment 1988-91 
1988 1991 Appoint 91 
Empl % Prot Empl % Prot No % Prot 
BIS Beecom 100 65.0 137 70.0 
du Pont 1,100 33.0 1,558 33.0 102 31.7 
Federal Express 106 47.0 106 56.2 
Ford Motor Co 763 58.0 716 58.2 9 44.4 
Gallaher 1,470 85.1 1,574 86.8 24 70.8 
Hughes Tools 244 92.6 262 92.5 0 
Lee Apparel 526 50.0 437 45.6 76 34.7 
Newtonards 280 91.4 
Derry 246 2.5 
Sherwood Medical 318 78.7 328 77.7 
Sonoco 49 55.0 39 59.0 
United Technologies 375 5.0 739 <1.2 390 1.0 
Source: Booth & Bertsch (1989); FEC Monitoring Returns for 1991 
Gallaher (a subsidiary of American Brands which took the case against MacBride 
shareholders) closed its Belfast plant in 1988. The workforce at the time of closure was 
94.3% Protestant. 
None of these companies show any major shift in employment composition over this 
period. The average trend from 1988 to 1991 was rather to increase the Protestant 
proportion, although appointees in 1991 included a greater proportion of Catholics. The 
misleading nature of the average figure however is demonstrated by the composition 
of the two plants owned by Lee Apparel. The increase in Catholic representation could 
reflect an expansion of the Catholic plant rather than an increased Catholic 
representation at the Protestant-dominated plant. 
Location 
The majority of these companies reflect the prevailing labour force composition in the 
area where they are located, with Catholic employment predominant in Derry and 
Newry in the West. and Protestant employment in the North and East. There are two 
sets of exceptions to this. The first group is firms located in predominantly Protestant 
areas with a disproportionately Catholic workforce. The greatest imbalance is in the 
relatively small firm Interface flooring, but it is also evident for Irlandus Circuits, DDL 
Electronics, and Warner's. The other group is Belfast-based firms in which Catholics are 
under-represented. There are seven North American firms in Belfast: Hughes Tools is 
over 90% Protestant; Shorts and Lummus over 80%; and Stockham Valve (employment 
123) and McDonnell Douglas (29) employ less than 10 Catholics. Only Federal Express 
(56.2%) and Ford (58.2%) have a workforce reflecting the Belfast area as a whole. 
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These figures also reflect the limited contribution of US firms to reducing 
unemployment. Of United States firms which have located in West Belfast, only two 
survive. Employment at Ford is declining, while Fisher Body was taken over by a 
Japanese Company and renamed European Components in 1988. In 1987 the company 
employed 817 in Dundonald, and 172 in West Belfast. The firm would not disclose its 
religious composition for the IRRC survey, describing the information as 'confidential' 
(p105)' but claimed it was the same as the surrounding area. European Components 
now has a composition of 77.6% Protestant, which would imply a heavily Protestant 
workforce at the Dundonald plant. There is a considerably greater proportion of 
Catholics in appointees (59.6%). 
Table 7.20 - Location of North American Companies 
Firm Location Empl- Protestant % 
oyment (workforce) (D.C.A) 
United Technologies Derry 739 <10 25.4 
Perfecseal Derry 69 17.6 25.4 
Interface Flooring Craigavon 149 18.6 55.2 
Synthetic Industries Newry 174 23.6 21.6 
Irlandus Circuits Craigavon 295 30.9 55.2 
Du Pont Derry 1,558 33.0 25.4 
Kent Plastics Enniskillen 159 39.0 41.4 
DOL Electronics Craigavon 77 43.5 55.2 
Lee Apparel Newtonardsl 437 45.6 86.61 
Derry 25.4 
Warner'8 Dromore 515 47.4 68.7 
Federal Express Belfast 106 58.2 54.9 
RU8Ch Lurgan 258 66.9 63.2 
Ford Belfast 716 68.2 54.9 
Sonoco Craigavon 39 69.0 56.2 
Hyster Craigavon 401 65.5 66.2 
BIS Beecom Antrim 137 70.0 63.3 
Invercon Larne 201 72.7 74.6 
Sherwood Medical Ballymoney 328 77.7 67.0 
Marquette Bangor 76 80.0 89.1 
Northern Telecom Newtownabbey I 1,813 84.3 16.51 
Belfa8t 54.9 
Camco Enniskillen 286 84.7 41.4 
Lummus Machines Belfast 626 86.3 54.9 
Gallaher Ballymena 1,674 86.8 79.6 
Short Bros Belfa8t 8,647 87.8 64.9 
3M Indu8trial Tape8 Bangor 272 90.4 89.1 
Hughes Tool8 Belfa8t 262 92.5 94.9 
NcDonnell Douglas Belfa8t 29 < 1 0 Catholic8 54.9 
Stockham Valve Belfa8t 123 < 1 0 Catholic8 54.9 
Source: FEC Monitoring Returns for 1991; lOB Fact Sheet on Inward Inve8tment 
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Ford Motor Company 
The US shareholders' campaign scored a major success when Ford adopted a set of 
employment practices explicitly modelled on the MacBride Principles. 
Ford was the first US company to locate in West Belfast, and is the only one still 
operating there. It is situated in the South West of the city, close to the Catholic 
Andersonstown area at the end of the Falls Road. The workforce is predominantly male, 
and nearly half of its employees come from Belfast. It is therefore one of only two large 
manufacturing firms in Belfast providing employment for Catholic men, the most 
underrepresented group in manufacturing employment (the other is Short Brothers). 
The factory is a typical branch plant. Established in 1964 at the height of the inward 
investment boom, it is one of the smallest of the company's European production sites, 
and its workforce has been declining for over a decade. In 1991, some its operations 
were transferred to the Michigan-based Electrical and Fuel Handling Division, further 
reducing its independence. (Ford, 1991). 
Despite its location, an FEA investigation in the 1980s into engineering employment in 
Belfast found major imbalances in the workforce. Only 9% of skilled workers were 
Catholic, and 40% of apprentices (Graham, 1984, p48; FEA, 1983). It was also found 
guilty of discrimination against Catholic employees in 1983, for allowing Protestants, 
but not Catholics to take time off for St Patrick's Day (Booth & Bertsch, p64a). In spite 
of the investigation, the Agency was not able to ensure that the company monitored 
its workforce (Irish National Caucus, 1990 p6). 
It was the MacBride campaign which forced a change of policy. In the face of a 
shareholders resolution, Ford management agreed in 1987 to carry out a study of the 
workforce, the first time a major US employer had committed itself to a "systematic 
evaluation of its employment practices" in Northern Ireland (Booth 8& Bertsch, p64a). 
The study found that although the general workforce represented the proportions in the 
recruitment area, there was serious underrepresentation in senior management and 
clerical positions with Catholics holding only 7.7% and 9.1 % of posts respectively 
(Booth 8& Bertsch, 1989). The former are typically 'Protestant male' jobs, the latter 
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'Protestant female' jobs. The company considered this "a matter of concern", but 
stressed that these represented only 3% of the plant's employees (ibid). 
Following the study, Ford's adopted fair employment principles which differ in only 
minor ways from MacBride. Affirmative action has included a training programme, 
which was extended to the local area in 1988; Ford provided equipment of $150,000 
for the local "high tech" training centre, and supports the local Community Workshop. 
Ford has established an equal opportunities department in its British headquarters with 
oversight of UK operations, while the Belfast Plant Manger is responsible for equal 
opportunities at plant level (Ford 1991). 
Table 7.21 - Ford (Belfast) Workforce by Grade, 1991, 
Job Category total Catholic Catholic 
employment employment% availability 
Senior management 12 25.0 30 
Middle management 16 31.3 30 
supervision, 102 41.2 35 
professional 
clerical 7 0 40 
semi-skilled 462 43.1 40 
craft, trainees 98 29.6 25 
Total 697 39.2 37 
Source: Ford Fair Employment Report, 1991 
There have been changes in the composition of the workforce. On the basis of Ford's 
figures for 'Catholic availability', Catholics are overrepresented in all grades except 
senior management and clerical, the two grades picked out by the 1987 study. Catholic 
representation in management has increased, as it has in craft grades, but there are still 
no Catholics among the small number of clerical grades, while Catholics are over 
represented in semi-skilled grades, which make up two thirds of the workforce. The 
Catholic proportion increased in all grades except craft and trainees between 1990 and 
1991. This was brought about not by extra recruitment, but by a fall in Protestant 
employment. 
'Catholic availability' is a matter of some dispute, and the company's calculations were 
criticised by Father Sean McManus of the Irish National Caucus (Booth & Bertsch, 
p64a). Ford states that it calculates the Plant Recruitment Area on the assumption that 
all people of working age are available for work, and possess the education and skill 
levels for at least semi-skilled and clerical work, but it does not explain how the 
proportions are obtained for individual job categories. It gives details of the residential 
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areas of its existing workforce, and I assume that the Catholic percentage for different 
grades has been taken as the proportion in the areas in which the current workforce 
lives. This is not necessarily a valid method. The recruitment area for senior 
management for example should encompass the whole of Northern Ireland, and 
therefore Catholic availability should be more like the proportion of Catholics in the 
economically active population, 39.8% Catholic (1991 Census). The craft and trainees 
figure of 25% appears grossly underestimated. 
The response of MacBride campaigners to the Ford initiatives has been generally 
positive. Ford's own Fair Employment Report quotes a report in 1990 by the 
Comptroller of New York state: 
-As in 1988, Ford Motor Company not only set a standard for the production of detailed information 
and careful survey answers, it also continued to be in a class by itself in identifying and 
implementing anti-discrimination programs - (p5J. 
The Fair Employment report makes no reference to gender composition, and equal 
opportunities for women is clearly not given as high a priority within the Belfast plant. 
Analysis of the gender composition is given in a separate Equal Opportunities Report 
(Ford, 1992), concerned with the UK operation as a whole (which the company refers 
to as Ford of Britain). The report contains data on gender and ethnic minority 
composition; no data on the latter is given for the Belfast plant. It does not specify the 
religion of employees, but by combining the two it is possible to identify patterns. 
Table 7.22 - Gender composition of Ford Belfast Plant, March 1992 
Salaried staff 
Hourly paid staff 
Total 
Total (% of workforca) 
140 
666 
706 
19.8 
80.2 
100 
Source: Ford Equal Opportunities Report. pp3-4 
female (%) 
13 
16 
28 
9.3 
2.6 
4.0 
The plant is overwhelmingly male, with women only 4% of employees. This compares 
with a female percentage of 5.4% for the workforce of 'Ford Britain' as a whole, and 
11 .0% for salaried staff. No other information is given specifically for the Belfast plant, 
but the general information shows that women on salaried grades in the company as 
a whole are concentrated at the lower levels. They represent over 80% of employees 
260 
on salary grades 2,3 and 4; by grade 5, the proportion of women has dropped to 
44.1 %, and at 6 to 7.3%; the proportion of women declines further as salary scale 
increases, with none in the top two grades. A similar pattern is evident among hourly 
paid staff, with women making up only 5.8% of technical trainees. 
One can therefore assume that the small number of Catholics in top management are 
all male, while virtually all the manual workers are men. The nine Protestant clerical 
workers are likely to come from the 13 female salaried staff. Clearly the priority of 
increasing Catholic employment has been interpreted as Catholic male employment. 
The continuing decline of the Belfast operation undermines the potential benefits of fair 
employment practices. As the 1991 monitoring report shows, Ford's religious 
composition has not changed much in recent years, and the number of employees taken 
on is very small. Only nine new appointments were recorded by FEC monitoring, and 
the company recruited 17 technical trainees in 1991. 
The company's 1991 Fair Employment report states that there will be a "limited number 
of promotions" from time to time, but the run-down of the workforce means these will 
be restricted. Although its training programme has been accelerated in recent years in 
line with company reorganisation, there has been a cut in its sponsorship programme 
(p10). The recent recession in the car industry has forced Ford to move towards short 
time working in several of its British plants, and poses a threat to the Belfast plant. 
Clearly Ford can not be relied upon to provide increased employment in Belfast in the 
foreseeable future, let alone to open up new opportunities for underrepresented groups. 
Short Brothers (Shorts) 
Short Brothers was privatised in 1989, becoming part of the Canadian Bombardier 
Group. Unlike Ford, Shorts begun as an indigenous Northern Ireland company, and was 
one of the key private sector employers in the dominant engineering industry for most 
of this century. It is not a peripheral plant, but continues to be involved in both the 
design and manufacture of aerospace products (Shorts, 1991). 
It has also been known as one of the most sectarian of employers, both when in private 
hands, and under state ownership. The present Canadian management is attempting to 
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transform that image. The company is located in the docks area in the East of the city, 
"regarded by West Belfast Catholics almost as non-go areas" (FEA, 1983, p10). It was 
not just travelling to the company that was problematic, especially for people without 
cars. There has been a long history of intimidation inside the plant, and a pervasive 
culture of sectarian displays (see eg Rolston &. Tomlinson, p65). 
The weakness of the British government's commitment to fair employment is nowhere 
more graphically illustrated than in its failure to develop effective equal opportunities 
programmes in the two largest and most sectarian of employers when in public 
ownership. Shorts, like Ford, was subject to the FEA investigation into engineering 
employment in the Belfast area. In a progress report, the FEA found that the Catholic 
proportion of skilled men was between 3 and 8%, and only 6% of apprentices came 
from Catholic schools (FEA, 1985, p1). The Catholic proportion in the workforce as a 
whole was also estimated at 3-8% (ibid p13). The company agreed to an Affirmative 
Action programme to increase Catholic representation (ibid, appendix I), and there were 
a series of monitoring exercises conducted by the Agency over the next two years. 
As a result the Catholic promotion of apprentices rose significantly, reaching 24% in 
1984. The Catholic proportion of adult appointees however, while rising initially to 
26.6%, fell back in the latter part of 1984 to only 14%. Catholic applications on the 
other hand had risen to 26.6%. Although the company blamed the low Catholic success 
rate on 
"11 IlIck of IIpproprillte skills, in which the Compllny include work experience, in the Clltholic 
community" (ibid, p71. 
The Agency found that Catholics did better in skilled areas, where lack of skills and 
experience might be expected to count against them, and worst in areas where no 
specific skills were required. The FEA concluded that recruitment procedures were 
seriously flawed, and the criteria for selecting candidates "extremely subjective". 
Although the Affirmative Action programme agreed in 1983 included a commitment to 
advertise all vacancies publicly, this was not done until 1986. Following the third 
monitoring report, the Agency made stated that if disparities continued which could not 
be satisfactorily explained, it 
"would be obliged ... to review the Compeny's right to hold en Eque' Opportunity Certificete" (ibid 
p13). 
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It was pressure from the United States, when the company was competing for a US 
government defence contract, which forced management to take fair employment more 
seriously. When the company was awarded the contract, it announced that it would 
open a new factory in West Belfast. The company has now established new sites at 
Dunmurry and Newtonards as part of its affirmative action programme. 
The new management of Bombardier has shown rather more commitment to fair 
employment at Shorts than the British state. An Equal Opportunities manager was 
appointed in October 1991 at senior management level, who reports regularly to the 
senior management team. He described fair employment as being 'fast tracked' by the 
company due to the political importance of religion in Northern Ireland.5 A former 
employee of the FEA/FEC, he argues that the voluntary nature of the 1976 Act made 
it ineffective and that US pressure was crucial in securing legislative change. 
Equal opportunities in Bombardier is very much tied to the vocabulary of the enterprise 
culture. In the words of the company's extremely glossy brochure 
·we have the backing of a well-motivated, highly skilled workforce whose talents in every field are 
today being nurtured and put to full used by creative training and management. by he introduction 
of state-of-the-art equipment. and by the application of a total quality concept in every facet of our 
operation· (Shorts, 1991, p9J 
The programme is very much a top-down policy. As with Ford (and other companies 
which have moved on equal opportunities ahead of British legislation) external pressure 
has precipitated action. The "attitude is right at the top", and the company is now 
running an 'awareness programme' to spread the message to all its employees. 
The company places great emphasis on training, and employee assessment, based on 
'objective criteria' of performance. The old 'last in, first out' methods of determining 
who should go under redundancy schemes - which inevitably involved an anti-Catholic 
bias - have gone. When the company made 200 people redundant over the past year, 
this was done on the basis of an 'Annual Performance Assessment'. 
An interesting aspect of developments at Shorts is the way in which the equal 
opportunities policy has been tied to restructuring of the production process, which is 
particularly associated with the new factories. A programme of refurbishment in the 
four years up to 1993 cost £200 million. Modernisation has "facilitated a change of 
attitudes and working practices, with less demarcation of jobs". As well as less 
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sectarian displays, there are "very few girlie pictures" in the new plant. Management 
has taken on the display of sectarian symbols, which has "not been a problem" since 
1987. But while the most overt symbols are no longer displayed, 'personalised tool 
boxes,6 continue to demonstrate identification with the dominant culture. 
This is tied to concrete changes which potentially undermine the old structures of 
working practices, and have implications not merely for the sectarian composition, but 
for gender as well. The traditional perception of engineering is male, requiring brute 
strength and getting ones hands dirty, with the "oily rag" as an essential item. The 
machinery which has been replaced was often 40 to 50 years old, and relied on 
traditional 'labour aristocracy' skills. The new production processes place less premium 
on force. The increased use of computer-aided design and assembly takes away much 
of the heavy work, while the new composites which are replacing the heavy metals in 
machine parts are easier to work with. 
Schools liaison is a significant part of the affirmative action programme. The company 
has developed its own education package which is currently being used in six schools. 
It has a schools work experience programme, with 68 students in 1992 from a mixed 
group of schools. This is motivated not merely by fair employment considerations, but 
the practical problem of recruitment and retention, since in the new types of skills these 
changes require, the firm competes with Britain for employees. 
The workforce has always been predominantly male; exclusionary practices have kept 
out women as well as Catholics from the 'labour aristocracy' jobs. About 13% of the 
workforce is now female, concentrated mainly in administration and clerical 
occupations, although there are some in information technology and a small number of 
female apprenticeships. There is one woman director. This represents an increase from 
the early 1980s when there were only about 3% female, and 1987 when it had 
increased to 9%. Changes in technology are likely to open up new jobs for women, 
while skill shortages may also force the company to take measures to recruit and retain 
women. 
Women have more problems in travelling to the plant than men, since they tend to have 
less access to cars, while caring responsibilities shorten the travel to work distance for 
many. The plant is at some distance from housing, and difficult to get to on foot. This 
particularly affects Catholic women, who are reluctant to make the journey through 
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Protestant-dominated areas of East Belfast. Catholics are less well represented in the 
female workforce than the male. 
Religion has been prioritised, and gender equality is not seen as politically urgent. The 
company brochure gives no indication that it has recognised the importance of 
promoting women in its workforce. Employees are pictured in various departments to 
display the new technology: well over a hundred are identifiably male, while only four 
are women. 
The equal opportunities manager is keen to pursue gender equality, and has been 
working with the EOCNI to develop new working practices. He would like to see a 
'menu' of flexible work practices to enable staff to combine work with caring 
responsibilities. He argues that fair employment policies in recruitment and training will 
also benefit women. The company's sex equality policy is however "still at the talking 
stage", although a childcare project is being developed, with a feasibility study in 
preparation and a sexual harassment policy has been drafted. 
In 1988, the company assured the US government that Catholics would be a third of 
the company's recruits by 1990 (Belfast Telegraph, 1/6/88, cited in Rolston & 
Tomlinson, p64). This manifestly has not happened. Although Catholic recruits to the 
workforce approached 17% in 1984, the improvement has not been maintained. The 
1991 monitoring returns showed a workforce still 87.6% Protestant. Between 
privatisation, and April 1992, the company took on 1,000 new employees. Of these 
856 appointments were monitored for 1991, and the Protestant proportion was 83.5%, 
still almost the same figure as in 1984. This hardly makes any difference to the overall 
composition of employment (less than 0.4%), let alone reaching the promised 30% 
Catholic proportion. The affirmative action programme contains no specific goals or 
targets. The impact of the company's new more developed fair employment practices 
had not worked their way through by 1991, and the equal opportunities manager was 
not in place. 
The size of the total workforce means that the company can claim that it is one of the 
largest private employer of Catholics. With 1044 Catholic employees in 1991 , only two 
companies (British Telecom and Desmond and Sons) employed more Catholics. But so 
far the company does not seem to have been able to break the barrier of less than 80% 
Protestant employment. 
265 
The company intends to expand its workforce after a period of cut back lasting a year 
to eighteen months. An upturn is expected, since there remains apparently a "healthy 
demand for short-range missiles". Competitive pressures which have forced 
restructuring of the production process and working practices may have an impact. 
Clearly the firm is in a stronger position than Ford Belfast, which is a peripheral plant 
within the company structure. 
As always in Northern Ireland, religion remains a deeply sensitive issue. The equal 
opportunities manager stated that the catchment area for the plant's workforce is now 
fairly wide, and includes West Belfast. But he argues that "you cannot shout too much 
about success" till people have got used to new ways. In other words, the fear of 
provoking a sectarian backlash remains a constant element. 
Financial Services 
Financial services has been one of the fastest growing sectors in Northern Ireland, 
although the growth is substantially less than in Britain. All the major employers are 
British or Irish-owned institutions, which has restricted the Northern Ireland operations 
to branch plants with limited functions. Finance has traditionally been a Protestant area, 
and FEA investigations of all three major sectors (banking, insurance and building 
societies) 1980s revealed significant imbalances in the workforce (FEC, 1986a; 
1986b;1986c). Ownership here is crucial in determining employment patterns: the 
British banks for example are Protestant dominated, while the Irish banks have an 
overrepresentation of Catholics. But different patterns of employment are related to the 
communities each serve, particularly in personal finance. 
Finance (SICS 81 and 82) employs 11,082 people in monitored firms (7,427 in banks; 
784 in building societies; 2,871 in insurance). The majority of employment, and all the 
substantial firms are British or Irish Republic based. The Trustee Savings Bank of 
Northern Ireland operates autonomously of the British operation. Just over half the 
employment in banking is in two of the major British clearing banks, Ulster Bank (a 
subsidiary of National Westminster); and Northern Bank (Midland). Another 16% is in 
the two major Irish banks, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank. Insurance is less 
concentrated, but only one of the 13 firms employing over 100 people is Northern 
Ireland based. The Prudential employs 22.9% in this sector. 
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Table 7.23 - Religious composition of Employment in Financial Sector. 1991 (% of 
employment in each sector) 
< 1 0 Catholic 
> 80 % Protestant 
> 76% Protestant 
Sub-Total 
< 50% Protestant 
Banks 
3.6 
36.8 
34.9 
75.2 
19.0 
Building 
Societies 
4.1 
61.9 
66.0 
o 
Insurance 
8.7 
32.8 
28.3 
69.8 
9.7 
Source: FEC monitoring returns for 1991; unpublished data from monitoring returns 
Over three quarters of employees in banking are in firms with a substantial 
underrepresentation of Catholics, and 19% in firms where Protestants are 
underrepresented (the Irish-owned banks), The figures are smaller for the other two 
sectors, but substantially over half. 
No information on gender is given in the 1991 monitoring report, but FEC investigations 
in the 1980s give some idea of gender composition. These are now some years old, and 
the proportion of women employed has increased, but they suggest patterns which are 
likely to have persisted. 
Banking 
Banking is highly unionised in Northern Ireland, with average salaries 50% above British 
levels (NIEC, 1992c, p 64). It is therefore a highly desirable occupation for school 
leavers with qualifications. The FEA'S investigation allows a comparison with the 
situation before the 1989 Fair Employment Act. 
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Table 7.24 - Religious composition of employment In 5 major banks, 1986-1991 (%) 
1986 1991 Appointees 1991 
p C P C P C 
Allied Irish 28 72 31.7 68.3 48.7 61.3 
Bank of Ireland 42 58 47.7 52.3 49.0 61.0 
Northern 84 16 81.1 18.9 73.9 26.1 
Ulster 17 23 76.6 23.4 81.1 18.9 
TSB 80 20 79.6 20.4 71.4 28.6 
Source: FEC, 1986a; Monitoring Returns for 1991 
Both Irish-owned banks have increased their Protestant proportion, and this is 
maintained in their appointments during 1991. The Bank of Ireland made 147 
appointments (nearly a quarter of total staff) with a substantially higher Protestant 
representation than in 1986. The British banks reduced their underrepresentation of 
Catholics, though in the case of the Ulster and the TSB this was marginal. The Ulster 
Bank made the largest number of appointments in 1991 (170) and these actually show 
a deterioration. In general it appears as if the Irish-owned banks have been rather more 
successful in moving towards a balanced workforce than the British. Total employment 
has increased over the period, with Protestant employment growing slightly faster than 
Catholic. 
The FEA report showed that of staff in 1986, there was a higher proportion of 
Protestants among those in post before 1970 (T5B was not included in this exercise). 
This applied both to the Catholic and Protestant-dominated banks. But while the 
Catholic proportion increased significantly among those recruited between 1970 and 
1976, there was a reversal after 1976, following the first Fair Employment Act. Of 774 
people appointed to the Northern Bank after 1976,87% were Protestant, while for the 
Bank of Ireland, the Protestant proportion increased to 46%, only 2% less than the 
pre-1970 proportion. Overall the recruitment of Catholics to the banks in the period of 
expansion 1970-76 was 35%, roughly in line with their proportion in the population, 
but this fell back to 31 % after 1976. The FEC concludes that 
-there must h.ve been. f.ilure to .fford equ.lity of opportunity on the grounds of religion especi.lly 
prior to 1970 ... the shift of recruitment plltterns demonstrates that blink mllflll(lements h.ve 
intended in recent yellfS IIIthough with vllrying success to afford equality of opportrJnity-(pp 14-16J. 
One of the most striking results of the report is the different gender composition of 
Protestants and Catholics. Catholic males were most underrepresented overall, with 
very low employment in Protestant-dominated British-based banks. Underrepresentation 
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of Catholics is higher where the male proportion of employment is highest (TSB and 
Northern). 
Table 7.25 - Employment in principal banks by sex and religion. 1986 (%) 
Males Females 
p C Total P C Total 
Allied Irish 32 68 43 25 75 57 
Bank of Ireland 46 54 46 39 61 54 
Northern 88 12 53 79 21 47 
Ulster 84 16 36 72 28 64 
TSB 88 12 46 73 27 54 
Total 78 22 46 66 34 64 
Sourca: FEC, 1986a, p4 
In each case Catholic men are less well represented than Catholic women. The 
proportion of female employment increased during the 1980s as electronic data 
processing. which has been predominantly female. replaced other posts. In March 
1991. 62% of banking employment was female. compared to 55% in 1983 (NIEC 
1992c, p63). This is likely to have increased the underrepresentation of Catholic men. 
Senior Staff 
A more complex picture emerges in relation to senior staff. Clear patterns of both 
gender and religious disadvantage are evident in the figures for managers: Catholic men 
were less likely than Protestants to be managers even in Catholic-dominated banks in 
which they were the majority of employees. The proportion of female managers was 
tiny. particularly among Catholics. The picture for assistant managers is less clear in 
terms of religion. but there is still a huge, though smaller. gender divide. Catholic 
women do slightly better than Protestant women. while Catholic men do proportionately 
better in the Bank of Ireland. and worse in Allied Irish. and the gap is closer in the 
Protestant-dominated banks. 
The expansion of incomes in the 1980s led to an increased demand for financial 
services. in both communities. The pattern of growth tended to maintain religious 
segregation. The FEA investigators 
"gained the impression thlft the religion of staff, pllfticul."V of senior stlfff, had bHfl considered 
relative to the type of business being generllted in particular branch.. lind that tN. affected the 
distribution of Protestllnt lind Roman Catholics in senior positions" (p6J 
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Table 7.26 - Proportion of staff in each group in senior positiona, 1986 
M ..... g.r. 
Protestant Catholic 
male female total male female total 
Allied Irish 25 13 20 0.4 9 
Bank of Ireland 29 14 26 11 
Northern 22 12 14 0.4 6 
Ulster 28 11 10 3 
TSB 16 6 
A.eiet .... t M ..... ger. 
Protestant Catholic 
male female total male female total 
Allied Irish 30 1 16 20 6 11 
Bank of Ireland 22 6 14 31 6 17 
Northern 20 2 12 19 4 10 
Ulster 26 4 12 26 4 9 
TSB 13 16 
Note: Figures for TSB were not broken down by gender 
Sou~e: FEC. 1986a.p6 
Banks in Northern Ireland have traditionally operated a ban, in cooperation with the 
Union, on recruitment of people over the age of 21 to permanent contracts. This has 
been particularly problematic for women who may leave the labour market for family 
reasons, and are unable subsequently to obtain permanent employment. They have been 
given temporary contracts, which deny them promotion. 
The Ulster Bank withdrew the bar in the face of a proposed formal investigation by the 
EOCNI (EOCNI, 1991, p1 0), and has since established an equal opportunities with a full 
time equal opportunities manager.7 The policy is "at the education stage", and she sells 
it within the bank on the basis that it makes "business sense". The equal opportunities 
manager was reluctant to give a gender breakdown of the workforce, but suggested 
that women were progressing through to management posts. 
Unlike other equal opportunities officers I spoke to, she argued that "religion is not an 
issue to the same degree as gender". The bank is "not unhappy with our figures on 
religion", and "people looking for a career in banking apply to all the banks irrespective 
of religion". But different patterns of employment clearly persist. The Ulster Bank itself 
had the highest proportion of Protestants among appointees in 1991, although its 
overall employment (76.6% Protestant) is less unrepresentative than the TSB or the 
Northern. 
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The defensiveness over religion may have been because the officer herself felt more 
comfortable with the gender issue. On the other hand, it could reflect a lack of pressure 
from senior management in Britain, which has not faced the same kind of campaign as 
MacBride.s The equal opportunities post itself was established in response to an EOCNI 
initiative, not from pressure from the FEA, although the Agency had criticised the 
bank's practices. Once again the two issues are being kept determinedly separate. 
Building Societies 
Building societies grew in importance in the 1980s with the increase in house purchase. 
Nine societies were investigated by the FEA (FEC, 1986b); eight British-based and one 
local. All except the leicester and Anglia had an underrepresentation of Catholics in the 
workforce as a whole; there were substantial numbers of all-Protestant branches, but 
only the Anglia and leicester had any all-Catholic branches. The companies explained 
the low employment of Catholics by the concentration of branches in the East, but the 
Belfast headquarters staff showed similar underrepresentation, with the Leicester the 
only exception. Catholic representation was very low among senior staff, with only 9% 
of branch managers Catholic. No regional manager was a Catholic. No information was 
given about the gender breakdown of the workforce. 
As in the other financial sectors, the proportion of Catholics increased during the 
1970s. But the FEA concluded that no society except Anglia and the Leicester afforded 
equality of opportunity. It made a series of recommendations to improve selection 
procedures. 
Table 7.27 - Religious composition of the workforce, 9 building societies, 1984-1991 
1984 1991 
empl Prot '" empl Prot '" 
Progressive 47 96.6 78 81.3 
Leeds 37 91.7 32 < 1 0 Catholics 
Halifax 172 90.3 242 81.6 
Gateway 38 88.9 
Abbey National 166 84.6 211 74.3 
Nationwide 92 83.7 
Woolwich 42 83.3 87 83.6 
Leicester 81 64.3 
Anglia 26 63.8 
Nationwide Anglia 121 68.0 
Note: figures are for Protestant'" of those who declared a religion. For Leeds, 11 staff from Northern Ireland 
not thought by the FEA to be Catholic are included as Protestant in the 1984 figures. 
Source FEC. 1986b; FEC Monitoring Returns for 1991 
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There have been considerable changes since 1984, with two societies closed, and two 
merged. Comparable figures are available for only five. Three show a considerable 
expansion in Catholic proportion, in all of which the workforce has increased 
substantially. One has a marginally increased Protestant proportion, while the fifth, the 
Leeds, employs less than 10 Catholics. The Nationwide Anglia has a Protestant 
proportion of 68.0% which reflects the proportions of the two previous societies. This 
sector therefore shows considerable increase in Catholic staff as employment has 
expanded, but there is still a preponderance of Protestants, with only two of the five 
for which a percentage is available employing more than 20% Catholics. 
Insurance 
The FEA's investigation into eight insurance companies found substantial imbalances 
in employment (FEC, 1986c). The picture is complicated by the fact that insurance 
business tends to divide into two groups: 'industrial life' is concerned mainly with 
individual life insurance, with agents making regular calls on clients to collect premiums; 
'ordinary business' involves larger clients, and business is conducted mainly from the 
company office. 
Residential segregation determines that the religious composition of industrial life staff 
is directly related to the areas covered, and 
-II person known to the compllny, from the IIrell IIlrelldy being worked by lin lI(Jent, WIIS quite likely 
to be recruited ... the tendency would be for Romlln Clltholics to cover certllin IIrellS lind Protesttlnts 
certain IIrellS. This in turn would be self perpetullting - (FEC, 7986c, p6J 
Office staff on the other hand were predominantly Protestant, as were the staff of firms 
engaged primarily in ordinary business. Of the eight firms investigated, five were 
industrial life (three with British headquarters) and three (all British) ordinary business. 
The FEA took the population of Northern Ireland as a whole as the relevant comparison, 
since these firms operate several branches throughout Northern Ireland, with 
headquarters in Belfast. On the basis of a Protestant share of the economically active 
population of 60.2% (1991 Census) Catholics were overrepresented in three companies 
(Britannic, Refuge and United Friendly), and significantly underrepresented in four (the 
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three ordinary business, and Prudential). Pearl came closest to reflecting the Northern 
Ireland population. 
Table 7.28 - Religious Composition of 8 insurance companies. 1986-1991 
1986 1991 
Empl % Prot Empl % Prot 
Ordln.., Busln ••• 
Commercial Union 100 89.0 155 85.1 
General Accident 134 88.8 142 85.7 
Royal 113 86.7 108 79.8 
Industrial Ut. 
Britannic 62 60.0 60 44.9 
Pearl 189 66.7 181 67.2 
Prudential 616 77.7 668 76.8 
Refuge 66 34.9 70 36.7 
United Friendly 138 42.8 130 41.6 
Total 1308 72.0 1404 71.2 
Source: FEC, 1986c, p3: FEC, Monitoring Returns for 1991 
The FEA concluded that Catholics were able to obtain agents' posts easily, but access 
to more specialist activities was restricted, and 
wcompanies pay little attention to the promotion of equillity of opportunity lind, except in the clISe 
of Pellrl Assurance PLC, the StlltiStiCS show that in practice none of the compllnies investigllted, 
positively provides equality of opportunity" (p 1SJ. 
The FEA recommended improvements in recruitment procedures, and there have been 
slight changes in the composition of employment. The proportion of Protestants in 
companies specialising in ordinary business has been reduced, though it still averages 
well over 80%. The Prudential, the largest company, has changed its ratio by less than 
1 %. Although the companies as a whole have increased employment by nearly 100 
(over 7%) the average Protestant ratio for the eight companies has changed by only 
0.8%. Only the Prudential was required to submit information on appointments. It made 
39 during 1991 , of which 71 .8 % were Protestant, a significantly lower proportion than 
in its workforce. 
Little information was given on the gender breakdown of employment. Women 
dominated secretarial and clerical posts (and presumably, thought it is not stated, the 
majority of agents were men). Catholic representation was not obviously tied to sex. 
There has been a shift in the gender composition of insurance, as an 8% decline in 
male-dominated policy presentation and serving work (due to computerisation), has 
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coincided with a 13.1 % increase in female-dominated data processing (NIEC, 1992c, 
p6). This does not appear to have been accompanied by any major shift in religious 
composition. 
Conclusion 
The religious and gender composition of the private sector has changed since Direct 
Rule, with a reduction in some of the more extreme imbalances. But this appears to be 
more a result of developments in the economy as a whole than of legislative changes. 
Catholics remain underrepresented in the workforce as a whole, and there are 
continuing patterns of specialisation by religion and gender. Even using the global 
figures for individual firms, it is apparent that very large proportion of the workforce 
work mainly with people of their own religion and sex. 
It seems clear that there is nothing specific to multinational corporations which tends 
to undermine sectarianism. It was political pressure from shareholders which forced a 
change in strategy. Although the new policies at Shorts coincide with private ownership 
by a Canadian company, it was the political importance of religion, and the previous 
campaign over contract compliance, which made sectarianism an issue for the 
company. 
Multinationals have tended to reflect the prevailing employment practices, with 
predominantly Catholic employment in Catholic areas. But in Belfast, there has been an 
imbalance: Ford, located in Catholic West Belfast has a workforce which reflects the 
population of Belfast as a whole, while US firms located in East Belfast have had almost 
exclusively Protestant workforces. The composition of skilled and management posts 
has also shown underrepresentation of Catholics, regardless of location. 
British firms show similar patterns of employment to those of local firms. Their distance 
from Northern Ireland's sectarian structures has not ensured that British subsidiaries 
operate non-sectarian employment practices. This reflects partly local management of 
these firms. But it is also a result of the lack of pressure from either the state or 
campaigns comparable to MacBride. British control of the major financial companies has 
accompanied Protestant domination of this sector. 
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The first Fair Employment legislation had little effect. The increase in Catholic 
employment, for example in the financial sector, came about before the Act. It was a 
response to a general sectoral shift, and the expansion of Catholic income, largely 
through employment in the state sector, which generated a market for personal financial 
services. The expansion in Catholic employment now appears to have stabilised. The 
tendency for each community to serve its own needs is being replicated in the financial 
sector. 
It is too early to make any very definite judgements on the impact of the later 
legislation, but the study of individual firms suggests that the impact has been uneven, 
and change has been extremely small. Although it has been argued that labour turnover 
is too low to allow significant change in anyone year (Gudgin & Murphy, 1991), the 
record of those companies which have made substantial numbers of appointments has 
not on the whole been encouraging. 
The discussion has had to ignore employment in small companies since no data is 
available through monitoring returns. These are the companies in which the greatest 
segregation is likely. The monitoring returns have demonstrated the persistence of 
sectarian imbalances in larger companies. The eradication of these in small companies 
which are embedded in local communities through family and community networks 
(McLaughlin & Ingram, 1991) is even more fraught with problems. 
Notes to Chapter Seven 
1. Obair (1991) US Investment in the North of Ireland, Briefing Paper 6, page 1 
2. The Monitoring Report lists returns for 1708 individual firms, but mistakenly refers to only 1707. 
3. The FEe claim a very low rate of non-compliance with monitoring 
4. Obair, op cit, p3 
6. The information in the rest of this section, unless otherwise stated, was obtained from an interview with 
Short's equal opportunities manager, April 1992. 
6. 'Personalised tool boxes' is a euphemism for the display of sectarian emblems on equipment, locke,., etc. 
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7. The quotations in the rest of this section come from a conversation with the equal opportunities manager 
of the Ulster Bank. 
8. The 'Equality Group' has initiated a campaign to boycott the Northern Bank, and would like to see it 
extended to Britain, but it has not received much support, and the campaign is unlikely to put serious pressure 
on the bank. 
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Chapter Eight 
Public Sector Employment 
Introduction 
This chapter examines patterns of religious and gender inequality in the public sector. 
Public sector employment has expanded rapidly since the 1970s, and the direct rule 
administration has taken most areas of public expenditure out of local control. The size 
and structure of public employment is therefore subject directly to British government 
policy. The chapter begins with an overview of public sector employment as a whole, 
and then focuses on the health service. The second part examines employment at the 
Royal Victoria Hospital (the Royal). 
A hospital was chosen for more detailed study because, unlike many public services, 
hospitals have a religiously mixed workforce, and serve mixed communities. As major 
employers of men and women from both communities, they offer the opportunity to 
examine patterns of religious and gender subordination. 
The Royal itself is interesting for a number of reasons. Situated in West Belfast, it is the 
major local employer and provider of health care. The area has lost most of its large 
scale private employment, particularly manufacturing, and has the highest 
unemployment in Northern Ireland. Poverty and social deprivation are also high, with 
obvious implications for health. The area is therefore doubly dependent on the hospital, 
and the recent cuts in employment and services have had a major impact on the local 
community. 
The Royal has sprung to prominence on a number of occasions through industrial 
disputes on both national and local issues. The hospital has a history of trade union 
militancy, and resistance to cuts in jobs and conditions of work. Inevitably these 
disputes have had religious and gender dimensions, although this is often implicit rather 
than explicit. The longest running Equal Value case in Northern Ireland involves five of 
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the hospital's cleaning staff. This case has raised issues about the value of traditional 
'women's work' and has had a wider resonance in the local community. 
The hospital is at the centre of conflicting government policies. On the one hand cuts 
in funding and privatisation have led to job losses and service cuts which have had a 
disproportionate effect on the most disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, 
legislation on equal opportunities and fair employment has led to the establishment of 
an equal opportunities unit within the regional Health and Social Services Board, the 
Eastern Board, with the avowed aim of improving the representation of Catholics and 
women within the workforce. 
The first part of this chapter is based on the 1991 Fair Employment monitoring returns, 
and the Eastern Board's own equal opportunities monitoring. As in Chapter Seven, in 
the tables below, where the information comes from the FEC's own analysis of the 
monitoring returns, the source given is 'Summary of Monitoring Returns' with the 
appropriate page number. Where they were constructed from the individual authorities 
monitoring returns, the source is given as 'FEC monitoring returns for 1991'. In general, 
figures for religious composition are given in () brackets where they refer to the 
percentage of the total workforce; and in [] brackets where they refer to percentages 
of the total whose religion was determined (excluding the category 'non determined'). 
The second part is based largely on published and unpublished material supplied by the 
Eastern Health Board, the Royal Hospital management, and health service trade unions. 
It is supplemented by a small number of interviews. 
Public Sector Employment in 1991 
The FEC received monitoring information for 1991 from 97 authorities employing 
153,414 people, of which 35.6% were Catholic.' Individual returns are listed for the 
80 authorities which employed more than 25 people (2 civil service departments; 26 
district councils; 5 education and library boards; 4 health and social services boards; 
and 43 'others'). Together they employed 152,985 people. The report gives an analysis 
by sex and occupation for the former group, but since the religious composition of the 
workforce is the same when the small authorities are excluded, it is safe to assume (as 
with the private sector) that the patterns revealed in the general analysis are replicated 
for those for which individual information is available. 
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Table 8.1 - Religious composition of monitored workforce, 1991 
Protestant Catholic Non- Total 
Determined 
Male 50,703 (64.6) 22,365 (28.5) 5,371 (6.8) 78,439 (51.1 ) 
[69.4) [30.6) 
Female 40,886 (54.6) 28,282 (37.7) 6,807 (7.7) 74,976 (48.9) 
[69.11 [40.9) 
Total 91,689 (59.71 60,647 (33.0) 11,178 (7.3) 163,414 (100) 
[64.41 [36.6) 
Note: figures in 0 brackets are percentages of total. Figures in II brackets are percentages of total whose 
religion was determined. 
Source: FEC Summary of 1991 Monitoring Returns, p 14 
Catholics are underrepresented in the public sector workforce as a whole, but this 
results from male underrepresentation. Catholic women are employed in more or less 
equal proportions to their participation in the labour force. There has been an increase 
in the Catholic proportion since 1990 of 0.2% for males, and 0.5% for females (FEC 
1992, P 13). 
There is a slightly higher proportion of Catholics than in the monitored private sector 
workforce, as a result of the high participation of Catholic women. Women account for 
55.8% of the Catholic workforce in the public sector, but only 44.6% of the Protestant 
workforce. The corresponding figures for the private sector are 45.3% for Catholics and 
41.2% for Protestants. Although Catholic women are overrepresented relative to 
Protestant women in both sectors, the difference is much greater in the public sector. 
The major source of male underrepresentation of Catholics appears to be their virtual 
absence from the security forces. when this group is excluded, the underrepresentation 
of Catholic males falls dramatically. Their share of the public sector workforce increased 
to 37.4% (FEC, 1992, p 20) just over 2% less than their share in the active population 
(1991 Census). The FEC's figures show that over 1 5,000 Protestant males are in 
security related occupations, or just over 30% of the Protestant male public sector 
workforce. By contrast, there were 1,157 Catholic men in these occupations, 5.2% of 
the Catholic male public sector workforce. 
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Occupation 
There are clear specialisations in occupational group by gender and religion, but religious 
differences are greater among men. Women's employment is more concentrated than 
men's. More than half (56.9%) is in two secs, associated professional and technical, 
and clerical; over three quarters in three; and over 88% in four. By contrast, personal 
and protective services employs 27.9% of men, but only one other sec, 'other 
occupations' employs more than 15%. Women are less well represented among high 
status occupations (SeCs 1 and 2), but are much more numerous among SeC3. 
The most numerous male occupation, personal and protective services, shows the 
greatest divergence between Protestant and Catholics; it employs over a third of 
Protestant men, but only just over 15% of Catholics. The difference is due to the 
security services, which accounts for the majority of male employment in this group, 
and 13.6% of total public sector employment, and whose religious composition is 
92.6% Protestant. 
Catholic men are substantially overrepresented in 3, 4 and 9. Their high numbers in 
'associated professional' contrasts with their low representation in this group in the 
private sector. This group includes the 'caring professions' of nursing and education 
which are 'Catholic' as well as 'female' occupations; nursing is a specifically 'Catholic 
male' occupation. A similar difference exists for SOC4 (clerical, which is a distinctly 
'Protestant' occupation in the private sector. SeC9 on the other hand shows similar 
Catholic overrepresentation in both. Catholic male employment in the higher status 
occupations (SeCs 1 and 2) is proportionate to their participation in the public sector 
as a whole. 
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Table 8.2 - Public Sector Employment by Occupation 
Male Female Total 
P C P C male female 
SOC 1: Managers, 70.6 29.6 66.0 36.0 8,239 3,961 
administrators [10.8) [10.2) [6.0) [4.7) 
SOC2: Professional 70.4 29.6 68.4 41.6 6,399 3,683 
occupations [7.7) [7.3) [4.6) [4.6) 
SOC3: Associate 61.7 38.3 63.5 46.5 9,219 19,331 
professional & tech [10.6) [14.8) [22.5) [28.2) 
SOC4: Clerical & 55.0 46.0 61.3 38.7 6,421 23,311 
secretarial [6.6) [12.2) [33.4) [30.5) 
SOC5: Craft, 71.0 29.0 71.2 28.8 7,510 294 
skilled manual [10.0) [9.2) [0.5) [0.3) 
SOC6: Personal, 83.2 16.8 60.1 39.9 21,908 14,066 
Protective 133.71 [16.41 119.01 118.31 
SOC7: Sales 74.1 25.9 73.0 27.0 140 354 
[0.2) (0.2) [0.6) (0.3) 
SOC8: Plant & 63.4 36.6 76.0 24.0 6,194 112 
Machine operatives [7.4) (9.7) [0.2) [0.8) 
SOC9: Other 68.8 41.2 59.6 40.4 12,409 9,873 
(13.21 [20.9) [13.3) (13.01 
Note: The first set of figures are for Protestant or Catholic as a percentage of those for whom a religion was 
determined. Figures in II brackets are for the proportion of each group in that occupation. 
Source: FEC, Summary of 1991 monitoring returns, pp 18-19 
There is less religious difference in the occupational distribution of female employment, 
although Catholic women are relatively underrepresented among managers (SOC 1 ) and 
overrepresented in associate professional (SOC3), both in contrast to the private sector. 
Their underrepresentation in clerical occupations is much less than in the private sector. 
The figures suggest that Catholic women have greater access than Catholic mens to 
public employment, but in high status occupations it is gender rather than religion which 
is the most serious barrier, and here Catholic men do relatively better than Catholic 
women. 
Religious Segregation 
The extent of religious segregation is less than in the private sector, based on the 
figures for total employment in public authorities. But primary and secondary teaching, 
which is almost entirely segregated, is excluded from the FEe figures. This group 
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employs approximately 38,000 people 2 or nearly 25% of the monitored public sector 
workforce. Of the 80 authorities whose individual workforce composition is given, 
seven employ less than ten Catholics, but only one of these, Carrickfergus Borough 
Council, employs more than 100. No authority employs less than ten Protestants, and 
only one has a workforce with less than 30% Protestants (Newry and Mourne District 
Council which is 90.5% Catholic). Six have less than 40% Protestants, and eight less 
than 50%. At the other end of the scale seven are more than 90% Protestant, and 12 
over 80%. 
Over a quarter of the public sector workforce is in sectors with less than 25 % 
Catholics, including over 10% in which Catholics make up less than 1 O°,.E,. Only a tiny 
proportion (0.2%) are in a workforce in which Protestants are less than 10%, but 
13.7% are in authorities where Protestants are in a minority, which means substantial 
underrepresentation in relation to the Northern Ireland workforce as a whole. 
Table 8.3 - Public authorities with an imbalanced workforce 
Proteet.nt-domlnated 
Prot % 
>90% 
80-89.9% 
715-79.9% 
< 10 Catholics 
Total 
Cethollo-domlnatect 
Catholic % 
>90% 
>60% 
>60% 
Total 
no 
7 
12 
e 
7 
32 
no 
1 
e 
8 
16 
Source: FEC Monitoring Returns for 1991 
Location 
employment 
115.871 
11,432 
115.1511 
399 
43,213 
employment 
310 
8,4159 
12.301 
21,070 
The relation between location and religious composition is similar to that in the private 
sector. The civil service and 'other' authorities are based in Belfast, while district 
councils and the health and education boards are located in the areas which they serve. 
Virtually all Catholic-majority authorities are in predominantly Catholic areas, whereas 
the reverse is not true for Protestant-dominated authorities. Of the seven employing less 
than 10 Catholics, only Carrickfergus Borough Council is outside Belfast. The rest are 
much smaller, but nevertheless display substantial underrepresentation in relation to the 
Belfast workforce. The seven authorities with more than 90% Protestant employment 
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include the RUC and the Ministry of Defence which together employ 14,379. The rest 
are all district councils. The 12 with over 80% Protestants include the Northern Ireland 
Police Authority which employs 3,177, 89.3% of which are Protestant; five district 
councils, and six 'others' based in Belfast, including Northern Ireland Electricity, and the 
Milk Marketing Board. 
The most Catholic authority is Newry and Mourne District Council. Of those with less 
than 50% Protestants, only two (Enterprise Ulster, and City Bus) are based outside 
predominantly Catholic areas. 
Senior Staff 
A separate survey of senior public sector staff (excluding 'uniformed organisations') 
revealed that the Catholic proportion is much lower than for public sector employment 
as a whole, which the FEC found a matter of concern. None of this information is 
broken down by sex. 
All sections showed an imbalance, but in the highest band, this ranged from a 
Protestant proportion of 70.0% in the Northern Ireland Housing Executive to 87.3% in 
'Other Specified Authorities'. The Protestant percentage in the Civil Service, at 84.5%, 
was among the highest. 
Table 8.4 - Religious composition of senior public sector staff, 1990 
Protestant Catholic Total 
empl % empl % 
Band 1 (>35,000) 772 79.6 199 20.6 1,198 
Band 2 (26-36,000) 1,658 79.8 420 20.2 2,366 
Band 3 (16-26,000) 3,849 73.3 1,400 26.7 6,646 
source: FEC, 1991 b, pp 7-9 
Appointees 
All authorities employing over 25 people were required to submit information about 
applicants and appointees. 
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Table 8.5 - Religion and sex of applicants and appointees. 1991 (%) 
applicants appointees diff 
p c p c in prop 
male 69.8 40.2 60.6 39.4 0.8 
female 69.2 40.8 69.1 40.9 -0.1 
total 69.6 40.6 69.7 40.3 0.2 
Source: FEC Summary of monitoring returns for 1991, pp 66-67 
The Catholic proportion of female appointees was the same as their share in the public 
sector workforce, but substantially higher for men. Catholic men were rather less likely 
to be appointed than Protestant applicants, (and Catholic women slightly more so). The 
difference in overall success rate was so small as to be statistically insignificant. But, 
as in the private sector, the proportion of Catholics was not evenly distributed among 
authorities, and in some cases appointees increased religious imbalance. The most 
Catholic-dominated authority, Newry and Mourne almost doubled its Protestant ratio, 
while of those with less than 40% Protestants, three reduced their Protestant 
percentage, two increased it and for the other the figures were not given due to the 
confidentiality rule. For those with between 40% and 50% Catholics, three increased 
their Catholic percentage, and three reduced it. A similar picture is revealed at the other 
end of the scale. Of the seven most Protestant-dominated authorities, the Protestant 
proportion of appointees was higher than in the workforce as a whole in two, including 
the Ministry of Defence. In none were they less than 83% Protestant. Of those between 
80% and 90% Protestant, nine reduced their Protestant ratio, and only two increased 
it. But in only two of the former were appointees less than 70% Protestant, and in three 
less than 80%. 
Health Service Employment 
The health boards employ a total of 48,351 people, of whom 79.8% are women. 
Catholics are better represented than they are both in the workforce as a whole, and 
in the public sector workforce. The proportion of Catholics is virtually the same for men 
(44.4%) and women (44.3%), which means Catholic men are relatively better 
represented in this sector. 
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Table 8.6 shows the usual pyramid structure, with women predominating at the 
bottom, and men at the top. Women are concentrated more than men, with 80.0% in 
three occupational groups, and 93.3% in four. Only 58.1 % of men are in three groups, 
and 71.8% in four. But Catholic men are more concentrated than Protestants: 63.2% 
are in three occupations, and 76.3% in four. The tendency of Catholic men to 
predominate in the 'female' occupations is also striking, with Catholics outnumbering 
Protestants in SOC 3 (which includes nursing) and in SOC6 (personal and protective). 
Catholic men are underrepresented in management and professional occupations (SOCs 
1 and 2) and in SOC5 (skilled manual). 
The distribution of women's employment between religious groups is more even, but 
Catholics are underrepresented in management and clerical, and overrepresented in 
associate professional and technical. A distortion exists in professional occupations, in 
which 22.1 % of men and 14.8% of women are 'non determined' compared with 
10.4% and 9.8% for the workforce as a whole. This includes the substantial number 
from outside Northern Ireland, since the market for these occupations is international. 
Table 8.6 - Composition of Health Board Employment by Occupation (%) 
Male Female Total Total 
P C P C male female 
SOC 1 : Managers, 69.6 30.4 67.2 32.8 604 446 
administrators 16.71 13.71 11.41 10.91 
SOC2: Professional 66.3 34.7 68.4 41.6 1,886 1,932 
Occupations [19.81 [13.11 [6.01 [4.41 
SOC3: Associate 46.7 63.3 62.4 47.6 1,886 16,866 
Professional, tech 116.61 123.71 140.21 146.0) 
SOC4: Clerical, 66.0 46.0 64.2 36.8 860 6,712 
secretarial 19.0) 19.2) 117.8) 112.6) 
SOC6: Craft, 70.8 29.2 70.1 29.9 876 163 
skilled manual 112.11 16.3) 10.61 10.3) 
SOC6: Personal, 47.6 62.4 66.9 44.1 1,900 8,322 
Protective 117.2) 123.8) 121.91 121.7) 
SOC7: Sales 87.6 12.6 66.4 34.6 17 27 
10.3) 10.06) 10.08) 10.06) 
SOC8: Plant, machine 61.4 38.6 86.7 14.3 487 8 
Operatives 16.6) 14.4) 10.03) 10.01) 
SOC9: Other 60.2 49.8 63.8 46.2 1,333 6,139 
112.6) 116.7) 113.11 114.2) 
Note: The first set of figures are for Protestant or Catholic as I percentage of those for whom a religion WII 
determined. Figures in II brackets are for the proportion of each group in that occupation. 
Source: FEC, Summary of 1991 monitoring returns, pp 64-6 
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Senior Staff 
The Protestant proportion of senior staff in the Health Boards is lower than in the public 
sector as a whole, particularly in lower grades. The staff structure is skewed in the 
health service: they make up well over half of total public sector staff in the top 
earnings band, but only minor proportions at the lower grades. In this top band, 
underrepresentation of Catholics is close to the public sector average. It is considerably 
less in the lower bands, but the numbers in these bands are very low in the health 
boards. 
Table 8.7 - Religious composition of senior health service staff, 1990 
Health Boards 
empl % of Prot % 
public 
sector 
Band 1 (>35,000) 445 57.6 77.5 
Band 2 (25-36,000) 76 4.6 65.5 
Band 3 (16-26,0001 231 6.0 67.9 
source: FEC, 1992, pp 7-9 
The Eastern Health and Social Security Board 
Public sector 
empl Prot % 
772 79.6 
1,656 79.6 
3,849 73.3 
The Eastern Board includes Belfast and the predominantly Protestant surrounding areas. 
The Board produces its own Equal Opportunities report covering the nine units under 
its management, including the Royal, plus its Belfast headquarters. There is a 
considerable difference in the religious composition of the units, although the gender 
composition is similar. The report provides only limited information, since the data is 
broken down either by gender or 'community background' but not both. It is not 
possible to ascertain for example how many Catholic women are employed. The 
occupational breakdown is given only for the Eastern Board as a whole, and not for 
individual units. 
The percentage of Catholics ranges from 12% [13.5%) in the Ulster North Down and 
Ards Unit to 69% [75%) at the Mater Infirmorium, the maternity hospital which until 
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recently was run by the Catholic Church. The composition of units outside Belfast 
reflect the varying compositions of the population. What is more interesting is the way 
in which the Belfast units reflect the much more locally based territorial divisions 
There is a difference of over 20% in the Catholic proportion of the workforce between 
the Royal and City, two general hospitals less than a mile from each other. The Mater 
for obvious reasons has a high Catholic percentage while the difference in the 
Community units are larger than for the hospitals. The Royal has the highest Catholic 
workforce, and is by far the largest employer of Catholics in Belfast. 
Table S.S - Religious Composition of Belfast Hospitals/units. 1991 
Unit/headquarters Protestant Catholic Not Known/ Total 
Outside NI 
Headquarters 1,113 (58) 548 (28) 257 (10) 1,918 
(671 (331 
Belfast City 1 2,095 (58) 1,113 (31) 303 (11) 3,611 
(65.31 (34.7) 
Royal Group 2,236 (39) 3,042 (52) 636(10) 5,814 
(42.41 157.61 
Mater 176 (23) 528 (69) 62 (8) 766 
(25.0) (75.0) 
S & E Belfast Com 3,155 (66) 1,075 (22) 568 (12) 4,798 
(74.61 25.41 
N & W Belfast Com 1,500 (43) 1,602 (46) 395 (11) 3,497 
(48.41 51.61 
Total 10,275 (50) 7,908 (39) 2,221 (11) 20,404 
156.51 (43.51 
Note: figures in II brackets are for each group as a percentage of total. Figures in II brackets are for 
Protestant or Catholic as percentage of those for whom a religion was determined. 
Source: EHSS Equal Opportunities Report for 1991, p3 
The occupational breakdown used in the Eastern Board's report differs from the SOC 
classification used by the FEC, and reflects the major occupations in hospitals. Table 
8.9 shows some specialisations along religious lines: maintenance is predominantly 
Protestant, as is medical and dental; Catholics are overrepresented in nursing, 
Protestants in professional and technical grades. 
The occupational groupings are not hierarchical as is the SOC classification. The 
inclusion of admin and clerical in one grade blurs the distinction in the SOC between 
management and clerical. Table 8.6 showed that the former was Protestant dominated, 
while Catholics are overrepresented in the latter in the Health Boards. The breakdown 
of staff by management level shows similar proportions of Catholics at senior 
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management level as in the Health Boards as a whole, with Senior Management 22% 
[26%] Catholic. 
Table 8.9 - Employment in Eastern Health and Social Services Board by occupational 
group and religion 
Staff Category Protestant Staff Catholic Staff 
% % in oec % % in oee 
Admin & Clerical 62 13.2 38 12.1 
Maintenance 73 2.0 27 1.1 
Ancillary & General 60 36.0 40 36.0 
Nursing 66 31.7 44 38.4 
Social Services 60 6.1 40 6.2 
Professional & Technical 71 7.9 29 6.0 
Medical and Dental 73 4.4 27 2.6 
Ambulance 61 0.8 39 0.7 
TOTAL 60 100.0 40 100.0 
Source: Eastern Board Equal Opportunities report for 1991, p 3 
The length of service of staff shows a discontinuity around 20 years' service. The group 
employed for between 15 and 19 years is 43% Catholic: the next group, employed for 
20-24 years, is only 35% Catholic. This suggests a marked increase in Catholic 
employment in the early 1970s, which is associated with an increase in health service 
employment generally and an increase in territorial segregation (see below). 
Gender 
The female percentage in the Board's employment is 82%. All units except 
headquarters employ more than 80% women, with 94% in North Down and Ards 
Community. The Royal's proportion is the same as the average. The headquarters, 
where senior managers are based, is only 43% female. Women do not predominate at 
all levels: there are no women in maintenance, and very few in the ambulance service. 
Women are also under-represented in the most high status occupation, medical and 
dental. A more detailed breakdown of the workforce at the Royal shows gender 
specialisations within these broad categories (see below). Women are more 
concentrated than men, with three quarters in two groups, and 87% in three. Only 
43.8% of men are in two groups, and 57.7% in three. Nursing, the most numerous 
occupation for women, is the third for men, after the higher status medical and dental. 
But the most numerous male occupation is the low status ancillary staff. 
288 
Table 8.10 - Employment in Eastern Health and Social Services Board by gender and 
occupational group 
Staff Category Female Staff Male Staff 
% % in occ % % in occ 
Admin & Clerical 86 12.0 16 11.1 
Maintenance 0 0.0 100 8.8 
Ancillary & General 87 36.0 13 28.2 
Nursing 93 39.0 7 13.9 
Social Services 77 6.0 23 6.8 
Professional & Technical 69 6.0 31 11.7 
Medical and Dental 30 2.0 70 16.6 
Ambulance 10 0.1 90 3.9 
TOTAL 82 100.0 18 100.0 
Source: ibid, p8 
There is a general tendency for the most 'Catholic' occupations within the health 
service to be the most female dominated (Table 8.11). Nursing is the most female and 
the most Catholic; ancillary is in second place in both. Maintenance and medical and 
dental are the least Catholic and most male dominated: the former a Protestant 'labour 
aristocracy' occupation; the latter a high status Protestant male white collar occupation. 
Gender composition of occupations varies more than religious composition, but religious 
differences are considerable. 
Table 8.11 - Religious and Gender Composition of Eastern Board Staff by occupational 
group 
Staff Category Female % Catholic % 
Admin & Clerical 85 38 
Maintenance 0 27 
Ancillary & General 87 40 
Nursing 93 44 
Social Services 77 40 
Professional & Technical 69 29 
Medical and Dental 30 27 
TOTAL 83 40 
Note: Catholic percentages is for the total excluding 'not known' and those born outside Northern Ireland 
Source: ibid 
The Royal Victoria Hospital 
The development of the RVH 
The Royal Group of Hospitals comprises four hospitals3 on a single site, in Grosvenor 
Road in the Lower Falls area of West Belfast. Together they make up the largest of the 
Belfast hospital groups, employing nearly 5,000 people. As a general hospital, the Royal 
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serves the local community, but its catchment area takes in the whole of Northern 
Ireland for its 32 regional specialisations, in some of which it has a world wide 
reputation. 
The first hospital on the site was the District Lunatic Asylum. Built in 1829, it was 
known as the Belfast District Hospital for the Insane Poor. The patients were transferred 
at the beginning of this century to Purdysburn, outside Belfast, which remains a hospital 
for the mentally ill. The old asylum building was demolished in the 1920s. By this time 
some of the hospitals had been built which were to come together as the Royal Group 
under the NHS. 
Hospitals in the nineteenth century developed as private nursing homes, or charitable 
institutions. The Belfast Hospital for Sick Children, which became part of the Royal 
Group, was established in 1873 following a meeting of business and professional men. 
In the words of its proposer, the object was 
"To provide medical treatment IJnd medicines for the sick children of the poor; To diffuse among 
the poorer clllSSes IJ knowledge of the proper manll(Jement of young children in helJlth and during 
sickness and to promote the IJdvlJnce of mediclJl science with reference to the disellS88 of infancy 
IJnd childhood" (Cited in McAteer, p 40). 
The area, then as now was largely populated by Catholics, and one of the poorest in 
the city. Formal health care was unobtainable for the majority, who depended on the 
women of the family and the local 'handywoman' (NUPE, 1992 P 45) to nurse the sick. 
Development of the hospitals continued throughout the first half of the century, and the 
number of inpatients doubled between 1903 and 1942 (McAteer, p 37). But until the 
National Health Service, admissions other than emergencies were controlled by a 
Committee of the Board of Management who interviewed each potential patient. Only 
those who paid the Working People Subscription were admitted automatically. In 1938 
a private wing was opened, but beds were restricted to those with an annual income 
less than £600 to make them available to 
"those who could scarcely afford nursing home fees but who did not wish to be the recipient8 of 
charity" (cited in ibid, p 38J 
The Stormont government took little initiative to develop health care. There was no 
Minister for Health: health matters were dealt with by the local government ministry 
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"where ratepayers' considerations were paramount" (NUPE, 1992, P 42). The only 
major change was the conversion of workhouse infirmaries to District Hospitals in 1921 
(ibid). Under Stormont, Northern Ireland continued to have the poorest health within the 
United Kingdom. 
The major expansion of health care came with the development of the National Health 
Service in 1947 under the post-war British labour government (see Chapter Four). The 
NHS was by no means universally welcomed in Northern Ireland. The Unionist MPs at 
Westminster voted against it, and the Catholic Church denounced it. The Irish News, 
which has a mainly Catholic readership, condemned what it called 'Dependence Day': 
"Those opposing the social measures introduced today may be denounced as cranks and faddists .... 
it should again be noted that one hospital in this area, the Mater, have refused to be controlled by 
the state ... Only by such a stand in the face of blandishments and enticements, can the state, 
greedy for power, be kept at bay" (cited in McAteer, p 39). 
To the Church, state funded health care represented a threat to its authority and control 
over the Catholic family. It opposed (as in the South) public provision which it saw as 
undermining the responsibility of the Christian family. But in Northern Ireland they were 
not able to halt the development of the public health service, or maintain their control 
over it as they did in education. 
In the 45 years of the National Health Service, attitudes in Northern Ireland have 
changed. There is now almost universal support for the NHS, and for public expenditure 
in general. Whereas Unionists were at one with the Catholic hierarchy in denouncing 
public provision in the 1940s, they now echo the views of local trade unionists in 
opposing cuts in services. This is not due merely to an ideological shift, but reflects the 
loss of their traditional economic strongholds. As the industrial base has declined, the 
health service has become increasingly important in providing employment. 
Furthermore, the arrangements under which 'parity' of provision was established 
through general UK taxation meant that Stormont could preside over increased spending 
without having to increase taxes. Under Direct Rule, local politicians no longer have any 
direct control over the level of service. 
With the establishment of the NHS, a Northern Ireland Hospitals Authority took control 
of most hospitals. The individual hospitals on the Grosvenor Road site were 
amalgamated to become the Royal Victoria Group. The Board under Stormont was 
Unionist-controlled, and management was firmly in Protestant hands. The Health 
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Service was reorganised after Direct Rule in the 1970s. Four area boards were made 
responsible not only for health but for personal social services, which in Britain is under 
local authority control. Board members included a minority of elected representatives 
"to eliminate the political bias of which previous hospital management committees had 
been accused" (Gaffikin & Morrissey, p187). Technocracy was to replace Unionist 
control. 
Spending on health increased faster than in Britain, to considerably above the British 
average. In 1986-7 for example spending per capita in Northern Ireland was £386.61, 
compared to £233.15 in the North of England, while the number of full time health 
service staff per 1,000 of the population was 40% greater than the next highest region 
(ibid p189). Health improved with increased spending: infant mortality, which was 
127% of the UK average in 1971 at the beginning of Direct Rule, fell to 117.8% by 
1981, and to just above the average at 101.6 in 1990. Similar changes occurred with 
stillbirths and perinatal mortality, in which Northern Ireland moved from having the 
highest rates in the UK in 1971 to below the average in 1990 (Regional Trends, 1992). 
The health service has become one of the largest employers in Northern Ireland, and 
increased employment opportunities for Catholics, particularly women. Its importance 
has redoubled with the decline of manufacturing employment. This is felt in acute form 
in West Belfast, where the old linen mills have long since shut down, and almost no 
sizeable employers exist within the area. Ford, the only large manufacturing plant, 
provides work almost exclusively for men. 
On the Jarman Index4 of Social Deprivation, Belfast is the most socially deprived region 
within the Eastern Health Board (EHSS, 1991 b). Within Belfast, poverty is concentrated 
in North and West Belfast (EHSS, 1988). Poverty brings poor diet and poor health. The 
Board's own figures show that the incidence of gastro enteritis in children under 2 years 
- always associated with poverty - is concentrated in the North and West of the city 
(p14), and the take-up of immunisation programmes is lowest in these areas (p12). 
West Belfast has the highest infant mortality rate in Northern Ireland: it was still 11.9 
per 1,000 in 1988 (Rolston & Tomlinson, p44) compared to a Northern Ireland average 
of 8.6 per thousand in the Eastern Board as a whole (EHSS 1991 b, p 5). 
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The Impact of Thatcherism 
Thatcherism started to affect health provision in the 1980s, and the steady 
improvement relative to Britain, has gone into reverse. Political support for the health 
service is so strong in both Britain and Northern Ireland that the New Right has not been 
able to attack it directly. Whereas hostility to other public services and to public sector 
staff (particularly teachers) has been unrelenting, the governments of Thatcher and 
Major have reiterated their commitment to the NHS. But their policies have gradually 
undermined the principle of universal access to free health care based on need.s 
This has taken three major forms in relation to hospitals, implemented in three 
overlapping phases: firstly restrictions on funding which began in the early 1980s; 
secondly, privatisation and compulsory competitive tendering in the mid-1980s; lastly 
the 'internal market' under the 1989 NHS Act. This established the separation of 
'provider' (hospitals, GPs etc) from 'purchasers' (the Health Authorities) creating the 
system of health care contracts and budgetary control which has led to a rationing of 
hospital services on grounds of cost. It also allowed hospitals to seek Trust Status, in 
other words to Opt Out of Health Authority control and become independently managed 
units. 
The first developments in Northern Ireland were in the Health Strategic Plan for 1983-8 
which budgeted for an increase of only 1 % in real terms, half of which was to be made 
through greater efficiency. The second five year plan was announced in 1987. This 
reversed the relatively favourable position of Northern Ireland, and planned a spending 
increase over the period of 5% compared to 6.4% in Britain (Gaffikin & Morrissey p 
195). The level of inflation exceeded the predictions on which these plans were based, 
with the result that severe cuts in services were threatened. A public campaign led to 
extra money being transferred into the health service (ibid p 196). Spending per head 
has increased slightly relative to the UK since then. By 1990/1 it was 122.4% of the 
UK average, which was little different from the level it had reached in 1982/3 of 
123.3% (Regional Trends). 
The private market has not developed as fast as it has in Britain, but there are now two 
private hospitals. Private nursing homes for the elderly have 'mushroomed' with two 
large employers in the field, Crestacare, an Isle of Man consortium and Sandown, a 
local group, which employs more than 1,000 people. These have resisted recognition 
of either trade unions or the RCN.8 
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Compulsory Competitive tendering has mainly affected manual occupations, such as 
domestic staff. This has led to job losses and erosion of conditions for the lowest paid 
workers. Although most contracts have been awarded 'in house', the exercise has been 
used to reduce the wages bill for manual workers. 
All units in the Eastern Board have applied for Trust Status. As in Britain, there has been 
opposition from trade unions, professional bodies and the local community. But unlike 
Britain, the politicians themselves have been united in opposing the changes. Their 
opposition is in contrast to their power, however. While in Britain the Health Service 
'reforms' have led to a dismantling of local accountability, in Northern Ireland this has 
been exacerbated by the lack of any effective local representative democracy. 
Direct Rule replaced an elected dictatorship with a technocratic dictatorship, with 
minimal local accountability. Increasingly that structure has been geared towards 
managerial aims, based on the criteria of the market place. The Health Minister 
described the role of health boards in combining representative and managerial roles as 
"mission impossible" (Gaffikin &. Morrissey, p 197). The representative role has been 
abandor:led in favour of the managerial. There are now no representatives of locally 
elected councils, or of professional or trade union bodies. The monitoring bodies, the 
District Committees, have been abolished, and no equivalent to Community Health 
Councils exist. The chair of the Eastern Board was himself a casualty of managerialism: 
his appointment was not renewed by the Minister after he objected publicly to cuts in 
funding (ibid, p 196). 
Industrial Relations at the Royal 
The Royal Hospital has often been at the centre of opposition to these changes. Not all 
the struggles are simply about 'trade union issues'. The history of relations between 
Unions, the Eastern Health Board and the hospital management has been marked by 
disputes which have developed at times into major confrontations. 
The unions have a reputation for militancy, and for resistance to government policies. 
In the West Belfast situation, this has sometimes brought them into direct conflict with 
state power in the form of the Army. As the chair of the joint shop steward committee 
put it 
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"The Eastern Health and Social Services Board and the government .... if they are talking to the 
American delegation we are Marxist revolutionaries and if they lire tlllking to other deleglltions they 
have branded us as Provos" (West Belfast Economic Forum, 1990, p16). 
The Eastern Board has a history of poor relations with trade unions in various units 
(LRA, 1986, pp7-8), but these disputes have become much more serious at the Royal. 
The longest period of industrial action came in 1986, when the Board imposed budget 
cuts without consulting the unions. Of the £5 million proposed cuts, £ 1 million were 
to come from the Royal, of which more than half came from ancillary staff1. As the 
official report into the strike put it 
"This put the tllSks being attempted by manllgement firmly into the area of industrial relations most 
likely to produce II robust reliction. " (LRA, p 11 I. 
The strike was precipitated by a cut in drivers' overtime, and dragged on for eight 
weeks. As the NUPE regional organiser put it to me, the strike was about more than 
this: it was about "the right to be heard". The unions viewed the outcome of the strike 
as a success: the workers won reinstatement on their previous conditions. It was 
followed by an official inquiry into the causes of the dispute, the Wood Committee. 8 
The Committee's report expressed some dismay at the complexity of the trade union 
structure at the Royal: 
"Local machinery is not so clear, either at Board or Unit level. Nor indeed are the exact sphere of 
influence of the individual unions .... particular departments have similar workers in different trade 
unions. No doubt there are historical rellSons for this, no doubt the situation works rellSonably well 
with good co-operation and shared representation. It is something, however, which could be 
difficult at times for the employer. "(LRA, 7986, p61. 
A total of 38 trade union or professional associations are represented. The great 
majority of staff are in one of these, and some professional staff and nurses are 
members both of a professional body and a trade union. Eleven trade unions are 
members of the Health Services Committee of the ICTU 
There is considerable friction between unions, and between unions and professional 
bodies. Splits have occurred with members of one union joining others, and the lack of 
clearly defined constituencies for each union inevitably creates rivalry over recruitment. 
The exact number in anyone union/association is in some doubt, and the unions 
themselves are able only to make rough estimates of their membership. The following 
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figures are based on figures given by trade union officers and the hospital's personnel 
department, not all of which coincided. 
The largest trade union is the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) with 
approximately 1300 members which recruits almost entirely among manual staff, and 
has a largely female membership. The second is the Confederation of Health Service 
Employees (COHSE)' with approximately 800 members, divided between nurses (300); 
ancillary (300); Professional and Technical (P & T), and Administrative and Clerical (A 
& C) (200). The Northern Ireland Public Services Alliance (NIPSA) claims 300 members 
at the Royal, mainly among A & C staff. This union, unlike the British equivalent 
NALGO, is the main union for civil servants as well as local government and public 
sector workers. Professional workers are mainly in Manufacturing, Scientific and 
Finance (MSF). The other major trade union is the Amalgamated Transport and General 
Workers (ATGWU), the Irish branch of the British TGWU. Membership of this union has 
fluctuated after a split from NUPE five years ago, but is now relatively small. Most 
qualified nurses are in the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) which is not TUC-affiliated, 
and is not part of the trade unions' joint negotiating machinery at the hospital. There 
is particular rivalry between the RCN and COHSE which recruits mainly unqualified 
nurses. 
The most militant of the unions is NUPE, or as management sees it, the other unions 
are "more reasonable to deal with".9 The union has been prominent in pushing for 
gender and religious equality. This is partly a reflection of its membership, mainly 
low-paid staff and predominantly Catholic women. It also reflects the union's leadership 
at regional level, which is almost entirely female, and has very close relations with its 
members (see also Cockburn, 1991). The leading officers have been prominent in the 
EOCNI and the Regional Officer is one of the signatories of the MacBride principles. 
NIPSA has also played a significant role on these issues, and claims to have driven the 
NICS towards adopting its equal opportunities policy. The union was one of the first to 
adopt a formal policy against sectarianism, in 1977.10 
The Wood Committee made a series of recommendations for improved consultation 
with staff (LRA, pp16-20), which the unions feel were not implemented seriously by 
management. Relations again deteriorated in 1988, when the Board launched a 
'Complementarity Study' as part of its financial planning for 1989-90 with the aim of 
investigating areas of overlap between services at the City, Royal and the Mater 
Hospitals, 
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·to IIddress how resources clln be relellSed from IIcute hospitlll services on II recurring bllSis· 
(EHSS, 1988b, p 1 ) 
The study recommended combining the management structures of the three hospitals 
and bringing the sites geographically closer. It also proposed merging several services, 
including Accident and Emergency. The proposals were withdrawn after a public 
campaign, and alternative studies by the unions and local community groups. But 
resources continued to be reduced. 
The Board's own figures show a fall of £5,117,000 in revenue allocation to Hospital 
Specialist and Related Services between 1988/9 and 1990/91, a drop of 1.65% (EHSS, 
1991 b, p 44). According to its draft application for Trust Status, the Royal Group lost 
over £6 million in revenue allocation in the seven years from 1984/5 to 1990/1 (Royal 
Group, 1991, p6). 
Many of the cuts have been in the ancillary staff budget, which was facilitated through 
the compulsory competitive tendering exercise. In-house tenders reduced hours worked 
by domestics by 4,000, but the number of posts was kept constant as full-time staff 
were replaced with part-time and temporary workers. Management are pleased with the 
results of this exercise which has cleared out "old customs and practices" ," while the 
unions, not unnaturally see it differently: one shop steward described privatisation as 
having "crucified the women".12. 
Essential maintenance and repairs have been neglected, and a backlog has accumulated. 
A report in the late 1980s suggested that a minimum of £20 million was needed to 
achieve "basic standards of health and safety" (NUPE, 1991 p6).13 At the beginning of 
1992, management was ordered by the Eastern Board to save £650,000. This led to 
the closure of over 100 beds, and the cutting of gynaecological operations by 50% and 
children's operations by 75% (Irish News, 2.4.1992). 
This drain of finance is a major reason given by the hospital management for its 
application for Trust Status, which was made in 1990.'4 While the unions share the 
criticisms of the Eastern Board, they do not support Trust Status, and have campaigned 
against it. Health services unions have objected on principle to Trust Status, which 
"introduces the concept of market forces into the arena of health care and endorses the 
profit principle" (NUPE, 1991 p8). A similar view was voiced by the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP) in its response to the application. 
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"One of our major concerns is that the high priority given to the financial viability of Trust units will 
in practice conflict with the aim of providing good quality clinical and personal care. A rapid 
through-put of patients and an increase in day-surgery will become more importsnt than decisions 
based on medical and social considerations (SDLP 1991, p3). 
NUPE's response also criticise the lack of consultation and high quality information; the 
failure to develop a coherent business plan. It is concerned at the lack of commitment 
in the application to all existing services, and the lack of commitment from the Minister 
on funding. 
The Trust application commits management to maintaining terms and conditions at least 
as favourable as those which are nationally negotiated. But they are determined to 
exclude trade unions as they develop new working practices. According to the 
personnel director, "we have not said we would agree to negotiate with trade unions 
on terms and conditions, but only to consult." 15 Flexibility is seen as a major advantage 
of Trust Status by management, but for the trade unions, 
"Reward, flexibility and skill mix sre sll words synonymous with reduced hours, reduced jobs lind 
grester worklosd for less income" (NUPE, p 11 J. 
One aspect which particularly angers the unions is the Shadow Trust team appointed 
to manage the transition to trust status. It consists mainly of businessmen with little 
connection with the area or with the health service. The two 'community 
representatives' are a nun from outside the area, and a former mayor of Belfast, 
Unionist City Councillor John Carson. Business representation includes a manager of the 
United States company BIS Beecom, but there is no trade union representation. 
The Board opposed the Trust application, and final approval has been deferred. The 
hospital has been a 'Shadow Trust' since April 1992 and will become a full Trust in 
April 1993. It is perhaps significant that every unit within the Eastern Board, including 
personal social services which is not covered by Trust Status in Britain, has expressed 
interest in Opting Out. This contrasts with only two units in the Southern Board, and 
none in the Northern or Western by March 1992. 
On the eve of the Shadow Trust taking over, the Eastern Board decided at a secret 
meeting to establish what it called a 'supervisory committee' to monitor the running of 
RVH. It announced that the Royal Group would have to save £3 million over the next 
financial year (Irish News, 2.4.1992). The unions see this "extraordinary coup" as a 
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being undertaken because the present management had not made "sufficient cuts to 
satisfy the Board" (ibid) and feared that the Board planned to strip the hospital of assets 
during the year up to Trust Status. 18 
With the election of the Conservative government for a fourth term, the transition to 
Trust Status is assured. The three-way dispute which has accompanied the 
development of the Trust, and the cuts in resources make it certain that its birth will 
be extremely painful. 
Employment at the Royal 
The Royal is the largest employer in the Eastern Board. In March 1991 it had 5726 staff 
1991,18% of the Board total (EHSS 1991b, p43). The Board's Equal Opportunities 
report gives the slightly higher figure of 5,814 staff for January 1991, of whom 52% 
[58%] were Catholic, and 82% women. I have obtained detailed figures for the gender 
breakdown of the hospital's staff for 1992 by occupational group, but no comparable 
figures are available on religion. It is however possible to make some estimate of the 
proportions in the various categories on the information available. 
Table 8.13 - RVH Staff, 1991-1992 
Grade 1992 1991 change 1991-2 
FTE. No. FTEs FTE. 
" 
Admin & Clerical 766.43 767 689.67 66.76 9.68 
Maintenance 96.00 120 120.00 - 26.0 -20.83 
Ancillary & General 1,076.44 1,473 1,164.67 - 88.23 -7.58 
Nursing 2,067.42 2,661 2,239.13 -171.71 - 7.67 
Student 416.06 666 666.00 -140.94 -26.35 
Trained/other 1,662.36 2,106 1,683.13 -30.77 - 1.83 
Professional & Tech 577.29 612 480.60 96.79 20.14 
Medical and Dent 197.64 197 149.98 47.66 31.78 
Other 2.67 6 3.47 -0.9 -26.94 
TOTAL 4,772.79 6,726 4,847.42 -74.63 - 1.64 
Source: RVH personnel dept, unpublished figures; EHSS, Statistics for 1991,p 43 
Table 8.13 shows changes over the period leading up to the Shadow Trust. The 
categories used in the reports are somewhat different which could account for some 
of the discrepancies in individual grades. There has clearly been an increase in 
administrative staff, and a decrease in maintenance and ancillary. In 1991, over half of 
the Board's medical staff were listed as headquarters staff, so the increase in this group 
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at the Royal could represent a transfer from the Eastern Board. The number of student 
nurses declined by over 25% over the year, while a freeze on vacancies meant that 
nurses who qualified during the year were not able to obtain posts. 
Gender and employment 
The proportion of female staff at the Royal was 77.6% in terms of Full Time Equivalents 
(FTEs) in April 1992, according to the hospital's own personnel department. Women 
were 82% of total staff in 1991 (EHSS 1 991 a). This discrepancy reflects the large 
number of part-time women workers in certain grades. 
Table 8.14 - Female % of Eastern Board & RVH Staff by occupational group 
RVH (FTE) 
Staff Category 1992 
Admin & Clerical 80.67 
Maintenance 0.0 
Ancillary & General 61.98 
Nursing 95.35 
Social Services n/a 
Professional & Technical 64.65 
Medical and Dental 41.51 
TOTAL 77.66 
RVH Staff 
1991 
84 
0 
87 
93 
77 
69 
30 
82 
EHSS Staff 
1991 
83 
Source: FTEs from unpublished figures from RVH management; staff figures from EHSS Equal Opportunities 
Report, 1991 
Table 8.15 gives the gender breakdown for the Royal by occupational group in greater 
detail. The structure is extremely complex and hierarchical, with many different grades 
in each occupational group. For example, there are fifty different categories of ancillary 
and general, which have been combined in the tables below into seven broad groupings. 
This detailed breakdown shows a more segregated workforce than indicated by the 
broad groups in published data, with a more distinct gender hierarchy. For example 
when the administrative grade is divided between management and clerical occupations, 
it is clear that women predominate in clerical occupations, while management is almost 
50% female. One clerical grade, personal secretary, employing 29.5% of clerical staff, 
is 100% female. The proportion of women in the other clerical grades is inversely 
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related to seniority, with no women in the most senior grade, and less than 50% in the 
next. 
Over half (55.13%) of ancillary staff are in grades in which staff are either 90% male 
or 90% female. Professional staff as a whole are over 90% female, while the technical 
staff group, though more evenly balanced, contains five all-male and nine all-female 
grades. Nursing is overwhelmingly female, with the majority of occupational groups, 
including every midwife grade, all-female. Men do not predominate in the top grades 
here: the largest male groups are nursing auxiliaries and student nurses. 
Table 8.15 - RVH Staff by gender and occupational group (FTE) 
Grade Female Male Total Female % 
Admin & ClerlCIII 610.19 146.24 766.43 80.67 
Management 17.00 16.00 32.00 63.13 
Clerical 693.19 131.24 724.43 81.88 
Maintenance 0.00 96.00 95.00 0.00 
Anoll'..., " General 667.16 409.29 1,076.44 61.98 
Catering 110.94 60.57 171.61 64.68 
Domestic 316.62 54.24 369.76 85.33 
Orderly 222.69 26.48 249.17 89.37 
Porter/ 3.00 223.00 226.00 1.33 
Security 
Telephonist 16.00 2.00 17.00 88.24 
Outdoor workers 0.00 36.00 36.00 0.00 
Misc 0.00 7.00 7.00 0.00 
Nurelng 1,971.34 96.08 2,067.42 95.36 
Other 2.67 0.00 2.67 100.00 
Prote.8Ion" " Teah 373.23 204.06 577.29 64.65 
Technical 198.12 143.55 341.67 57.99 
Professional 160.03 16.50 176.53 90.65 
Works Officer 0.00 17.00 17.00 0.00 
Scientist 13.08 22.01 35.09 37.28 
Misc 2.00 5.00 7.00 28.57 
MecllOIII end Dental 82.04 116.60 197.64 41.51 
TOTAL 3,706.52 1,066.27 4,772.79 77.66 
Source: RVH management, unpublished figures 
Flexible working 
The extent of part-time working can be estimated by comparing FTE figures with staff 
numbers (Table 8.16). This shows that maintenance and student nursing are full-time 
occupations. Maintenance is all male, while student nursing, which is female-dominated, 
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is almost by definition full-time. There is considerable part-time working in ancillary, 
nursing, medical, and in the small group of 'other occupations', with rather less in 
clerical and professional and technical. Part-time working prevails where the workforce 
is predominantly female. The large amount of part-time work in medical occupations 
appears an exception, but more probably results from doctors working in a number of 
hospitals. 
Table 8.16 - RVH Staff, 1991 by occupational group 
Grade 1992 1991 
FTE % female (a) nos (b)FTE bas % of a 
Admin & Clerical 766.43 80.67 767 6a9.67 91.11 
Meintenance 96.00 0.00 120 120.00 100.00 
Ancillary 1,076.44 61.98 , ,473 1,164.67 79.07 
Nursing 2,067.42 95.36 2,661 2,239.13 84.16 
Student 416.06 92.29 666 666.00 100.00 
Trained/other 1,662.36 96.12 2,106 1,683.13 79.96 
Professional & Tech 677.29 64.66 612 480.50 93.85 
Medical and Dental 197.64 41.61 197 149.98 76.13 
Other 2.57 100.00 6 3.47 57.83 
TOTAL 4,772.79 77.66 5,726.00 4,847.42 84.66 
Source: 1992 figures, RVH personnel, unpublished figures; 1991 figures, EHSS Statistics for 1991, p 43 
This reflects the way in which flexible working is structured differently for men and 
women, and is tied to the notion of male breadwinner and female dependent. For 
women, flexibility means part-time working and this has been increased with 
compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). For men, flexible hours tend to be achieved 
by overtime, which is not available in female occupations. Male cooks for example, with 
a working week of 39 hours, regularly work 65 hours a week, and porters seven days 
a week.17 
Different forms of flexibility also appear in relation to sickness cover. Female domestics 
cover for each other when one of their colleagues is sick, increasing their own work 
load. Porters on the other hand have one-to-one sickness cover, with a porter on leave 
brought in on overtime rates when someone is sick. There is scope for considerable 
abuse of this system, and it has caused friction between staff and between different 
trade unions.18 
Female dominated occupations were the first to be affected by Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (CCT). Management claims that staff are better off with the enhanced 
flexibility, and that all domestic staff are now on a 10% bonus." For the unions, CCT 
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represented an attack on basic conditions of work whose main purpose was cuts. They 
claim that low paid workers have borne the brunt of the cuts in the staffing budget. 
However, management plans to carry out the exercise in male occupations, such as 
transport, security, portering. 
New forms of flexible working are being developed for nursing. A debate was launched 
in 1991 with a paper on Reprofi/ing by Roger Dyson, a former government adviser. His 
"philosophy of change" aimed to improve benefits to staff and the quantity and quality 
of patient care by attacking the "mind-set" that believed these were mutually exclusive 
(Dyson, 1991, p2). The way forward, he argues is to increase the skillmix to allow less 
skilled workers to work with a smaller number of highly skilled/paid staff, and thus 
reduce total cost. He claims that 
Wa higher quality of planned nursing care for patients which carries with it some increll8e in the 
proportion of nursing time away from direct bedside contact. This can only be mllde possible buy 
changes in staffing ratios which would allow direct bedside contllct to be maintained by other stllffW 
(ibid, p4) 
This approach is combined with personal contracts, to be signed on an annual basis, 
which allows workers the opportunity to opt out of a standard contract 
Wbssed on the concept of a working week or a working month, the origin of which lies in the needs 
of mille manual workers in the 19th Century (ibid p7) 
In the guise of 'personal freedom' and an attack of male-oriented working practices, this 
paper proposes a casualisation of the workforce, and a break with collectively agreed 
working conditions. 
The skill-mix approach has been enthusiastically embraced by management at the Royal. 
Reprofiling has not yet been introduced into Northern Ireland, but the Royal is 
developing proposals, under a 'forward looking' nurse manager. Management intends 
to upgrade nursing auxiliaries to health care assistants, who will be able to take on 
nursing tasks such as taking temperatures, and free nurses' time, although it 
acknowledges that the RCN, which represents qualified nurses, "fights tooth and nail 
to stop it". 20 
The RCN has criticised the principle of the exercise, arguing that the continuous 
presence of skilled staff is necessary to maintain quality of care (see for example 
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Buchan & Ball, 1991). COHSE, which recruits mainly unqualified nurses, recognises 
potential benefits to its members from upgrading unqualified staff. They see RCN's 
position as reflecting the interests of the high grade staff, and limiting the responsibility 
allowed to their own members.21 Both oppose casualisation of working conditions, 
which COHSE condemned as a plan for "two tier staffing in a two tier service" .22 
The Equal Value Case 
Northern Ireland's most protracted Equal Value case concerns five women domestic 
staff at the Royal (see Chapter Five). The case began in 1986 and was precipitated 
when a new grading structure was introduced which collapsed grades 1 to 3 into one. 
Women were able to earn only 10 pence an hour extra after two years. The women 
claim their work is of equal value to two male comparators, a porter and groundsman 
on grade 4. 
I interviewed the main claimant, Rosaleen Davidson, a NUPE shop steward. She is a 
part-time cleaner, working four hours a day in the early evening. She is able to work 
part-time because her husband is in full-time work. The majority of her colleagues have 
husbands who are either in full-time work or are retired or on invalidity pension. She 
says that women have had to leave if their husbands become unemployed because of 
the loss of benefit. No figures are available to confirm this, but it conforms to the points 
made by McWilliams (1991), and information from the EOCNI survey of Working Lives 
(see Chapter Six). 
Rosaleen estimates that well over 90% of domestics are Catholic women, although the 
majority were Protestant up to the 1970s. Protestant women didn't want to work in the 
area when 'the Troubles' started. Most domestics live within walking distance of the 
hospital. They are therefore committed to the hospital both as workers and potential 
users. While this is a traditionally female occupation, some young men have started 
work recently, due to the lack of work locally. 
Domestic work (cleaning) is traditionally seen as one of the lowest level occupations. 
In the same way as women are assumed by employers in the clothing industry to be 
able to sew (see Chapter Two), domestic work is seen as unskilled work which women 
are 'naturally' able to do. There has been no formal training in the hospital, with new 
staff trained by colleagues on the job. 
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Management is defending the equal value case, which was described as a 'shambles'. 
The problem lies, in this view, not in the undervaluation of the women's work, but in 
the overvaluing of the porters. Porters should have been on Grade 3, but were given the 
extra grade as a result of a political decision to avoid trouble. 23 
But for the claimants, the case has been extremely important in allowing the women 
"value themselves and their work". It has raised the importance of domestic work and 
the maintenance of hygiene standards to patient care. As Rosaleen put it elsewhere 
"Many years ago, people didn't understand how essential hygiene was for good health care. Today 
everyone knows its importance, but the authorities aren't prepared to pay for it. Our hospit.1 is 
dirty . .. (NUPE, p 112J 
She was critical of the CCT exercise, not only because cuts were built into the 
specification, but because she felt that the domestic manager who wrote it did not 
understand the nature of the tasks. The exclusion of supervisors from the exercise 
showed "they were held in contempt by management" , and they are now more inclined 
to see their interests in common with the domestics. 
In making the claim, the women have been supported not only by their male 
comparators, but more generally by workers in the hospital and in the community. The 
case has won widespread publicity, and Rosaleen herself has featured in a television 
documentary contrasting working practices in Northern Ireland with Scandinavia (to the 
disadvantage of the former, needless to say). Local people (men and women) are 
"delighted" at the publicity over the case. 
The union is seen very much as a supportive network, both within the hospital and 
through the full-time officers. The education programme the union provides has given 
its members confidence in themselves and allowed them to develop wider involvement 
in the union and the community. Since women have taken on the job of shop steward, 
there is now 100% trade union membership among domestics. 
Another development has been the women's committee's Oral Health and History 
Project, initiated as part of the education programme. It culminated in the publication 
this year of Women's Voices (NUPE, 1992), which was launched both in Belfast and 
in the House of Commons. One of its five main authors was another of the domestics 
involved in the Equal Value case, Mary Ferris, and another was a school meals worker 
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Anna McGonigle, who has since become National President of the Union. The book 
celebrates the work of women, 
"the story of the invisible. It is the story of women who have struggled in the shadows that we may 
come into the light" (NUPE, p 7) 
Whatever the final outcome of the equal value case it has clearly helped to open up new 
perspectives for the women involved, which has allowed them to take pride in the work 
and in themselves as women workers. Rosaleen described in the book how the 
experience had 
"increllSed my respect for my fellow workers. Ward-maids weren't expected to have values or 
opinions. They were just supposed to be work horses. They weren't seen or appreciated .. . after 
seven years the female domestics are still fighting to be recognised lIS having equal value (NUPE 
p112). 
The work on the book has also started to raise issues such as sexuality and 
contraception, which have been taboo for Northern Ireland women. Although it is 
cautious about abortion, on which the group "felt no more comfortable with it than 
most others" they have been forced to confront accepted attitudes, and conclude 
"the realisation that there had been no new evaluation of a law which ruled the lives of women 
more than 100 yeaTS 8(/0 and continues to do so, leaves us disturbed. When the life-threatening 
alternatives presented to our great-grandmothers are still amongst those sought out by women 
today, then condemnation is neither appropriate nor relevant" (NUPE p 111). 
A group of NUPE members, most of them from the hospital ran a seminar on the project 
at a women's history conference which I attended. The discussion ranged over a series 
of personal issues connected with health, which inevitably included sexuality, and 
although many in the group were complete strangers to each other, it was free and 
comfortable, and above all funny. 
There are other cases concerning sex discrimination within the hospital: of a total of 12 
new cases against the Eastern Board during 1990, three were at the Royal (EHSS, 
1991 a, p 33). 
None of these concern sexual harassment. This issue does not appear to be seen as a 
serious problem by management or unions. Two cases were mentioned to me. One 
concerned a security guard who attacked a woman. He denied it and was not 
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disciplined, while the woman was transferred. The evidence that she had brought him 
back a present from her holiday was deemed sufficient to support his claim that she had 
led him on. In another case a domestic in catering 'flashed' at a nurse. Although he was 
disciplined, he was not transferred, while she was told to use another canteen. 
The woman who told me about these cases was angry about the treatment, particularly 
of the first woman. But she said that "most women here wouldn't let it happen", an 
attitude echoed by a male trade unionist, who said that the women "could take care of 
themselves" . 
Equal Opportunities Policies 
The Eastern Board established its equal opportunities unit in 1989 following the fair 
employment legislation. The Royal has no equal opportunities officer, but the training 
unit has run a series of seminars for managers on equal opportunities during 1992 
(Royal Group, 1991 b, p 45). The draft Trust application contained a short section 
committing it to 
"provide equlJl opportunity regardless of religious IJffililJtion, sex, race or disability" and to "build 
on the excellent progress already made in the ar6a of equal opportunities to encourege flexible 
working, job shlJring, career breaks, paternity leIJVB, back to work training progrlJmmes IJnd other 
related activities" (Royal Group, 1991, p61J 
The personnel manager feels they have done "quite a bit for women". But the 
beneficiaries of flexibility have tended to be the higher paid, who can afford career 
breaks. The lower paid women feel that management policies have created flexibility 
at their expense and not in their interests. 
The hospital has a "handful" of people involved in job shares. Personnel does not appear 
enthusiastic about this. I was told that "people worry about their other half 'skiving'", 
a concern not generally found with job-shares. This probably reflects a lack of 
commitment to the scheme, and preference for part-time working. 
The RVH has one of only two workplace nurseries in Belfast, for which all employees 
are eligible. It is open five days a week to cover a standard working day (8.15am 
-5.20pm) and has 50 places. The hospital provides premises, and maintenance free, but 
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does not subsidise fees. I was told that under Trust Status more help might be given, 
but the nursery itself is already budgeting for an expected loss of subsidy. 
Although by British standards the fees are reasonable (£235 per month full time 
inclusive food and equipment), it is out of range of the majority of women workers, 
especially part-timers. It is mainly used by doctors, nurses and technical staff, and a 
few clerical staff. 24 Again it is the relatively advantaged on the staff who benefit. The 
chair of the shop stewards committee claimed the cost means it is "used by hierarchy, 
not working class women". 
Religion and Employment 
Religious composition is more difficult than gender to ascertain, and the subject is 
treated as much more sensitive. The Board's own 'confidential' fair employment figures 
are of limited use since they do not show the religious composition of employment by 
sex or occupation for individual units. The concentration on global figures for religious 
composition in effect disguises as much as it reveals. The board's claim of a balanced 
workforce (EHSS, 1991a, p16) is hard to justify based on the total figures. 
Just over half of employees at the hospital in 1991 were avowedly Catholic, or 58% 
of those for whom a religion was determined (ibid, p3). The distribution of Catholics 
between occupational groups within the Eastern Board as a whole showed that 
Catholics were underrepresented in maintenance, professional and technical and in 
medical. The Board comments that this tends 
"to reflect the trend within society in Northern lrelllnd - II stron(J emphllSis within the Protestllnt 
community in science lind en(Jineerin(J lind II comlsponding emphllSis within the ROmIIfJ Clltholic 
community in the "cllrin(J services" such as nursing IIInd community work" (ibid, p 3) 
This 'emphasis' appears to be taken as a fixed characteristic requiring no further 
investigation. The fact that the highest status caring profession, medicine, is 
predominantly Protestant is not commented on. There is no evidence in the report of 
any recognition of the need, let alone a strategy, to break down occupational 
stereotyping. 
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The proportion of Catholics at the Royal is much higher than the Eastern Board average 
of 35% [39.6]. This reflects Catholic predominance in the local area. Residential 
segregation has increased since the start of the 'Troubles', and people are less willing 
to travel to work across 'hostile territory'. This particularly affects ancillary staff and 
other low-paid workers, who are more likely to be female, to work part-time, and not 
have access to a car. Most are able to walk to work through their own neighbourhood. 
These groups are therefore overwhelmingly Catholic at the Royal. Higher paid staff are 
more likely to travel to work from outside the area, and the majority are Protestant. 
This pattern is confirmed by the Board's analysis of its recruitment catchment area for 
specific grades. It analysed applications for 92 posts across all its hospitals to establish 
the location of applicants (Table 8.17). Both ancillary and maintenance staff are mainly 
locally recruited, while 50% or less of applicants to other grades live locally. 
Table 8.17 - Proportion of job applicants living inside local council area (Eastern Board, 
1991) 
Grade % in local no of no of posts 
council area applicants 
Admin & clerical 50 924 24 
maintenance 78 79 2 
ancillary & general 74 710 22 
Nursing 34 588 18 
Social Services 48 132 7 
Prof & tech 36 297 13 
Medical & dental 10 197 6 
Source: Eastern Board Equal Opportunities Report for 1991, p 19 
Two of the posts examined in detail were at the Royal, a part-time domestic assistant, 
and a student dental assistant. There were 97 applications for the domestic vacancy, 
of which 77% came from West Belfast, 5% from South and North Belfast, and 17% 
from Lisburn to the South West. Only 4% of applicants were Protestant with 84% 
Catholic and 12% 'not known'. None came from East Belfast. It appears that people 
were more willing to travel in from outside the city than from Protestant areas of 
Belfast. The fact that 76 people from West Belfast applied for a temporary part-time 
domestic post demonstrates the desperate shortage of jobs in the area. The dental 
assistant vacancy attracted 25 applicants, 45% Protestant, 45% Catholic and 10% 'not 
known'. Only 20% came from West Belfast, and 20% from other Belfast wards. 
This analysis suggests that overrepresentation of Catholics at the Royal is largely 
accounted for by their numbers in ancillary grades. Domestic and allied staff make up 
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25% of the total at the Royal (EHSS, 1991 b, p43). On the assumption that these are 
90% Catholic, the proportion of Catholics in other occupations falls to 42.5%, not 
much higher than the average for the Board as a whole. The religious composition in 
higher status occupations, where the majority of applicants live outside the local area, 
is likely to reflect more closely the general distribution within the board area. 
The hierarchy of gender is therefore replicated in the religious composition of the 
hospital staff, with the most Catholic occupations those with lowest status. 
Nevertheless, the past twenty years have seen significant improvements in Catholic 
representation in other occupations. While it may be an exaggeration to say that "20 
years ago no Catholic was employed above a domestic"25 there has been an increase 
in Catholics among clerical and professional and technical occupations as the health 
service has expanded, while Catholics have gained increased opportunities in the 
traditional Catholic occupation of nursing. 
There have also been some changes at the top. This has taken place particularly over 
the past three years, since the new fair employment legislation required the Board to 
monitor its workforce. The Eastern Board now has a Catholic General Manager, and the 
senior management at the Royal includes at least one Catholic. 
"Catholics have been 'fast-tracked' by the government for top jobs in order to improve the Board's 
image while working class Catholic women are suffering from government policies ,,28 
The recruitment and promotion procedures adopted by the Board and the Royal in 
response to fair employment guidelines should eliminate direct discrimination. Vacancies 
are widely advertised in media sources read by both communities. Nevertheless there 
were thirteen new complaints of discrimination to the Fair Employment Tribunal (FET) 
on religious or political grounds in 1990, of which four were at the Royal (EHSS 1991 a, 
p 29), and the finding by the FET of unlawful discrimination against the Board in the 
Purdysburn case (see p) "highlighted failings in the operation of the selection 
procedures" (NIPSA, 1991, p132). 
The Board's Equal Opportunities Report comments that the total of appointees reflects 
the overall workforce, and beyond noting that there are compositional variations across 
each unit, makes no mention of the different success rates. But Catholics have a lower 
success rate than Protestants in general, and the difference is much greater at the 
Royal, with the Catholic proportion of appointees over 10% less than their proportion 
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of applicants. It is possible that this reflects the large numbers of Catholic applications 
for individual posts due to the high unemployment in the area. But the figures suggest 
at the very least a trend that requires further investigation. 
Table 8.18 - Applicants and Appointees, 1991 (%) 
Protestant Catholic 
appli- appoi- success appli- appoi success 
cants ntees rate cants ntees rate 
Royal 34.5 45.2 19.0 65.5 64.8 12.1 
EHSS Board 66.0 69.6 12.0 44.0 40.6 10.4 
Source: EHSS Equal Opportunities Report for 1991. p12 
The report devotes considerable attention to the establishment of the relevant 
'community labour availability' and to the sources by which applicants became aware 
of vacancies. But beyond this, the section on 'the way forward' contains very little on 
plans for positive action on fair employment. NIPSA singles out the Eastern Board for 
criticism, describing a 
"'lick of pro-active and coordinated approach to the promotion of equa' opportunities in the 
workplace" (NIPSA, 1991, p 132) 
The perception is widespread that the Royal has been singled out for unfavourable 
treatment, and that part of the problem is its largely Catholic workforce, and the 
nationalist community it serves. As one union officer put it, "if they could put wheels 
on the hospital and take it somewhere else they would" .27 But while religious divisions 
pervades every aspect of working life in the hospital, the subject is also one which 
everyone tries to avoid. 
Trade Unions and sectarianism 
The official trade union movement has found it extremely difficult to confront the issue 
of sectarianism. Unions, particularly those in the public sector, have moved on from the 
position when to raise the question of discrimination was automatically dismissed as 
sectarian (Rolston, 1981). Opposition to sectarianism and support for fair employment 
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became official policy of all public sector unions and the Northern Committee of the 
ICTU during the 1980s. 
But fear of dividing the membership by raising the issue still dominates trade union 
activity, including those at the Royal. One branch secretary told me she "can't raise 
issue of discrimination at branch meetings" because it is "too sensitive". Protestant 
members would "think I was raising it because I'm a Catholic and it would tear the 
branch apart." 28 
The extent of the difference goes much deeper, since religion determines a whole series 
of political and social ideas. The attitudes of the two communities to the state reflects 
a basic division over national identity. The Northern Ireland Attitudes Survey found more 
polarised national identities since the Troubles 
Table 8.19 - Religion and national identity (%) 
British 
Irish 
Ulster 
Northern Irish 
Protestant 
1968 
39 
20 
32 
1989 
68 
3 
10 
16 
Source: Northern Ireland Attitudes Survey, 1990-1, p25 
Catholic 
1968 
20 
76 
5 
1989 
8 
60 
2 
25 
Protestants have shifted towards a greater identification with Britain, with only a tiny 
proportion now identifying as Irish. A majority of Catholics identify as Irish, though the 
proportion is smaller than in 1968. The shift has not been towards British identity, but 
towards Northern Irish, with those identifying themselves as British falling to only 8%.29 
This division is reflected in the attitudes of staff at the hospital as in every workplace 
in Northern Ireland. Whole areas of discussion which are part of normal trade union 
branch life elsewhere can be ruled out. 
"Protestants reject anti-govemment statements, becllUse they think I'm getting at 'their' 
go vemment", 30 
Most trade unionists still prefer to ignore religious divisions within their membership, 
and there is a general desire to act as if 'all that' was left outside. A constant theme 
reiterated here, as elsewhere, is that "we don't inquire into somebody's religion. We 
treat everybody the same". But this precludes any confrontation of the issue, or of 
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wider political debate. COHSE has four male regional officers, who according to one of 
them, "happen to be Catholics" but "we don't discuss politics" .31 When I asked about 
sectarianism, this official emphasised this even-handedness by giving the example of 
a case he had taken up of discrimination against a Protestant. 
The issue is also one which the RCN would prefer to leave alone. There are "few case 
of religious problems" and the organisation "tries to remove religious bias in 
employment and care of patients" .32 
The NUPE members I spoke to seemed more comfortable with discussing sectarianism 
openly. Rosaleen, describing the situation among her own colleagues, said that you 
"can speak without denying your background". The union has raised the issue publicly. 
-Discrimination has been 'invisible-, and the union has 'named' the issue. We have had a lot of 
opposition from the TUC. _33 
All the people I spoke to claimed there was no overt sectarianism among staff within 
the Royal. The hospital was portrayed as an island of non-sectarianism in which trade 
unionists could unite around trade union issues, and staff can get on with the job. The 
attempt to divorce trade union issues from the political situation has not been easy. 
Three members of staff have been murdered within the hospital itself in 
political/sectarian attacks. The unions organised a stoppage in protest, uniting both 
Protestant and Catholic workers. The organiser told me that the murders were carried 
out by "people from outside". 34 
The Troubles 
The 'Troubles' inevitably impinge on working life in the hospital. Armed soldiers patrol 
the streets outside, while fortified police stations and army barracks tower over the tiny 
houses surrounding the hospital. The hospital regularly receives casualties from the 
violence both from the local area and the whole of Northern Ireland, since it has 
specialised units to deal with these injuries. The hospital is often full of friends and 
relatives of the injured. Soldiers have at times been stationed inside the hospital, both 
to guard patients and for surveillance. 
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The contradictions of attempting to separate trade union issues from political issues 
developed during the 1986 strike. According to NUPE's general secretary, Rodney 
Bic kerstaffe, 
-the strikers, joined by 100 women workers, were confronted by a convoy of 17 police and military 
landrovers complete with personnel carrying machine guns. In another terrifying scene, the 
divisional Mobile Support Unit was drafted in -. 36 
The use of troops was also condemned by Peter Archer, Labour's Northern Ireland 
spokesperson in the House of Commons 
-There can be no justification for the use of the army and police to deal with such a civil 
dispute ... This goes beyond anything done in even the most bitter of the recent disputes in Britain-
36 
The workers at the Royal were treated in Bickerstaffe's words "as enemies of the 
state". But he was careful to stress the separation of the economic battle from political: 
-Such provocation and intimidation ... must be condemned by all who share civilised values, 
regardless of their views of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Ancillary workers at the Royal Victoria 
do not want to be dragged into a political battlefield. -37 
It is significant that it was at the Royal, where the striking workforce was 
predominantly Catholic, that a successful protest was made against the use of the 
Army. For Protestant workers, the use of 'their' army raises contradictions between 
their position as Unionists and trade unionists. The unions have also been able to 
persuade management to stop the use of the hospital's canteen by soldiers. Dangerous 
political arguments were avoided by stressing the danger that the soldiers' presence 
represented to patients and staff, since they offered a potential target.38 
A much earlier protest at the Royal was an unofficial strike in 1980 by NUPE members 
in protest at the army's use of the hospital roof for surveillance of the area. The officials 
who dominated NUPE's regional office at that time denounced the workers as motivated 
by 'sectarianism'. They did not use the same charge against the two NUPE branches 
who demanded the expulsion of the shop stewards who led the action (Rolston, 1981, 
pS9). 
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Towards equality" 
The Royal presents a contradictory picture in relation to gender and religious 
subordination. On the one hand women and Catholics are gaining a foothold in senior 
management and in occupations from which they have traditionally been excluded, 
while the proportion of Catholics in the workforce as a whole is increasing. On the other 
hand the hierarchies of gender and religion remain, and have in some ways become 
more entrenched as the position of the least well paid has deteriorated. 
Management can claim some success for their equal opportunities policies, while the 
unions claim that their workers' conditions have suffered. The difference reflects 
different notions of equality of opportunity which are the product of different 
philosophies. 
The Board's statements stress the importance of equal opportunities within the 
"turbulent competitive world of the 1990s" and the need for a workforce which is 
"competent, committed and flexible" within the new framework of the internal market 
(EHSS, 1991 a, p42). For unions, particularly those representing low paid workers, these 
policies of restructuring are harming the worst off, and destroying collectively agreed 
conditions on which their members depend. The main losers are women and Catholics. 
The relative importance of gender or religious disadvantage varies according to grade. 
The technical side has only recently started to recruit Catholics, and a women 
technician told me she felt more discriminated against as a Catholic than as a woman. 
She is herself fighting a two year battle over regrading. The domestics on the lower 
grades are fighting their equal value case on the grounds of sex inequality, but the two 
hierarchies are clearly seen by their union as connected, not as separate. 
The lowest paid jobs in British hospitals tend to be done by women from ethnic 
minorities, often those with insecure legal status which allows them to be doubly 
exploited. Northern Ireland does not have this pool of labour to drawn on, and Catholic 
women "do the 'skivvying' work" in the hospital.39 While a minority of Catholics and 
women have been able to do well at the top, flexibility has been used against the low 
paid. 
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Notes to Chapter Eight 
1 . Unless otherwise stated, the religious percentages are of those for whom a religion was determined. 
2. The approximate figure is derived from the figure of 55,317 for employment in education given in the 
Census of Production for 1989. From this are deducted the figures for employment in education and library 
boards (which excludes teachers in schools) and the two universities given in the Fair Employment monitoring 
report for 1991. 
3. The Royal Victoria (General) Hospital; Royal Belfast Hospital for Sick Children; Royal Maternity; the Dental 
Hospital. 
4. "The Jarman Index used eight variables to calculate levels of social deprivation - numbers of elderly living 
alone, children under five, unskilled workers, unemployed, single parents, overcrowding, moving house in the 
last year and ethnic minorities" (EHSS, 1991 b, p 10). 
5. The previous Labour government had already started on this road by introducing prescription charges. 
6. Interviews with RCN and COHSE regional officials (30.3.92. and 27.3.92). 
7. NUPE press release, 24th March 1988. 
8. The members of the Committee were Professor John Wood; David Kenny; and Barbara Switzer of TASS 
(AUEW). 
9. Interview with RVH personnel director, 2.4.92. 
10. Interview with NIPSA regional official, 23.3.92. 
11. Interview with RVH personnel director. 
12. Interview with Chair of Shop Stewards Committee, RVH, 18.3.92. 
13. Estimates of the current repairs backlog given by trade union officers varied from £33 million to £63 
million. 
14. This view was put to me by the RVH personnel director. 
16. Interview with RVH personnel director 
18. Interview with NUPE regional official, 1.4.92. 
17. Interview with COHSE branch official, RVH, 30.3.92. 
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18. Some trade union officials claimed that this issue had been behind a split in which members of NUPE left 
the union to join the ATGWU. 
19. Interview with RVH personnel director. 
20. Interview with RVH personnel director. 
21. COHSE research officer. 13.5.92. 
22. COHSE press statement on Skill Mix. March. 1991 
23. Interview with RVH personnel director. 
24. Information supplied by nursery deputy manager. 
26. Interview with NUPE regional official. 
26. Interview with NUPE regional official. 
27. Interview with COHSE branch officer. 
28. Interview with COHSE branch officer. 
29. National identity in Northern Ireland is more complicated than suggested by these figures. When a8ked 
to chose only one category. there may be a tendency to make a political statement. which doe8 not reflect 
the complexity of national identity. and the way it changes in different contexts. For example people may 
identify themselves as British in II political sense. but in their day-to == day lives see themselves as Northern 
Irish. and even (for example in relation to some sports) as Irish. 
30. Interview with COHSE branch officer. 
31. Interview with COHSE regional official. 
32. Interview with RCN regional official. 
33. Interview with NUPE regional officer. 
34. Interview with NUPE branch officer. 
36. NUPE press release. 6th June. 1986. 
36. House of Commons pre8S relea8e. 6th June. 1986. 
37. NUPE pre88 relea8e, 6th June, 1986. 
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38. Interview with COHSE branch officer. 
39. Interview with NUPE regional officer, 24.2.92. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions 
This study has shown that there has been no simple relation between processes of 
modernisation and sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland. These divisions have outlived 
both the traditional economic base on which Unionist hegemony was built, and the 
Stormont regime, and continue to dominate political, economic and social life. The 
political importance of the sectarian divide has overshadowed interest in gender 
inequality. But, as this work makes clear, gender has been a crucial element in the 
construction of sectarian divisions, while sectarianism has helped to sustain patriarchal 
structures. The labour market is structured by religion and by sex, and sectarianism has 
compounded gender disadvantage for Catholic women. 
The proposition that modernisation - in the form of 'neutral' British state policy, and 
multinational capital - would overcome sectarian divisions suggests that capitalism and 
sectarianism are two mutually antagonist forces. This represents an ahistorical and 
abstract view of capital, which is echoed in the modernisation thesis in both its Marxist 
and conservative variants. 
Capital accumulation takes place in concrete conditions, and must confront an existing 
set of social relations in which divisions based on gender and ethnicity intersect with 
those of class. Maintenance of the conditions for accumulation requires accommodation 
with existing structures of domination as well as confrontation with them. The 
relationship between capitalism and non-class divisions is therefore one of both 
contradiction and functionality. Modernisation will tend both to undermine and 
reconstitute existing inequalities. 
In Northern Ireland class formation developed a sectarian character. This also had a 
specific gender dimension: Protestants were identified with maleness and Catholic with 
femaleness, both in the mythology of the two communities, and concretely in labour 
market specialisations. 
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Unionist hegemony was based on Protestant privilege in the workforce, which was 
entrenched under Stormont through Protestant control of the state. Penetration of 
multinational capital has not in itself brought about changes in employment practices. 
Multinational companies depend, as do all capitalist firm operating in Northern Ireland, 
on the cooperation of a workforce in which sectarian practices have been established. 
These companies are also dependent on the state both to provide the general conditions 
for profitable production, and to subsidise production. Multinationals did not initiate 
change in employment practices. Nevertheless, when pressures for action against 
discrimination developed, they were in a position to make changes more easily than 
domestic capital. 
The expectation that British policy under direct rule would be able to overcome 
sectarianism suggests that British rule could operate independently of the dominant 
(Unionist) classes in Northern Ireland. To tackle the structures of sectarianism would 
be to undermine this class, and the basis of their own support in Ireland. 
Official anti-discrimination policy has been slow and reluctant. The recent strengthening 
of Fair Employment legislation was brought about through pressure from the United 
States rather than a commitment to equality. At the same time, other government social 
and economic policies are exacerbating inequalities which in the Northern Ireland 
context inevitably reinforce divisions based on religion and gender. 
Sectarianism and Employment 
The past twenty years have seen substantial changes in the structure of the labour 
market. Increased state expenditure has brought expanded employment opportunities 
for Catholics, while the growth in private services has brought increasing numbers of 
women into the labour market. But the evidence discussed above suggests that 
inequalities based on gender and religion persist. 
The unemployment differential between Protestants and Catholics has shown 
remarkable consistency, and is the most obvious indicator of disadvantage. While the 
range of occupations open to Catholics and to women has increased, occupational and 
industrial specialisation by religion and gender remains. The highest status occupations 
continue to be disproportionately the preserve of Protestant men, both manual (the 
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traditional 'labour aristocracy' in public and private sector) and non-manual (for example 
management, medicine). The identification of 'Catholic' occupations with 'women's' 
occupations is a reflection of the low status of both groups. 
The FEC monitoring returns for individual private companies showed a high degree of 
workplace segregation. Almost 45% of the monitored workforce was in companies 
employing less than 20%, or fewer than 10 people, from the other religious group. 
These global figures disguise the true level of segregation: the example of Lee Apparel 
shows how an apparently balanced workforce may be made up of separate, religiously 
segregated, plants. 
Catholics are better represented in the public sector. This reflects higher employment 
of Catholic women: Catholic men are substantially underrepresented, but the majority 
of this underrepresentation is due to Protestant domination of the security forces. The 
FEC monitoring returns are more aggregated than for the private sector and do not 
reveal the high level of segregation which exists in individual workplaces. The study of 
the Eastern Health Board and the RVH suggested that individual occupations and units 
remain highly specialised on religious and gender lines. 
Multinationals 
The patterns of employment in multinational companies have not been discernibly 
different from domestic firms. This suggests that they have tended to follow prevailing 
practices rather than to challenge them. The location of new industrial developments 
in predominantly Protestant areas has ensured that the workforce would be 
disproportionately Protestant. But many companies located in Belfast have also 
employed few Catholics, even in occupations where access to skills and experience 
were not important. Ford, a pioneer of MacBride-inspired employment practices in the 
late 1980s, was found guilty of discrimination in the early part of the decade. 
British capital, which might also be assumed to be free of involvement with sectarian 
structures, displayed the same type of employment practices as domestic capital. 
While multinational firms capital cannot be treated as the embodiment of 'pure' capital, 
indifferent to sectarian divisions, they nevertheless operate under different constraints 
and pressures from indigenous capital. It was pressure from their own shareholders, 
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rather than Fair Employment legislation, which forced US companies to change their 
practices. 
These companies are in a better position to respond to this pressure than indigenous 
firms. They have access to greater resources (both capital and human) to develop new 
practices. United States companies in particular have experience of implementing 
effective equal opportunities policies on both race and gender. 
It could be argued that the peripherality of many of the Northern Ireland plants, and 
their relatively short stay there, would make it not worth their while to attempt to 
change employment practices. But when these firms were under pressure from 
elsewhere to change, their relative autonomy from local structures becomes an 
advantage. 
The Canadian company Bombardier has ploughed huge investment into its Northern 
Ireland operation, Short Brothers. Equal opportunities has been tied to changes in the 
labour process and the declining importance of traditional 'labour aristocracy' 
occupations. These changes have been forced quite explicitly by the desire to win US 
defence contracts, which were made conditional on changing employment composition. 
But the continuing overwhelming Protestant domination of the workforce at Short 
Brothers illustrates the structural obstacles to change. The company has so far failed 
to meet its advertised targets for Catholic recruitment. 
Prospects 
The Chair of the FEC recently described the Commission's 'nightmare scenario' as one 
where the religious imbalance in employment was made up of small discrepancies in a 
large number of firms; and that imbalance was concentrated in small firms. The first 
appears to be borne out; but underrepresentation of Catholics is lower, the smaller the 
company, and this makes rectifying the imbalance less problematic (CCRU, 1991, p49). 
This optimism may be misplaced. Firstly, the figures on which he based the statement 
deal only with firms employing more than 25 people. Smaller companies are generally 
more tied into their local communities, depending on informal methods of recruitment, 
and more resistant to change. Secondly, overall figures can disguise grossly unbalanced 
workforces in individual firms. The segregation which the monitoring revealed in larger 
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companies is likely to be much greater in small companies. It should also be noted that 
while Catholics as a whole are underrepresented in large companies, this is due to a 
shortfall in Catholic males. There is a higher proportion of Catholic women in these 
firms than in smaller ones. 
The language of equal opportunities has started to permeate the larger companies, 
particularly multinationals, as compulsory religious monitoring has forced them to 
examine the composition of their workforce. 1 But the decline in inward investment 
makes it unwise to pin hopes of transformation on this source.2 The intensity of the 
religious divide makes it extremely unlikely that small companies would be able or 
willing to develop balanced workforces. An increase in the Catholic workforce is more 
likely through an expansion of Catholic owned firms, than from desegregating existing 
small companies. 
The gloomy outlook for the economy and rising unemployment reduces the prospect of 
creating new companies, or new jobs, and therefore eliminating the unemployment 
differential. With low rates of labour turnover, even if fair employment practices are 
rigorously adhered to change is likely to be extremely slow (Gudgin 8& Murphy, 1991). 
The public sector should offer greater prospects for change. Recruitment to the civil 
service is now 40% Catholic, although the proportion at the top remain low. There has 
been controversy over employment practices in local councils. A recent FEC report on 
Lisburn borough council showed a clear failure to afford fair employment (FEC, 1992). 
The extension of the welfare state brought increased employment for Catholics, but the 
'social apartheid' in social reproduction has served to entrench as well as undermine 
sectarian divisions. The security forces remain an area of Protestant privilege. 
The study of the Royal Victoria Hospital showed the contradictory impact of 
government policy. The hospital saw an extension of employment for women and 
Catholics over the past 20 years, both in numbers and the range of occupations. But 
the workforce remains heavily structured by gender and religion. The 'fast-tracking' of 
fair employment in recent years has seen Catholics move into senior management. 
Equal opportunities policies have tended to favour those in higher status occupations, 
while those in low status occupations - disproportionately female and Catholic - have 
suffered most from the new 'flexibility'. 
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Cuts in government social spending and deregulation exacerbate differences. While 
equal opportunities policies have helped some at the top, they are tending to increase 
divisions at the bottom. The government's own senior officials recently leaked a report 
which argued that the Targeting Social Needs programme was seriously underfunded, 
while existing legislation could not be expected to change patterns of religious 
disadvantage within the next ten years. 3 
The workplace and traditional trade union activity provide only limited possibilities for 
tackling sectarianism. Segregation means there is no meeting place where workers can 
come together to discuss issues of common interest. The study of the RVH pointed to 
the limits which sectarianism places on trade union debate and activity. The fear of 
breaking a fragile unity does not merely place discussion of the politics of sectarianism 
out of bounds; it also makes problematic discussion of 'normal' trade union issues, such 
as cuts in government expenditure. 
Gender and Sectarianism 
The separation of concern with religion and gender in official data and academic inquiry 
has limited the available information on the interrelation between religion and gender. 
But the evidence presented above suggests the importance of these connections. 
Catholic and Protestant women experience different relations to the labour market. Until 
the 1950s, the low wages and high unemployment of Catholic men meant that Catholic 
women were more likely than Protestant women to be in the labour force. Their 
privileged access to employment allowed Protestant men to earn a 'family wage' and 
kept Protestant women out of the formal labour force. But this situation has now been 
reversed. The extension of female employment has been greater among Protestants, 
particularly in part-time work. 
One of the most striking figures emerging from official data was that less than half of 
Catholic men between the ages of 44 and 65 are in full-time work, and thus able to be 
'bread-winners'. But this is not compensated by their wives' earnings. The benefit 
system assumes married women's dependence on the male wage, and restricts wives 
of unemployed men from entering the labour market. For Catholic women, sexual 
inequality is compounded by religious disadvantage. 
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Working women in Northern Ireland face more difficult conditions than in Britain, with 
the worst child-care in the EC. Flexible working practices to enable caring 
responsibilities to be combined with paid work are less widespread. The 'political 
vacuum,4 created by direct rule deprives women of a focus for campaigning around 
workplace issues. 
There has been little study of sectarian relations in the workplace. Those studies which 
have examined in detail workplace relations have concentrated on gender. The 
sensitivity of the religious question means that it is either ignored, or mentioned 
obliquely, as 'different cultural traditions'. But religious segregation at work divides 
women from each other, and does not provide the basis for unity on issues of common 
concern. 
Women are also divided by the different traditions of the two communities. The ties of 
Protestantism to the ascendancy has meant that Protestant women have no tradition 
of struggle against oppression with which they can identify. Women in the South were 
able to link the struggle for the vote with the nationalist and socialist movements at the 
beginning of the century. Protestants were unable to make this connection, and were 
much less active in the suffrage movement. Gordon argues that a Protestant woman 
who fights for her own interests is still seen a rocking the boat. Women in the 
Protestant traditional are 'invisible': 
"Historically and currendy the bonding rituals of the IIScendancy, like the Orange Order or the 
MlISons have totally rejected and excluded women" (Gordon, 1990, p7). 
In Catholic mythology women are not invisible, but their image is bounded by the 
virgin/motherhood dichotomy. While Catholic women can identify with a history of 
struggle against oppression, it is also one in which the rights of women have rarely 
been prominent, and were often counterposed to the rights of the community. In the 
independence struggle, women were ultimately forced to sacrifice their interests to the 
national struggle (see Chapter Three). This helped to ensure that the regimes created 
at partition were built on extremely conservative attitudes to women. 
The civil rights movement of the 1960s challenged the Unionist state, and ultimately 
led to the overthrow of Stormont, but it was within a framework which left the basis 
of the two communities intact. Women played a largely subordinate role. The increased 
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polarisation of the two communities with the 'Troubles' made common struggles for 
women's rights more difficult. 
There have been some small signs recently of renewed activity by women, with the 
growth of community based women's projects, such as the Shankill Women's Centre, 
and the Falls Women's Centre. The equal value case of the women domestic workers 
at the RVH has also unleashed a new creativity and self-confidence among the women 
involved and their colleagues. 
The women's movement has made a tentative start in discussing 'difference'. A 
conference in Belfast on 'Women in Ireland in the 1990s held workshops on both 
Women, Protestantism and Unionism and Women, Republicanism and Catholicism, 
which at least raised openly that "most taboo of subjects. ,,5 These signs of movement 
from avoidance towards "recognising the need to name those issues which divide US"6 
is hopeful. But whether women will be able to move on towards challenging the 
reactionary elements in these traditions together remains uncertain. 
The State and Sectarianism 
Since direct rule, the policy of successive British governments in relation to sectarianism 
has shifted as it has come up against contradictory pressures. It would be too simplistic 
to argue either that it has been straightforwardly reformist, or that it has 
single-mindedly aimed at shoring up sectarian divisions. The primary concern has been 
the maintenance of stability. This has meant that it has had to rely on the structures on 
which Unionist power was built, while at the same time avowedly aiming to dismantle 
sectarianism. 
The 1976 Fair Employment Act was weak and ineffective. The Fair Employment Agency 
was hampered by lack of support - and sometimes obstruction - from the government 
whose policies it was supposed to carry out. 
The 1989 Act was brought in following political pressure from the United States, and 
has been described as the minimum necessary to appease this pressure. The 
involvement of the FEC Chair in the campaign against MacBride reduced its credibility 
as a body independent of the government. 
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Equal opportunities legislation assumes a social consensus which does not exist in 
Northern Ireland. While the state professes neutrality, the security exemption from the 
Fair Employment Act emphasises the continuing identification of Catholics with 
disloyalty. 
The extension of the welfare state widened the circle of Catholics who benefit directly 
from state spending. But the demands of the civil right movement for citizenship rights 
for Catholics could not be accommodated within the Stormont regime. The reforms 
carried out under direct rule have created a new Catholic middle class who have a more 
direct stake in the state apparatus itself. The civil service is no longer the exclusive 
preserve of the Protestant ascendancy. But the translation of this increased inclusion 
in employment into inclusive political structures remains unresolved. 
While equal opportunities policies assume a neutral state, the repressive apparatus 
remains in the hands of one (Protestant) community. Furthermore, this apparatus is 
defending the boundaries of the Northern Ireland state. This boundary was established 
explicitly to create a Protestant state, and the character of that state has inevitably 
been defined by the territorial division. 
The overthrow of the Stormont regime has not overcome the sectarian divide. The 
border remains the essential glue which sustains sectarian divisions. Attempts to build 
a working class unity which ignores the roots of these divisions have proven futile. 
Notes to Chapter Nine 
1. This was brought home to me during a discussion with the personnel manager of a large company. After 
a detailed outline of equal opportunities policies in his company, in which he expressed optimism about the 
changes of attitude he saw in relation to the employment of Catholics in employment, he told me that he had 
only ever worked with one Protestant with whom he could feel comfortable. 
2. This is true, despite the recent announcement of £96 million new investment by an Indonesian 
manufacturer, which is hoped to create 900 new jobs over the new three years (Financial Times, 28th 
January, 1993). 
3. /re/llnd Agenda, Number 8, January, 1993 (Labour Committee on Ireland, London). 
4. Joanna McMinn, speaking at Conference on Women in Irelllnd in the 1990s organised by WEA Women's 
Studies Branch, 14th October, 1990. (Conference Report, 1991). 
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5. Report of Conference Women in Ireland in the f990s organised by WEA Women Studies Branch, 14th 
October, 1990 
6. ibid. 
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